Tactical Decision Game Scenario #4
Attack on Narrow Pass – Canuck Style¹

The image is a map belonging to a tactical decision game scenario. It shows the current situation, including Western Narrow Pass, Sanctuary Ridge, Sanctuary City 8 km, Narrow Pass. The map also includes a scale indicating a distance of 0 meters, 250 meters, 500 metres and1000 meters.

This scenario is an excellent example of the need for the Canadian Army practice of insisting that commanders understand the plans of their commanders two levels up. As the platoon commander tasked to guard the battalion (Bn)’s flank, we need to act in a manner that advances the Bn’s position (posn).

What do we know about the enemy thus far? There is some enemy element engaging the Bn in the vicinity of the bridge. It is reasonable to assume that they are sited to maximize the obstacle effect of the rocky gulley and the canalizing terrain of the bridge to either delay the Bn’s advance or block it outright. This posn is supported by additional posns on the ridge possessing (at a minimum) machine guns. The fact that the machine guns are firing overhead suggests this is a deliberate posn. Our platoon has made contact with a small enemy element which has fled northwest. This small element could be a security element for the main posn where the Bn is currently engaged. The enemy’s preparation and the canalizing nature of the gulley, the bridge and Narrow Pass suggests that this will be a challenging posn to overcome.

What about Western Narrow Pass? Our platoon managed to cross the gulley, gaining contact with only a small element that did not seek to stand and fight. It did flee in the direction of the Western Narrow Pass. The lack of a determined engagement forward of the gulley suggests that this avenue of approach could be held in reduced strength compared to the main pass, but the direction in which the enemy patrol fled tells us that we should assume that there is at least a small element in its vicinity. Perhaps the enemy has had to treat the Western Pass as an economy of force mission and is only screening it. This is an area of uncertainty.

Another area of uncertainty is Sanctuary Ridge between the passes. We have not seen any indications of enemy activity in this area; however, it is dominating terrain that would be advantageous to hold even if only for the observation it offers. Having said that, the enemy cannot be strong everywhere. They may have had to accept gaps in their posn to be strong elsewhere or thought the terrain was a major obstacle in itself. What we do know about the ridge is that it is impassable for our vehicles, but where our vehicles cannot go our infantry can.

Lastly, we have not seen any signs of the enemy’s armour. Their armour represents a critical threat to the Bn. The east–west road directly to our north represents a potential avenue of approach. Concealing their tanks on the north side of the ridge seems like a plausible option that we need to consider, and, based on the current situation, tanks may make use of Western Narrow Pass.

By making a few reasonable deductions based on what we know, we can estimate a plausible enemy course of action. The enemy is defending the Narrow Pass to either delay or block the Bn’s advance. To achieve their goal, they are using a posn near the bridge with posns in depth on the ridge. They are conducting a security mission (screen or guard) to the west of the Bn to protect the main posn and secure their use of the Western Narrow Pass. Their reserve is their armoured force, which could be postured north of the pass but could be elsewhere, and is ready to counter-attack into the Bn’s left flank once it is fixed by the main defensive posn. Another likely task for their reserve would be to conduct a blocking mission against the Bn at the northern exit of Narrow Pass in the event that we are successful in clearing enemy resistance in the vicinity of the pass. Having gained a better understanding of what the enemy may be doing and the relationship of the terrain to their objectives, what does this mean for our platoon, our task to guard the Bn’s flank, and the necessity for us to support the Bn’s mission? Let’s examine a few options.

The first option is to just do as you’ve been told: guard the flank along the east–west road. That is your task, after all, and it is reasonable of your commanding officer (CO) to expect you to execute your task and protect the Bn’s flank while it is in the midst of a contact that is attracting the attention of its leadership. From our current location we could probably lend some support to the Bn by calling in supporting arms, or if we can get our light armoured vehicles into a posn of fire.

Second, we could attack the enemy at Narrow Bridge, with whom the Bn is currently in contact, hitting them in the left flank. This would demand that we abandon our flank guard mission, or assume risk to the mission by splitting your force between the two tasks. In addition, it is night, the Bn is focused on its current fight, it has an element flanking the enemy posn attacking east to west risking friendly fire, and we would be attacking into the machine gun fire that is currently engaging the Bn. Coordinating this attack would be impossible. This course of action would also commit the platoon to the Bn’s fight, whereas we currently have freedom of action, which is helpful to the Bn. Some might argue that this is a bold move, but it is more likely to be foolhardy and unhelpful.

The third option would be to attack along the spine of Sanctuary Ridge, striking the enemy holding Narrow Pass in their left flank or their rear. That enemy is likely fixated on their engagement with the Bn, and this offers a way to reduce the pressure on the Bn while enabling their objective of advancing through the pass. Similar to the second option, this course of action assumes risk to the flank guard mission. We also need to consider the risk–reward ratio of eliminating the frontal threat to the Bn while reducing our capacity to guard against a potential armour threat to the Bn’s flank.

A fourth option would be to commit the platoon to Western Narrow Pass and the crest. This option takes advantage of an opportunity by seizing the key terrain that provides posns of observation on either side of Sanctuary Ridge and gives us the chance to cut off the enemy’s ability to counter-attack (C atk) through Western Narrow Pass. It also establishes the platoon in an improved posn to either conduct an attack along Sanctuary Ridge or secure the attack posn and line of departure for another organization to conduct the attack if either were deemed to be desirable. It is a bold option but, like any such option, it entails risk. We are uncertain as to the situation along the crest and in the vicinity of Western Narrow Pass. It is plausible that the enemy will seek to retain the pass and has sufficient enemy in location to deny the platoon its use. It is also plausible that the crest could hold enemy elements as well. A series of observation posts seems entirely possible. The movement to the crest and the pass, and then an engagement in either location, could compromise the platoon’s ability to conduct its guard task. We are also uncertain as to the location of the enemy’s reserve. It makes a lot of sense that it would be north of Sanctuary Ridge, but it is possible that it could be somewhere south of the Ridge and west of us. In such a case, committing our forces to the pass and the ridge could compromise our ability to guard the Bn’s flank. Lastly, in the event that the enemy’s armoured force was successfully committed against the Bn and the platoon was located on the ridge, we would risk being cut off from the Bn. This is a significant risk to force for the platoon and would likely limit the Bn’s freedom of action to choose to break contact and withdraw from such an engagement.

The fifth and last option would be to continue to protect the flank while developing other options on behalf of the Bn without committing the platoon to the crest and pass. The risk of an armoured C atk means that guarding the flank cannot simply be abandoned. At the same time, the Bn is fixed in front of Narrow Pass. Their ability to force the pass may be compromised, and it behooves us to support the Bn in opening up other options. The Bn may need to start considering other options to cross Sanctuary Ridge, and the crest of the ridge offers posns of observation to the north side of the ridge as well as a potential avenue of approach to attack Narrow Pass as discussed in the third option, if that were determined to be necessary. In this option, we would take the bulk of our platoon and establish a hasty blocking posn that would achieve the guard task, while a patrol conducts a reconnaissance of the Western Narrow Pass and crest in the vicinity of the pass. This option gathers information on behalf of the platoon and the Bn. It would help us determine the enemy’s strength, disposition and composition in the vicinity of the pass and the crest and perhaps confirm the location of the enemy’s reserve. This information would help the Bn Commander (Comd) in making decisions on their next step while still guarding the Bn’s flank and avoiding the risk of charging headlong up Sanctuary Ridge. However, it carries the risk that the enemy could act before us and in such force that we would lose the option to seize Western Narrow Pass and the crest.

In this scenario, it is fair to ask what the Bn should be doing. In contrast to some other tactical decision games, we do have communications with our headquarters, so we should be reporting to the Bn, which will help the Bn Comd and staff to formulate additional options other than smashing frontally into Narrow Pass. The Bn Comd could seek to attack through Narrow Pass by conducting a series of hasty attacks. Failing that, the CO could transition to a deliberate attack. Hasty attacks into a strong enemy posn entail the risk of having the Bn ground away incrementally into combat ineffectiveness. If the CO chooses to transition to a deliberate attack, then significant time will be spent, and if the decision is still to try to force the pass frontally, the outcome could still be to render the Bn combat-ineffective. If the CO’s assessment reveals that the Bn lacks the combat power to force the pass, then they could engage the Brigade (Bde) Comd to seek additional forces. This option would also take significant time, and there is no guarantee that the Bde Comd would agree to the release of such forces.

As our platoon has met minimal resistance up to this point, the Bn should be strongly considering the viability of the Western Narrow Pass as a bypass route. They should also be actively conducting reconnaissance, even while in contact to find the enemy’s tank unit. Attacking the enemy’s weakness and mitigating their strengths is self-evidently good. Western Narrow Pass represents a potential enemy vulnerability; on the other hand, their armour unit is a strength that we need to find in order to better disrupt their ability to damage us. There is also a temporal component to this situation. We made contact with an enemy element which withdrew, meaning they are aware of the platoon’s presence and could reasonably deduce that we may seek to take action to gain control of the pass. The situation presents us with an opportunity to pre-empt the enemy’s own action involving the pass, placing us in a posn of advantage and keeping our options open.

Ultimately, we know that we want to gain access to Sanctuary Plain and that to support the CO’s decision making we need to provide them with information and options. Options facilitate taking and maintaining the initiative to gain advantage. The first, second and third options do not achieve this, while the fourth and fifth options do. The fourth option is optimized for a situation where the enemy reserve is north of Sanctuary Ridge, and the crest and Western Narrow pass are lightly held. Alternatively, the fifth option mitigates the risk of getting the reserve’s location wrong, the risk to force of the uncertain situation of the enemy on the crest and around Western Narrow Pass, and the risk of being cut off. It does, however, entail the risk that the enemy could occupy Western Narrow Pass or parts of the crest in force and prevent its use by us or the Bn. How one chooses between these two options will be a function of how we interpret which risk is more dangerous to the Bn and its mission. There are no easy answers in such cases. Either way, we must choose, and someone will think we are wrong. We need to be able to defend the option we choose, then violently execute it!