Diffusion of Far-Right Ideas in Western Europe: The Role of Social Media

Right-wing organisations may be extreme or radical, but all are nativist and authoritarian. Many are also populist. Most extremist movements are marginal in impact, but radical right and populist parties have had electoral success in some European national elections. An examination of Twitter content illustrates that the most active Twitter communicators on the right are political parties rather than movements, and that Islamophobia and economic nativism are the most resonant themes.

The presence of far-right organisations, activists and politicians online and the diffusion of their ideas through social media is becoming the bogeyman of many commentators on contemporary politics. On 1 May 2017, The Guardian warned “the far-right thrives on global networks^{Footnote 15} ” based on exchanges through social media, and a 31 October 2018 article by Time Magazine suggested that far-right content may foster offline violence^{Footnote 16} . Indeed, the dissemination of far-right ideas through social media platforms is increasingly and emphatically portrayed as the new challenge for contemporary democracies.

While scholars agree that far-righters invest heavily in social media to promote their ideas, the extent to which such diffusion actually occurs remains a matter of debate. The novelty that social media represents for politics in the 21st century has intrinsically limited the amount of evidentiary research in this area, but the diffusion of far-right ideas between like-minded organisations and their audiences across countries in Western Europe on Twitter is being examined. This chapter discusses the heterogeneity of the far-right milieu in Western Europe, examines diffusion between Western European far-right organisations and their audiences on Twitter as explored by one research study, and considers the implications of this activity to counter far-right ideas online in contemporary democracies.

Identifying Far-Right Ideas

The Western European far right is heterogeneous, including organisations diverging in ideological and organisational terms. Ideologically, ‘extreme right’ organisations oppose democracy tout court and want to replace it with non-democratic political orders (fascism or Nazism). Examples of this are neo-fascist and neo-Nazi organisations such as the Greek Golden Dawn or the Italian CasaPound. With few exceptions, most extreme-right organisations remain marginal in contemporary politics.

For their part, radical-right populist (RRP) organisations oppose fundamental values of liberal democracy, in particular pluralism and minority rights, but remain (at least formally) democratic. Examples of RRPs include political parties such as the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the National Front/ National Rally (FN) in France and the Italian (Northern) League (L). Some of these parties entered parliaments, such as the  Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (VB) and the Dutch Centre Party (CP). Others became important in government formations (for example the Hungarian Fidesz, the Italian League, the FPÖ, the Bulgarian Ataka, and the Greek LAOS) or supported minority governments (the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the Danish People's Party). Organisationally, it is possible to distinguish between political parties (running for elections) and social movements, grassroots and/or intellectual groups aiming to influence politics through non-electoral channels. Overall, while ‘extremist’ groups are often openly racist and oppose the democratic constitutional order, ‘radical-right’ organisations formally accept the rules of liberal democracy but oppose minority rights. These differences are important to make sense of the heterogeneity of the contemporary far right.

Despite these differences, far-right organisations share at least two core ideological features: nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism is an ideology positing that only native people may inhabit the state and that non-native elements (personas or ideas) are a threat to the homogeneity of the state. Authoritarianism may have different interpretations. It may refer to nostalgia for non-democratic political orders such as historical fascism and Nazism (in the case of the extreme right) and/or to a belief in a strictly ordered society where infringements must be punished harshly.

Although there is no agreement in the literature, for some researchers the far right has also a third ideological feature: populism. Populism is one of the most disputed concepts in contemporary political science. It refers to a set of ideas depicting society as being divided in two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’. Populism argues that politics must be an expression of the general will. In the case of the far right, ‘the people’ are the natives. These core ideological features inform far-right ideas on immigration, but also on different issues such as welfare (ie, more state aid programs for natives) and education (ie, free access to education for natives).

The Diffusion of Far-Right Ideas on Twitter: A Qualified Assessment

There are many ways to define and observe the diffusion of the above-mentioned far-right ideas on social media. To explore the diffusion of far-right messages on social media, one research study considered messaging diffusion on Twitter in Western European countries between 2016 and 2017, focusing on exchanges between France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom—four countries differing in terms of configuration of the far-right spectrum. Far-right movements and other loosely organised groups are particularly more active in Italy and France than in Germany and the UK. While France and Italy host two of the most electorally successful and long-lived radical-right populist parties (the National Front/National Rally and the League respectively), the far right in Germany and the United Kingdom (ie, the British National Front) has thus far experienced relatively modest electoral support.

In each country, the study examined the most popular far-right Twitter accounts and their content. To build the initial sample (10 per country), researchers relied on country reports by watchdog organisations. To avoid artificial accounts, scholars selected only Twitter handles belonging to existing far-right organisations, their leaders and/or high-rank officials. The expansion of the initial sample was made by means of snowball sampling. The study identified the diffusion of far-right ideas across audiences in different countries by building a network of tweets that were retweeted—more than five times—from more than one country, such as a user that retweeted content from Germany and from France. Subsequently, to examine what ideas were more likely to spread on Twitter among far-right audiences, the study explored the content of tweets that were retweeted from more than one countryTo detect the initiators, researchers also accounted for whether the Twitter handle belonged to a far-right organisation (distinguishing between political parties and movements) or to a politician.

Overall, the study results suggest that the extent to which Twitter diffuses far-right ideas needs to be qualified. More specifically, the results highlight two main patterns:

1. Political parties (rather than movements) are the most active far-right entrepreneurs on Twitter. Marine Le Pen, leader of the French National Rally, is among the most popular accounts across countries; and
2. In terms of content, only select few themes garner traction from one country to the other: immigration and the economy.

More than immigration in general, it is Islamophobia and the portrayal of Muslims as both a cultural and security threat to the West which are most widely promoted by far-right groups.  These tweets capitalise on fears of ethnic invasion and replacement and on the vision of Islam as a monolithic, fundamentalist and imperialistic religion. In this respect, many far-right organisations position themselves as the defenders of civil rights (such as women and/or LGBTQ rights) supposedly associated with a so-called Western national identity.

Another significant theme, economic nativism, illustrates how the far right values the economy not as a goal, but as a means of protecting the interests of the nation and its nationals from foreign competition. In economy-related tweets, this theme is politicised by describing economic programs as catalyzers of the interests of native people. Here again, anti-migrant nativist arguments prevail over purely economic ones, or at least encompass them. Hence, more than about the state-market dichotomy, in general the far right speaks about protectionism or neoliberalism to preserve the natives’ economic interests.

Implications

While observers of contemporary politics are concerned about social media fostering the diffusion of far-right ideas, the true extent of this remains unclear. The above-noted study illustrates that the argument that social media foster the diffusion of far-right ideas among like-minded organisations and audiences across different countries needs to be qualified, at least when it comes to Twitter messaging in Western European countries. Findings highlight that the types of issues emphasised in tweets play an important role in whether or not the messaging is shared among far-right organisations and their audiences on Twitter. Compared to other issues, only immigration and the economy are significantly more likely to generate resonance.

The need to expand the focus of the study is noted, particularly by comparing Twitter results with results collected from other social media platforms. As well, the exploration of these patterns beyond Western Europe and over a longer time span would add to the body of evidence in this area. Future research should also consider the important role of fake accounts, fake content and bots in the diffusion of far-right ideas across broader audiences. Eventually, more evidence is needed to bridge online patterns to offline, real-life outcomes, including support for far-right parties and movements.

Despite any shortcomings, the findings of this study have broader implications to address far-right ideas online in contemporary democracies. The results highlight the necessity to decrease inappropriately alarmist tones regarding the perceived profuse and widespread diffusion of far-right ideas on social media. That being said, results do underscore that Twitter is a social media platform on which the far right is successful in diffusing its core ideas regarding immigration and the economy across heterogeneous audiences in Western Europe.