Executive Summary

In early 2018, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced that the government was willing to enter into comprehensive peace discussions with the Taliban. This offer was taken seriously by the Taliban which began sending consistent messages on its conditions for participation through multiple channels. Talks between Taliban representatives and the United States, facilitated by US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, continue to take place.

Negotiations are expected to proceed through three phases. First, talks must establish pre-conditions for substantive discussions. Second, there must be agreement on the structure and terms of a transitional government. Third, parties must agree on a comprehensive peace settlement which will include a new constitution and governance model. A significant milestone in the first phase was passed when an agreement in principle for a peace framework on 28 January 2019.  

Important changes in the political and security environment are facilitating a serious movement to settle the prolonged violence in Afghanistan.

• Influential global and regional parties are prepared to consider seriously the Taliban’s declarations that it is only interested in the governance of Afghanistan, and not international jihad. The US requires this assurance to agree to withdraw from Afghanistan, but it is also important for all of Afghanistan’s neighbours. While regional actors benefit in some ways from Afghan instability, there are greater potential gains from an end to the war, and the suppression of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).
• Despite attacks by the IS-K, almost all the violence in Afghanistan is attributable to the Taliban, the government and US forces. The adherence by Taliban forces to a three-day ceasefire in June 2018 demonstrated that Taliban leaders exercised control of their combatants and could potentially enforce a peace agreement.
• Taliban conditions for continued talks, including a tentative date for US withdrawal, a transitional government, as well as an agreement for a constitutional process to produce a new government structure, are difficult. They nevertheless provide skilled diplomats with enough to work with. The US wishes to withdraw from Afghanistan, but the critical question is when and how it will manage this withdrawal.
• The Taliban remains confident it can eventually push out the US and defeat the government, but this would take more time and many more casualties. An end to the war in exchange for participation in government and possibly dominance is a reasonable bargain at this point.

The IS-K is focused on furthering international jihad and will not be part of peace discussions. The IS-K has fought the Taliban with the goal of replacing it. Its centralised hierarchy and dependence on electronic communications has made its fighters vulnerable to US attacks, and many IS-K leaders have been killed. An agreement not to launch attacks within Pakistan led to the provision of a safe haven for the IS-K leaders and a restoration of leadership stability.

• The IS-K is more extreme in its violence and beliefs than the Taliban and, consistent with the IS-K’s harsh relations with local populations elsewhere, is well behind the Taliban in terms of local support. The IS-K morale and reputation have suffered from Daesh’s defeat in Syria and the execution of reluctant fighters.
• The loss of the so-called caliphate in Syria initially led to more resources flowing to the IS-K, but this flow has now reversed as Daesh now attempts to rebuild in Syria as a guerilla force. Fighting strength has fallen from a possible high of 12,000 to an estimated 8,000. The IS-K has seen a decrease in its funding from Daesh and fears losing financial support coming from Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf.
• Supporters in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf still give limited support to the group. To retain their backing, the IS-K has engaged in murderous attacks on Shia tribes and carried out attacks on foreigners in Kabul—possibly with the paid help of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China and India have a greater interest in peace than in continued warfare in Afghanistan. As a jihadist force, the IS-K is a threat to their own internal security, while the Taliban claims to have no ambitions outside Afghanistan. Russia, Pakistan and Iran have relations with both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan.

• Pakistan has been a long-term supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a means of retaining regional influence, but has encouraged the Taliban to negotiate. India constantly warns of the continuing danger from Afghan extremists and wants a long-term US commitment to regional stability.
• Russia would like to see the US humiliated in Afghanistan, just as the USSR was, but it fears the spread of violent jihadist movements into the adjacent republics of Central Asia, and into Russia itself.
• China has a short common border with Afghanistan, but is sensitive to any movements which could encourage or train Uighur separatists.
• As a predominantly Shia state, Iran does not want a violent anti-Shia force, such as the IS-K, on its border.

Afghanistan’s governance and electoral machinery contribute to national instability and could potentially produce outcomes that would conflict with an orderly peace process. Afghanistan’s constitution established a strong presidency, and the difficulty of working with parliament has led to the assertion of even greater presidential powers.

• Provincial council elections have habitually been delayed beyond their constitutional limits, and have now been postponed to 28 September 2019, the date of the presidential election. This deadline may be impossible to meet.
• The results of the chaotic October 2018 parliamentary elections are still contested.
• There are well over twenty potential candidates for the next presidential election, representing numerous different factions. The election will take place at a critical time in the ongoing peace discussions.
• Afghans believe in the idea of democracy, but their reality has been corruption, vote manipulation and violence.

Many observers believe that conditions exist for progress in peace talks towards a transitional government. There is strong pessimism about whether this could lead to permanent peace.

• A transitional government would bring peace for between 18 and 24 months, but could not be sustained for longer. A transitional agreement would have to freeze the current status of Taliban and government control of territory, decide on the division of portfolios, and commit to a process for constitutional negotiations.
• A permanent peace would require agreement on many contentious questions: a permanent governance model; the structure of future unified security forces; human rights; action against extremists who are not part of the agreement; and measures to rebuild an economy destroyed by civil war, corruption and, increasingly, climate change.
• The ethnic, religious, tribal and political forces that have repeatedly led to civil war in Afghanistan are undiminished. The Bonn Agreement of 2001 empowered and enriched important factional leaders from past conflicts.
• The Taliban is strong and united, bolstered by senior leaders released from Guantanamo. The Kabul government is weak and unable to overcome endemic corruption, factionalism and economic failure.
• Afghanistan’s army is undertrained, crippled by corrupt suppliers and no match for the Taliban without US support.

Much depends on how long US forces remain in Afghanistan. If the US reached a clearer agreement with the Taliban and then withdrew before a final agreement on a transitional government was concluded, the government of Afghanistan could collapse quickly. Withdrawal before a final constitutional agreement could be reached by a transitional government and would increase the already strong possibility that negotiations for a lasting peace agreement would fail.  Even if a new constitution is agreed to, it could quickly evaporate if the Taliban felt there was no incentive to adhere to it. A final peace agreement would also be threatened by other violent or corrupt parties with too much to lose, or an unyielding opposition to Taliban participation in the government of Afghanistan.

• The Taliban is negotiating because it calculates that, although it will eventually take back total control of Afghanistan, the cost would be very high if it tried to do so early. As soon as the US withdraws, this calculation would change to a belief in the high probability of a rapid victory if fighting resumed.
• Many Afghans who can leave are doing so. Many believe that if the economy, stability and human rights did not improve after almost eighteen years of foreign attention, there is little hope for Afghanistan after abandonment by the US and its allies. 
• An early withdrawal of US forces could result in a new Taliban offensive and the end of the current regime.