Executive summary

The conflict in Syria and Iraq has partly become a struggle for dominance between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda. This struggle has been affected by the use of air power by the United States, its allies and Russia.

  • Five years ago, Al-Qaeda seemed in permanent decline and ISIL had not yet arisen. Now ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliates are fighting for dominance across the Middle East and in parts of Africa and Asia. Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra is gaining strength in Syria. The dynamic of the Syrian civil war has spread into Iraq, where ISIL originated. Syria is strongly supported by Shia forces contributed by Iran.
  • The United States has struggled to stabilise Iraq around a political leadership able to reconcile Sunni and Shia elements, and has helped to train Iraqi national forces. It had hoped to end the Syrian civil war with a peace agreement based on the removal of President Bashar al-Assad, but the current cease‑fire does not include it.
  • Air power, led by the United States, has reduced the territory held by ISIL in Iraq and Syria. Russian air power has enabled the Assad regime to regain vital territory in western Syria near the coast.

ISIL is the focus of media attention and coalition attacks, but Jabhat al-Nusra is gaining in strength and may be in a better position to dominate the jihadist movement in the long run.

  • ISIL has been successful in gaining territory, recruiting fighters and issuing compelling propaganda. Its brutality has hindered its ability to win allies among other jihadist groups.
  • ISIL fighters have sustained very high casualty rates. Recruitment is faltering slightly and defections are increasing. Bombing attacks and battlefield losses have undermined part of ISIL’s revenue base, allegedly resulting in the salaries of fighters being halved.
  • Jabhat al-Nusra has benefitted from the attacks on ISIL, and it has been relatively free to carry on offensive operations. Al-Nusra has thus far rejected the visible brutality of ISIL’s methods. It has therefore become more acceptable to local populations, and other groups are more likely to merge or ally with it.
  • Both groups are firmly and equally committed to violent jihad. Al-Qaeda has a more explicit policy of attacking the far enemy and ISIL is currently putting less emphasis on distant attacks while it attempts to consolidate the so-called caliphate. An argument can be made for either group eventually achieving supremacy or for a merger between them. It is difficult to see a scenario in which the danger to the West, or the destabilising impact on the Middle East and beyond, diminishes. Jabhat al-Nusra seems best placed to predominate in the longer term.

ISIL has been extremely successful in recruiting foreign fighters. Most come from the Middle East, but a significant number are drawn from Europe. Smaller numbers travel from North America and Asia.

  • The religious appeal of ISIL rests on the ideal of a caliphate and a utopian life there, the unity of Sunni Muslims fighting against victimhood and conspiracy, the call to jihad, as well as an apocalyptic vision.
  • ISIL recruiters establish one-on-one contact with many recruits through the Internet, using finely tailored psychological appeals which are reinforced by official propaganda outlets.
  • Men are recruited with a mixture of instrumentalised religious arguments, the lure of military adventure, sex slaves or wives, personal power and the draw of violence in the service of a just cause. Women are often drawn to an idealised life and union with a warrior hero.

Many foreign fighters die in battle. Others are disillusioned with ISIL and seek to return to their countries of origin.

  • The promises of ISIL propaganda are at the root of disillusionment. Instead of finding a ‘better’ world founded on Islamic brotherhood, many find internecine combat, corruption, excessive brutality, and hypocrisy. Many foreign fighters believe they are being used as cannon fodder.
  • Countries of origin seek to take advantage of such disillusionment. Many have de-radicalisation programs targeted at fighters or would-be fighters.
  • Parents are the most frequent source of tips indicating that an individual is being radicalised. De-radicalisation interventions are intensive and prolonged; it can take up to nine years for de-radicalised individual to stabilise.
  • Recruitment and indoctrination narratives anticipate de-radicalisation attempts, and warn recruits of the tactics that will be used. Many returning fighters remain radicalised and a threat, including some who initially appear open to de-radicalisation.

While the online presence of ISIL receives much attention, even more significant is its total domination of online and offline communications in the territories it controls.

  • The ISIL media apparatus is extensive and averages 38 propaganda events a day. It is sophisticated, multilingual and transmedia.
  • Within ISIL territory, recruits and the population are subject to unrelenting propaganda to socialise them to the objectives and methods of ISIL. When ISIL establishes a presence within a new area, it removes all alternate sources of information, such as satellite dishes. The relentless propaganda directed to those living within ISIL territory is a means of consolidating absolute power; it will have a long-lasting impact beyond the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

ISIL and Al-Qaeda compete for affiliates abroad. These provide a source of fighters and give the organisations strategic depth and alternatives, should their strongholds come under unrelenting pressure.

  • Local factors often determine whether potential local allies pledge allegiance to ISIL or Al-Qaeda.
  • ISIL has a foothold in Libya, where it controls Sirte and part of the nearby coastline. Sirte accepted ISIL’s presence because, as a former Qaddafi stronghold, it needed protection from the opposition Misrata militias. ISIL seeks to destroy the oil industry, which finances the national government.
  • Libya would benefit from a dialogue centred on the security sector, as well as one on governance. Foreign powers seeking to intervene in Libya face a difficult balancing challenge. Unless properly calibrated, outside intervention could worsen the situation and make effective governance and stability even more difficult to achieve.
  • Anti-regime rebels in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula constitute an effective fighting force that inflicts a steady casualty rate on the Egyptian army. So far, it remains largely a local force with local objectives. If it became a more ambitious jihadist organisation, the position of the UN’s Multinational Force and Observers would become untenable.
  • ISIL and Al-Qaeda are competing for the allegiance of groups in Indonesia, and so far ISIL is ascendant. To date, this means Indonesian recruits to jihad are travelling to Syria to fight. However, there are also a number of fighters joining Jabhat al-Nusra who seem more intent on gaining battle experience with a view to strengthening domestic terrorist forces upon their return.

The entry of Russia into the conflict has given Moscow much wider geopolitical significance.

  • Russia’s bombing campaign prevented the defeat of the Syrian Army and enabled it to re-take much of the heavily populated sector of western Syria. Russia’s military presence and its missile defences have inhibited Turkey from intervening more directly in Syria, and forced the United States to ensure its forces do not come into conflict with those of Russia.
  • The Assad regime also owes its survival to Iran, which has supplied forces from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hizballah. Both have played major roles in the fighting. Hizballah is skilled in urban combat. Ground assaults have been coordinated with Russian bombing.
  • With its intervention in Syria, Moscow has advanced a geopolitical strategy designed, among other objectives, to undermine NATO. It has rescued its long-time ally, the ruling Assad regime, and protected the future of its base at Tartus, in the eastern Mediterranean, which it may expand. NATO member Turkey now faces a resurgent Syrian regime protected by Russia, with a Kurdish-ruled territory along the border. Peace in Syria is now impossible without Russian participation; the price may be the permanence of the Assad regime. Moscow is accused of weaponising the refugee flows into Europe, creating dissention among the European countries that have applied economic sanctions on Russia because of its aggression in Ukraine. 
  • While Russia may succeed in securing the western portions of Syria, most vital to its own strategic interests, the outcome for Syria will be its destruction as a viable state. Moderate opponents of the regime will be left with little fighting capacity, while ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra control much of the country.

The impact of war in Syria and Iraq, the resurgence of Al-Qaeda and the rise of ISIL will have a long-term impact on the region and on global politics.

  • Terrorism inspired by Al-Qaeda and ISIL has proved to be resilient. The nature of this terrorism may well change again, but the regional and international threat level will remain high for the foreseeable future.  
  • Even if an enduring peace agreement is reached on Syria, the Syrian Kurds will attempt to secure their territorial gains along the Turkish border, generating long-term conflict. ISIL and al-Nusra will continue to control much of the interior, resulting in further protracted violence.
  • Turkey’s strategic position is weaker. Syria, with Bashar al-Assad in power and supported by Russia and Iran, will be an enduring hostile presence. Turkey, already fighting the Kurds domestically, will have a Kurdish mini-state on its border.

The United States faces a Middle East dominated by authoritarian regimes and many of those will continue to face constant pressure from terrorists. There are few easy choices in an extremely complex conflict zone.

Page details

Date modified: