Transnational Repression Operation

As part of its mandate to monitor the digital information ecosystem during the general election, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has observed a transnational repression (TNR) operation targeting the 45th general election.

As part of its mandate to monitor the digital information ecosystem during the general election, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has observed a transnational repression (TNR) operation targeting the 45th general election.

As part of its mandate to monitor the digital information ecosystem during the general election, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force has observed a transnational repression (TNR) operation targeting the 45^th general election.

Background

In December 2024, Hong Kong Police announced they would provide monetary rewards for information that would lead to the arrest of six individuals living overseas, including two Canadians.

The decision by Hong Kong to issue international bounties and cancel the passports of democracy activists and former Hong Kong lawmakers, is deplorable. This attempt by Hong Kong authorities to conduct TNR abroad, including by issuing threats, intimidation or coercion against Canadians or those in Canada, will not be tolerated. 

One of the six individuals targeted by Hong Kong is Joe Tay, Conservative Party candidate for Don Valley North, and known for his opposition to PRC laws and practices in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), including Mainland China and Hong Kong, uses a variety of tactics to carry out TNR activities. It exploits PRC-based family members to pressure those in Canada to cease certain activities the PRC views as hostile, or to return to the PRC. It also threatens PRC-based family members with a range of potential coercive actions, including detention or financial penalties. The PRC also leverages overseas actors to monitor, surveil and report on others in Canada.

To support its TNR activities, the PRC uses its diplomatic missions, PRC-linked organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department, community organizations and influential community leaders, among others.

About transnational repression

Transnational Repression (TNR) takes place when foreign governments reach beyond their state borders to advance their interests or silence criticism and dissent using intimidation, threats or violence, often against diaspora and exile communities.

TNR activities typically target political dissidents, human rights and democracy defenders, and religious and ethnic minority groups. But TNR also increasingly targets the people and organizations that defend the victims. This can include activists, international students and scholars, lawyers and doctors, as well as journalists.

Hostile state actors will use a variety of tactics to extend their reach into Canada:

• Physical intimidation and violence: Monitoring and surveillance, vandalism, threats, abduction, assault, or attempted murder. Actors can use coercion or assault as punishment or to influence opinion, and hostile state actors sometimes hire organized crime groups or proxies for this.
• Threats against overseas relatives and other connections: Threats against relatives and partners in the home country, to relay messages or force an action in Canada. This creates a sense of vulnerability, as close relations abroad may be victim to the laws and regulations of a non-democratic country.
• Legal manipulation: Foreign states abusing legal mechanisms for coercive purposes, like libel suits, extraditions agreements, bounties for information on individuals, Interpol Red Notices, imposing sanctions, and refusing visa applications for personal or professional travel.
• Community ostracism: Rejection from community associations, use of labels such as ‘extremist’ or ‘traitor’, or loss of access to social events and employment opportunities.
• Malicious Digital Activity: Hacking, cyberbullying, targeted deepfakes, online defamation and disinformation, doxxing, or threatening online messages.

Impact

TNR causes harm both to the victims and the community.

• At the individual level, there is a profound psychological impact on victims who experience TNR. They might experience fear, anxiety, and stress due to the continuous surveillance and harassment they face. In fact, just knowing that a foreign government can monitor their activities or harm their families can lead many victims of TNR to self-censor or withdraw from public life.
• At the community level, TNR creates mistrust and division. Targeted communities may become fragmented as individuals fear infiltration by foreign agents or retaliation for associating with activists.

Transnational Repression Operation

During the writ period, SITE has observed two significant trends related to Mr. Tay across multiple social media platforms.

1. Inauthentic and coordinated amplification of content related to the bounty and arrest warrant against Mr. Tay, as well as content related to his competence for political office.
   
   The SITE Task Force has seen that multiple accounts or platforms published or interacted with content at similar times and dates – sometimes within minutes or even seconds of each other. This creates an increased volume of content, making it more likely that users of these platforms are exposed to the amplified narratives.
   
2. Deliberate suppression of search results, or “keyword filtering” censoring Mr. Tay’s name in simplified and traditional Chinese on platforms based in the PRC.
   
   The SITE Task Force is observing deliberate efforts to suppress any new content about Mr. Tay, and when users search his name, the search engine only returns information about the bounty.

This is not about a single incident with high levels of engagement. It is a series of deliberate and persistent activity across multiple platforms – those in which Chinese-speaking users in Canada are active, including: Facebook, WeChat, TikTok, RedNote, and Douyin, a sister-app of TikTok for the Chinese market.

Overall engagement levels since December 2024 have been low, with an increase at various points during the writ period. The combined instances, inauthentic and coordinated amplification across multiple platforms, and the concerning trend of deliberate search suppression on platforms frequented by Canadians, have led us to determine that voters need to be aware.

It is clear that this was a deliberate attempt to amplify inauthentic content. However, at least until this point, that content has not generated much traction.

Reporting transnational repression

If you are in immediate danger, always call 9-1-1.

1. Take a record of events:
   As soon as it is safe, write down or record the situation as precisely as possible. Include descriptive details about the person, date and time, location, other witnesses, and event. For instance: Did it happen in-person? Was it a phone call? An email? Any security cameras or witnesses nearby?
2. Report it:
   Contact your local police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Clearly articulate why you believe you are being targeted and mention that you believe this is transnational repression.
   
   Even if the piece of information provided may not on its own be something that meets a criminal threshold, it may be a building block that helps police to identify threats, support a larger police response, or even contribute to another ongoing investigation.
   
   When the matter concerns your vote, you can also reach out to the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and the SITE Task Force. 
   
   Contacts
   RCMP secure website
   RCMP phone: 1-800-420-5805
   CSIS secure website
   CSIS phone: 1-800-267-7685
   Commissioner of Canada Elections secure webform
   Commissioner of Canada Elections phone: 1-855-759-6740
   SITE Task Force: SITE-MSRE@smtp.gc.ca

Sample images

These are just some examples among many. It is important for the SITE Task Force to avoid amplifying this type of transnational repression campaign any further.

Other languages

• Chinese (Traditional) - 中文 (繁體)
• Chinese (Simplified) - 中文 (简体)