Statement
CEFCOM S-07.001 - August 7, 2007
OTTAWA - Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, Commander Canadian Expeditionary
Force Command (CEFCOM) issued the following statement upon the release of the
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson Board of Inquiry (BOI) findings:
"I have carefully reviewed the Board's investigation into the circumstances
that lead to the death of Private Robert Costall at Forward Operating Base
Robinson, Afghanistan, and found it to be complete and well prepared. The CDS
and I fully agree with the recommendations of the Board. The review process
has taken a significant period of time to allow for diligent legal and other
review requirements and to coordinate with allied forces involved in the incident
while sustaining the intensity of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The
report clearly documents the sequence of events and the situational context
in which this unfortunate event occurred. Private Costall was killed
as a result of an attack of unprecedented intensity by Taliban forces from
multiple directions. In the heat of this battle, our troops were engaged
by other friendly forces defending FOB Robinson leading to Private Costall’s
death and a number of wounded.
The circumstances facing Coalition forces at FOB Robinson on the 28th of March,
2006 were as fluid as they were complex. In the preceding 42 days the
relatively small force defending the FOB had been attacked 21 times. Moreover,
a large re-supply convoy, escorted by both Afghan National Army (ANA) and Coalition
forces from another command, was subjected to a significant, coordinated attack
and subsequently an improvised explosive device (IED) attack leading to casualties
while en route to FOB Robinson. In response to the attack on the convoy
and the situation at FOB Robinson, a Canadian Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was
deployed on short notice by Coalition Multinational Brigade (South) Headquarters
to reinforce the FOB. The QRF, comprised of a small Headquarters, an
infantry platoon from 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
(1 PPCLI), and mortar and medical detachments, arrived at the FOB by helicopter
after dark.
On arrival, the QRF linked up with the on-site forces and was assigned positions
to support the defence of the FOB. Shortly thereafter, the re-supply convoy
arrived, rapidly swelling the population of the FOB from 200 to over 400 personnel
from many different chains of command. Just a few hours later, as Coalition
forces were organizing their defences, the FOB was attacked in force. Responding
to sustained enemy fire from the northeast and the northwest, 2 Section of
the QRF moved forward to reinforce the FOB’s north defences. This
placed them on a berm between the point of origin of enemy tracer fire and
a friendly machine gun position. The machine gun crew, unaware of the presence
of the QRF elements to their front, and taking incoming fire from that general
direction, opened fire on the berm, inadvertently engaging 2 Section and killing
Private Robert Costall and injuring other Canadian soldiers. It is a
measure of the intensity and the confusion of the situation that a US soldier
was also killed (Master Sergeant John Stone of the Vermont National Guard)
and other Coalition soldiers wounded by friendly fire not long after this incident.
Combat is often accompanied by high levels of confusion and friction brought
on by a variety of factors. This phenomenon, commonly referred to as the "fog
of war", was clearly prevalent in this incident, wherein determined insurgent
forces launched an attack from at least two different directions, in the middle
of a very dark night, with little or no ambient illumination, against a tired
and besieged Coalition defensive team. Moreover, the leadership in the FOB
had little time to integrate the QRF and other arriving forces into a cohesive
force before the attack was launched, exacerbating the circumstance and uncertain
context in which this terrible incident occurred.
The Board determined that Private Costall was killed, and the other Canadians
wounded, by friendly fire originating from a U.S. defensive gun position within
the existing FOB Robinson defensive complex. Beyond the inherent confusion
and friction associated with the timing and other circumstances of the attack,
the Board identified three contributing causes to the friendly fire incident,
these being incomplete coordination and control, poor situational awareness
and an error in battlefield combat identification. These errors and omissions
clouded situational awareness amongst different elements on the FOB, with the
inevitable and sad consequences.
This tragic incident was the result of unfortunate alignment of a number of
actions and omissions, in the intense crucible of combat. In reviewing
the actions of the individuals and the causes of the incident, I have carefully
considered the mitigating circumstances identified by the Board in their report:
The in-place force had experienced a protracted period of intense attacks,
which, combined with the exhausting work to establish and build the FOB,
led to a state of mental and physical fatigue on the part of the in-place
soldiers and leaders.
The entire series of events, including the arrival
of the QRF, the arrival of the convoy, and the subsequent attack took place
on one of the darkest days of the year. Visibility was further limited by
the fine powdery soil was which remained suspended for significant periods
after being disturbed.
The defensive forces, within a period of one hour,
received the QRF with little notice, and the convoy, which had numerous dead
and wounded who needed to be attended to.
The defence of the FOB required
the integration of a wide variety of forces, from a wide spectrum of contributing
units and nations with the recognized threat of an impending attack.
This
represented the first major combat engagement for the members of the QRF.
This
attack, launched from two points, was the most complex and intense attack
on the FOB that had been experienced by the defenders up to that point.
Taking into consideration all factors that prevailed at the time and the actions
of all individuals, I fully support that Board's conclusion that no blame can
or should be assigned to any individual. In my view, there is nothing in the
Board's report that suggests any individual willfully acted inappropriately.
Based on the evidence, the leadership at all levels did their best under extremely
trying circumstances.
The Board also made several recommendations to improve equipment, training
and tactics, in order to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence of such an incident
in the future. These recommendations have all been endorsed at my level and
by the CDS. Details regarding the solutions and their implementation status
cannot be provided for operational security reasons, however it can be said
that most have been resolved and solutions to the remainder are well underway.
Even with these improvements, however, the complexity and demands of combat
are such that the risk of repeating such incidents can simply not be reduced
to zero.
Throughout this process, we have worked hand in hand with US authorities to
investigate the full circumstances of what happened that night. The cooperation
we received from the US Army has been outstanding. The BOI President has kept
the Costall family informed of our approach, and all aspects of the BOI process,
every step of the way.
All the soldiers who fought the Taliban that night did so with courage and
honour, especially Private Costall and Master Sergeant Stone, each of whom
made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of their nations and the Afghan
government. Ultimately, their death resulted from a determined attack
by forces who oppose the democratically elected government of Afghanistan. They
died defending their fellow soldiers, while in the noble pursuit of making
a better and more peaceful life for the Afghan people. They will not be forgotten.
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