Short Bursts:
Restructuring the Reserve to Ensure the Canadian Army’s Operational Success

By Lieutenant-Colonel Sébastien Campagna, CD, M. A.

Introduction

Recent events have demonstrated how quickly modern conflicts can intensify. Following the Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003, we thought that we had seen the last of conventional wars. However, they have made a remarkable comeback. The current threats hanging over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, as well as other threats in the Pacific region and to Canada’s territorial sovereignty, suggest that we will have little time to react if Canada is drawn into a war. In addition, given the intensification of Canadian operations around the world and notably in Eastern Europe, Regular Force units are faced with a shortage of troops. Standing up new Regular Force units would take a great deal of time and resources, but there is a solution.

Canada’s most recent defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF), states that Reserve units must play a role in territorial defence, and not only in domestic operations, at all levels: “Maintain Reserve Forces that provide depth at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”^{Footnote 1}  In addition, as mentioned in A New Vision for the Reserve Force, “In line with existing reconstitution and modernization efforts, any planning for a future integrated CAF must not solely be limited to the twinning of Reserve Force units, or Reservists, into Regular Force units or formations as a persistent means of addressing shortfalls or replenishments.”^{Footnote 2}  The role of the Reserve units cannot be limited to augmenting Regular Force units. However, this empowerment and enhancement of the role of the Reserve within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) involves numerous challenges.

Problems Currently Confronting the Canadian Army Reserve Units

My proposal seeks to address three major problems currently affecting the Canadian Army (CA) Reserve: succession, ineffective hierarchical structures and the lack of operational capabilities. A particular challenge for the CA Reserve is succession planning. Some Reserve lieutenants-colonels (LCol) have taken on three, or even four different commands. If the Reserve cannot ensure a succession plan, it reveals the gap which exists in the generation of officers. As for chief warrant officers (CWO), there are some who undertake multiple appointments, but the most surprising thing is the fact that some of them, after their tenure, receive a commission as an officer, rise up to the rank of LCol, and assume command of a Reserve unit. This situation shows how fast the pace of promotions can be in the Reserve. The need to generate LCols and CWOs obliges units to push their members to the next promotion quickly and, in many cases, give them the minimum of time at each rank, which is often an acting rank. This way of doing things is analogous to digging up a plant to make it grow faster. In 2nd Division, corporals (Cpl) are promoted immediately after the Primary Leadership Qualification, while master corporals (MCpl) are promoted to the rank of sergeant (Sgt) almost automatically after two years. This means we could have Sgts with as little as four years of part-time experience in the CA. Clearly, the reason behind this policy is the need for more instructors. However, the lack of experience at each rank exacerbates the already considerable imbalance between the Reserve and its Regular Force colleagues. A number of unit commanding officers and regimental sergeant majors (RSM) have no experience commanding a company or squadron of a territorial battalion group (TBG) at full strength, which means that they do not have substantial command experience. In addition, it is not necessary to have commanded a TBG squadron or company in order to become a commanding officer, which inhibits even more the acquisition of that important experience.

In addition, the Reserve units have a very heavy hierarchical structure, with a battalion/regiment structure to supervise a single sub-unit, which itself has only one sub-sub-unit. It is top-heavy, like an inverted pyramid, with more people at the top than there are carrying bayonets (Figure 1). Doctrinally, a unit should include more than one sub-unit, otherwise it is only a sub-unit in disguise.^{Footnote 3}

The span of control of a brigade headquarters is also much too broad. For example, some brigades, such as 34 Canadian Brigade Group (34 CBG), must supervise 13 units, which is a difficult task that entails more responsibilities for the units. In this specific case, the pyramid is almost flat (Figure 2).

Lastly, because of the lack of commanding officers in the Reserve units, the CA leaders decided to create “tactical groupings” or to amalgamate units. That situation created an additional supervision problem, especially in geographically dispersed regions, by increasing the workload of the unit commanding officers, who were already overtasked.

Figure 1: General structure of Reserve units (infantry)

Figure 2: Existing structure of Reserve brigades

Solution

The Reserve light infantry battalion (Bataillon d’infanterie légère de reserve, or BIL-R) was an impressive success, and it can be used as a model for restructuring the CA Reserve. The BIL-R is an experimental unit created in 2022 by Colonel Alain Cohen, then Commander of 34 CBG, which brings together all of the brigade’s infantry units to create a single infantry battalion for training purposes.

At 34 CBG, one unit is mandated to command the BIL-R for one year, while the other units support it by providing an infantry platoon and part of a company command element. I had the privilege of commanding the BIL-R in 2024–2025, and we succeeded in generating groups of almost 500 soldiers during our weekend exercises, thanks to our stimulating high-calibre exercises with the three Regular Force battalions of the Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR) at Valcartier. However, this grouping is temporary and is used only as a training instrument. Commanding the BIL-R and a Reserve unit at the same time is also a colossal task and has a significant impact on that Reserve unit. Nevertheless, it would be possible to expand the concept and transform it into a distinct and permanent organization.

The BIL-R demonstrated the usefulness of creating a Level 3.5, an intermediary level between the brigade headquarters (HQ) and the units: a permanent “BIL-R HQ.” Each unit would form a company of the BIL-R, as shown in Figure 3. Training would be the responsibility of BIL-R HQ, which would have its own staff, RSM and commanding officer. That person would serve for two or three years in order to capitalize on the experience and the lessons learned, instead of starting over each year, as is the case in the prototype developed at 34 CBG.

The units would retain considerable independence while carrying out their responsibilities related to recruitment, clothing, traditions, their armouries and their finances. Training would be the responsibility of the BIL-R, which would plan and conduct all the exercises. This would enable the acquisition of valuable command and control experience at the battalion level. As each unit is already the equivalent of a company group, they would be commanded by majors (Maj), with a master warrant officer (MWO) as sergeant major. That hierarchical structure would facilitate the interaction with the BIL-R. In addition, the entire unit should participate in the exercises, rather than just one platoon. Duplication of positions in the units would thus be eliminated, like the Operations Cell and the Regimental Quartermaster (RQM), which would emphasize a company structure (see Figure 4). Thanks to the training of the entire unit, more focus could be applied to creating a number of sub-sub-units so that the commanding officer could acquire command experience at the sub-unit level. That would produce a hierarchical structure that would be more pyramid-like. The BIL-R HQ personnel would come from the units’ unfilled MWO/CWO/Maj/LCol positions, which would create a more robust headquarters, with no extra costs in positions or salaries.

Figure 3: Proposed permanent grouping of the BIL-Rs

Figure 4: Proposed structure for Reserve units

Advantages

This proposal has the advantage of creating a smaller span of control for the brigade headquarters with an intermediary staff it can deal with. This structure would bring the Canadian Brigade Group (CBG) back to something closer to a pyramid (see Figure 5). Thus, there would be a larger number of Reservists participating in the exercises and operations, as the entire unit would be requested. There would also be more staff officers trained to work in a battalion HQ. The Reserve LCols would benefit from the experience of commanding several sub-units instead of just one. In addition, there would be more majors with the experience of commanding at the company level, since it would be necessary to command their unit in the field. That experience would prepare them for a higher command if they are selected. There would be less pressure on the promotions at all levels, as it would no longer be necessary to generate an LCol and a CWO in each unit. This way of doing things would also enable them to acquire more experience at each rank level. As well, there would naturally be better collaboration between the units within a BIL-R. Ultimately, this solution could result in a larger number of operational TBGs/BIL-Rs with HQ brigades ready to act as HQ for a formation or for a component of Land Command. That would also make it possible to develop standardized operating procedures within the BIL-Rs and to retain the experience, instead of starting from zero again every year. As a result, the BIL-Rs would have the advantage of being transformed into semi-professional organizations, ready to be used as manoeuvre units.

Figure 5: Proposed structure for the CBGs

Conclusion

The CA Reserve has been in great need of a restructuring for a long time. It must get rid of its mass mobilization structure, which dates from the period of the two world wars, and adopt a structure that is reactive, operational and agile. The adoption of a permanent structure like that of the BIL-R with the Reserve units under its command would lead to augmenting the operational capability throughout the CA. More Reserve soldiers would be trained, and officers would be able to acquire more command and staff experience, while there would be less pressure to award promotions at all levels, which would result in more experience at all levels. Lastly, we should not overlook the strong potential of this approach to generate a larger number of manoeuvre units for the CA.

This solution will not resolve all the problems of the CA Reserve. There are still many challenges to meet, such as the chronic lack of equipment, the administrative burden and the excessively long recruitment process. However, if we can correct the structure, we will be on the right track and will generate more operational results. This article is intended to stimulate a discussion about the state of the CA Reserve, which merits examination because it has been neglected for so long. In the face of today’s global challenges, our Canadian Army must be capable of fulfilling its mission of defending Canada and Canadian interests. If we are to achieve that, the Reserve must be taken into account.

About the Author

The author has more than 35 years of experience in the CAF, including 30 years in the Regular Force serving in the R22eR in various staff and command roles. He devoted almost half that time to supporting the Reserve, including with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal in 1996, and as G3 Ops 34 CBG in 1998, G1 34 CBG in 2006 and G3 34 CBG in 2014. After leaving the Regular Force in 2020, he assumed command of 6th Battalion, R22eR, then of the Light Infantry Battalion within 34 CBG in May 2024 and of the militia concentration in 2025. He is currently Deputy Commander of 34 CBG; he teaches military history at Royal Military College Saint-Jean and leadership at the Chief Warrant Officer Robert Osside Institute.

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This article first appeared online in the Short Bursts section of the Canadian Army Journal (September 2025).