Conventional thinking holds that Iran is on the verge of a major change as the Revolution is now firmly into its late thirties and is increasingly feeling its age.
The nuclear deal indicates that Iran may be ready to engage with the US, though this will not be automatic or easy.
While many believe that Iran’s international position is strengthening, others are of the view that Iran is playing a weak hand well and taking advantage of the mistakes of others, but has to contend with serious structural weaknesses in terms of its broader regional and global position.
Despite the growing logic of the need for major change in Iran, it is not assured. The Iranian system has shown a marked propensity to “muddle through” and escape the need for serious change. It may continue to do so.
Iran’s domestic political situation
The way factions in Iran have tended to be classified (“Moderates”, “Pragmatists”, “Reformers”, “Hardliners”, etc.) may no longer be applicable. Indeed, the labels we in the West have given to these various groups have said as much about our understanding of, and our hopes for, Iran as they have about the real situation on the ground.
Instead, it may be more sensible in today’s political landscape to divide the major political forces in Iran into those who, in varying degrees, support the predominance of the theocratic aspects of the present regime, and those who, in varying degrees, wish to see the republican elements of the Iranian system become increasingly dominant.
Despite the leadership’s dislike of organised political parties as potential challengers to its control, it will likely not be able to prevent them indefinitely. If such parties do come into being, the question of how they are organised and run will have a significant impact on the evolution of the system.
Most believe that the current Supreme Leader will pass from the scene in the next few years due to old age and illness. If this happens, the process by which he is replaced will be a defining moment for the system.
Although the constitution specifies a replacement process, it is unlikely to be followed. Instead, backroom deal-making will decide the outcome.
As there are many competing factions and interests, the outcome may be the creation of a committee to fulfill the role of the Leader, instead of one man. If a single individual is selected, the disparate factions may opt to agree on someone who is older, and thus not likely to sit in the position for decades as the present Leader has done.
Iran’s regional situation
There is a popular perception in the West, especially among those suspicious of Iran, that it has a long-term plan in the region towards which it is progressing methodically.
However, many Iran experts believe that, though the country has some broad declaratory goals, it has little in the way of a concrete regional policy.
Instead, these people believe Iran is making it up as it goes along, taking advantage of opportunities caused by others mistakes, and responding in a largely ad hoc fashion to regional developments in the shadow of the deepening infighting at home over means and goals in the region.
In particular, the significant infighting which takes place within and among the multi-faceted security and intelligence services, and also between those services and the other forces on Iran’s political landscape, means that different power centres in Iran take actions across the region which may not be the result of agreed policy decisions or even necessarily coordinated.
Though Iran has successfully penetrated the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, it is playing a largely defensive game and is trying to balance contradictory objectives, which it can service in the short term, but which cannot be the basis of long-term success.
For example, in Iraq, Iran needs a weak country which will not threaten it again, but cannot accept the break-up of Iraq as this would unleash centrifugal forces that would negatively impact Iran’s basic interests. So some in Iran support the central government, but others support the militias which hinder the ability of Baghdad to really control the country; Iran positions itself as a mediator between these forces, but also promotes the fighting between them.
Can this contradictory, high-wire balancing act continue indefinitely? It seems doubtful. Either one side in Iraq will win, with potentially serious consequences for Iran, or forces of the two sides will become tired of being pawns for Tehran and find ways to cooperate, which would also not be in Iran’s interests.
In Syria, Iran has helped the Assad regime to survive, but how much influence has this really bought Tehran? Assad has shown a high degree of skill at playing his sponsors off against each other, and at playing chicken with them since they have no other alternative but to support him once they are committed. Iran may well have got itself into a situation in Syria where the tail is wagging the dog.
The biggest regional issue Iran faces is the growing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, which is a combination of a long-standing Realpolitik rivalry between two aspiring regional hegemons (which pre-dates the Iranian Revolution) and an increasing sectarian split between Sunni and Shia Islam. Most experts are the view that it is Riyadh which has cynically stoked the sectarian aspect of this situation far more than Iran, though Tehran is not blameless. There is growing concern that the sectarian aspect of the dispute, though perhaps initially played by Riyadh as a card, is in danger of getting out of hand and increasingly consuming the region as popular anger takes over with each atrocity, and alleged atrocity, committed by agents of one side or the other.
Iran’s global situation
The implementation of the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will be far from smooth. While the technical aspects of the deal are complex, it will be the internal political games in Iran which will pose the biggest challenge to the implementation of the agreement, as various factions and groups vie for supremacy.
Even if sanctions directly related to nuclear issues have been eased or removed as the JCPOA has been implemented, this does not mean that all sanctions have been lifted. As different elements in Iran pursue various regional and other agendas (such as the ballistic missile program), other sanctions will be strengthened and imposed. Wide swathes of the Iranian public cannot be counted on to make the necessary distinctions between sanctions imposed for one reason and those imposed for another. Critics of the JCPOA will take advantage of this to weaken support for the deal over time.
The Supreme Leader remains extremely cautious about wider engagement with the West in general and the US in particular. He fears the “contamination” of the Revolution through the weakening of its “moral strength”, and commitment to the ideal of “resistance”, but this has already begun, to a large extent because the young in Iran have tired of the rhetoric and are eager for change.
While some in the West fear that Iran may turn to Russia and China as strategic partners, thereby escaping the need for reforms that the West will insist upon if a true relationship is to be achieved, there are serious problems with both countries from Iran’s point of view.
Russia and Iran historically have had a much worse relationship over many centuries than have Iran and the West. While Iran may be willing to act as though it has a strategic partner in Russia for largely tactical reasons, there is great and long-standing mistrust of Moscow in Tehran. Iran also recognises that Russia is a fundamentally weak actor on the world stage, despite Putin’s bravado. Thus, to be anti-Western in Iran is fundamentally not the same thing as being pro-Russian though that appearance may be given from time to time.
China is a country with which Iran can do business, but no one in Tehran is under any illusion that Beijing would ever really support Iran on anything if that were contrary to China’s perception of its interests, and that Iran’s needs figure low in China’s calculation of those interests.
Against a generally gloomy prognosis, one can discern possible hopeful scenarios. In particular, because most Iran watchers focus on the country’s elites, we have an incomplete understanding of evolving views. Those indications we do have point to a restless population that is ready for fundamental change. The fact that the US-Iran dialogue taboo has been; that economic logic suggests an eventual opening of Iran, despite attempts to stop it; and that US and Iranian interests in the region are aligning in at least some ways as the US and Saudi Arabia enter a more strained period, all create a potential for transformative change.
But there is no identifiable process to take advantage of these trends and marshal them into an unstoppable momentum for change. It is exactly the creation of such a process that the Supreme Leader and many of those around him seek to prevent. How well he will be able to do so, and for how long he will remain on the scene, will determine the future of Iran’s relationship with the world.
Iran’s economic situation
It is an open question as to whether the sanctions imposed on Iran, or its own mismanagement of the economy and corruption are the prime causes of its dismal economic performance. If the economy does not improve as sanctions are lifted, this will be a significant cause of embarrassment for the proponents of the JCPOA. For this reason, some hardliners may welcome, and even seek to stimulate the imposition of additional sanctions as they will provide an rationale for continued poor economic performance.
At the least, continued uncertainty over where the sanctions are going, and the possibility of “snap back” scenarios, mean that longer-term investments in Iran are unlikely; people are willing to sell things to Iran, but few will make long-term, multi-billion dollar investments until they know that these will not be wiped out if relations suddenly worsen. It is exactly these kinds of investments Iran needs, most particularly to modernise its ageing oil and gas production and transportation facilities.
Political reform and economic reform are therefore inextricably linked in Iran. President Rouhani and those around him know this and their agenda reflects it.
There are pockets of potential economic hope. Unlike most Arab countries in the Middle East, Iran does have a genuine and indigenous entrepreneurial and manufacturing class. It is stunted and has had to survive in an artificial environment for decades, but it is there and has proven historically to be resilient. If it were unleashed it could stimulate respectable growth—not enough by itself to lift Iran out of its malaise, but certainly enough to make the point that further economic and political reform can lead to prosperity.
Conclusion
Iran is, in many ways, at a crossroad: significant political change is expected in the coming few years, most notably if the Supreme Leader departs the scene. Most importantly, the population is restive and wants change.
None of these factors, in themselves, will lead to far-reaching change and there are powerful forces who do not want it. There has yet to emerge a concrete and resilient process whereby the proponents of change can harness and manipulate the various trends and forces that seek change. This is the missing ingredient. It is difficult to know what event, or events, might lead to the creation of this spark.
