Russian Private Military Companies in “Grey Zones”

Russian private military companies (PMCs) are useful tools for the Russian state. Unlike their US equivalent, they are used as irregulars, and may be employed when a military intervention cannot be official. They are a flexible instrument, with plausible deniability, whether focused on Russia’s borders, or geopolitical and financial goals. Despite their menacing reputation, PMCs are not always successful against indigenous forces.

One of the main tools employed by Russia in “grey zones” and conflicts of low intensity are so-called Private Military Companies (PMCs)—a de-jure non-existent yet state-sponsored tool of power politics actively employed by Moscow since at least 2014. Once alluded to by Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu as “a black cat in the dark room”^{Footnote 93}, these entities have become an indispensable element in non-linear operations carried out by Russia in areas constituting its sphere of strategic interests. The main danger associated with this phenomenon is a combination of opaqueness (and the associated impunity of the Russian side), full support of the Russian state, broadening geography of employment, and increasing interest from the side of third parties.

Hybrid Warfare à la russe: The Role of Non-State Actors

Non-linear methods in (para)military confrontation have historically been one of ’Russia’s main strengths. An integrated use of strategic deception and information-phycological operations^{Footnote 94}, maskirovka and partisan/guerilla tactics have traditionally constituted an essential supplement to Russia’s conventional military capabilities. Following the “decade of failures” (the 1990s)—both domestically and internationally—Russia started to re-gain its position, which was premised on (a) the revival of anti-Western narratives for internal mobilisation; and (b) growing assertiveness in the post-Soviet geopolitical arena (initially). These processes were heavily influenced by the siloviki faction. As a result of major geopolitical shifts (construed by Moscow as anti-Russian developments modelling a regime change in Russia) that took place between 2000 (the Bulldozer revolution) and 2010 (the Arab Spring), Russia’s military-political elites strengthened the course on confrontation with the West. Given its (conventional) military, demographic and economic inferiority, Russia has emphasized on the principle of “asymmetricity” and non-conventional methods of confrontation. As noted by Valery Gerasimov, in the upcoming wars (paramount role played by non-military methods) military operations are likely to be dominated by tactical, highly maneuverable groups (including PMCs and other irregulars) capable of easily penetrating porous frontlines and operating in the enemy’s rear^{Footnote 95}. This principle acquired some practical meaning following the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis (in late 2013) and its transformation into a violent conflict (April 2014), when the above-mentioned functions were vested upon so-called PMCs. This said, two aspects need to be clarified. First, in terms of functions performed and legal status, Russian PMCs have very little in common with contemporary Western PMCs. Second, Russian PMCs cannot be classified as purely non-state actors. It has been proven that these forces remain under the umbrella of the Russian state and key security structures; their relationship to some Russian oligarchs such as Yevgeny Prigozhin and Gennady Timchenko has also been ascertained. In addition, in December 2018, Vladimir Putin publicly admitted the existence, and even encouraged activities of the Wagner group^{Footnote 96}—Russia’s notorious and best known PMC. Therefore, PMCs should be viewed as an integral part of Russia’s toolkit in confrontation with Western countries and promoting/pursuing Russia’s interests abroad.

Main Operative Theaters and Key Functions

At the time of writing, Russian PMCs/irregulars have been spotted in conflicts and zones of instability in Africa, Central/South America, East Central Europe and the Balkans. Based on observations and analysis of their activities, it would be possible to identify the following key functions performed by Russian PMCs^{Footnote 97}:

(1) (Para)military functions premised on three main pillars. First, the ability to create, maintain and control instability in a given area. In regard to this function—best demonstrated in Crimea and the Ukrainian Southeast between 2014-2015—Russian PMCs/irregulars showcased the ability to act as both a separate force (frontal attacks; counter-offensive operations; intelligence gathering; disinformation) and conduct joint operations with elite military formations (the Special Operations Forces) as an auxiliary force (during the annexation of Crimea). Second, performing military operations against other non-state actors—the Syrian conflict (ISIL and anti-Assad elements)—as (a) a separate force; (b) alongside Russian elite forces and/or the Russian Aerospace Forces; (c) together with other non-state actors and irregular formations; (d) jointly with the Syrian armed forces. Third, confronting so-called “hybrid threats” (potential growth of the anti-government protests)—best exemplified in Kaliningrad, with the Cossacks playing the key role—via ‘control of territory’ and other paramilitary auxiliary functions.

(2) Geopolitical functions that are inseparable from the Russian version of the “security export” (eksport bezopasnosti) concept—a means to project Russia’s power abroad, challenging the West in emerging/exiting areas of instability. In this domain Russia pursues a “double-deck” strategy that fits the following pattern: legitimate Russian military advisors are invited by the host country (usually, a part of the weaponry/arms/munitions deal, or other forms of technical-military cooperation), yet in addition to a limited number of these forces (which is meant to create the veneer of legitimacy), Russia sends a number of irregulars, who are involved in illegal training (the CAR, Venezuela), and, allegedly, in counter-insurgency operations/violent suppression of public revolts as was the case in Sudan, and, allegedly, in Nicaragua.

(3) Geo-economic/strategic functions based on the “power economy” (silovya ekonomika) concept and commercialisation of war principle. Unlike the Soviet Union (driven by the ideology and neglecting the economical aspect), Russia seeks to gain pecuniary gains from its activities in Africa and Latin America, with PMCs becoming an indispensable element used by the Russian side toward this goal.

(4) ‘Hybrid’ functions that are primarily based on the non-military use of irregulars/non-state actors, where a broad array of forces—ranging from PMCs to Cossacks and the Night Wolves—are serving Russia’s interests in various regions, with the Balkans^{Footnote 98} being one of the best illustrations of this element.

Expanding Geography: Threats and Challenges

Russia’s so-called non-state actors pose a variety of challenges (actual and potential) to the Western alliance in general, and Canada in particular.

In the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro) these groups—whose members are connected with the Union of Donbass Volunteers (SDD) and the Cossacks—have already identified their presence and strong determination to keep destabilising the region and inflaming anti-Western sentiments through various Russia-sponsored/supported groups. The unsuccessful coup in Montenegro (September 2017) orchestrated by Moscow should be a stern warning to the Western alliance. Russia’s other potential target might become Bosnia—an area where Russian “volunteers” (among them, Igor Strelkov/Girkin) operated in the 1990s^{Footnote 99}—which, with its ethnic diversity and entanglement of complex issue presents a near perfect site for destabilisation.

In ‘frozen conflicts’ located in the realm of previous-Soviet influence (Transnistria, the Donbass, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) Russia continues to support various para-military groups and irregular forces—mainly, the Cossacks, local militia and some Russian mercenaries—as a deterrent against Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia being drawn into the West’s orbit.

The three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland could be challenged from Kaliningrad by means of locally deployed irregular formations. This scenario is by no means an illusory one—during the Zapad-2017 (14-20 September) military-strategic exercises, irregulars (Cossacks) from Kaliningrad and the Don Army Cossacks performed exercises near the city of Sovietsk, near the Lithuanian national border^{Footnote 100}, while later emergence of the first territorial defense unite consisting of Cossacks was announced.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, nicknamed the “birthplace of PMCs”, Russia will keep relying on PMCs to challenge Western countries in this resource-endowed, and politically unstable region. At the same time, Russia is seeking to redraw regional PMCs market by pursuing what could be called “private security dumping” with Mozambique (the former Soviet client, extremely rich in natural gas) presenting a noteworthy case. Furthermore, the Central African Republic (CAR) (an area of massive involvement of Russian PMCs) could become an important stepping stone for the Russian side to pursue opportunities: (a) along the Libya–South Sudan–Democratic Republic of Congo–Ethiopia–Somalia–Yemen perimeter (the Eastern part of Africa); (b) along the CAR–Cameroon–Nigeria–Chad–Libya (Misrata port) line serving as Africa’s prime “buccaneer route” (gold, precious gems, ivory).

In Central (Nicaragua) and Latin America (Venezuela), Russia has been using a combination of regular military advisors and PMCs to tackle the ground and potentially forge cooperation with China. An area of potential major concern would become the Nicaragua Canal project—an initiative that could (if launched) pose a serious challenge to the existing status quo in the region and in many ways, re-shape the existing scheme of maritime trade. This project might inaugurate the emergence of Chinese-Russian partnership in Central America, which could follow the formula “Chinese money—Russian security”.

Conclusions

From 2014 to 2019, some important features pertaining to the activities of Russian PMCs were brought to light. The main strength of Russian irregulars is inseparable from their (il)legal status, which grants Moscow plausible deniability and, what is arguably more important, makes these forces economically affordable and a much sought after commodity by undemocratic, internationally isolated regimes. Second, the essential strength of Russian irregulars is inseparable from their flexibility and the diversity of functions performed (from training and physical protection to small scale military operations), which is inseparable from the pivotal role played by the Russian State, which provides essential backup. It is also important to note that in rendering their services, Russian PMCs are following the “Syrian model” based on the exchange of military/security services for a share in specific branches of local economies (usually, the extraction of hydrocarbons, precious gems and metals)—a status quo that seems to be working out well for resource rich, yet cash poor nations.

Finally, the activities of Russian PMCs have produced a much more powerful information-psychological effect, perhaps more than Russia even anticipated. The true extent of the omnipotence of these groups has significantly outstripped their real capabilities. For example, involvement of Russian mercenaries in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars as well as Mozambique (Cabo Delgado province) has identified some military-related weaknesses that could be utilised by the West in countering this adversary. Namely, Russian PMCs performed poorly and suffered relatively heavy casualties when confronted by technologically superior enemies (in Libya and Syria) in a landscape ill-fit for partisan-type military operations. On the other front, the Wagner group has seemingly experienced serious problems in Mozambique fighting against a diverse coalition of local rebels presenting a patchwork of forces consisting of Islamist fundamentalists (followers of ISIL) and tribal animists. Apparently, the lack of knowledge of the local environment (cultural and religious) coupled with the unsuitable jungle landscape have created significant difficulty for the Russian mercenaries.