Canadian Tank Squadrons are too Large: Options for Modernizing the Tank Squadron

By Major B.R. Simpson - July 15th, 2026

Reading Time: 25 min

Disclaimer: This article was written before “The Armoured Regiment in Battle” (ACRIB) was published and may not reflect the most recent changes to the document.

Introduction

The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) is in the midst of a drafting of one of its key supporting doctrinal publications: The Armoured Regiment in Battle, which was last published in 1990. Draft copies of this important document’s chapters are circulating within the Corps and Canadian Army Doctrine Note 23-01 was recently published outlining the future complete publication’s basic philosophy and organization.¹ Among other notable changes, the new draft proposes that armoured squadrons be increased from 19 armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to a total of 20² (figure 1). While not a fulsome critique of the forthcoming publication, this article will address the question of optimal tank squadron size and make the case that the current (and future) Canadian tank squadrons are significantly larger than they should be to achieve their doctrinal tasks. This is by no means a new argument, and informally at least it is an opinion held by many within the Corps.³ What this article will endeavour to achieve is to provide quantitative and qualitative data to support that conclusion.

Figure 1: Canadian Armoured Squadron (2023 - Present)​

A brief note on the scope of this article is called for: first, it is an argument specific to tanks and while the new Armoured Regiment in Battle purports to cover light AFVs as well, the optimal organization of a light AFV equipped squadron is outside the bounds of this commentary. That said, organizing light AFV subunits differently than tanks has been a constant in armoured warfare since at least the likes of Heinz Guderian were prescribing it in the 1930s.⁴ Further, the author has yet to locate a single nation whose armies currently structure light AFV elements identically to their tank forces, so the new publication likely requires an examination specific to platform types as well.⁵ Secondly, this article is specific to main battle tanks. Prior to the Second World War, most armies recognized multiple types of tanks (heavy, medium, cruiser, infantry, light etc) with niche roles. The experience of total war led to a process of fusion in which virtually all tank sub-types coalesced into the “capital” tank or what later came to be called the “universal” or “main battle tank” (MBT). Canada, along with most modern industrialized states, experienced this transition. Indeed, Field Marshal Montgomery decreed prior to the invasion of Europe that all prior distinctions of tank by type were abolished and henceforth the Anglo-Canadian armies would be equipped with exclusively “capital tanks” and “light reconnaissance tanks.”⁶ The existence of a single class of ‘fighting’ tank (the MBT) has been assumed in Canadian doctrine since that time, and this article assumes the continued existence of this paradigm.

Overview of Methodology and Data

The primary vehicle for the argument that Canada’s tank squadrons are too large will be a detailed comparison between the Canadian Army and a variety of foreign nations’ historical and current subunits. Of course, national doctrines exists in unique circumstances and conformity with Allies or prospective enemies is not a hard requirement. However, Carl von Clausewitz observes “if, in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective, it will be used again; it will be copied by others and become fashionable; and so, backed by experience, it passes into general use and is included in theory.”⁷ If I can be excused for adding a Canadian military spin on this dictum, we might dub this the ‘One of These Things is Not Like the Others’ principle (a phrase many of us have had chanted at us by cantankerous NCOs during early military training). In short, Clausewitz is asserting that a process exists by which common conditions lead armies to adopt common means of organization and operation. Therefore, if Canada’s tank elements do not resemble those of other nations, we should at least ask ourselves ‘why do we not look like the others’ and perhaps question our underlying assumptions.

Table 1 includes a comparison of 38 current and historical tank units from 12 countries, compared by number of tanks per troop, number of troops per squadron, number of squadron headquarters (SHQ) and regimental headquarters (RHQ) tanks, number of squadrons per regiment, and total numbers of tanks.⁸ The data is a sizable sample, but of course is not exhaustive enough for a true statistical analysis. However, it does include every unit for which reliable organizational data was available, primarily through official publications from the country of origin. Further, no unit for which data was available was excluded to avoid bias for or against this article’s thesis. Therefore, we can cautiously say that this data is at least representative of the historical and current shape of armour units internationally.

At first glance, the data reveals some self-evident commonalities in historical and current armoured structures. Firstly, the size of a troop has settled at between three and four tanks, particularly after the Second World War. Additionally, after the Second World War SHQs contained, with few exceptions, never more than one or two tanks. The data also reveals an important trend towards smaller squadrons and regiments time. The average size of a squadron in the 1938-1953 period was 16.9 tanks and a regiment was 58.7. These figures declined steadily until by the 1990-present day period they had dropped to 14.0 and 47.2 tanks respectively. Glaringly, Canada’s unit structures (with the exception of the 1960-1977 and 1977-1982 regiments) seem to ignore the otherwise accepted practice in regards to the number of tanks in SHQ and, more disconcertingly, remain the sole outliers to the nearly universal international trend towards smaller squadrons and regiments. Based on the available data, we can assert with some confidence that the Canadian Army tank squadron and regiment are the largest elements of their type in the entire postwar history of armoured warfare.

The ‘Principle of Four’

The proposed 20-tank squadron (and 82-tank regiment!) in the draft Armoured Regimental in Battle is a further move against this nearly universal trend towards smaller tank units. Arguably, the origin of this frankly massive structure can be credited towards an adherence to a structural interpretation of a ‘Principle of Four’ which asserts that “historically, armoured forces have fought in groups of four to allow for mutual support while conducting fire and movement… In application, an armoured troop will have four vehicles, an armoured squadron will have four troops, and an armoured regiment will have four squadrons.”⁹ In short, a Canadian regiment is to be entirely organized around this principle as a 4-4-4 unit (four tanks per troop – four troops per squadron – four squadrons per regiment.) However, given the available data it is reasonable to conclude that no other army has ever adopted a strictly structural interpretation of the principle of four. The most common structure is a 4-3-3 model closely followed by 3-3-3 and 3-4-4. In other words, while there is an argument to be made that four tanks constitutes an ideal fire unit for reasons of mutual support, this principle cannot be extrapolated infinitely to higher levels of organization.

In Canadian doctrine, the ‘principle of four’ (though not given that title) refers to the Core Functions in the application of combat power (find, fix, strike, and exploit). Prior to the draft Armoured Regiment in Battle, doctrine never mandated this as a structural model for force design, but rather as a conceptual one for force grouping. Indeed, Canadian doctrine is explicit in noting that not all four Core Functions may be fulfilled with integral element means: PsyOps ‘fixing’ a population for a manoeuvre force is given as an example.¹⁰

The simplest explanation for this complete lack of 4-4-4 structures in the data is that other nations’ interpret the ‘principle of four’ in flexible conceptual as opposed to rigid structural terms. The only publication from any country which the author was able to locate that articulated an explicit ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ of four, was the mid-2000s British Type 58 armoured squadron which indicated that commanders should group their forces to provide finding, fixing, striking, exploiting and reserve components. However, the regiment in this structure was organized on a 3-4-3 design.¹¹ Clearly the ‘principle’ articulated above is meant to be implemented via grouping within a combined arms team, with commanders utilizing phasing (e.g. the fixing force in phase one becomes the exploitation force in phase two), attachments (e.g. an infantry platoon in a combat team becomes the reserve) or a combination of both. Further, this principle does not apply at all levels: how was the troop leader in this structure supposed to provide all four functions with only three tanks? Evidently, he or she is meant to provide one or perhaps two of the functions in their squadron commander’s plan. Similarly, perhaps a squadron in a 4-3-4 regiment provides the find, fix, and strike functions while depth squadrons constitute the reserve and exploit forces? In summary, while slavish adherence to a ‘rule’ of four through a strictly structural interpretation of this principle is one option, it leads to Canada having the largest squadrons of any nation on earth and an unattainably (and possibly undesirably) large regiment. Adoption of a more flexible conceptual understanding of this principle would bring us into line with our contemporaries and allow us to explore other structural options outlined below.

A Modernized Canadian Tank Squadron

In formulating a modernized squadron structure, we can, as other nations have done, begin with the tactical output of the structure: the irreducible minimum required for it to fulfill its most common functions. Retired British Army officer Jim Storr argues that this figure is not necessarily reflective of the number of tanks “present in a company in barracks”, but rather of those present in a combined arms team to accomplish essential tactical tasks.¹² The analysis of a required squadron ‘output’ is not a science, but a reflection of tactical principles as an art: ‘what has worked’ and ‘what might work.’ Any assertion of an all-encompassing ‘right’ answer to the question of tank squadron size would be, as Storr would argue, “excessively self-confident.”¹³

For instance, we can, with some justification, say that an armoured squadron’s essential tactical output is the combined arms hasty attack including a hasty breach. Necessary forces for such an operation include: two breaching lanes (two plow tanks), an assault force (the breaching tanks plus 3-5 more tanks), and a firebase (3-5 tanks including an SHQ element).¹⁴ This would bring us to a total of 9-12 tanks as the ‘irreducible minimum’ for a squadron to complete this task (with the number trending towards the high-end if a complex breach is required). While this may seem like a small number, any armoured soldier who has participated in field training with tanks in the last several years will probably have conducted successful (and tactically sound) hasty attacks with squadrons of this size. Readers could infer that a tank squadron’s essential tactical output was one of many common armour tasks: delay, attack-by-fire, advance-to-contact, etc. However, none of these tasks, when limited to their irreducibly minimum requirements, requires more than 9-12 tanks, and many can be conducted with far less. Storr notes that both Western and communist countries during the Cold War believed that combined arms groupings could conduct most tasks with 5-10 tanks.¹⁵

So, should Canada’s modernized tank squadron fall in line with Israeli or Soviet/Russian practice and form subunits of only 10 tanks? Noted panzer theorist and celebrated commander Hermann Balck argued that companies of this size actually reduce losses, claiming that “If I had a good tank, 10 tanks per company would be enough ... there should be 3 platoons with 3 tanks each, and one tank for the company commander. Too many tanks will lead to too many losses.” This is of course an option, and would give squadrons enough combat power to conduct their tasks when at full strength. Context is important here: nations with smaller companies may have the institutional depth behind them to rely on large reserves of ‘replacement tanks’ for damaged or destroyed vehicles or may conduct traditional tank tasks differently (perhaps a hasty attack is always a battalion-level operation?). Another important factor in tank subunit size must be “availability” or the percentage of tanks available for combat when maintenance and casualties are factored in.¹⁶ If we impose a requirement on ourselves for our modernized Canadian squadron to be able to take 25% casualties (or maintenance losses) before it is unable to provide its essential tactical output (9-12 tanks), we arrive at a squadron size of 11-15 tanks. Incidentally, squadrons of this size make up the vast majority of post-Second World War examples in our data set.

If we accept 11-15 tanks as our tactical output (including casualty redundancy) as our minimum baseline, we can then begin to design the command structure of these tanks, beginning with the number of troops. Fulfillment of its essential tactical output (a hasty attack) could arguably be completed with two troops acting as fire units (one as a firebase, and one as an assault/breaching force), but this would leave few options for the Officer Commanding (OC) to provide intimate support tanks, form a reserve or depth of any kind, or detach any forces to another combat team if required. Therefore, three to four troops is likely a requirement which is borne out in our data: 21 of our squadron examples contain three tank troops, and 15 contain four. Here the question of tank troop size comes into play: most countries with three-tank troops have four-troop squadrons while four-tank troops are more often organized in three troop squadrons. What are the relative merits of the two most common troop size options?

The question of optimal tank troop size appears, based on our data, to be a contentious one: 18 examples contain four tanks while 13 contain three. Some countries have gone back and forth between the two options multiple times over the recent decades (the United Kingdom and Germany notably). That said, three tanks are clearly seen by most countries as a viable fire unit. The US Army concluded, after extensive study in the late 1970s, that the three-tank platoon was superior (i.e. more lethal) to four and five tank platoons in force-on-force engagements, with the three-tank element being easier for the commander to control and direct fire and movement.¹⁷ However, the contemporaneous structural redesign of the US Army recommended the adoption of a four-tank platoon explicitly because a three-tank platoon required a 100% availability rate for their platoon to remain effective. The many reserve tanks and high ratio of mechanics of the Israeli system (which had led the Americans to experiment with three-tank platoons) were unlikely to be available in the fiscal and personnel environment envisioned by late-Cold War American force designers.¹⁸ Given that Canada is similarly limited by personnel and a lack of reserve tanks, we can safely settle, as the Americans have, on the four-tank troop model.¹⁹

So, if our modernized squadron is to contain four-tank troops, we can safely assume (as most of the data examples have) that three troops will make up the fighting element of our subunit. A subunit with three troops also better aligns with the Army’s current operating concept: Close Engagement: Land Power in the Age of Uncertainty. Close Engagement mandates that manoeuvre subunits be capable of commanding up to eight platoon-sized elements including manoeuvre, combat support, and combat service support attachments.²⁰ This ambitious goal from a span-of-control perspective makes it prudent to build force generating subunits smaller in order to allow effective control of future combined arms groupings. For instance, a three-troop squadron could readily absorb 2-3 infantry platoons, an engineer troop, counter UAS element, and (with its integral Admin Troop) still not exceed the eight platoon limitation. So, with 12 tanks in our three fighting troops, it is only left to design our SHQ.

As noted above, a constant in the data since the end of the Second World War is the existence of only one or two tanks in SHQ: only Canada has retained a third and, in the draft Armoured Regiment in Battle, a fourth tank. Before outlining SHQ requirements, we should therefore address these anomalous tanks in Canadian squadron structures. The origins of these tanks lay in Second World War-era squadron structures which contained unique tank variants. (Figure 2) For instance, the 1948 SHQ included two ‘cruiser’ tanks (for the OC and BC) and a pair of tanks equipped with large-calibre, but low-velocity howitzers. The purpose of these specialized assault guns was “to provide a close support weapon which can put down high explosive or smoke in places other weapons cannot deal with effectively” and were capable of both direct and indirect fire.²¹ In short, these were combat support assets analogous to infantry mortar platoons, whose purpose was to compensate for the low effectiveness of the regular cruiser tanks’ main armament in delivering high explosive.²² Similarly to current Canadian squadrons, the 1948 version contained a ‘dozer’ tank. However, while the current dozer equipment on a Leopard 2 has minimal impact on its employability as a gun tank, the 1948 version significantly degraded its mobility to the point that the dozer was kept to the rear of the squadron (with the echelon vehicles) in all narrative and graphical descriptions.²³

Figure 2: Postwar Canadian Armoured Squadron (1948)​

The close support and dozer tanks outlined above bear little resemblance to the regular MBTs included in the SHQs of the current and proposed Canadian armoured squadrons, being specialized combat support assets rather than regular or augmented gun tanks. All other countries examined who maintained specialized tanks in their SHQs during the Second World War removed those tanks from their structures once the specialized tanks were no longer in service and it is almost certainly time-past-point for Canada to do the same. All Canadian MBTs can fulfill the close support tank role of delivering high explosive and Canada has more than enough dozer implements to equip one per tank troop if we so choose. Further, there is no requirement for SHQ to fight as a formed troop (with OC or BC fireteam partners), as the purpose of SHQ tanks is to exercise command and control: a task that can be done by these two personalities when physically separated from one another and in general proximity to the fighting troops for mutual support.²⁴

Shorn of its Second World War-era relic tanks, SHQ can be reduced to only those vehicles necessary to allow the OC “to be located where he can best exercise command”, implying a requirement for at least one tank.²⁵ The requirement for the BC to be able to assume “command of the squadron temporarily” during the absence or death of the OC would seem to generate a requirement in Canadian doctrine for a second SHQ tank, which is the approach taken by 23 of our unit examples.²⁶ This also provides flexibility in allowing the OC to task an SHQ element to control a distinct task (such as a firebase) or a detached element. We are then left with two tanks in SHQ to control our three, four-tank troops generating a squadron total of 14 tanks. (Figure 3) This conclusion is by no means intended to be doctrinally ‘universal,’ and given the diversity in the available unit structure data, any commentator’s assertion to have designed such a ‘perfect’ squadron would frankly be nothing short of arrogance. However, 14‑tank squadrons constitute the most common structure in our data set and would align us with many of our allies. Variations in the 13-16 tank range would also be reasonable alternatives given different base assumptions and variations in a squadron’s essential tactical outputs.

Figure 3: Modernized Canadian Armoured Squadron (Proposed) ​

Areas for Further Study

Several areas of squadron design remain to be examined, but are outside the immediate scope of this article. The question of whether a tank squadron requires an additional command AFV (such as an Armoured Combat Support Vehicle Command Post) requires examination to validate the command and control requirements of a squadron in a battlegroup context. Echelon support to a tank squadron from integral and regimental assets is also likely in need of a complete re-evaluation: the draft Armoured Regiment in Battle places 57 personnel out of 137 in the squadron A1, A2 and B echelons constituting 42% of its total personnel strength. In comparison, a British tank squadron has only 30 personnel in its echelon (approximately 33% of its strength), and an American tank company contains only six (or 10% of its strength).²⁷ Given that these nations are presumably able to conduct successful combat operations, we should perhaps explore whether efficiencies in personnel can be achieved by centralizing further echelon support at regimental level. Finally, work remains to be done to generate the optimal regimental organization including how many squadrons it should contain, and what combat support enablers an armour-heavy unit requires. This, of course, should not be done in isolation from other arms: at a minimum, an armoured regiment should be able to form the basis of a combined arms battlegroup. The key question becomes how many combined arms units should a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) be able to form and how much armour they should contain. A three-squadron regiment allows a CMBG (with two mechanized infantry battalions) to form up to three combined arms battlegroups with one squadron each, but precludes the formation of an armour-heavy battlegroup or an armoured reserve. For this capability, a four-squadron regiment would probably be required. That said, the squadron sketched out above would function equally well in a three- or four-squadron regiment without generating an unmanageably large tank force.

Conclusions

The primary purpose of this article was to demonstrate that Canada’s current and proposed tank squadrons are, when compared to our allies and competitors, unreasonably large. It seems that over the nearly eight decades since the end of the Second World War, Canada has somehow missed the trend towards smaller, more agile squadrons leaving us in the Clausewitzian situation of being the subject of the dreaded ‘One of These Things is Not Like the Others’ principle. The secondary purpose of this article was to offer a rough methodology to design a modernized Canadian armoured squadron. A smaller squadron would present the RCAC with several advantages. Commonality with allies would be increased considerably, and we could perhaps examine the feasibility of committing a doctrinally complete squadron to the enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Latvia (rather than the squadron(-) currently employed there). Along similar lines, a smaller squadron could perhaps reduce the tendency battlegroup CO’s have of splitting up tank squadrons into an OC-led squadron(-) and BC-led half squadron. Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Charles S. Oliviero recently noted that squadron splitting is “highly unlikely” something ever encountered by his readers from armies where tank companies are only 10-13 tanks.²⁸ Arguably, this is because the essential tactical output of those subunits (as discussed above) aligns with their squadron structure: the 19- or 20-tank squadron lends itself to splitting because both we and our infantry counterparts are well aware that 9 or 10 tanks are capable of conducting a tactically sound hasty attack, regardless of the obvious command and administrative headaches splitting causes us. Remember: an Israeli or Russian armour officer would look at a squadron(-) and see a full-strength subunit!

In addition to potentially reducing the Army’s inclination towards dismembering tank squadrons, smaller squadrons would create the opportunity to create more subunits. Ironically, with the 82 Leopard 2 gun-tanks originally acquired a decade ago, Canada could have immediately formed two 41-tank regiments of the sort employed by Germany during the Cold War. Now that tank centralization in Western Canada has been enacted, smaller tank subunits could enable the formation of at least a fourth tank subunit in the Canadian Army with a minimal increase in the overall personnel requirement. This would improve opportunities for RCAC leaders to command or fill key staff and advisor roles in tank squadrons, and four tank squadrons would be significantly easier to align the enduring operational output of a squadron(-) to Lativa. Overall, liberating ourselves from a dogmatic ‘rule of four’ structural approach and associated Second World War-era organizational biases provides the RCAC with immensely more flexibility and opportunities.

End Notes

1.  Department of National Defence (DND), B-GL-305-001/FP-001, The Armoured Regiment in Battle – Working Draft #3 Chapters 1 and 2, (December 2022); DND, CADN 23-01, The Armoured Regiment in Battle (25 September 2023).
2.  The new draft purports to replace all extant reconnaissance doctrine as well, and so the squadron size and structure applies to all weights and capabilities of vehicles. See CADN 23-01, The Armoured Regiment in Battle, 6.
3.  The argument that Canada’s tank squadrons were too large was old enough in 2003 that Charles S. Oliviero was able to assert that “many of us have argued for decades that Canadian tank squadrons are too large” before proposing small armoured subunits of 10 or 13 tanks each. See Charles S. Oliviero, “Thought Piece on Restructuring the Armoured Corps – A Rebuttal”, Armour Bulletin 35.1 (2003): 21.
4. “The smallest combat unit is the platoon, which is made up of between three and five machines in the case of heavy and medium companies and five and seven within the light companies.” [emphasis added] Heinz Guderian, Achtung Panzer: The Development of Tank Warfare, Christopher Duffy, trans., first published 1937 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), 182.
5.  See the author’s “A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-Examining the Mounted Arm for the Future”, Canadian Army Journal 19.3 (2022): 13-15.
6.  John A. English, Monty and the Canadian Army (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 152.
7.  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., 1st ed. 1976, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 171.
8.  For simplicity’s sake, all armour element sizes will be expressed in Canadian terms (troop, squadron, regiment vice platoon, company, battalion). Below are the source materials for each structure.
   a) Australia, Armoured Cavalry Regiment: Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-4, Employment of Armour (Combined Arms Training Centre, 2016), 23-24.
   b) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1948): Canada, CAMT 3-1, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Training Tactics, The Armoured Regiment, reprinted by direction of the Chief of the General Staff, (Ottawa: 1948), 17.
   c) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1960): Canada, Army Headquarters, CAMT 3-1, The Armoured Regiment in Battle (1960), 10.
   d) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1977): Canada, DND, B-OL-305-001/FT-001, Armour, Volume I, The Armoured Regiment in Battle (1977), 2-1.
   e) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1982): Canada, DND, B-GL-305-001/FT-001, Armour, Volume I, The Armoured Regiment in Battle (1982), Chapter 2.
   f) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1990): Canada, DND, B-GL-305-001/FT-001, Armour, Volume I, The Armoured Regiment in Battle (1990), Chapter 2.
   g) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1940): Canadian Army Historical Section, Report No 57, A Summary to Major Changes in Army Organization, 1939-1945 (Ottawa, 1952), 20-21. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/army-headquarters-1948-1959/army-organization-1939-1945.html (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   h) Canada, Armoured Regiment (1944): Ibid., 22-23.
   i) Canada, Proposed Armoured Regiment: Department of National Defence (DND), B-GL-305-001/FP-001, The Armoured Regiment in Battle – Working Draft #3 Chapters 1 and 2, (December 2022).
   j) France, bataillon de chars de combat : Steven J. Zaloga, French Tanks of World War II, Vol I: Infantry and Battle Tanks (Osprey, 2014).
   k) France, Régiment de chars 80: French Army, Manuel D’Emploi des Groupements Tactiques a Dominante Leclerc, (Inspection de l’Arme Blindee Cavalerie), Chapter 12, https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/a137e0_43cd699a47ca4d5a8d62c6688aa2cc4f.pdf (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   l) Germany, Germany, Panzer-Abteilung (1939): Pier Battistelli, Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg Years, 1939-1940 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 29.
   m) Germany, Germany, Panzer-Abteilung (1944): German Army, Kriegsstärkenachweise 1177 (fG), Panzer-Abteilung (freie Gliederung), (1944), translated at https://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstn1177fg1nov44.htm, (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   n) Germany, Panzerbataillon (Army Structure 4): German Army, Panzerbataillon, Heeresstruktur 4 O.W. Dragoner: Die Bundeswehr 1989. Heeresamt. I. Korps. II. Korps. III. Korps, 2.1 – Heer, https://www.relikte.com/_basis/docs/bw_2_1-4.pdf, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   o) Germany, Panzerbataillon (Army Structure 5): German Army, Panzerbataillon, Heeresstruktur 5 http://panzerbaer.de/units/bw_hstr_5_pzbtl-a.htm (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   p) Germany, Panzerbataillon (Army of the Future): German Army, Die Deutsche Heer: Sachstand und Entwicklung, (2003), 83, http://www.geopowers.com/News/News_II_2003/Heer_Jan2003.pdf, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   q) Israel, Armour Battalion (ca. 1967-1973): Chris McNab, Arab Armour vs. Israeli Armour (Osprey Publishing, 2021), 45.
   r) Italy, Medium Tank Battalion: F. Cappellano, P.P. Battistelli, Italian Medium Tanks: 1939-1945 (Osprey, 2012).
   s) Italy, Tank Battalion : Paolo Valpolini, “Italian Army: Towards Heavy Forces Modernization,” European Defence Review, (10 Mar 2022), https://www.edrmagazine.eu/italian-army-towards-heavy-forces-modernisation, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   t) Netherlands, Tank Battalion: Netherlands Army, VS 17-131 Het tankbataljon (1976), reproduced at https://www.orbat85.nl/reference/unit-organisation-and-equipment.html#tkbat-pabrig, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   u) Netherlands, Tank Battalion (in an Armoured Brigade): Netherlands Army, VS 17-131 Het tankbataljon (1983), reproduced at https://www.orbat85.nl/reference/unit-organisation-and-equipment.html#tkbat-pabrig, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   v) Netherlands, Tank Battalion (in an Armoured Infantry Brigade: Netherlands Army, VS 17-131 Het tankbataljon (1983), reproduced at https://www.orbat85.nl/reference/unit-organisation-and-equipment.html#tkbat-pabrig, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   w) People’s Republic of China, Combined Arms Battalion: U.S. Army, ATP 7-100.3, Chinese Tactics (August 2021): 2-5. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf. (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   x) Russia, Tank Battalion (in Tank Brigades and Regiments): Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian War of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (U.S. DoD, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016), 224.
   y) United Kingdom, Mixed Battalion: British Army, Mobile Division Training Pamphlet No 2., Notes on the Employment of the Tank Brigade, (London: 1938), 35.
   z) United Kingdom, Type 38 Armoured Regiment: Simon Dunstan, Challenger Squadron (Wiltshire, UK: Crowood Press Ltd, 1999), 16.
   aa) United Kingdom, Type 57 Armoured Regiment: Oliver E. Holder and Frederick G. Lee, “The Armoured Regiment of the RAC,” Armor 94.5 (1985): 19.
   bb) United Kingdom, Type 44 or Type 58 Armoured Regiments (Army 2020): Capability Directorate Combat, Mounted Close Combat Doctrine, Volume I, Royal Armoured Corps Tactics, The Armoured Squadron (United Kingdom, 2011), 2-3.
   cc) United Kingdom, Type 56 Armoured Regiment: British Army, Capability Directorate Combat, Combat Capability for the Future (2013): 6-7.
   dd) US Army, Tank Battalion (1944): U.S. Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 17-25, Tank Battalion (Washington, D.C.: 18 November 1944) and U.S. Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 17-27, Medium Tank Company (Washington, D.C.: 18 November 1944), http://www.militaryresearch.org/17-27%2018Nov44.pdf (accessed 13 Oct 22).
   ee) US Army, Pentomic Armored Division Armor Battalion (1957): U.S. Army, Field Manual 17-33, Tank Units, Platoon, Company, and Battalion Washington, D.C.: 1957), 7-15.
   ff) United States Army, Reorganization Objective, Army Division (ROAD) Armor Battalion: James F. Pasquarette, M1A2 Tank Battalion Organization: A Call for Innovation, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 9.
   gg) United States Army, 'Division 86' Armor Battalion: James F. Pasquarette, M1A2 Tank Battalion Organization: A Call for Innovation, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 11.
   hh) US Army, Armor Battalion (2004): US Army, FKSM 71-8, Armour/Cavalry Reference Data, Vol III, Force XXI Armour Division, (US Army Armor Centre, May 2004), I-14 to I-18.
   ii) US Army, Combined Arms Battalion (Armour): United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, Force Structure Reference Data: Armor Brigade Combat Team, (Fort Benning: October 2016), 24-30.
   jj) USSR, Tank Battalion (in Mechanized Corps): Mechanized Corps 1942-1945, https://tmg110.tripod.com/RedA8.htm, (accessed 14 Oct 22).
   kk) USSR, Tank Battalion (Motor Rifle Regiments): US Army, FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment (Washington, D.C.: 1991), 4-26.
   ll) USSR, Tank Battalion (Tank Regiments): US Army, FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment (Washington, D.C.: 1991), 4-107.
9. The Armoured Regiment in Battle – Unpublished Draft, (2022), 1-2.
10. Department of National Defence (DND), B-GL-300-001/FP-001, Land Operations, (2008): 4-21.
11. Combat Capability Directorate Royal Armoured Corps, Mounted Close Combat Doctrine – Volume 1 – Royal Armoured Corps Tactics: The Armoured Squadron, para. 0154.
12. Jim Storr, Battlegroup: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War (Warwick, UK: Helion and Company, 2021), 107.
13. Ibid., 106.
14. Outline of combined arms hasty attack tactics can be found at Department of National Defence (DND), B-GL-321-006/FP-001, Combat Team in Operations, (2017): 2-4 to 2-29.
15. Storr, 107.
16. Ibid., 155.
17. John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86: Vol I: Division 86, The Development of the Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC, 1982), 9-10.
18. Ibid., 10.
19. Given the current strain on the Army’s NCO Corps (with a “missing middle”) the adoption of a three-tank troop could be considered as an interim measure to reduce the number of NCOs required as crew commanders until the personnel situation stabilizes. However, the issue of tank availability rates would still detract from the desirability of this option.
20. Department of National Defence, B-GL-310-001/AG-001, Close Engagement – Land Power in an Age of Uncertainty – Evolving Adaptive Dispersed Operations (2019), 23.
21. Canada, CAMT 3-1, Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Training Tactics, The Armoured Regiment, reprinted by direction of the Chief of the General Staff, (Ottawa: 1948), 19.
22. Historian John English notes that wartime cruiser tanks had sometimes not even been provided with high explosive rounds. See English, 131.
23. The Armoured Regiment (1948), 54.
24. “SHQ may travel as a group or the OC may be forward with the leading troop(s) while the BC controls the rear elements.” Canada, Department of Defence, B-GL-305-001/FT-001, Armour, Volume I: The Armoured Regiment in Battle, (31 December 1990), Chapter 3, Section 5.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Royal Armoured Corps Tactics: The Armoured Squadron, 1-A-1 to 1-A-4; and United States of America, Headquarters, Department of the Army, MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90, Force Structure Reference Data: Armor Brigade Combat Team, (Fort Benning: October 2016), 30.
28. Charles S. Oliviero, Praxis Tacticum: The Art, Science and Practice of Military Tactics (Toronto: Double Dagger Books, 2021), 125.