Changing ideological influence in China: An analysis of major surveys

President Xi has intensified the campaign to drum up enthusiasm for socialist ideology as an essential contributor to the Party’s control. Surveys suggest that the acceptance of socialism and willingness to attend educational and indoctrination programs depend on proximity to power structures, economic status, age, and exposure to information not controlled by Chinese authorities. Not surprisingly, Party officials embrace socialism. Businesspeople and students hold a wider range of views, while peasants see official ideology as remote and irrelevant.

Ideological control and indoctrination are major political tools the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) relies upon to maintain itself in power. The Party-state has made tremendous efforts to keep ideological control over Chinese society: educational programs from primary school through university, media political propaganda, and indoctrination activities in all walks of life. The ideological framework is based upon Marxism, Leninism, Mao Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, ‘Three Represents’, ‘Scientific Development Outlook’, and the ‘Xi Jinping Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era’. Other concepts are also important in the Chinese ideological narrative: socialism with Chinese characteristics, core socialist values, collectivism, and a sense of common aspirations (gongtong lixiang).

It is widely believed that the CCP’s ideological influence in China has been declining during the reform era, leading to a significant erosion of the Party’s legitimacy. Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has stepped up the promotion of the ideological narrative in all aspects of Chinese life. Under his leadership as well, the Party-state is staging a vehement attack on Western democracy and values. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Party-state’s ideological indoctrination by taking stock of major findings that have appeared in a number of surveys done by Chinese researchers in the past few years. Surveys of different groups, including Party and government officials, professionals, peasants, university students, and private business owners are examined here.

A few conclusions can be drawn from these surveys. First, ideological work will remain a top priority for the Party. The CCP is unlikely to reduce the intensity of its ideological propaganda and indoctrination efforts in the foreseeable future. And adherence to the Party’s ideological framework continues to generate political opportunities, jobs, career advancement, and business-networking opportunities for people in different sectors. Support and belief in the governing ideological narrative, no matter how genuine it is, is still regarded as a requirement for people working within the system and in certain sectors. This narrative, to some extent, continues to serve as the benchmark for political correctness in Chinese society.

Secondly, to a large extent the influence of ideology in China is rather shallow. Most sympathisers of the official ideology are only inclined to agree with such catch-all statements as “Marxism should be the guiding ideology for China” and “China should continue with socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Few people are true believers in the substance of the country’s ideological framework. A partial exception is the circle of party and government cadres. In general, these officials tend to exhibit stronger and more genuine support for the official ideology. All other groups of supporters tend to be pragmatic and utilitarian; they simply pretend to subscribe to the official ideology in their pursuit of personal interests.

Thirdly, one can observe some major challenges to the effectiveness of the propaganda programs. There is a wide gap between the country’s socio-economic reality and the tenets of the official ideology. Widening income disparity, corruption, social injustice, abuse of power by government institutions, and rising housing prices challenge the veracity of the ideological messaging for the vast majority of the Chinese people. The growing popularity of the Internet and various social-media outlets significantly reduces the effectiveness of the ideological indoctrination activities. Access to information from foreign sources, particularly Western countries, also helps offset the official ideology’s attractiveness.

In summary, there is a diversification of values and a general decline of interest in ideological matters in Chinese society. 

Party-state officials

The first group of people one must examine is Chinese officialdom. A study of 1300 cadres in Anhui Province reveals some interesting facts about the influence of ideology among Party-state officials. This group included 1067 party members, most of them officials at the director and director-general levels. According to the survey, 67 per cent visited government-sponsored web sites for information about Chinese politics and policy. Most of them also relied on the China Central Television (CCTV) and local TV programmes, party newspapers, and party journals to keep abreast of current events. In general, these officials displayed a low trust in information from foreign sources and overseas web sites that would be available through virtual private networks (VPN). Clearly, mainstream official media outlets continue to have strong influence on this group of people. Surprisingly, about 20 to 25 per cent of these officials also relied on foreign media for information.

When asked about their views on ‘universal values’, 46 per cent of respondents replied that different countries and different societies may have different interpretations of the concept and 359 denied their existence. With regard to online foreign views critical of China, 35 per cent believed that these were a result of ineffective propaganda and 60 per cent attributed them to the West’s jealousy of China’s rise. Some 32 per cent noted that the perception was a result of some Chinese inappropriate policies; 45 per cent chose corruption of some officials as a contributing factor, whereas 30 per cent opined that China needed to contend with Western countries’ critical voices. The survey showed that almost 80 per cent chose Marxism as their belief system.

When asked to assess the ideological struggles facing China, 79.95 per cent of respondents noted that the struggles are very intense and serious; 58.2 per cent stated that Western ideological and values infiltration is close or very close to them personally. Some 52 per cent noted that the cultural infiltration by hostile Western forces and the threat to China’s ideological security through the Internet have become a very serious problem for China. Over 63 per cent noted that “the cyber sphere has become a major battlefield for ideological struggle between China and Western countries”; and 61 per cent agreed that “young people are the key target (of) such ideological struggles online”.

Ninety per cent of this group of cadres “fully support” or “support” the ideals, objectives, requirements, concepts and policy measures that have been proposed by the Party since the 18th Party Congress held in 2012; these include “the four comprehensives”, “modernisation of the state’s governance”, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the economic new normal. Seventy per cent believed that the Chinese dream will come true; 63.3 per cent were confident and 24 per cent were somewhat confident in the socialist path with Chinese characteristics. Over 59 per cent respondents supported and felt satisfied with China’s socialist system; 30.2 per cent supported but felt somewhat unsatisfied.

In response to the view that livelihood issues (education, medical care, employment, housing, pension and social insurance) and corruption were more threatening than ideological challenges, 17 per cent fully agreed; 43 per cent agreed to some extent while 25 per cent disagreed. In response to the statement that “high housing prices in first and second tier cities have had a profound impact on people’s values and attitude towards wealth”, 30 per cent respondents strongly agreed and some 43 per cent did so to some extent. With regard to the question of the most important factor that negatively affects the receptivity of core socialist values, 31 per cent chose “corruption and abuse of power”; 24 per cent noted “the big contrast between social reality and core socialist values”; 16 per cent referred to the “ineffectiveness of educational programmes of core socialist values”; and 15 per cent blamed the “insufficient handling of people’s livelihood matters”.

Clearly, the official ideology still exerts a fairly strong influence on these Party-state officials^{Footnote 3}  . 

Business leaders in the private sector

There has been an assumption that the private business sector is less ideologically inclined than others sectors in Chinese society. A 2015 study on the political attitudes of 278 private sector business leaders in Wuhan may be indicative of the degree of ideological influence in this sector. When asked about “the differences between socialism with Chinese characteristics and capitalism”, 58.7 per cent of respondents noted that there are fundamental differences between the two. Forty-five per cent indicated that they are willing to join the CCP, whereas 31.4 per cent were not willing to do so. The survey data indicates that 51.4 per cent are not representatives in any social or political organisation; for those who are, 35.5 per cent are affiliated to a federation of trade unions; 25.2 per cent to a people’s political consultative conference, and 8.4 per cent to a local people’s congress. The survey suggested that nearly half of the business leaders who decided to serve as political representatives are highly motivated by various utilitarian considerations: 25 per cent see these organisations as channels for their own business concerns; 16.1 per cent are seeking a higher profile for themselves and their businesses; and 8.9 per cent are seeking networking opportunities with government leaders and elites in other sectors. This survey’s findings also suggest that there are differences in ideological outlooks among different age groups. Foreign exposure also matters. Those with some foreign exposure tend to be less supportive of the official ideology.

Views among the rural population

A 2016 survey of the political and ideological attitudes in the Yanglin region in Shanxi Province concluded that in general the peasants do not have a sufficient understanding of the mainstream ideology. The researchers distributed and collected 150 questionnaires from six villages in Yanglin. With regard to the villagers’ belief system, 20 per cent of households feature a Buddhist icon, 90 per cent have images of folk religions, and 10 per cent hang images of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai or other former CCP leaders. Villagers noted in the interviews that they hang CCP leaders’ images as a show of admiration and respect for them. When asked whether they attended Marxism-related study sessions organised by the village authorities, 14.5 per cent (mostly village cadres) replied positively; 21 per cent occasionally attended, while 64.5 per cent had never heard of such study sessions. When asked to identify major obstacles preventing them from believing in Marxism, 56.25 per cent responded that Marxist theories are too distant from their actual life; 27.1 per cent noted that the big wealth gap in society makes it difficult for them to believe in Marxism; and 43.75 per cent suggested that they do not have any intrinsic motivation or need to study Marxist ideology. The survey also indicated that even peasants who are Party members are not interested in studying Marxist ideology because they felt that the gap between Marxism and reality is too big and that ideological theories are too abstract and difficult to understand^{Footnote 4}  . The degree to which inferences can be made from this small survey remains limited, but the figures offer an important window on to the rural population.

University and graduate students

A survey of 1800 students at nine universities finds that they rely heavily on the Internet and social-media platforms for information and that there is a real diversification of values within this group. Some 61.5 per cent of respondents noted that the teaching of ideology in the universities remains unappealing and the content continues to be uninteresting^{Footnote 5}  . The graduate students’ ideological outlook appears to be even less positive. In a study of graduate students in ten universities in Xi’an, 37 per cent decided to join the Party to pursue job opportunities and career development^{Footnote 6}  .

A 2015 study of 200 students at three universities in Hefei, the capital of Anhui province reveals other interesting findings. In response to the question “how closely do Western ideological values influence you?”, 65 per cent responded that their influence can be felt in their daily lives, entertainment, and education; 35 per cent replied that they had no impact on them or that they have not paid any attention to such issues. In reply to the question “how do you evaluate US ideological infiltration in Chinese culture?”, 67 per cent noted that they notice some infiltration but that it is not be a cause of alarming concern, whereas 31 per cent suggest that the phenomenon is important and the situation is very dangerous. In response to the question “how do you regard our country’s ideological struggles with the West”, 16 per cent noted that they have rarely paid attention to them, and 38 per cent said that they have heard of them but do not quite understand the issue. On the other hand, 22 per cent responded that they roughly understand the issue, and 25 per cent believe that such struggles will be long term, intense and complicated. From the data, the Chinese researchers behind the survey concluded that most university students failed to understand the harm of Western ideological infiltration and were lacking in vigilance.

Sixty-eight per cent believed that Marxism should be the mainstream ideology. When asked about their attitudes towards Marxist beliefs, 59 per cent responded that they roughly agreed with and supported them while 14 per cent stated that they did not care. Thirty-eight per cent of respondents noted that the Western democratic system and a multi-party system could be tried in China^{Footnote 7}  .

Another survey of students in four universities in Hunan province underscores the challenges confronting the Party. Among the 756 respondents, 87.3 per cent did not pay much attention to politics and 96.4 per cent could not provide an accurate description of the contents of the ‘Four Comprehensives’. In response to the question “what is your view on the statement that the Chinese Communist Party is the leading force for socialism with Chinese characteristics”, 71.2 per cent of students agreed; 28.8 per cent noted that they had no idea. Only 55.3 per cent could correctly state the founding year of the CCP, whereas 39.5 per cent noted that they did not understand the following statement: “The CCP played a pivotal role in anti-Japanese war”. When asked what they were doing during political and ideological classes, the responses were as follows: 35 per cent wanted to take a nap; 25.4 per cent were doing homework for other courses; 10.9 per cent were secretly using their mobile phones; and 28.7 per cent were listening to the lecturer^{Footnote 8}  .

Another group of researchers conducted a survey of 111 students (131 questionnaires were distributed) at the International Relations University^{Footnote 9}  , one of the best-known foreign language universities in China. Over 92 per cent agreed that “socialist China has made enormous achievement” while 76.6 per cent and 82 per cent of them agree with (rentong) the guiding role (zhidao) of Marxism in China and the policy lines of the Party-state respectively. The researchers concluded that these university students’ understanding of the mainstream ideology needed to be further improved. In general these students are patriotic, but when it comes to their political identity, they tend to be less willing to support the socialist nature of their nation.

Another survey of Party members that are also university students reveals a stronger ideological mind set but also suggests that these young CCP members have diverse views. Among the 296 student members of the CCP at Xinyu College who took part, 46.9 per cent said that they “regularly pay attention to” Xi Jinping’s serial speeches and the 5th Plenary Session of the 18th Party Central Committee; 58 per cent of them did so occasionally. Ninety-four per cent agreed that the CCP was the core force for socialism with Chinese characteristics whereas 95.9 per cent expressed support for Marxism as China’s leading ideology. Some 77.6 per cent of them noted that they believe in Marxism.

These junior Party members, however, have a very different evaluation of the commitment of their fellow Party members. Only 6 per cent said they demonstrate “very high” ideological and political morale, while 56.4 per cent described it as being “relatively high”. Some 20.4 per cent noted that they had not paid any attention to Western ideological influence. Surprisingly, 16.4 per cent said that they also believed in religion.

It is interesting to note that non-Party students assess the student Party members very differently: 59.3 per cent said that Party members around them only “occasionally” payed attention to current political events, whereas 51.2 per cent believe that student Party members “only casually listened ”to ideological and political lectures and appeared to lack interest (da bu qi jingshen). Some 70.4 per cent of regular students rate their Party classmates are “so so” in terms of political and ideological fervour. Over 66 per cent said that Party members around them liked US movies, fast food, and the NBA. When asked whether “Party members close to you can play a leading or influencing role for you on political and ideological issues”, 53.7 per cent of them replied that they are not sure or simply said no^{Footnote 10}  .

A study of student Party members at private universities in Liaoning provides different insight. Among them, 59.7 per cent said that they strongly believe in Communism, 25 per cent are sceptical and 15.3 per cent are non-believers. Student Party members in 70 per cent of the private universities account for less than 5 per cent of their student population. Fifteen per cent of these universities have less than 2 per cent affiliated to the CCP. Regular students also have a fairly low opinion of their Party peers; 55 per cent note that their Party classmates perform at an average level and 34.8 per cent believe that Party members are not even as good as ordinary students^{Footnote 11}  .

Conclusion

A scan of various surveys conducted in China in recent years suggests that the Party-state’s ideological education campaigns and activities have failed to boost the ideological outlook and morale of the vast majority of the Chinese people. Party and government officials have been subject to a more effective political education, but it is difficult to know whether these officials and public servants truly believe in the substance of the official ideological narrative. The political structure in China is such, however, that these ideological tenets continue to be binding on their mind sets. Also, a result of the constant propaganda administered in the form of political study activities, it could well be that these officials have at least a fairly strong inclination towards the official ideology.

The other groups in China all demonstrate pluralistic political orientations. Ideological education programs do not seem to have been very effective. Chinese peasants remain ideologically indifferent. People in the private sector pay attention to political and ideological activities, but their involvement in and attention to these activities seem more symbolic than substantive. Chinese students are strikingly diverse when it comes to their ideological views and attitudes towards political education. Many of them exhibit pragmatic considerations and utilitarian pursuits. The Party’s ideological propaganda cadres face many daunting challenges in influencing Chinese society in the information age.