Overall, the implementation of the Protocol was successful. While no threats met the threshold, the Protocol ensured the Government of Canada was prepared to report to Canadians as needed and that decision-making about potential interventions did take place as appropriate.
The Panel was well supported and received timely, varied and considered intelligence and other reporting.
Panel members developed a rapport and came to a common understanding of their roles and the challenges of meeting their responsibilities. Collegial relationships were also developed with partners (Elections Canada and security agencies).
Challenges include: the range of possible threats; no other similar model to draw from; the short time for decision-making, possibly with incomplete information; threshold not lending itself to quantifiable decision-making; and finally, distinguishing between domestic and foreign threats on social media.
Overall, public and media reactions to the Protocol were neutral to positive. Some foreign media contrasted the Canadian actions very favourable relative to the efforts of other Western countries. That said, the report notes two areas of criticism. The first questioned the utility of the Protocol as any intervention would do more harm than good. The second was about the composition of the Panel. One observation was that was it should not be comprised of public servants, but rather eminent Canadians such as former jurists or political leaders. Another critique of the Panel’s composition was that the Panel did not have representation from Elections Canada.
Recommendations
Implement the Protocol for the next election using the same model and Panel membership. Prepare Panel members early, starting with new members. The high threshold and decision by consensus should be maintained, as well as the support and participation from the same departments and agencies. The rationale is that this model has already been accepted by the parties and there is the ability to maintain some consistency in membership. An accompanying media strategy should also be developed.
The Protocol should also cover the pre-writ period, recognizing this may not be possible in the event of an election triggered by a non-confidence vote.
Privy Council Office support teams (Democratic Institutions and Security and Intelligence) should monitor any international developments, with particular attention paid to any evolution in tactics by malign actors and any developments in defensive counter-measures taken by target countries (legal, regulatory and operational). This can also include academic and think-tank research.
Immediately establish the same relationships with the political parties, particularly with respect to guidance and support around cyber issues as the parties are likely targets beyond simply the election period.
Conduct an evaluation on the extent to which the social media platforms lived up to the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online. Once complete, hold discussions with the platforms on the Government’s expectations for the next election. Participation in the Paris Call could possibly inform any new agreements.
