The Military Aspects of Russian Grey Zone Activities

Russian grey zone tactics are principally intended to support Russia’s view of its place as a great power and to frustrate the capacity of the US to create an opposing consensus. Russia has many options for aggressively challenging countries attempting to counter its agenda, and its long experience in deception and denial has led to material gains in geopolitical influence. Economic failings have not hindered its exercise of power.

Since the 2014 seizure of Crimea and subsequent Ukraine crisis, Western governments have been trying to come to terms with what some perceive to be a new, or at least rejuvenated, level of coercive activity below the level of open conflict. Russian activities in Crimea, Ukraine and Europe more broadly were quickly labeled as hybrid, consisting of a mix of military and non-military means aimed at weakening Western institutions and international norms, and advancing Russian aims. Hybrid warfare goes by many names including political warfare and activities in the grey zone. Since grey zone activities are more universal and well understood this essay will use that terminology. This chapter will situate Russian grey zone activities within the broader context of Russian foreign and security policy and will discuss some of the poor arguments made about Russia that stand in the way of a nuanced understanding of the Russia challenge.

Russia’s Vision of the International Order

In so far as grey zone activities are part of great power competition it is important to ask what Russia is competing for^{Footnote 101}. Many will describe Russian foreign policy as one of spoiling the Western liberal order or simply seeking chaos^{Footnote 102}. Although it is true that Russia does play the part of spoiler, particularly with regards to US foreign policy initiatives, Russian actions are based on Russian beliefs about the international order. Far from simply wanting chaos—something Russian citizens decidedly do not want—the Russian intelligentsia seek a particular world order that differs significantly from the one supported by the West since the end of the Cold War.

The Russian leadership, and much of its population for that matter, believes that the current US-led international order seeks to keep Russia marginalised^{Footnote 103}. Moreover, the Russian leadership sees US actions abroad as a systematic attempt to change governments antithetical to the US vision of the international order. Given this policy, the Russian leadership believes that the United States seeks to create instability within Russia, weakening the legitimacy of the regime and eventually pushing for its replacement.

The Russian leadership, as well as younger foreign policy experts, look toward what they call a polycentric world order wherein the international order is made of centers of power with their own regional spheres of influence^{Footnote 104}. Arguably it is inherent in this system that only great powers exercise absolute sovereignty. A country like Ukraine cannot on its own decide what its strategic orientation should be. Its sovereignty is dependent on the core interests of the great power in its region, namely Russia. To achieve this world order, Russia will seek to set itself up as an alternative to the western liberal order and undermine Western interests, where doing so does not undermine Russia’s own interests^{Footnote 105}. It is not simply about chaos and undermining institutions; these are means and the end is a different world order more reminiscent of the order that emerged out of the World Wars than out of the Cold War.

The Grey Zone and Russian Strategic Deterrence

Grey zone activities fit within a broader Russian framework of competition and deterrence. Russian strategists, political and military leaders have been articulating a concept called strategic deterrence that includes a set of military and non-military activities—executed continuously in peacetime and war—to manage competition and coercion with potential adversaries^{Footnote 106}. This framework provides for activities that range from political warfare designed to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policy contrary to Russia to regular conventional warfare, to strategic nuclear warfare. Each of the levels of escalation and deterrent action in the strategic framework are dependent on each other. According to Russian military writers, for example, standard conventional deterrence is toothless against an adversary if one does not have the capability and willingness to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons^{Footnote 107}. Grey zone activities reside toward the political end of the strategic deterrence framework, although like all the rungs of the escalation ladder, grey zone activities depend on the credibility of the next level of escalation. For example, one could argue that the main reason Western powers did not go into Ukraine in 2015 and kill “little green men'' was because Western powers knew they were Russian and that Russia had more than enough capability to escalate multiple times over.

When talking about grey zone activities, many have looked at Russian private military companies (PMCs) as a prime example. Much is being written on this subject primarily to understand how these groups, which are actually illegal in Russia, fit into Russia’s broader foreign and military policy^{Footnote 108},^{Footnote 109}. Owned by private citizens, these groups are often supported and work at the behest of the Russian government. They were involved, at least partially, in operations in Crimea and certainly served in some operations in Eastern Ukraine. One interesting episode is the failed battle at Deir ez-Zour where approximately 200 Wagner members were killed when they attempted to attack the US base there^{Footnote 110}. What is important to note is that the Russian military appears to have made no effort to rescue these individuals. This suggests that there is some space between PMCs like Wagner and the Russian military. They should not be seen as purely deniable extensions of the Russian military, as it has plenty of special forces groups for that purpose. It does appear that they provide rudimentary security operations and certainly perform missions for financial gains of their owners. Placing PMCs in perspective, Russia has a host of capabilities and tools at its disposal to engage in competition below the level of open conflict and PMC are one part of that toolkit.

Killing Bad Arguments

This section will argue against some of the flawed analysis currently circulating about Russia, especially within the policy community. These shorthand analytical bites serve more to undermine our understanding of Russia than to support a well-informed policy that works towards Western goals.

Within the defense establishment of many Western countries you still hear murmurings of the Gerasimov Doctrine, named after the current Chief of the General Staff of Russia’s armed forces. The origin of this purported doctrine was an article Gerasimov published in 2013 just before the invasion of Crimea^{Footnote 111}. In the article, he described the threat environment as understood by himself and other Russian strategists. Following the invasion of Crimea, Western analysts looked back at that article and its discussions of non-military methods and saw it as a “Russian playbook” and a new way of Russian warfare^{Footnote 112}. This interpretation misses a fundamental point: the article describes the threat environment but it does not dictate a doctrine—the steps to take in response to the threat environment. To take the entire picture of the threat environment as doctrine is to miss potentially new and innovative steps an adversary may be taking in response to the threat they perceive. It is important to remember that the hybrid warfare ascribed to the Gerasimov Doctrine did not work in Eastern Ukraine; it was conventional Russian artillery that decimated Ukrainian forces that were defeating Russia-supported separatist forces^{Footnote 113}. The hybrid and grey zone activities ascribed to Russia always need to be put into context with overall Russian military power. To miss either is to invite surprise.

Another argument that raises its head in policy circles is the notion that Russia is a short term problem that the West will soon move beyond, given Russia’s declining population and its weak economic outlook. This argument seems to come out of an emotional need to be dismissive of this upstart Russia that has come to challenge the Western order. In a recent piece, Michael Kofman makes the point that the relationship between demographics and power is complicated and not necessarily destiny^{Footnote 114}. A further point is that even if Russia has demographic challenges, it is not clear what the policy implications are of these challenges. If one were to walk into the office of a President or Prime Minister and say, “Russia has a demographic problem”, her or his comeback may be to ask what that means for policy. It seems doubtful that the correct answer is that Russia is not going to be an issue in a couple of years. The same applies to the Russian economy. Westerners tend to place undue status on economic strength, often measured in international exchange rates. However, one would not say that the Soviet Union was not a great power because its economy was half that of the US. Additionally, when it comes to military expenditures, it is important to remember that Russia does not purchase tanks and planes in US dollars, therefore it is of limited utility to measure Russian defense expenditures in dollars^{Footnote 115}. The underlying point here is to be skeptical of the utility of offhand analysis that suggests that Russian hostility to Western interests will simply disappear in time.

Finally, perhaps the most pernicious idea is that inside every Russian there is just a Westerner waiting to break free with a change of leadership. This sentiment misses the nuanced and complicated culture that is Russia. Take the example of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He is often portrayed as an authoritarian who is deeply repressing the Russian people, and that if only he would go away all would be better^{Footnote 116}. While it is true that Putin can correctly be described as an authoritarian, in Michael Kimmage’s words, he is the people’s authoritarian^{Footnote 117}. Westerners either do not know or often forget the deep humiliation and economic hardship experienced by most Russians following the end of the Cold War. Putin has managed to instill, in modern day Russia a restored sense of esteem. That is not to paint a rosy picture of Putin and his regime, as recent protests show, however policy makers and analysts should not get ahead of themselves in thinking that Russians are deeply oppressed and are simply waiting to overthrow the regime in favour of something that looks like the West.

Conclusion

The challenges that the Russian Federation poses to US, NATO and their partners are complex and nuanced. Russia has fully engaged its instruments of national power in an attempt to shape a changing world order to one that validates Russia’s perception of itself in that world order. Far from chaos, Russian policy makers are pushing for a world order that sees great powers—which it clearly considers itself to be—as the epicenters of the international community. In this world order, great powers are the final arbiters of international security arrangements, watching over and shaping their own spheres of influence.

Among the tools Russian leaders use to push for their world order and deny alternatives are those that lie beneath the level of armed conflict. These tools and actions executed in the grey zone are designed to incrementally change international norms and the very psyche of adversary nations in favor of Russia’s conceived polycentric world order. Russia’s use of PMCs in Crimea, Ukraine, Syria, and Africa are part and parcel of its attempts to aggressively engage the international arena (although, notably, these PMCs also serve their master’s financial interests—which may or may not coincide with Russian goals).

Finally, to mitigate the challenges posed by Russian grey zone activities one must do the hard work of understanding Russia without resorting to over simplifications and unfounded analytic assertions. These do little to strengthen the position of NATO members and can lead to poor policy decisions.