Chapter 2 - The forces influencing Iranian political life

A confounding political landscape

The tallies of Iran’s recent parliamentary elections were confusing. They varied from one news outlet to another. While initially some^{Footnote 4} reported that supporters of President Hassan Rouhani, or the so-called moderate currents of Iranian politics, had won 143 out of the 290 parliamentary seats, others^{Footnote 5} put that number at 122. Statistics aside, mainstream observers had trouble interpreting the results. Most opted to herald the moderates’ electoral triumph, despite reporting earlier that nearly all moderates had been barred from running^{Footnote 6}. These discrepancies stem from two inter-related problems: a) the absence of a rigid party system in Iran, which has given rise to a protean factional landscape; and b) an outdated typology that fails to capture real and evolving fissures in Iranian politics. Factional demarcations are less discrete and bounded affiliations than categories among which politicians—who are, at times, backed by more than one political camp—can move over time. Political coalitions form and often dissolve with each election, as factions recombine to improve their electoral fortunes. Lacking a coherent policy platform or membership beyond their founders, they are little more than vehicles for elite blocs, with shifting alliances based on short-term constellations of interests.

Iran’s own political vernacular adds to the confusion. The reformist-conservative dichotomy, often used as shorthand to distinguish those who believe in rapid change from those who prefer gradual or no change at all, is no longer relevant. Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, often labelled a staunch conservative, went considerably further than his predecessor, the “reformist” Mohammad Khatami, in transforming executive institutions and reforming the economy, particularly through vast privatisation and ending state subsidies. Some factions that have been identified as “extremist”, in fact oppose radical change. Groups that pursue radical reform are often called “moderate” because they espouse a relatively conciliatory foreign policy and fairly liberal social norms. The “moderate” label is also used for certain centrist politicians, such as former President Ali Rafsanjani and incumbent President Rouhani, whose foreign policy is as conciliatory as those of the reformists, but who are more conservative when it comes to social policy.

The February 2016 parliamentary elections, which saw prominent political figures, like the centrist Rouhani (formerly conservative), reformist Khatami, and conservative speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani (formerly ultra-conservative), bundled in the same camp and pitted against so-called hardliners, put the inadequacy of Iran’s existing factional classification on full display.

The real battle lines

The central divide among Iranian factions reflects the duality weaved into the Islamic Republic’s fabric: an incongruous blend of popular sovereignty and religious authority. Since 1979, a vast chasm has divided Iran’s theocrats, who believe that government legitimacy stems from divine providence, from its republicans, who deem popular will a more important source of authority. Under the auspices of the revolution’s charismatic founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the theocrats managed to purge the proponents of republicanism, who were mostly leftist secular Jacobins. After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the theocrats split into two groups: the pragmatists advocating stability and reconstruction after a decade of revolutionary turmoil and war with Iraq, and the radicals who pursued a statist economy and an aggressive foreign policy. Constitutional revisions that bifurcated the political system also led to increasing friction between the office of the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and then President Rafsanjani. Tensions boiled over in the 1997 presidential elections, which pitted Rafsanjani’s choice, Khatami, against theocrats who sought to concentrate power in Ayatollah Khamenei’s office. Khatami won, and the split increasingly pushed Rafsanjani, the grey eminence of the Islamic Republic, towards republicanism.

When Khatami, a pragmatic republican, was unable to weaken the grip of theocratic bodies such as the Guardian Council, popular frustration led to the rise of the radical republicans, who won parliamentary elections in 2000. Their push for rapid socio-political reforms led to a pushback by equally radical currents from the theocratic camp. Between 2004 and 2005, radical theocrats, led by Ahmadinejad, captured the parliament and the presidency. They marginalised and eventually purged radical republicans in the crack-down that ensued the heavily contested 2009 presidential elections. But their rule saw the economy grind to a halt and the country teeter on the brink of a military confrontation during the nuclear crisis. That paved the way for the return of pragmatic republicans, led by Rouhani, in 2013.

The Islamic Republic’s governance system, too, reflects its binary nature. Republican features are most prominently represented by the popularly-elected president and unicameral parliament. A variety of theocratic bodies, however, oversee these, foremost the Office of the Supreme Leader, which has the final word on all matters of state. Selecting and theoretically overseeing the leader is the Assembly of Experts, comprised of 88 Islamic jurists. Other tutelary bodies supervise the elected executive and legislature, principally to guard the system’s theocratic nature. The most important of these is the Guardian Council, which vets all legislations and candidates for elected offices. Another oversight layer comes in the form of consensus-building and adjudication bodies, like the Expediency Council, which resolve disagreements and arbiters cases in which the legislature is overruled by a Guardian Council veto.

The four quadrants of Iranian politics

A more adequate typology for analysing political groupings is a two-dimensional classification scheme. The first distinguishes different sources of legitimacy. At one end of the spectrum are theocrats, who deem divine providence, based on the principle of velayat-e faqih ("guardianship of the Jurist"), the main source of authority in the system. At the opposite end are those for whom legitimacy is not solely conferred by God, but rather stems from popular will. The second axis pits pragmatists who seek to gradually adjust the status quo against radicals who seek either a rapid return to the original principles of the revolution or possess strong revisionist inclinations. Taken together, these axes delineate the four following political quadrants.

• Pragmatic theocrats believe in rule by divine will, advocate economic liberalisation, espouse conservative Islamic social norms, and see an unavoidable clash of interests between Iran and the West. They are the old guard of the Islamic Republic, dominating the majority of Iran’s unelected institutions.
• Radical theocrats also believe in divine providence, but they support populist, statist and redistributive economic policies to promote social justice. They also adhere to restrictive Islamic mores and pursue a confrontational foreign policy based on an existential zero-sum battle with the West and on promoting regional hegemony.
• Pragmatic republicans emphasise Iran’s elected institutions and constitution over divine authority. They advocate a market economy with state-driven industrialisation, support cultural freedoms within Islamic norms, and espouse regional interdependence, interaction with the West, as well as integration into the global economy.
• Radical republicans believe most strongly in the people’s will, as expressed in elections. They contend that the Supreme Leader’s authority ought to be subordinated to the constitution. They promote a free-market economy, have liberal views on social issues, and endorse a cooperative regional policy and moderate foreign policy centered on normalising relations with the West.

The current political landscape is the product of three decades of metamorphosis, punctuated by sharp changes at certain junctures that reconfigured the political map. In the wake of the July 2015 nuclear agreement, many hoped—and some feared—that the twin elections of 2016 for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts could mark another pivotal moment that reshapes the system.

A more republican parliament

The parliamentary poll came at a sensitive time. Following the signing of the nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), theocrats feared that Rouhani’s foreign policy victory could boost the republicans’ electoral fortunes, give them the upper hand in the legislature, and worst of all allow the comeback of radical republicans under their shadow. The opposite outcome could turn the president into a lame-duck for the rest of his term, jeopardising the odds of his re-election in 2017. The removal of sanctions six weeks prior to the elections further raised the stakes, posing a threat to vested interests and questions about priorities—issues over which the parliament can exert authority.

The Guardian Council took it upon itself to prevent an outright republican victory and a return of radical republicans to the fold. Of the record 12,123 candidates for parliament, the Council disqualified nearly 58  per cent in the first round. It barred more than 95  per cent of the radical republican candidates. This prompted a public outcry. Rouhani and Larijani succeeded in persuading the Council to reinstate 1,500 aspirants, of mixed political affiliations, bringing the disqualification rate down to 49  per cent. Yet, lacking well known contenders in some cities and sufficient representation around the country, the republicans were forced to adopt an innovative electoral tactic: publishing a list of their preferred candidates that included not only pragmatic republicans, but also pragmatic theocrats in order to defeat radical theocrats who obstructed Rouhani’s agenda.

Their plan worked remarkably well. In some major cities, like Tehran, they performed a clean sweep of all 30 seats allocated to the capital in the first round, held on 26 February 2016. In rural areas and religious centres, like Qom and Mashhad, the theocrats did better. Run-off elections for 68 candidates failing to win more than 25  per cent of the votes in the first round were held on 28 April. With just 26  per cent of incumbency, the election fundamentally changed the complexion of the parliament and shifted the balance of power in favour of the republicans. The final results divided the 290-member legislature between 123 republicans (almost all pragmatists), 80 theocrats (mostly pragmatists, with a few radicals) and 84 independents—with no discernible political affiliation.

From Rouhani’s perspective, this is certainly a satisfactory result. The republicans gained political ground and ousted leading radical theocrats. But their ability to gain a workable majority depends on how the independents position themselves. They tend to coalesce into political blocs only after a new parliament convenes. Rouhani could use the power of the purse to draw some of them into a republican bloc, but it is unclear whether he could use them to build an absolute majority. The independents could form their own bloc or split the legislature into blocs of similar weight, thus giving rise to a hung parliament that would slow—rather than facilitate—decision-making, at least on issues over which there is limited elite consensus. Alternatively, the independents could vote on an issue-by-issue basis, most probably throwing their weight behind the republicans on economic policies while siding with the theocrats on socio-political matters.

Even if the next parliament were to come decisively under the republicans’ control, Iran’s governmental institutions would not necessarily work in harmony. During Khatami’s first term in office, both the legislative and executive branches were in the hands of his republican allies, yet their reforms were obstructed by the theocratic-controlled Guardian Council. The succeeding Ahmadinejad theocratic government, on the other hand, was at daggers drawn with a theocratic-controlled parliament for most of its time as a result of factional infighting. Nevertheless, given that the most ardent critics of the JCPOA were ousted, the legislature will likely be more cooperative when it comes to implementing the agreement. This is, however, not the same as delivering a blank cheque to the republicans for advancing Rouhani’s agenda. Entrenched interests and diverging viewpoints mean that even the cooperation of this friendlier parliament in implementing Rouhani’s economic reforms should not be taken for granted. On almost all major policy decisions, from economic to socio-political issues and relations with the West, the political establishment is deeply divided and these differences will come to the surface. The elections have put more wind in Rouhani’s sails, but with partisan shoals awaiting him and the republicans at virtually every other turn, the journey ahead is anything but clear sailing.

An equally theocratic Assembly of Experts

The republicans posed an even greater threat to the Assembly of Experts. If they managed to increase the size of their existing minority (25 slots), led by Rafsanjani, they would have gained greater influence in the selection of Ayatollah Khamenei’s successor, which requires a two-thirds majority (59) vote. Failure to select a leader would automatically transfer his powers to a leadership council—an option recently advocated by Rafsanjani and aimed at diluting the Supreme Leader’s power and weakening the theocrats. Given these fears, the Guardian Council applied a more stringent filter to the Assembly’s aspiring candidates, going as far as disqualifying Hassan Khomeini, a popular grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder and a figure closely aligned with pragmatic republicans. He was one of the 472 candidates—including major clerics and all 16 women candidates—whose credentials the Guardian Council rejected. With a 75  per cent disqualification rate, in six out of Iran’s 31 provinces, there was no competition with only a single candidate on the ballot box.

Expectedly, the results did not alter the balance of power in the Assembly: the theocrats still control nearly 73  per cent of the 88-member body. However, radical theocrats suffered a major symbolic defeat in Tehran, where pragmatic republican leaders, Rafsanjani and Rouhani, finished first and third respectively, while two of the three prominent radical theocratic clerics (Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi) were voted out, and the third, the Guardian Council’s head, Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, barely secured his re‑election bid. Yet the latter went on to win the Assembly’s internal election by 51 votes to become its new chairman. His election demonstrated that the theocrats are still very much in control and have no intention of giving more space to Rafsanjani and his republican allies.

The perennial struggle

Rivalry between republican and theocratic factions is neither new nor limited to the 2016 elections. Over the years, control of the presidency and legislature have switched hands between the two camps, but pragmatic theocrats’ grip on unelected institutions and their well-honed exclusionary mechanisms to engineer electoral outcomes prevent republican factions from achieving dominance. While radical forces from both camps that have trespassed the system’s redlines have been pushed to the fringes of the political system, the theocrats can neither afford to eliminate republicanism—to which many of the system’s founding fathers and technocrats adhere—nor sanction a drift in their direction. To maintain stability, the system manages, at times with great difficulty, to accommodate both republican and theocratic elements. The Supreme Leader, who in theory is above the political fray, maintains this precarious balance. His role as the chief arbiter is central to maintaining the system’s stability.

...pragmatic theocrats’ grip on unelected institutions and their well-honed exclusionary mechanisms to engineer electoral outcomes prevent republican factions from achieving dominance.

The big question is what happens next. The next major test will be the 2017 presidential poll. Parliamentary elections often presage the outcome of the subsequent presidential contests. The results of this year’s election have probably increased both the theocrats’ concerns and their motivation to block Rouhani and the republicans from securing a second mandate. Sharp differences between the president and the Supreme Leader on economic priorities, representative politics, the rule of law and cultural norms will provide ample ammunition for Rouhani’s opponents. For their part, the republicans can hope to count on possible improvement in the electorate’s economic well-being in the next few months (albeit not to the level of heightened popular expectations); better coordination and cohesion; and their skillfulness in using modern campaigning tactics to mobilise their constituency.

The outcome of the 2017 election is not only important because it will determine the next occupant of the presidential office in Tehran, but because it will establish which faction will be in control of the executive branch when, potentially, the question of Ayatollah Khamenei’s succession arises. Given the Supreme Leader’s outsized power, that transition above all else will define the future balance of power between Iran’s republicans and theocrats, the political trajectory of Iran’s modern theocracy, and by extension its role in the region and relations with the West.