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Media Response Lines on National Shipbuilding Strategy

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Commitment to Canadian Shipbuilding / National Shipbuilding Strategy

Speaking Points/Media Lines – National Shipbuilding Strategy

Cost and time estimates (need common response across departments)

Capability gaps

Improvements

The OAG Report highlighted a number of corrective actions and key decisions made, which have placed the NSS on a more viable path. These actions included:

COVID-19

Questions and Answers (full project lines are available separately)

Canadian Surface Combatant

Timeline:

Cost: $56-60B

Q1. What are the current timelines for the CSC project?

A1. The CSC project entered the design phase in 2019. This phase is expected to take four to five years. Once the design work is sufficiently mature, the Government of Canada will award an implementation contract to Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to build the ships. We expect to begin construction of the simpler zones [parts] of the ship while the design work on the more complex sections continues, similar to what we have done for the Joint Support Ship.

The construction of the first ship is expected to begin in the 2023/2024 timeframe, with delivery of the first ship expected in the early 2030s. We are working closely with our industry partners to find efficiencies and accelerate these new timelines.

Q2. When will the Halifax-class fleet be retired? Will you start receiving the CSC before Halifax-class ships are retired or will there be a capability gap?

A2. Following the recent Halifax-class frigate life extension, no firm timeline has been identified for the retirement of the fleet. We continue to maintain the ships in order to ensure they remain operational until the CSC is transitioned into service.

Q3. The initial estimate for the CSC project was $26.2 billion in 2008, and is now between $56-60 billion. How did you calculate your cost estimate?

A3. The initial cost of the CSC project in 2008 was an early estimate that was calculated based on the generic warship design of a similar size and capability. This early estimate used historical and available market data from previous domestic shipbuilding projects, as well as recent industry benchmarks from other countries building comparable warships, such as labour, material costs, and inflation. This initial cost estimate was based on the available data at the time, and did not account for future changes to economic conditions, the costs of goods and services, or industry capacity.

Since the initial project estimate was made, the Government of Canada implemented the National Shipbuilding Strategy, which included the selection of Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to build the CSC, and the development and release of a competitive procurement process to select the design contractor team and the basis for the ship design– the Type 26. With the release of Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged in 2017, a cost analysis for the CSC project was completed, and the project cost was updated to $56-60 billion. This revised value reflects costs related to building modern ships with current technology and resources; improvements to the rate of production as the shipyard gains efficiencies during construction; and additional contingency funding. The updated project cost was also independently verified by external organizations to ensure validity and consistency, and will continue to be monitored by an independent third-party to ensure its accuracy throughout the duration of this project.

Joint Support Ships

Timeline:

Cost: $4.1B

Q1. The current interim services contract expires before the first JSS is scheduled to be delivered. What will you do about this capability gap?

A1. The RCN has a variety of options available to ensure it remains able to deliver on the missions laid out in Strong, Secure, Engaged. This includes the use of commercial Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment capabilities, as well as the implementation of strategies such as smart scheduling (sailing with and leveraging allies and partners who have support ship capabilities). As there are approximately two years remaining before the end of the interim contract, no decision has been made by the Government of Canada on an extension of the contract yet and all options are still possible.

Q2. You’ve changed the cost of the JSS twice while the Parliamentary Budget Officer successfully predicted this new cost several years ago. Why didn’t you get it right the first time?

A2. As with any large-scale procurement project, all project values are best estimates that are based on the data and figures available at the time. Following the beginning of construction in June 2018, the cost was updated with a better understanding of project risks, the remaining work required to build the ship, as well as the details of the associated construction contract. Based on this understanding, the total project cost estimate was updated from $3.4 billion to $4.1 billion for the design, construction, project and contract management, and contingency costs associated with the acquisition of these ships. We will continue working closely with all our partners to actively manage and monitor this budget over the duration of the JSS project. As the cost to build a ship is based on engineering specifications, production plans, and schedules developed during the design phase, the full budget continues to be further refined as the design is finalized. As a result, it is not uncommon for the cost estimate to change throughout the duration of a project, especially for a first-of-class ship.

If pressed about not waiting for completion of full design before announcing these changes:

Based on our latest estimates, we needed to seek additional funds for this project. These funds needed to be secured before a final contract was signed. In order to avoid any delays to the project, we have proceeded to secure funds based on our advanced estimates and before completion of the design work. As this has had an impact on the overall project budget, updated figures were shared with the public.

Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships

Timeline:

Cost: $4.3B

Q1. Will additional work on the Halifax-class ships be required to continue their role as a result of delivery delays? Will the Halifax-class be retired before the AOPS are delivered, creating a capability gap?

A1. The decision to keep the Halifax-class ships in service was made several years ago, and was not based on delays to the AOPS project. As a result, ongoing maintenance of the Halifax-class will continue to ensure the RCN has the fleet capacity required to support its operational needs until the transition to its future fleet is complete in the early 2040s.

Q2. The original delivery date for the first AOPS was spring 2018, which was progressively delayed to spring 2020. This date was then further delayed as a result of COVID-19. Why have there been so many delays and why are you incapable of providing an accurate delivery timeline?

A2. Building a new class of ships is very complex, and we acknowledge there have been delays to our original delivery timelines for the first and second AOPS. Our foremost priority is ensuring that a quality ship is delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy, and we will take the time needed to ensure this.

The schedules were difficult to predict mainly because the AOPS is a new design, and is being built with largely new facilities, workforces, and processes. The ship is also a complex military platform (for example, there is over 300 kilometers of cabling and various weapons systems), which makes sequencing work, anticipating potential integration issues, and forecasting schedules very challenging. Additionally, as the shipbuilder must adapt and modify several construction processes to establish the best way to build these ships, construction of a first-of-class ship will not be as efficient as the following ships.

The timelines for the first ship had shifted in order to ensure required work was completed before delivery. This included completing rigorous inspections, tests and trials (including sea trials), and correcting any defects. Lessons continue to be learned throughout the construction process, and are benefitting the construction of the subsequent ships. However, as resources were focused on delivery of the first ship, and some inefficiencies were still being resolved, delivery of the second ship was delayed. Unfortunately, these timelines have been further delayed as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We continue to work closely with Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to mitigate potential impacts, and will provide an update on timelines once the local and global impacts of COVID-19 are better understood.

Overall, the project is progressing successfully. The first ship has been delivered, and construction of the second ship is moving forward, with various inspections, tests, and trials concurrently underway to ensure the ship meets technical design requirements at the time of delivery. Construction of the third and fourth ships is progressing on-land, and construction of the fifth ship is expected to begin later this year. Additionally, hundreds of new jobs have been created at the Halifax Shipyard.

2021 Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) Report on CSC

Context:

Key Messages:

Questions and Answers:

Q1. How do you explain the difference between your costs and the PBO’s costs?

A1. After reviewing the report, we find that the key difference in our cost estimates can be primarily attributed to the PBO including provincial sales tax and the emphasis put on weight as a cost factor. As the PBO used a weight-based costing model, any increase in ship weight translates into an increase in cost. Comparatively, while DND considers weight as a factor in its cost analysis, it also incorporates the information received from industry, such as the actual known prices for the equipment required to build the ships.

Our cost estimate also includes all components required to build and bring these ships into service, and is not just the cost for the ships themselves. In addition, our estimate includes contingency funding to account for project risks, which continues to be refined as we progress with design work and gain greater certainty about the complexity and required space for the ship’s combat and support systems.

While we recognize the differences in our calculations, we remain confident that our current estimate of $56 billion to $60 billion accurately reflects the value of this project. Additionally, available data confirms that our estimated project costs are in alignment with estimates for other comparable shipbuilding projects when the scope of the projects, life of the vessels, and full capabilities are considered.

Q2. So, are you saying the PBO’s numbers are wrong?

A2. No, we are not saying that the PBO is wrong, but we do recognize differences in the assumptions and models used for the calculations. With a project of this size and complexity, subtle differences in assumptions early in the project can result in significant differences to cost estimates over the duration of a project. The work of independent third parties such as the PBO and the Office of the Auditor General provides critical validation and accountability in support of our important procurement projects. We welcome their assessments and are happy to cooperate with them in the work they do.

Q3. Why didn’t you include taxes in your estimate?

A3. Our current estimate for the CSC project is $56 to $60 billion (before taxes). As a federal department, our practice is to not include taxes in our budget or cost estimates, since taxes do not have an impact on the department’s expenditures.

For provincial sales taxes, the department does claim an exemption in accordance with the Summary of Reciprocal Taxation Agreements with Provinces and Territories (Section 6). For federal sales taxes paid (e.g. GST&HST) are returned to the federal government through the Canada Revenue Agency.

In the case of CSC costs, DND follows the same financial reporting methodology.

Q4. The PBO report highlighted a significant increase in weight for the CSC. Why has the weight increased and how is this being managed?

A4. Canada’s requirements for the CSC outlined in the RFP did not specify weight. Instead, we included specifications that would enable the ship to perform its assigned missions during its operational service life. As the CSC are upgrading and replacing the capabilities of the Halifax and Iroquois classes of ships, it was expected that its overall size and displacement would be larger than that of either of these two classes of ships, but the exact weight couldn’t be known until a design was finalized.

Following selection of the design, we have gained a better understanding of ship. As a result, the weight of the CSC has increased from 6,900 tonnes to 7,800 tonnes. Increases to the weight of a ship are not uncommon during the design phase, and are managed by using design margins to accommodate changes. We are still in the early stages of the design phase, and we are examining options to mitigate and rationalize weight increases.

The overall weight, stability, and available margin for change of the CSC continue to be closely tracked by Canada as this is an important metric for supporting the design phase. This information is also being shared and discussed with other members of the Global Combat Ship User Group (the U.K. and Australia) to ensure the design and build of the CSC benefits from the successes and lessons learned from our allied partners building variants of BAE’s Type 26 warship.

Q5. Are there any costs the PBO didn’t include in their estimates?

A5. As noted in the report, the PBO cost estimate related to the scenario of starting with a new design does not include some key cost risks associated with the selection of a new design to replace the Type 26. A key cost risk relates to the assumption that the FREMM or the T31 would be proposed in response to a RFP based on Canadian requirements, and, if they were proposed, that assumptions used in the PBO costing model would remain consistent. Other cost risks include the associated costs of further extending the life of the RCN’s Halifax-class ships to mitigate gaps and ensure they have the required operational support until the arrival of the CSC.

In the case of the PBO’s second scenario where two different designs are built, there could be increased through-life costs for operating and maintaining two different classes of ships, including in-service support, training, spare parts, infrastructure, etc.

Additionally, selecting a second design and starting a new design phase required to meet the RCN’s operational requirements would challenge the capacity of both the Government of Canada and industry to manage two large concurrent procurement processes.

Finally, the PBO estimate did not account for additional costs associated with the interruption and inefficient re-starting of work at shipyards, their sub-contractors, and in the supply chain. Cost efficiencies generated by lessons learned after construction of the first ships are also included in our costs and would be lost should we build two classes instead of one.

Q6. The PBO has stated that every single year of delay could result in an additional cost of $2.3 billion. What steps are you taking to mitigate potential project delays?

A6. We recognize the impacts that changes to design and construction timelines can have on project costs, and acknowledge the PBO’s data on this issue. However, it’s important to note that this cost increase would only be a result of fully stopping all related work on the CSC project. Work on the CSC project has progressed well since February 2019, in spite of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Our project management practices ensure that timelines are updated and validated as the project progresses. Risks and uncertainty will continue to be reduced as more concrete information becomes available through the design and beginning of construction. Like any large-scale procurement project, project schedules will remain under close review, and we will continue working with our partners to actively manage timelines and find efficiencies to ensure this critical platform is delivered to the RCN in a timely manner, while also providing the best value to Canadians.

Q7. The PBO suggested a scenario where work on the Type 26 design be terminated in favour of launching a new competition to select an alternative, cheaper design. Would you consider this scenario a possibility?

A7. No. The CSC design was selected through an open, fair, and transparent competitive procurement process, in which performance against the RCN’s requirements was a key selection criteria. Following the selection of the design in February 2019, significant progress has been made in adapting the design to meet Canada’s mission-specific requirements to enable the start of construction in 2023/2024. Changing the design at this stage in the project would also undo all of the current progress to support the start of construction, further delaying the delivery of this critical platform to the RCN, and requiring an extension of the Halifax-class.

While other allied warships could potentially be built at a lower cost, most do not provide the level of capability required for the CSC, and are therefore not an acceptable alternative to meet the RCN’s unique operational needs and required fleet capabilities. Alternative designs that could meet the RCN’S requirements would still require significant changes to meet Canadian specifications, and could result in a cost on-par with the current CSC budget. Additionally, changing the design as a way to reduce costs could have the opposite effect, as it would result in hundreds of millions of dollars in economic loss and a reduction in Canadian jobs due to work stoppage, increased costs due to lost productivity at the shipyard, expensive litigation costs, and significant operational impacts to the RCN due to associated project delays. Finally, the selection of a new design would lead to new costs to start the design process over.

After extensive analysis of the above factors, we remain confident that the inherent warfare capability and versatility of the selected CSC design will equip the RCN with the modern, capable, and effective fleet of warships it needs to defend Canada at home and abroad for decades to come, while also providing the best value to Canadians. As a result, we will not be re-opening the procurement process or selecting a new design, and will continue with ongoing design work to support the start of construction in 2023/2024.

Q8. The PBO has suggested a hybrid scenario that involves building the first batch of three Type 26 vessels, while simultaneously re-competing the design for the remaining 12 vessels. Would you consider this as a possibility?

A8. No. It is important to note that selecting one of the scenario designs (the T31e) would result in a significant reduction in operational capability for the RCN. While other allied warships could potentially be built at a lower cost, most do not provide the level of capability required for the CSC, and are therefore not an acceptable alternative to meet the RCN’s unique operational needs and required fleet capabilities.

Other scenarios with alternative designs that could meet the RCN’S requirements would still require significant changes to meet Canadian specifications, and would likely result in a cost on-par with the current CSC budget. Any savings in this case would quickly be eroded through additional in-service support costs of supporting two different classes of ships. As the CSC will upgrade and replace the capabilities of two classes of RCN ships in a single, combat-capable vessel, the Type 26 design was selected as the best option to meet the full spectrum of Canada’s operational requirements.

Additionally, selecting a second design and starting a new design phase required to meet the RCN’s operational requirements would challenge the capacity of both the Government of Canada and industry to manage two large concurrent procurement processes.

It’s also important to note that there are no guarantee that the recommended designs would submit a bid during a new competition, or that they would be selected as the winning bidder upon completion of the competition.

Q9. Why are you building ships in Canada when the PBO estimates that it’s more than 50% more expensive to do so?

A9. We recognize that building ships in Canada requires significant investments into our shipbuilding capabilities and workforce, which is at the core of the Government of Canada’s commitment to revitalizing the industry through the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). While it’s difficult to accurately determine if it would be more cost effective to build the ships outside of Canada due to various differences in exchange rates, material costs, and supply chains, there are significant benefits to building the ships in Canada. This includes the strategic capability to maintain the ships in Canada once they are built. Past experience, such as our mission in Afghanistan, have demonstrated the importance of being able to maintain, repair and modify equipment within the country.

In addition to growing Canada’s domestic shipbuilding expertise, the CSC project will provide significant and long-standing economic investments into communities from coast-to-coast-to-coast. Through Industry and Science, and Economic Development Canada’s (ISED) Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy, 100% of the design and build contract values will be invested in Canada. Additionally, this project is estimated to create or maintain an estimated 2,500 Canadian jobs during the 4-5 year design period, and more than 10,000 Canadian jobs throughout the 25-year construction period. This project is also estimated to generate at least $40 billion in GDP. The CSC project will also continue to benefit from the expertise of Canada’s marine industry with ongoing sustainment work throughout its operational life.

Q10. Why do you need 15 ships? Will you consider acquiring fewer to reduce project costs? (RCN lead)

A10. As outlined in Canada’s Defence Policy, Strong Secure Engaged, Canada needs a navy with 15 Canadian Surface Combatants, complemented by two Joint Support Ships and four Victoria-class submarines to provide the necessary fleet mix and capacity to deploy forces responsively, prepare follow-on forces effectively, and conduct maintenance efficiently. This will provide a naval fleet that is built around the ability to deploy and sustain two naval task groups, each composed of up to four combatants and a joint support ship, and supplemented where warranted by a submarine, bringing the full breadth of combat capability, force enablers, specialized teams, maritime helicopters, and remotely piloted systems.

The CSC is Canada’s next generation warship that will replace and update the capabilities found in both the retired Iroquois-class destroyers (three) and the Halifax- class frigates (12) with a single, more capable combat ship, to meet multiple threats on both the open ocean and in the highly complex coastal (littoral) environment. Where Canada would have required multiple classes of ships for this range of missions in years past, the CSC is leveraging the latest technology, digitization and miniaturization, to enable a multi-role capability in a single class.

As the CSC project was fully costed, we remain confident in our current budget estimates, and are still planning to acquire 15 new ships.

Q11. What is the estimated cost breakdown for the CSC project?

A11. The current estimated project value includes all components required to build and bring these ships into service, and is not just the cost for the ships themselves. We are still within the $56-$60 billion estimate for the project, thanks to a contingency that was set aside for the project since the beginning.

Based on our current cost estimates, the estimated breakdown for the CSC project budget is as follows:

We don’t calculate the cost per ship, as the project value includes all components required to build and bring these ships into service, and is not just the cost for the ships themselves. We remain confident that we’ll be able to deliver the 15 ships, the integrated logistics and support, as well as the supporting infrastructure within that budget.

Exact costs for personnel, operations, and maintenance needed throughout the full lifecycle of the CSC ships will be greatly influenced by the ship design, and will therefore only be available later in the process.

Q12. The PBO report shows that delivery of the first CSC has been delayed to the early 2030s. Why has delivery been delayed, and what measures are being implemented to prevent further delays?

A12. Ongoing work to adapt the selected CSC design to meet Canadian requirements has provided us with greater clarity about the complexity of the design and time required to build these ships. As a result, industry has proposed revised project timelines for the CSC project as follows:

It’s important to note that the date for the start of construction hasn’t changed, but the expected length of the construction period has been updated to correspond to industry experience in the United Kingdom. We continue working closely with our allies and industry that are building variants of BAE’s Type 26 design in order to find efficiencies, accelerate delivery, apply best practices, and include updated industry benchmarks.

We are also working to implement measures to reduce risks of further delays. One of the ways we are doing this is with the construction of a Land Based Test Facility. Due to the complexity and highly integrated nature of the CSC combat systems, these systems must be tested to ensure they function correctly before they’re installed on the ships.
Since there are no existing facilities capable of supporting this type of testing for CSC, a new, purpose-built land-based test facility will be built in Halifax, Nova Scotia to carry out this work as part of the CSC’s rigorous tests and trials program. This facility will reduce the time required to test and certify functionality of the new combat systems for operational use, helping to reduce the risk of delays due to integration challenges, while also enabling the ships to enter into service quicker.

Like any large-scale procurement project, these timelines will remain under close review, and we will continue working closely with our industry partners to identify and implement appropriate mitigation measures, as needed. This active risk mitigation of the build schedule will continue for the entirety of the project to help ensure we are delivering the right ship for Canada to the RCN as quickly as possible.

Note: please see CSC-timeline specific media lines for more messaging on changes to delivery dates.

Q13. There have been multiple changes to this project, including the ship’s weight, timeline, and cost. Is this because you chose a design that was not yet proven and has never been fully built?

A13. The CSC project is the largest and most complex shipbuilding initiative in Canada since World War II. These ships will equip the RCN for decades to come. It’s also important to note that the changes to the schedule and design are a result of better understanding the complexity of the design and associated work prior to the start of construction. As a result, any warship with this capability would involve changes to its inherently complex design in order to ensure it meets RCN requirements. The changes to the design and project timelines are a normal part of any large-scale shipbuilding project, and would likely have occurred regardless of which design was selected.

The Type 26 design was selected through an open, fair, and transparent competitive procurement process, in which performance against the RCN’s requirements was a key selection criteria, and which was overseen by a fairness monitor. Despite the changes to date, this design remains the right choice for the RCN, and for Canada.

Q14. What is the benefit to having a single class of 15-ships, vice three ships that offer more specialized capability, and 12 that are more general purpose?

A14. The CSC is being designed as a single class with multi-role capability, which will enable it to be re-rolled from one mission to another while remaining deployed. This means, for example, that a CSC operating in the Asia-Pacific region as an air-defence platform for an allied amphibious task group, could quickly respond to a requirement to hunt an adversary’s submarine, or to lead an international task group providing humanitarian and disaster relief.

Where Canada would have required multiple classes of ships for this range of missions in years past, the CSC is leveraging the latest technology, digitization and miniaturization, to enable a multi-role capability in a single class:

Having a single class with multi-role capability will result in:

When taken as a whole, the technological advancements that will be incorporated into the CSC result in a single-class, single variant choice, with an inherent multi-role capability, which will serve Canadian interests for decades to come.

Approved:

Issue: Joint Support Ship (JSS) project status

Date: April 2021

Overview

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is replacing its surface fleets with new, modern, and versatile ships. Through the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver B.C. will be building two new Joint Support Ships (JSS) for the RCN. Known as the new Protecteur- class, these large support ships will be replacing the RCN’s former auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessels that were decommissioned after reaching the end of their operational lives. In addition to providing critical at-sea replenishment, these multi-purpose warships will also be capable of seamlessly integrating with any Canadian or allied naval task group, and will significantly extend the range and endurance of these groups through the provision of fuel, ammunition, aviation support, food, spare parts, and medical and dental care. The project is currently valued at $4.1 billion.

Construction of the ships early blocks began in June 2018, and a contract award to progress with full-rate construction was awarded on June 10, 2020. The first ship is expected to be delivered in 2023, with the second ship expected to be delivered in 2025.

Key Messages

On welding issues

Questions and Answers

Q1. What is the Joint Support Ship (JSS) project?

A1. As part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), the Joint Support Ships (JSS) will replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) former fleet of Protecteur-class Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment (AOR) vessels, the last of which was paid off (decommissioned) in late 2016.

The new JSS (to be known as the new Protecteur-class) will be built by Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. This company was competitively selected in October 2011 as the prime contractor to build the NSS program’s non-combat vessels.

Q2. What is the purpose of AOR vessels?

A2. The purpose of AOR vessels is to re-supply deployed ships at sea. This extends the amount of time a task group can remain at sea, eliminating the need to leave an operational area or return to port for resupply. This greatly increases the task group’s effectiveness, flexibility and endurance. This capability ensures that the RCN is better positioned to succeed across a range of mission sets, including combat operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and diplomacy. An AOR capacity also improves our collaboration with other Canadian government departments and agencies, as well as our interoperability with our allies.

Q3. How will the new JSS benefit the RCN?

A3. The JSS is critical to the future of the RCN, and constitutes a vital and strategic national asset. The presence of replenishment ships increases the range and endurance of a Naval Task Group, permitting it to remain at sea for significant periods of time without returning to port for replenishment. The new JSS will have capabilities such as:

The JSS will provide Canada with a modern, task tailored, globally deployable, naval support capability that can provide support to the ships and aircraft of a naval task group at sea. It will be crewed by CAF personnel and meet the RCN’s operational requirements for this role.

Q4. How many ships will be delivered?

A4. As outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, the JSS project will deliver two ships.

Q5. The RCN has previously indicated that they need three, even four ships for support purposes. Why are only two being purchased?

A5. As outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Government of Canada has determined that a fleet of 15 Canadian Surface Combatants, complemented by two Joint Support Ships, and four Victoria-class submarines, will provide the necessary fleet mix and capacity to meet the needs of the future maritime security environment.

Ensuring that our women and men in uniform have the equipment they need to complete their work is essential to the Department of National Defence (DND). Through Strong, Secure, Engaged, DND will deliver the capabilities the RCN needs to meet future defence and security challenges, both at home and abroad, and to carry out the tasks required of a modern navy.

Q6. Will purchasing only two ships create a capability gap?

A6. No. The RCN has a variety of options available that will ensure they will be able to deliver on the missions as laid out in Strong, Secure, Engaged. This includes the contracting of services from a commercial AOR capability (like what was done with MV Astérix), as well as the implementation of strategies such as smart scheduling (sailing with and leveraging allies and partners who have support ship capabilities).

Q7. Why can’t you just use MV Astérix and convert another commercial ship? It would be quicker, cheaper, and easier than building the JSS.

A7. While MV Astérix is meeting the RCN’s short-term requirements for basic at-sea replenishment duties, it is a commercial vessel that is not built to the same standards as a military ship. As a result, it is not equipped to conduct the full spectrum of military activities required by the RCN, including those required in high-threat environments.
Additionally, as MV Astérix is manned by a civilian crew, who has the right to refuse to undertake any missions or tasks for reasons of safety or commercial interests, the vessel may not be deployed for all missions or tasks required by the RCN. Finally, the cost of Astérix only covers the provision of service over a limited number of years, and does not represent the cost of purchasing the ship outright.

In comparison, the JSS will be able to carry out at-sea replenishment capabilities as well as the full spectrum of military activities required for RCN operations, with a design that includes improved survivability, lifespan, and effectiveness. The JSS will also provide added flexibility and range to Canadian and allied warships in high threat environments by serving as supply vessels providing fuel, ammunition, aviation support, spare parts, food, medical and dental care, and cargo space. Together with the Canadian Surface Combatants and Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, the JSS will form the core of the future RCN fleet, and will provide the best value for Canadians.

Costs and Benefits

Q8. What is the total cost of the project?

A8. The cost of this project is currently valued at $4.1 billion. This includes the funding for the two brand new ships, as well as all of the equipment, tools, and project oversight needed to build and bring them into service. This total cost estimate for the project remains under review as the design effort finalizes and the construction of the ships progresses.

Q9. Why has the Joint Support Ship project budget increased again from $3.4 billion in 2018 to $4.1 billion in 2020?

A9. As with any large-scale procurement project, all project values are best estimates that are based on the data and figures available at the time. In the case of the first JSS, construction of the early build blocks was able to begin ahead of schedule in June 2018 as their design was sufficiently mature to enable production, while the design of the remainder of the ship continued to progress. We now have a better understanding of project risks, the remaining work required to build the ship, as well as the details of the associated construction contract. This has allowed us to update our total project cost estimate from $3.4 billion to $4.1 billion for the design, construction, project and contract management, and contingency costs associated with the acquisition of these ships. We will continue working closely with all our partners to actively manage and monitor this budget over the duration of the JSS project. As the cost to build a ship is based on engineering specifications, production plans, and schedules developed during the design phase, the full budget continues to be further refined as the design is finalized. As a result, it’s not uncommon for the cost estimate to change throughout the duration of a project, especially for a first-of-class ship.

Note: Questions regarding the cost increase are answered in separate media lines.

Q10. Germany built the same ship at a much cheaper cost. Why is the cost of the JSS significantly higher than the German version?

A10. In addition to the costs required to design and build the JSS (material, equipment, labour, contingency, and project and contract management costs), our estimated project budget includes all the costs associated with bringing a ship into service. This includes spare parts, technical data, training, and many other components required to support and maintain these ships over their lifetime.

Comparatively, the cost of Germany’s Type-702 Berlin-class ship may seem significantly lower than the JSS, but it is solely for the construction of the ships and does not include all the associated project components. For example, it does not include the cost of required changes to meet current Canadian standards or costs associated with inflation as the first German ship was commissioned in 2001. As a result, it’s not a fair “apples-to- apples” comparison between the costs of the two projects as they do not include the same elements. Comparing the project budget of the JSS to other countries building supply ships presents the same problem as other countries do not calculate budgets the same way we do, where different project components may be included or excluded.

Q11. Will the Industrial and Regional Benefits policy apply?

A11. Through this design work Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. will be expected to demonstrate value to Canada including meeting its commitment to provide Industrial and Regional Benefits equal to 100 per cent of the value of the design and build contracts.

Build and Design

Q12. What work has been done to date on the project?

A12. A number of key tasks have already been accomplished on this project:

Q13. What are the next steps for the JSS project?

A13. Construction of the JSS continues, and was able to make significant progress despite the COVID-19 pandemic. To date, more than 110 of the 123 blocks that make up the first JSS are substantially complete, with 16 of the remaining blocks under construction. The design of the remaining few blocks will be finalized and released for construction in the next few months, with the final design review expected to be completed in summer 2021.

The main engines for the JSS are expected to arrive at Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards in May 2021. These engines were manufactured by Mann Diesel in Augsburg, Germany, and were acquired by Seaspan through a long-lead item sub-contract. Integration of the engines into the ship blocks during will begin in summer 2021 during the “main engine load-out”. These timelines are tentative and may change as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

In spring 2021, we expect to take delivery of four new sea-to-shore connector systems. Manufactured by Navamar Inc. of Montreal, Quebec, these modular, self-propelled barge units will provide the JSS with an enhanced ability to transfer cargo and equipment from the ship to shore in areas with inadequate docking facilities.

Following the delivery of the JSS by Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards, the RCN will conduct a series of trials to confirm that the ship meets the criteria for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and will subsequently enable Full Operational Capability (FOC). Each JSS is expected to be operational within one year of delivery to the RCN.

Q14. Why has completion of the final design review been delayed from April to summer 2021?

A14. As with any large-scale procurement project, internal project milestones are established as best estimates based on the data available at the time, and are revised as progress is made. Design work has continued since the completion of the Preliminary Design Review for the JSS project in 2017, with construction of the early blocks beginning in June 2018. While construction was able to transition from early block build to full build in summer 2021, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on project timelines. As a result, the timeline for the completion of the Final Design Review is now expected to be completed in summer 2021. Building a ship is very complex – especially for a first-of-class vessel, so taking the extra time to complete design work will ensure project success. The full impacts related specifically to COVID-19 continue to be assessed, with mitigation strategies being developed to address areas such as the global supply chain and production.

Q15. What are the key features of the selected design for the future JSS?

A15. Key distinctions of the selected proven off-the-shelf design for the future JSS include the following:

Q15. Why are we going through a design phase if we are buying an “off-the-shelf” design, and why is it taking so long?

A15. While the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Canada off-the-shelf design was selected as the baseline design for the JSS, it needed to be modified to ensure the ship could be built in Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards production facilities. This included incorporating changes to German equipment and material in favour of a Canadian supply chain (where possible), and to meet essential Canadian requirements. Examples of these changes include adapting to Canadian and North American electrical standards, better insulation and HVAC to support Canadian climate requirements, enabling operation of a different helicopter type, and fitting the RCN self-defence weaponry and boats.

Design work is critical for ensuring that a ship is built to the required standards – especially a first of class ship – and it takes time to get it right. The first part of the design phase, the initial design review, was completed in 2017, and the final design review is expected to be completed in summer 2021.

The changes as a result of this design phase are not only supporting the production of the RCN’s new ships, but are also helping to rebuild the Canadian shipbuilding industry by creating jobs and economic prosperity for communities across the country.

Q16. How could you start construction before the ship design was finalized?

A16. The JSS project took a hybrid design-then-build approach. This means that, as the design of each block reaches a sufficient point of maturity, construction on that block can begin. So rather than waiting for the 123rd block to be designed, we’re able to begin the construction of the more simple blocks, enabling the ship to be delivered on schedule.
This hybrid design-then-build approach was particularly successful in enabling VSY to move out on the construction of simpler blocks well in advance of finalization of the full design.

This approach also allowed us to progress with the acquisition of long lead items and the planned schedule for the first ship while design work on the more complex blocks continued in parallel. This design-then-build approach is standard for all NSS shipbuilding projects, and allows for reduced risk and improved efficiency as design and construction work are able to progress at an appropriate rate.

Q16. When is the first delivery expected?

A16. Based on the February 2019 revised schedule, which include the change of sequencing of the construction of ships, the first JSS is now expected to be delivered by the shipyard in 2023. However, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic may have impacts on these timelines.

Q17. With JSS 2 being pushed back, does this change the need for a second interim supply ship? (DND lead)

A17. No, while the interim AOR vessel is providing necessary replenishment capabilities, it cannot do what the new Protecteur-class ships are being built for. The RCN needs a ship that can conduct a full-spectrum military operations in high-threat environments.

Mitigation measures including the leasing of the interim Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment vessel and collaboration with ally countries will help support the RCN’s operations until both Joint Support Ships are delivered

Q18. How will the change in the build sequencing affect the operations of the RCN?

A18. There will be no direct change to operational schedules as the JSS have yet to be scheduled for any operations. The sequencing change strengthens the earliest possible delivery schedule for the first JSS, allowing the RCN to integrate this renewed capability back into the fleet and in service more quickly than last anticipated.

Mitigation measures will continue to be assessed to ensure the RCN has the tools it needs to do its job. The RCN has a variety of options available to ensure it will be able to deliver on the missions as laid out in Strong, Secure, Engaged.

Q19. When will the JSS actually be fully operational?

A19. Following the delivery of the JSS by Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd, the RCN will conduct a series of trials to confirm that the ship meets the criteria for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and subsequently to enable Full Operational Capability (FOC). Each JSS is expected to be operational within one year of its delivery to the RCN.

Ship Name

Q20. What will the future JSS be named?

A20. On September 12, 2017, the RCN announced the future JSS ships will be renamed as the Protecteur-class as a tribute to the dedication and sacrifices of the generations of sailors who have served in the past ships of the former Protecteur-class.

Q21. Weren’t the ships previously named the Queenston-class?

A21. In October 2013, the Government of Canada had announced that the JSS ships would be named the Queenston-class. Since that announcement, the original purpose-built AORs, the former HMC Ships Protecteur and Preserver, were paid off and are no longer part of the RCN’s fleet.

This fact presented the RCN, through its Ships Naming Committee, an opportunity to consider reusing the names of the original AORs, an option that was not available when the JSS were originally named in 2013.

Steel Issues

Q22. Will the Joint Support Ship being constructed be made from Canadian steel?

A22. As part of its contract with the Government of Canada, Vancouver Shipyards sources its steel through a Canadian distributor. This shipyard supplier, Samuel Custom Plate and Profiles, acquires steel from a variety of mills based on best value and availability of the types and dimensions of steel that is required. In the case of our JSS warships, we require the use of Det Norske Veritas - Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL) certified steel (DNV-GL being the Classification Society to which JSS is being designed and built.) This certification ensures we obtain material of the highest quality that has been manufactured under strict controls and standards.

Canadian mills have and will be considered to fulfill the requirement for the construction of the Joint Support Ships if such mills are able to provide the necessary grades, size and quantities of steel required. Algoma Steel Inc. has already won a contract for an initial supply of steel for Canada’s new Joint Support Ships. This award follows an open and competitive procurement process conducted by BC’s Samuel Custom Plate and Profiles. As parts of the Joint Support Ship are made ready for construction, new steel orders will be sent to the shipyard supplier to fulfill.

Q23. Why can’t you use Canadian steel anyway? Steel is steel, isn’t it?

A23. There are a variety of factors considered when sourcing steel for building a warship.
Considerations such as best value, certification, and the in-mill availability of steel with the required dimensions and specifications determines where it is acquired. Canadian steel is always part of the consideration.

Coast Guard Welding Issues

Q24. Given current issues with the Coast Guard’s ships, why do you believe Seaspan will be able to build the JSS correctly?

A24. First ships out of the production line often have aspects that need some refinements or adjustments, as was the case with the OFSV. We are pleased to see that issues have been actively detected and managed, and that corrections are both being made on current ships and being implemented for future builds.

Seaspan is currently implementing new initiatives that will benefit the JSS construction:

We are confident in these initiatives and in our inspection process that help ensure all equipment meets our standards.

Q25. There was recently a new sequence for the construction of JSS, why is the schedule identified as having risks?

A25. The schedule indicated in the quad chart reflects the new sequence announced in February 2019 and is reflected in the updated JSS 1 planned milestones. Due to the complexity of the undertaking, risks still remain on the dates for the construction of JSS 2, as it will be dependent on both the progress of construction of JSS 1 and the Coast Guard ship construction.

Q26. The construction sequence of JSS and OOSV was recently changed because Seaspan was unable to build several vessels simultaneously. This delayed the delivery of JSS 2. With the announcement, the Seaspan shipyard will now build Multi-Purpose Vessels in addition to its current work package. How will DND ensure that the Joint Support Ships will not be further delayed?

A26. As both the engineering and production capacity of the shipyard has matured and deepened, there is growing confidence in Seaspan’s ability to manage the simultaneous design and construction of more than one class of vessel at a time. Canada will also continue to ensure that the contractor adheres to the integrated production schedule by regularly monitoring the progress of build modules through various production facilities. These numerous worksites allow the contractor to assemble several sections of different ships simultaneously. Additionally, Canada will ensure that appropriate priorities are applied to the construction of the JSS as the project progresses.

    Updated:
    April 2021
    Drafted by:
    Stephanie Poulin; ADM PA
    Consulted:
    • Jacques Arsenault, JSS PCSM
    • Wayne Rockwell, PM JSS
    Approved by:
    • Geoff Simpson, DGMPD(Sea)
    • Patrick Finn, ADM Mat
    • Véronique Duhamel, DPAPI

Issue: JSS project budget update

Media Query: Produced in anticipation of media queries

Date: 15 June 2020

Overview

In October 2019, Seaspan Shipyards of Vancouver B.C., provided an updated build proposal outlining the cost to start full construction of the future Joint Support Ships (JSS). After reviewing the build proposal and overall project components, the total project budget has increased from the previous estimate of $3.4 billion to $4.1 billion, and now accounts for increased costs associated with ship production, establishing supply chains, material costs, and design work. This is the second major increase to the estimated project budget, the first occurring in 2018 when the original cost estimate rose from $2.3 billion to $3.4 billion. This estimate has been risk-adjusted based on government and industry experience to arrive at the current budget.

In February 2020, we received project implementation approval and full authorities for the current total project value of $4.1 billion. As the previous budget increase for this project received significant media and public scrutiny, it is anticipated that the latest increase will garner the same attention.

Approach: The approach is proactive. The below messaging will be used to address related media queries. A briefing with media and interested stakeholders will be proposed to provide an update and explanation on the change in project budget with participation from DND, PSPC, and ISED SMEs (TBC).

Key Messages

On why the cost has increased:

Note: Questions about the contract structure, the National Shipbuilding Strategy, or associated funding, should be directed to PSPC.

Questions and answers

Q1. In 2018, you said you completed a more informed cost analysis, resulting in the increase to $3.4 billion, yet the project cost is increasing again. How is it possible that you underestimated the cost twice while the Parliamentary Budget Officer successfully predicted this new cost several years ago?

A1. As with any large-scale procurement project, all project values are best estimates that are based on the data and figures available at the time. In the case of the first JSS, construction of the early build blocks was able to begin ahead of schedule in June 2018 as their design was sufficiently mature to enable production, while the design of the remainder of the ship continued to progress. We now have a better understanding of project risks, the remaining work required to build the ship, as well as the details of the associated construction contract. This has allowed us to update our total project cost estimate from $3.4 billion to $4.1 billion for the design, construction, project and contract management, and contingency costs associated with the acquisition of these ships. We will continue working closely with all our partners to actively manage and monitor this budget over the duration of the JSS project. As the cost to build a ship is based on engineering specifications, production plans, and schedules developed during the design phase, the full budget continues to be further refined as the design is finalized. As a result, it’s not uncommon for the cost estimate to change throughout the duration of a project, especially for a first-of-class ship.

If pressed about not waiting for completion of full design before announcing these changes:

Based on our latest estimates, we needed to seek additional funds for this project. These funds must be secured before a final contract is signed. In order to avoid any delays to the project, we have moved forward with securing funds based on our advanced estimates and before completion of the design work. As this has an impact on the overall project budget, updated figures are now being shared with the public.

Q2. So, the PBO was right in 2013 when they said the ships would cost $4 billion?

A2. While our current project budget is aligned with the PBO’s 2013 estimate, the figures leading to this estimate are different. We remain confident in our costing process and budget based on our latest information.

Q3. Is the cost of the project going to increase again?

A3. While we remain confident in our current project estimate, it’s possible that the figure could change in the future. As with any large-scale procurement project, all project values are best estimates that are based on the data and figures available at the time. For example, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in the weakening of the Canadian dollar, which may result in increased material and supply chain costs in the future, impacting the overall project cost. While the total project budget includes contingency funding for these types of reasons, their implications can only be addressed as they happen. As a result, it’s possible that cost estimates may change for a variety of reasons that can’t be controlled or predicted. It’s also important to note that while the construction contract may continue to be amended throughout the duration of the project, it does not necessarily mean that the project budget will increase.

Like any large-scale procurement project, the estimated project budget will remain under ongoing review, and we will continue working with all our partners to actively manage and monitor this budget over the duration of the project.

Q4. Will construction of the ship be delayed due to COVID-19?

A4. Under normal circumstances, we would expect the delivery of the first ship within three years from the start of full-rate construction. Currently, construction of the JSS continues at Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards under the health restrictions and guidelines directed by the provincial government. We will continue working closely with our partners to monitor progress. Further questions about the shipbuilder’s current operations should be directed to Seaspan.

Q5. Germany built the same ship at a much cheaper cost. Why is the cost of the JSS significantly higher than the German version?

A5. In addition to the costs required to design and build the JSS (material, equipment, labour, contingency, and project and contract management costs), our estimated project budget includes all the costs associated with bringing a ship into service. This includes spare parts, technical data, training, and many other components required to support and maintain these ships over their lifetime.

Comparatively, the cost of Germany’s Type-702 Berlin-class ship may seem significantly lower than the JSS, but it is solely for the construction of the ships and does not include all the associated project components. For example, it does not include the cost of required changes to meet current Canadian standards or costs associated with inflation as the first German ship was commissioned in 2001. As a result, it’s not a fair “apples-to- apples” comparison between the costs of the two projects as they do not include the same elements. Comparing the project budget of the JSS to other countries building supply ships presents the same problem as other countries do not calculate budgets the same way we do, where different project components may be included or excluded.

Q6. What is the estimated total cost breakdown for the JSS project over its lifetime?

A6. The contract for construction of the two JSS is currently valued at $2.4 billion. This includes the cost for construction of the early build blocks that began in June 2018, as well as ongoing construction of the ship, which will progress to full-rate construction in summer 2020. This new contract is funded out of the broader $3.1 billion budget for the construction of the two JSS and initial spares, which also includes all of the material, equipment and labour costs. The remaining design, project management and associated contingency costs for this project are valued at $1 billion. Together, this represents a total estimated project budget of $4.1 billion for acquiring two new ships and bringing them into service.

Additionally, the AJISS contract will provide in-service support for both the RCN’s Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and the Joint Support Ships for 35 years. The contract for in-service support is valued at up to $5.2 billion, and is being managed as part of a separate project.

Q7. Why are you awarding another construction contract when you already awarded one in 2018?

A7. This new contract is essentially a continuation of the first construction contract. In August 2018, an initial $66.6 million contract (including taxes) was awarded for the construction of up to 52 early blocks for the JSS. This was possible due to the maturity of the ships blocks’ design, which allowed us to progress with early construction and the acquisition of long lead items while design work on the more complex blocks continued at the same time. This contract was amended to approximately $120 million (including taxes) to sustain construction until the full-rate construction contract could be awarded. This new $2.4 billion contract (including taxes) will absorb the costs from the previous contract and its amendment, and will cover all construction activities for both ships going forward.

Q8. Why can’t you just use the MV Asterix and convert another commercial ship? It would be quicker, cheaper, and easier than building the JSS.

A8. While the MV Asterix is meeting the RCN’s short-term requirements for basic at-sea replenishment duties, it is a commercial vessel that is not built to the same standards as a military ship. As a result, it is not equipped to conduct the full spectrum of military activities required by the RCN, including those required in high-threat environments.
Additionally, as the MV Asterix is manned by a civilian crew, who has the right to refuse to undertake any missions or tasks for reasons of safety or commercial interests, the vessel may not be deployed for all missions or tasks required by the RCN. Finally, the cost of the Asterix only covers the provision of service over a limited number of years, and does not represent the cost of purchasing the ship outright.

In comparison, the JSS will be able to carry out at-sea replenishment capabilities as well as the full spectrum of military activities required for RCN operations, with a design that includes improved survivability, lifespan, and effectiveness. The JSS will also provide added flexibility and range to Canadian and allied warships in high threat environments by serving as supply vessels providing fuel, ammunition, aviation support, spare parts, food, medical and dental care, and cargo space. Together with the Canadian Surface Combatants and Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, the JSS will form the core of the future RCN fleet, and will provide the best value for Canadians.

Q9. Is the cost increasing because Seaspan lost money building the Coast Guard’s Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels and needs to remain profitable by building the JSS?

A9. We recognize that building ships in Canada requires significant investments into the capabilities and workforce of our shipbuilders, which is at the core of the Government of Canada’s commitment to revitalizing the industry through the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). We are proud to have our new ships built in Canada and remain confident in Seaspan’s abilities to effectively and affordably deliver our new support ships.

The increased project budget is a result of a better understanding of project risks, the remaining work required to build the ship, as well as the details of the associated construction contract. We also have greater certainty in identifying what infrastructure, labour, and material is required to effectively build these ships. This includes the establishment of shipyard production norms, such as welding quality and efficiency rates, rates of construction re-work based on the lessons learned.

Note: Questions regarding the increase from $2.3 billion to $3.4 billion are answered in separate lines.

Q10. What is the impact of COVID-19 on Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged?

A10. The overall impact of the pandemic on individual departments is not yet known. However, in this current context, it is now more advantageous than ever that Canada’s defence policy is based on a long-term vision and features the flexibility to respond to a changing world. We are committed to the significant and strategic long-term investments that will ensure the Canadian Armed Forces continues to function as an agile, and combat-ready force, capable of making tangible contributions and delivering on its commitments.

Q11. What’s included in the $2.4 billion contract out of the broader $3.1 billion budget for the acquisition of the JSS?

A11. The $2.4 billion (including taxes) contract awarded to Seaspan Vancouver Shipyards is primarily for the material and production effort associated with constructing the two JSS in the shipyard. This cost also includes such items as tests and trials, as well as financial incentives based on achieving predetermined milestones.

This contract also includes the cost for construction of the early build blocks that began in June 2018 and has since substantially completed work on 30 large blocks and progressed work on another 34. This has positioned Seapsan to quickly transition to a more aggressive production rate under this recently awarded contract.

The remainder of the $3.1 billion is primarily for the acquisition of the major equipment and sub-systems that must be ordered well in advance of being installed in the shipyard (known as Long Lead Items). This effort is essential in order to acquire the information necessary to advance the detailed design of JSS and also to support the shipyard’s production schedule. Seaspan is executing this work under a Long Lead Items contract which was initially awarded in December 2015 and will be completed during the construction period of the ships.

Q12. What is an "initial spare"?

A12. A number of spare parts will be delivered with each ship, to facilitate their transition to in- service support. These would include items that would normally be expected to be replaced due to regular operations within the first year or so, post-delivery. While this aspect will undergo further review as the project progresses and the list of items is refined, it would include items ranging from air filters to spare engine components.

Q13. How much of the $1 billion in supporting costs (design and production engineering, project management, contingency, etc.) has already been awarded to Seaspan?

A13. Besides the ongoing design work that is in its final stages, this component of the budget includes all of the historical costs associated with the JSS project:

This $1 billion (taxes excluded) also includes all costs associated with running the JSS Project Management Office, such as travel and salaries, and costs leading up to completion of options analysis.

Altogether, this represents a total estimated project budget of $4.1 billion for acquiring two new ships and bringing them into service.

Updated:
15 June 2020
Drafted by:
Sarah Kleinhempel, Communications Advisor
Consulted:
  • Commander Bagga, COS, PMO JSS
  • Jacques Arsenault, PCS, PMO JSS
  • Kevin Fitzpatrick, DMEPM(NC)
  • Vrenti Ghergari, DCA, ADM(Fin)
Approved by:
  • Blaine Duffley, PM, JSS
  • Wayne Rockwell, DGMPD(Sea)
  • Troy Crosby, ADM(Mat)
  • Cheri Crosby, ADM(Fin) and CFO
  • Vice-Admiral McDonald, CRCN
  • Tina Raymond, A/Manager, Mat/IE PA
  • Véronique Duhamel, DPAPI, A/DGPASP
  • Joe De Mora, A/ADM(PA)
  • MNDO
  • PCO

Issue: Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS)

Date: April 2021

Overview

Canada is acquiring six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

In May 2019, the Government of Canada announced a decision to move ahead with the acquisition of a seventh and eighth AOPS, which will be modified for the Canadian Coast Guard. The construction of two additional ships will mitigate the potential production gap between the AOPS and the Canadian Surface Combatant.

Irving Shipbuilding Inc. has been contracted to build the ships. The first ship was launched in September 2018 and delivered on July 31, 2020. The second ship was launched in November 2019, and is expected to be delivered in summer 2021. The third and fourth ships are also currently in production, with construction of the fifth ship expected to begin later in 2021, however, timelines are tentative and may change as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The project also includes the construction of the Nanisivik Naval Facility, a berthing and fueling facility, and the newly constructed Halifax NJ Jetty to support the AOPS. The project will also provide funding to the Esquimalt A/B Jetty project.

As this project is part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, and due to the multiple delays and changes experienced thus far, the media remains heavily interested in this work.

Related Information

Key Messages

Questions and Answers

Cost and Schedule

Q1. What is the estimated cost breakdown for the acquisition budget?

A1. The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) acquisition budget for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is $4.3 billion. This includes ship design, project management, materials and labour needed to build all the ships, jetty and fueling infrastructure, initial spare parts, technical data, crew training, and contingency costs. This budget does not include costs for the two AOPS intended for the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG).

Additionally, the AJISS contract will provide in-service support for both the RCN’s AOPS and the Joint Support Ships for 35 years, and is valued at $5.2 billion.

Q2. What is the delivery schedule for the ships?

A2. The current delivery schedule is as follows:

Ship Planned Delivery Date
AOPS 1 July 2020 – completed
AOPS 2 Summer 2021
AOPS 3 2022
AOPS 4 2023
AOPS 5 2024
AOPS 6 2025
AOPS 7 2026
AOPS 8 2027
 

Note all delivery dates are tentative and subject to change due to anticipated delays as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. At this time, it is too early to determine the possible length of delays as the situation continues to evolve. An update on timelines will be provided once the full extent of COVID-related impacts are better understood and schedules are reviewed.

Q3. Will the construction of ships 6, 7, and 8 close the production gap between AOPS and CSC?

A3. The construction of a sixth AOPS for the RCN and two additional ships for the CCG was intended to help mitigate the production gap between AOPS and CSC, enabling Canada to retain highly skilled workers in the shipbuilding industry. While the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is impacting timelines for the AOPS project, it is too early to determine how this may impact the construction of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) and Canadian Coast Guard vessels. A full evaluation of potential impacts to project schedules under the National Shipbuilding Strategy will be completed once the situation has stabilized and the full extent of COVID-related impacts are better understood.

Q4. Will the ships built for the CCG be the same as the ones being built for the RCN?

A4. The ships for the RCN and the CCG will largely be the same, although there will be slight modifications to the CCG ships to support their unique operational and regulatory requirements. For example, the ships will share the same hull form and the majority of key systems. Further questions about the design of the CCG ships should be directed to the CCG.

Q5. The original delivery date for the first AOPS was spring 2018 which has been progressively delayed to spring 2020, and was then further delayed as a result of COVID-19. Why have there been so many delays and why are you incapable of providing an accurate delivery timeline? Will there be delays to the other ships?

A5. Building a new class of ships is very complex, and we acknowledge there have been delays to our original delivery timelines for the first and second AOPS. Our foremost priority is ensuring that a quality ship gets delivered to the RCN, and we will take the time needed to ensure this.

The schedules were difficult to predict mainly because the AOPS is a new design, and is being built with largely new facilities, workforces, and processes. The ship is also a complex military platform (for example, there is over 300 kilometers of cabling and various weapons systems), which makes sequencing work, anticipating potential integration issues, and forecasting schedules very challenging. Additionally, as the shipbuilder must adapt and modify several construction processes to establish the best way to build these ships, construction of a first-of-class ship will not be as efficient as the following ships.

The timelines for the first ship shifted in order to ensure required work was completed before delivery. This included completing rigorous inspections, tests and trials (including sea trials), and correcting any defects. Lessons continue to be learned from the construction of the first ship, and are benefiting the construction of the subsequent ships. However, as resources were focused on delivery of the first ship, and some inefficiencies were still being resolved, delivery of the second ship has been delayed. Unfortunately, these timelines were further delayed as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Overall, the project is progressing successfully with the first ship delivered, and construction of the second AOPS progressing, with various inspections, tests, and trials concurrently underway to ensure the ship meets technical design requirements at the time of delivery in summer 2021. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the third and fourth ships is progressing on-land, and construction of the firth ship is expected to begin later in 2021. Additionally, hundreds of new jobs have been created at the Halifax Shipyard.

Q6. What is the current status of AOPS 2?

A6. Construction of the second AOPS is progressing, with various inspections, tests, and trials concurrently underway to ensure the ship meets technical design requirements at the time of delivery. Sea trials for the ship are expected to begin in May 2021 to test the functionality of certain systems at sea. After sea trials, remaining production work will be completed, and deficiencies noted during the inspection, test, and trials program will be addressed. Following reviews and final inspections by National Defence, Irving Shipbuilding Inc. will deliver the ship.

Based on the current schedule, we expect the second AOPS, the future HMCS Margaret Brooke, to be delivered in summer 2021, noting that these timelines are tentative and may change as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon delivery and acceptance by Canada, HMCS Margaret Brooke’s program will be similar to that of HMCS Harry DeWolf, with an anticipated twelve-week post-delivery work period that is necessary to install and set to work the ship’s communication systems, conduct physical configuration audits, and necessary preventative maintenance. Once completed, a readiness evaluation program will be conducted for a period of approximately ten days. At that point, HMCS Margaret Brooke will be considered “safe to proceed to sea,” and a basic ship readiness employment program will be executed. The RCN will then assume operational control and use of the ship. A formal commissioning ceremony is expected to occur in the summer of 2022.

Q7. How will the new schedule impact the RCN’s planned operations for these ships? (RCN Lead)

A7. As these ships have not been put into service yet and represent a new operational capability for the RCN, there are no impacts to current RCN operations. As the AOPS are delivered and transitioned into service, the RCN will incorporate them into its operational schedule, which is routinely adjusted based on fleet capacity and available resources in order to respond effectively to operational requirements.

Q8. What are the different steps in the shipbuilding process?

A8. Shipbuilding is a complex, non-linear process that includes many steps and simultaneous activities.

Generally, a ship’s construction progresses through various stages of production, with each stage resulting in a greater level of ship completion. Construction starts in Irving Shipbuilding’s Inc.’s state-of-the-art Assembly and Ultra Hall, where ship units are assembled, joined into larger blocks, and then joined together to form a mega-block. Each AOPS consists of 64 units, 21 blocks, and three mega-blocks. Once each mega- block is complete, it is then moved to the outdoor land-level production area, where the three mega-blocks are joined together to form one complete ship hull. Once the ship reaches an appropriate level of completion, it is then launched into water, where it stays for the remainder of production.

Major milestones in the construction of the AOPS include:

Throughout the construction process, a testing and trials program is carried out by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. and Government of Canada representatives to ensure that design and quality requirements are being met. This program takes place starting from the steel cutting until the delivery of the ship, and includes thousands of planned verification activities. Some of these activities include inspections to verify weld quality during assembly of the ship units and blocks, as well as sea trials, where the ship is taken to sea to test various key systems before delivery to the RCN. Some ships may include a builder’s trial, where the ship is taken to sea for a first informal “test-drive” before formal sea trials begin. These will be conducted on an as-required basis.

Once the ship is complete, the Government of Canada has approved the final inspection, and all criteria laid out in the construction contract have been met, the ship will then be delivered and accepted by the RCN. It will then be moved from the Halifax Shipyard to the CFB Halifax Dockyard, where it will be berthed at the new Jetty NJ. The ship will then undergo final preparations and outfitting, including the completion of communications systems. The crew of the ship will then begin operational readiness activities and training over the following months.

During the first year after the delivery, post-delivery trials will be completed by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to confirm final elements of the ship’s design, with the RCN operating the ship. These trials may be done concurrently with operational readiness activities.

Q9. Why was the start of construction for AOPS 5 delayed?

A9. While the steel cutting for AOPS 5 was originally delayed to allow for more focused efforts on the first four ships, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in additional delays to project timelines for all ships. As a result, the start of construction for the fifth ship is currently expected to begin later in 2021, noting that timelines remain tentative.

We continue to work closely with Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to mitigate potential impacts, and will provide an update on timelines once the full extent of COVID-related impacts are better understood and schedules are reviewed.

Capabilities

Q10. What kind of tasks will the AOPS be able to accomplish? (RCN Lead)

A10. The Harry DeWolf-class patrol ships’ tasks include, and are not limited to:

Q11. Why are landing craft being acquired for the AOPS?

A11. To support RCN operations and activities while deployed, each AOPS will be equipped with one landing craft onboard. These landing craft were acquired as part of the AOPS project, and represent a new capability for the RCN. With a range of more than 200 nautical miles, these landing craft will be used to transfer and deploy personnel, equipment, and small vehicles such as ATVs and snowmobiles from the ship’s vehicle bay to shore. The landing craft will also be equipped with a crane to load and unload cargo, as well as equipment enabling them to deliver cargo to shore and/or connect to berthing infrastructure or deliver cargo to shore.

As the designated shipbuilder for the AOPS project, Irving Shipbuilding Inc. was responsible for selecting and awarding a subcontract to ABCO Industries Ltd. for these landing craft, which was included in the overall project budget. The informal first look of this landing craft provided to the RCN was very positive, given their potential for a wide range of capabilities to support RCN requirements.

Q12. What rescue boats will be used on the AOPS?

A12. Each AOPS will be equipped with two multi-role rescue boats. A $7.3 million sub- contract was awarded by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to Rosborough Boats of Halifax, Nova Scotia for the acquisition of 12 Rough Water™ rescue boats. These 8.5 metre Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB) will act as a rescue boat for marshalling and towing lifeboats, and deploying and supporting the RCN’s Enhanced Naval Boarding Party during operations. These boats are also highly adaptable and seaworthy, and can be used in multiple operating environments, including harsh sea conditions.

Q13. The Government announced in November 2018 that it will purchase a sixth ship. How will a sixth ship support the RCN?

A13. The ships are well suited to execute several essential missions assigned to the RCN, such as assisting civil authorities, law enforcement, and non-governmental partners in support of national security, responding to domestic and international emergencies, conducting search and rescue operations, and capacity building in support of Government of Canada objectives.

The acquisition of a sixth ship will also greatly increase the availability of vessels to the RCN. With six AOPS, the RCN will be able to deploy up to four AOPS simultaneously – two in the Arctic, and two available for domestic tasks (one each coast). Additionally, the great versatility of the AOPS will allow the RCN to have its combatants, the Halifax- class, and the future CSC, to focus on higher intensity operations.

Q14. How long will AOPS be able to operate in the Arctic compared to existing naval vessels? Will they be able to operate without CCG escorts? (RCN Lead)

A14. These ships will be able to sustain operations for extended periods of time, and will be capable of operating in the Arctic during the navigable Arctic season, which is between June and October.

The Nanisivik Naval Facility, the northernmost Canadian naval facility, will provide refueling and replenishing services for the vessels, helping to further extend RCN operations. Unlike the existing RCN fleet, the AOPS will be capable of operating in medium first-year ice, allowing unescorted access to portions of the Arctic that were previously inaccessible to the RCN. The AOPS will enable a greater CAF presence and operational capability in the north.

While the AOPS will be able to navigate without escorts, we will continue our close collaboration with the CCG in the development of joint operations, procedures, and patrols to ensure an optimal and effective presence in the Arctic.

Infrastructure

Q15. What jetty infrastructure is required?

A15. To ensure that we are able to berth these new ships, jetty infrastructure is being upgraded on the east and west coats, as well as in the Arctic. Construction of the new NJ jetty was successfully completed at CFB Halifax in summer 2019, and construction of the new B jetty at CFB Esquimalt is expected to be completed in 2023. Additionally, work to establish a docking, replenishing, and refuelling facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut is underway, and is expected to be operational in summer 2022.

Q16. When will construction of the Nanisivik Naval Facility be completed, and how long will it be able to operate? (IE lead)

A16. Construction work in the Arctic presents unique challenges given the climate and significant logistics planning. Work has to be planned a year ahead of time in order to get the material to this remote site, and the department counts on sea and air transport to be on time. Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought further challenges. Due to the pandemic, most of the on-site work originally scheduled for 2020 had to be postponed, which has impacted the project schedule. We now forecast the fueling facility to be completed by September 2021, with initial operational capability targeted for summer 2022. However, there remains significant schedule uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic and how this may impact the 2021 construction season in the Arctic. NNF will operate during the navigable season of the year, which is approximately July through October

Steel Issues

Q17. Are the AOPS made of Canadian steel? If not, why not?

A17. The steel used for the construction of the AOPS originates from several countries, including Canada. As part of its contract with the Government of Canada, Irving Shipbuilding Inc. is responsible for the procurement of steel used for the construction of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships. Irving Shipbuilding Inc. procured the majority of steel from a foreign supplier who sourced it from Europe and, to a lesser extent, from China. A small amount of steel was procured in Canada.

The Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy requires that Irving Shipbuilding Inc. invest in Canadian business activities as much value as they are receiving in the contract. This ensures a dollar-for-dollar investment into the Canadian economy and the off-setting of foreign content.

Q18. Why can’t you use Canadian steel anyway?

A18. There are a variety of factors considered by the shipyard when sourcing steel, such as: best value, delivery timelines, certification, compatibility with shipyard equipment, and whether the current availability of steel meets the required dimensions, tolerances, and specifications for the ships. The assessment and decision for procuring steel lies with the shipyard and Canadian steel would always be considered.

Updated:
April 2021
Revised by:
Sarah Kleinhempel, Communications Advisor
Consulted:
  • Cdr Guillaume Côté, PD AOPS
  • Stéphane Cormier, PMO AOPS
  • Jason Kaddatz, PMO AOPS
  • Navy Public Affairs
Approved by:
  • Andrea Andrachuk, PM AOPS
  • Wayne Rockwell, DGMPD(Sea)
  • Troy Crosby, ADM(Mat)
  • Tina Raymond, A/Manager, Mat/IE PA
  • Véronique Duhamel, DPAPI
  • Joe DeMora, DGPASP + A/ADM(PA)

AOPS 1 Delivery

Strategic Considerations

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Narrative

As outlined in Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Government of Canada is investing in six new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) to support the current and future needs of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). On July 31, 2020, we formally accepted delivery of our first new AOPS, HMCS Harry DeWolf. Built by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. under the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), the delivery of this new class of ship represents a historic milestone for the RCN.

These modern and multifunctional ships will be at the core of an enhanced Arctic presence, and will effectively and strategically complement the capabilities of our current and future warships through critical reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Designated the Harry DeWolf-class in honour of Vice-Admiral Harry DeWolf, a Canadian wartime naval hero, the AOPS were designed with a thick and robust hull that will allow them to operate in up to 120 cm of first-year sea ice. With its considerable space to efficiently transport cargo, the AOPS will also be able to accommodate a Cyclone helicopter as well as small vehicles, deployable boats, and cargo containers. The ship’s modern facilities include gender-inclusive washrooms, individual crew accommodations, and the flexible use of common spaces, such as the briefing room, wardroom, and boarding party room, to serve as a silent space for prayer or meditation required for various religious practices. These modern accommodations on-board the ship will significantly improve the comfort and quality of life for its crew, which underscores our commitment to improved inclusivity and well-being for our personnel.

With the ship officially delivered to the Government of Canada, it will remain berthed at NJ Jetty in the CFB Halifax Dockyard while it undergoes post-acceptance work. This post-acceptance work is a normal part of the shipbuilding process, and is used to address outstanding work including deficiencies that may have come up during formal sea trials, but were deemed acceptable to be completed after delivery. It is also used to prepare the ship and its crew for the first time a ship goes to sea under RCN command, which includes RCN sea trials to allow verification of major ship systems and overall ship performance.

The crew of HMCS Harry DeWolf began their operational readiness activities and collective training in October 2020, and successfully completed various training operations, as well as cold weather and ice trials, in Canadian waters. As this ship represents a new capability for the RCN, this period of training is required to ensure the crew is familiar with how the ship functions. To support the operationalization of this ship, Irving Shipbuilding Inc. is also conducting post- acceptance trials to verify final elements of the ship’s design while the RCN operates the ship. Following participation in the maritime portion of Operation NANOOK in August 2021, HMCS Harry DeWolf is expected to circumnavigate the Arctic throughout fall 2021.

This new class of ship is built for a real and clear purpose, and will provide the RCN with a modern, effective, and high-quality ship to patrol Canada’s three coasts. The delivery of this ship marks an exciting new chapter in Canada’s long and proud naval history, and we look forward to welcoming the first new AOPS into RCN service in summer 2021.

Questions and Answers

Q1. Will Irving Shipbuilding be charged a penalty for this late delivery?

A1. As delays to the delivery of the first ship were further impacted by the ongoing COVID- 19 pandemic and could not have been foreseen by the shipbuilder, Public Services and Procurement Canada has allowed a period of excusable delay, as outlined in the construction contract. As further details about the contract are protected by commercial confidence, we are unable to comment further on this matter.

Q2. How are timelines for the remaining ships being impacted by COVID?

A2. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented situation. While the first ship was delivered on July 31, 2020, and the second ship is expected to be delivered in summer 2021, we are anticipating delays to the timelines for the remaining AOPS. At this time, it is too early to determine the possible length of delays as the COVID-19 situation continues to evolve. We will continue working closely with Irving Shipbuilding Inc. and our industry partners to mitigate potential impacts and continue work on the remaining ships while keeping our respective workforces safe. An update on timelines will be provided once the full extent of COVID-related impacts are better understood and schedules are reviewed.

Q3. Will delays to the AOPS result in delays to the Canadian Surface Combatant and the Canadian Coast Guard vessels?

A3. At this time, it is too early to determine how delays to the AOPS project may impact the construction of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) and Canadian Coast Guard vessels. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, progress on the CSC design has been maintained, and will continue under its current design phase. A full evaluation of potential impacts to project schedules under the NSS will be completed once the situation has stabilized and the full extent of COVID-related impacts are better understood.

Q4. The delivery of the AOPS was already delayed before COVID-19. Could these additional delays have been mitigated if you had stayed on schedule?

A4. The global COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in an unprecedented situation, and its impacts are far reaching and difficult to define at this time. While we are unable to accurately assess how COVID-19-related delays could have impacted early project timelines, public health guidance to adjust industrial operations for large-scale construction projects would have inevitably resulted in some form of delays to the project.

Q5. The original delivery date for the first AOPS was spring 2018, which was progressively delayed to spring 2020, and was then further delayed as a result of COVID-19. Why have there been so many delays and why are you incapable of providing an accurate delivery timeline?

A5. Building a new class of ships is very complex, and we acknowledge there have been delays to our original delivery timelines for the first and second AOPS. Our foremost priority is ensuring that a quality ship gets delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy, and we will take the time needed to ensure this.

The schedules were difficult to predict mainly because the AOPS is a new design, and is being built with largely new facilities, workforces, and processes. The ship is also a complex military platform (for example, there is over 300 kilometers of cabling and various weapons systems), which makes sequencing work, anticipating potential integration issues, and forecasting schedules very challenging. Additionally, as the shipbuilder must adapt and modify several construction processes to establish the best way to build these ships, construction of a first-of-class ship will not be as efficient as the following ships.

The timelines for the first ship had shifted in order to ensure required work was completed before delivery in July 2020. This included completing rigorous inspections, tests and trials (including sea trials), and correcting any defects. Lessons continue to be learned from the construction of the first ship, and are benefiting the construction of the subsequent ships. However, as resources were focused on delivery of the first ship, and some inefficiencies were still being resolved, delivery of the second ship was delayed.
Unfortunately, these timelines were further delayed as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We continue to work working closely with Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to mitigate potential impacts, and will provide an update on timelines once the local and global impacts of COVID-19 are better understood.

Overall, the project is progressing successfully with the first ship delivered, and construction of the second AOPS progressing, with various inspections, tests, and trials concurrently underway to ensure the ship meets technical design requirements at the time of delivery in summer 2021. Despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the third and fourth ships is progressing on-land, and construction of the fifth ship is expected to begin later in 2021. Additionally, hundreds of new jobs have been created at the Halifax Shipyard.

Q6. Will work be required for the Halifax-class ships to continue their role as a result of these delays?

A6. The decision to keep the Halifax-class ships in service was made several years ago, and was not based on delays to the AOPS project. As a result, ongoing maintenance of the Halifax-class will continue to ensure the RCN has the fleet capacity required to support its operational needs until the transition to its future fleet is complete in the early 2040s.

Q7. How will delays as a result of COVID-19 impact costs?

A7. We are working through the contractual and financial implications of the COVID-19 pandemic to find resolutions that are acceptable to both Canada and suppliers, and to mitigate any budgetary and schedule impacts. At this time, it is too early to determine what impacts COVID-19-related delays may have on the project cost. However, like any large-scale procurement project, the estimated project budget will remain under close review, and we will continue working with all our partners to actively manage and monitor this budget over the duration of the project.

Q8. When will the in-service support contract for the AOPS come into effect?

A8  A long term In-Service Support contract for the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Joint Support Ships (AJISS) was awarded to Thales Canada in 2017. Once the ship was accepted by Canada on July 31, 2020, the responsibility for the management of in- service support was assumed by Thales Canada.

Q9. When will the ship deploy to the Arctic? (RCN lead)

A9. The crew of HMCS Harry DeWolf began its Basic Single Ship Readiness Training (BSSRT) in October 2020 to to familiarize themselves with the ship and how it functions. Following this training, the ship successfully navigated the waters off the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, and ice off the coast of Nunavut, crossing the 60th parallel, in February 2021. Cold weather and ice trials were also conducted as part of its Post Acceptance Trials program off the coast of Baffin Island. HMCS Harry DeWolf is currently scheduled to participate in the maritime portion of Operation NANOOK in August 2021, and will be followed by circumnavigating the Arctic throughout fall 2021. Further details about the ship’s deployment plans will be shared over the coming months.

Q10. When will Harry DeWolf officially enter into RCN service? (RCN lead)

A10. HMCS Harry DeWolf is expected to enter into RCN service in summer 2021 once the crew has completed all of their required operational training. This event will be marked by an official commissioning ceremony.

Q11. How will this delay impact the RCN’s planned operations for these ships (RCN lead)

A11. As these ships have not been put into service yet and represent a new operational capability for the RCN, there are no impacts to current RCN operations. As the AOPS are delivered and transitioned into service, the RCN will incorporate them into its operational schedule, which is routinely adjusted based on fleet capacity and available resources in order to respond effectively to operational requirements.

Post-Delivery Work Period

Q12. How could you accept a ship that had defects at the time of delivery?

A12. Delivery of a ship does not mean it is complete and ready to enter into service. Ship delivery occurs when the ship has reached a point of construction that meets detailed design, quality, and functionality criteria outlined in the construction contract and agreed to by Canada and the shipyard. These requirements are verified by the Government of Canada and the shipbuilder during a pre-delivery inspection.

Prior to delivery of HMCS Harry DeWolf, a number of construction deficiencies were identified and documented as part of a rigorous quality assurance program. Both the Government of Canada and the shipbuilder agreed that certain deficiencies could be corrected after delivery. Identifying and correcting some deficiencies following delivery is a normal part of the shipbuilding process – especially for a first-of-class ship – and was agreed to as it would allow the RCN to begin their training and operations.

While the shipbuilder has corrected most remaining deficiencies, a few remain to be completed during the following months. In the meantime, appropriate mitigation measures have been put in place where necessary. Following detailed assessment and review of all deficiencies, HMCS Harry DeWolf has been deemed as safe to proceed to sea.

If pressed on whether the ship is safe for sea:

We take the safety and security of our sailors very seriously, and no ship will go to sea if any potential safety risks are identified. We will continue to monitor the state of the ship, and are taking the appropriate actions to ensure both the safety of our sailors and the operational capability of the ship.

Q13. Why is post-delivery work needed?

A13. Besides rectifying deficiencies, other post-acceptance work was always planned for the AOPS in order to finalize construction and operationalize the platform. During this stage, the ship has and will continue to undergo final preparations, including the outfitting and integration of onboard systems to meet RCN operational requirements. As this type of work involves sensitive or classified information, or trade-specific expertise, it can only be completed by the RCN once it has been delivered.

As the Harry DeWolf-class represents a new capability for the RCN, these work periods will also be used to prepare the ship and its crew for the first time it goes to sea under RCN command. During the first year after delivery, post-acceptance trials will be completed by Irving Shipbuilding Inc. to confirm final elements of the ship’s design while the RCN operates the ship. These trials may be done concurrently with operational readiness activities.

Q14. What work has been done on the ship since delivery?

A14. Since the delivery of HMCS Harry DeWolf, over the fall of 2020, the ship’s crew and Thales Canada Inc. have equipped the ship, familiarized themselves with the systems, conducting maintenance, and generally prepared to operate and support the ship. These activities were performed to ensure the ship was safe and ready for RCN sea training.

The first short work period for HMCS Harry DeWolf began on November 30, 2020, and was completed on February 5, 2021. During this work period, Thales Canada, the in- service support contractor, conducted additional corrective and preventative maintenance. A few engineering changes were also incorporated by various organizations, and the shipbuilder, Irving Shipbuilding Inc., corrected outstanding deficiencies and warranty work

The ship underwent a second short work period from the period of March 8 to April 1, 2021.

The work conducted during these periods is a result of strong collaboration between the in-service support contractor, Thales Canada, the shipbuilder, Irving Shipbuilding Inc., RCN and DND Fleet Maintenance Facility (FMF) crews, and other Government of Canada stakeholders.

Q15. Will further work be required?

A15. Similar to a car, ongoing work will be required to ensure the ship remains safe and effective to support operations.

An additional short work period is scheduled for HMCS Harry DeWolf from July 5th to August 2, 2021, prior to its planned Arctic deployment. Outstanding work from the shipbuilding contract will also continue, and will ensure the ship fully meets its operational and technical requirements. This includes the finalization of outstanding deficiencies and warranty items, inspections, post-acceptance trials, change requests, validation of the ship’s technical requirements, approval of change requests, and the analysis of various technical and program documentation.

Q16. What new deficiencies or issues have been identified since the ship was delivered?

A16. During readiness at sea training in October 2020, a few new technical issues arose. This included:

Quick Facts (Background Information)

Update:
April 2021
Drafted by:
Sarah Kleinhempel, A/Senior Communications Advisor, Mat PA
Consulted:
  • Karen Watson, AJISS PM
  • Kevin Fitzpatrick, DMEPM(NC)
Approved by:
  • Andrea Andrachuk, PM, AOPS
  • Wayne Rockwell, DGMPD(Sea)
  • Cmdre Carosielli, DGMEPM
  • Troy Crosby, ADM(Mat)
  • Tina Raymond, Manager, Mat PA
  • Veronique Duhamel, DPAPI/DGPASP
  • Joe De Mora, A/ADM(PA)
  • MNDO
  • PCO

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