Chapter 4 - The evolving role and limitations of Iran's security apparatus

The security apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran—that is the combination of those institutions and organisations that are responsible for internal and external security including matters of national defence and intelligence—differs slightly from that of other authoritarian regimes as it combines revolutionary and state institutions. Hence forces like the army and the police are balanced by ideological units like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the revolutionary committees and irregular forces (Hizballahis).

The result is a cohabitation of a numerically strong but technologically obsolete conscript army and police force with an overlapping network of intelligence and paramilitary forces. Limited military capacity is buttressed by anti-imperialist revolutionary rhetoric. That is why the United States remains enemy No. 1, notwithstanding the signing of the nuclear agreement (Joint Common Plan of Action, or JCPOA). The present US-Iranian alignment of interests in the region (the stabilisation of Iraq, the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has not resulted in a strategic reassessment. National security is largely defined as regime security.

As commander-in-chief, the Supreme Leader appoints the higher echelons of military commanders, some of them at the suggestion of the president. Parliamentary oversight of the armed and security forces is ensured as all, ministers including the ministers of defence, intelligence and interior, must be confirmed by parliament. By law, the minister of intelligence must be a cleric; occasionally the Ministry of Interior, too, has been led by a cleric. Political oversight and ideological indoctrination are the responsibilities of the representatives of the Supreme Leader, who are present at all levels and in all ideological and political offices. They are responsible for the obligatory ideological review of all public servants (gozinesh). Additionally, the establishment of security offices (daftar-e herasat) is mandatory in all private and public organisations and institutions. In military organisations, the protection and intelligence organisations (daftar/sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat) function as an intelligence and counter-intelligence force. In the army, these units exist in addition to the staff positions responsible for military intelligence and security. The IRGC’s protection and intelligence organisation (sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat, or SHE) has developed an organisational and political life of its own. In the Law Enforcement Forces of the Republic of Iran (NAJA), a similar unit exercises the functions of internal audit and state police. Additional surveillance units include the para-state Basij and the irregular Hizballahis. The latter act as a moral police but have proven difficult to control. Since 1992, they are organised under a private umbrella organisation called Ansar-e Hizballah, whose influence the Rouhani government has tried to curb.

The coordination and separation of responsibilities is regulated by a number of laws. The main strategic decision‑making body is the Higher National Security Council (HNSR), chaired by the president. In it, key ministers and military commanders are represented. Sensitive security policy decisions are taken in the informal “Council of the Heads of the Three Powers” (legislative/head of parliament, executive/president and judicial/head of justice). Matters of internal security are decided on by the State Security Council, headed by the minister of the interior. There are overlapping and competing mandates for the Ministry of Interior, the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s intelligence service.

The full development of the Iranian intelligence services is not yet complete, it is still an amalgam of most departments of the old SAVAK with revolutionary forces. Legally, the Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA) should be the central intelligence agency responsible for internal security and strategic reconnaissance, except in military affairs. The establishment of the ministry in 1984 was to the detriment of the first intelligence unit of the IRGC, which had to transfer its best cadres to the new ministry and was reduced to a mere military intelligence unit during the war. This act laid the foundation for the deep institutional hostility between VAJA and the IRGC, with the latter trying to curtail VAJA’s purview in the field of domestic security.

The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran (AJA) is solely responsible for military defence and has no role in domestic security. AJA was originally divided into three military branches: land, sea and air. In 2009, air defence was separated from the air force and joined up with the IRGC’s air defence, and thus a fourth branch was added. The transformation of the 12,000-strong air defence command headquarters (qarargah) Khatamolanbiya into a military branch underscores the defensive nature of Iran's military doctrine. The armament consists partly of outdated missile systems, but Tehran launched a modernisation programme in 2007 when the Russian Tor-M1 missile system was introduced, which seems now to be complete with the introduction of the S-300 air defence system. The Iranian Air Force could never compensate for war-related losses of material and experienced pilots. Most aircraft is of US origin but Russian systems, including several Mig29 and Sukhoi, have been introduced. The Iranian navy operates in and outside of the Persian Gulf. In cooperation with the missile speedboats of the IRGC’s Navy, they prevent the penetration of enemy ships in Iranian territorial waters. Their tactical and military capabilities are not very impressive and their adventurism has often provoked naval incidents.

The merger of the police, gendarmerie and border troops with the revolutionary committees led to the creation of NAJA in 1992. The dissolution of the feared revolutionary committee was welcomed by the population and marks the beginning of the post-revolutionary phase. NAJA’s border troops have a strong identity of their own. The borderguard battalions are equipped with SUVs armed with multiple rocket launchers. The worsening of the situation on the eastern border with Pakistan in 2013-2014 led to the involvement of the IRGC.

The IRGC was created through the merger of various Islamist militias loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini. Initially used as a domestic security detail, it became militarised when the Iran‑Iraq War broke out in 1980. In 1982, the Basij-e Mostazafin were created as a reserve element. They perform the functions of auxiliary police and ideological mass movement. They get their ideological, military and police training from the IRGC but lead an institutional life of their own. From the outset, the Basij were used as an additional monitoring and control element of the population. They were notorious for their moral or modesty controls (gasht-e ershad) and their activities in the universities and schools. Membership at the Basij is associated with numerous privileges and benefits, especially in the field of higher education. Basij are also active in the cyber sphere today, especially in the realm of surveillance. Actual electronic warfare, however, is still in the hands of the Ministry of Intelligence.

The IRGC’s Air Force and Navy were established in 1985. Organised until 2009 into 15 divisions, the IRGC’s land forces are now organised into 31 regional commands, all focusing on domestic security. Nowadays, the IRGC comprises five branches: land, air, sea, Basij and Qods. Several special units, such as the anti-terror unit Ansar Al‑Mahdi and the Vali Amr unit responsible for the Supreme Leader’s security, are part of the IRGC’s land forces. The Qods Force is used to safeguard Iranian interests worldwide, such as in Bosnia and in Lebanon in the 1990s, or in Iraq and Syria since 2010. The Qods suffered heavy losses from 2013 to 2015 and has largely been replaced by special forces from the military, the prestigious takavor of which not much is known. The SHE remains independent from the IRGC.

The IRGC oversee the prestigious missile program which is the responsibility of the otherwise less significant Air Force of the Revolutionary Guards. Tehran is capable of producing an unknown number of short-range missiles of the Shahab 1 and 2 types (based on the North Korean SCUD) and has tested a medium-range missile (Shahab 3 / Ghadr 1, North Korean No-Dong). Of major international concerns are the Sajil 1, a two-stage, solid-fuel rocket which could reach Israel and southeastern Europe, as well as the potential for the Sajil to turn into an ICBM program.