Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe

Far-right networks follow four distinct ideologies but they are increasingly cooperating to intensify their collective impact. Some specific groups are dedicated to building cross-national coalitions using social media and dedicated IT platforms. Serious divisions within the overall movement persist despite common targets, but by using a variety of overt and covert activities, neo-Nazis, white nationalists, counter-jihadists and conspiracy theorists are gaining influence. A significant trigger event could lead to mass protests and a still greater impact on far-right politics.

The European Landscape

The far right in Europe is dominated by a range of loose networks of activists that work together around common rallying points and critical strategic junctions such as elections, referendums, data leaks, scandals and protests. For example, the gilets jaunes (“yellow vests”), Brexit and the European Parliament election have featured highly on the far right’s 2019 agenda to build cross-ideological and transnational coalitions. Four main ideologically separate but strategically intertwined networks can be distinguished in Europe: the neo-Nazis, the white nationalists, the counter-jihadists and the far-right conspiracy theorists. Over the past several years, emerging opportunistic alliances among these far-right networks have allowed fringe groups to mobilise much larger audiences, stage mass protests and launch high-impact social media campaigns.

Currently, groups such as Right Wing United (RWU) illustrate efforts to bridge ideological gaps between US and European networks, bringing together conservative, traditionalist, and counter-leftist groups in order to engage in safe and effective activism against the radical left. The movement has a social media presence on Facebook, YouTube, Minds, Reddit, Gab, Telegram and Twitch and uses a calendar to keep track of all major political events of strategic importance. Its Discord server, which counts hundreds of active members, functions as its main organisational hub and encourages participation in far-right protests across the world.

Despite efforts to unite the different corners of the far right, disagreement over the limits of transgression and neo-Nazi symbolism have led to divisions and in-fighting^{Footnote 3} . Similar to the widening rifts in the US alt-right following the backlash of the lethal Charlottesville rally, events that cause negative publicity or challenge the movement’s legitimacy tend to heighten such internal tensions.

Drivers, Enemies and Goals

Shared drivers, enemies and visions have provided these different networks with a lowest common denominator that can be leveraged for the sake of temporary cooperation and impact.

• Shared drivers include the anxieties and angers related to terrorism, migrant rape and crime rates, a loss of cultural identity and socio-economic stability, and perceived freedom of speech infringements;
• Common enemies include migrants, Muslims, the left, the political establishment and traditional information sources such as established media outlets and academic institutions; and
• The shared vision is to provoke changes in the political space by shifting acceptable discourse to the right through transgressive and provocative campaigns. Strategies to mainstream their ideologies include sophisticated rebranding, gamified propaganda and media manipulation campaigns, as well as the infiltration of populist parties and protest movements.

Networks and Groups

Neo-Nazi networks

The past few years have seen the rise of several underground terrorist organisations across Europe, such as National Action in the UK and Nordadler in Germany. Both groups continued operations after their networks were discovered and exposed: National Action reappeared under the aliases NS131 and Scottish Dawn, thereby mirroring a tactic that Islamist organisations such as Al-Muhajiroun had previously used after being banned. Meanwhile, the group Nordadler is still active on Telegram, where its members pose with guns, post about Day X and reach out to other far-right groups such as Patriotischer Widerstand in an effort to recruit new members^{Footnote 4} .

Mixed martial arts (MMA) and rock music (especially black metal, hardcore and hatecore) are key cultural pillars that European neo-Nazi groups use as gateways for recruitment and as springboards to foster international connections with other white supremacist networks. Festivals such as the Schild & Schwert Festival, which is held bi-annually in the town of Ostritz at the German-Polish border, provide regular meeting points for the European neo-Nazi scene and allow groups to raise funds through ticketing, merchandise sales and online promotion^{Footnote 5} .

A prominent figure in these networks is Denis Nikitin, a Russian neo-Nazi who has been funding and supporting extreme-right MMA events and ultranationalist hooligan movements in Russia and across Europe^{Footnote 6} . Large-scale neo-Nazi festivals feature political speeches, white power rock gigs, MMA competitions and fashion shops, including Nikitin’s own MMA White Rex label and nipster (‘Nazi hipster’) brands like Ansgar Aryan.

White nationalist networks

European white-nationalist groups operate in similar ways as the US alt-right and form the bridge between US and European groups. Their loudest voice in Europe is Generation Identity, a movement that originated in France and has offshoots in Germany, Austria, Italy, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and other countries. Although Generation Identity’s propaganda focuses on narratives of a white genocide and calls for ethno-culturally homogeneous societies, its language is carefully tailored to the legal hate-speech limits in each country. Thanks to its branding as a trendy and transgressive counter-culture movement, it has attracted young and educated audiences and connected the more extreme ends of the far-right spectrum to the mainstream. The Identitarians’ innovative hybrid media stunts, which pair carefully orchestrated offline action with slick social media operations, have generated disproportional attention for their causes and allowed them to exercise pressure over politicians and the media.

Counter-jihadist networks

The English Defence League (EDL) founder and former British National Party (BNP) activist, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka, Tommy Robinson), has been at the heart of the British far right as well as the global counter-jihadist networks. His bold campaigns against grooming gangs, the ‘mainstream media’ and freedom of speech infringements, as well as his focus on topics such as working-class grievances and declining trust in the establishment, have turned him into a popular figure among a wide range of audiences.

In North America, Yaxley-Lennon works closely with the US counter-jihadists Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller, as well as the Canadian far-right news outlet Rebel Media and social media influencers such as Lauren Southern. Across Europe, he has kept strong ties with the leaders of Generation Identity, the German PEGIDA street protest movement and the Dutch far right. An analysis of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon Twitter and Gab networks, conducted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), shows that the British counter-jihadist has strong followership which overlaps with international white nationalist, alt-right, Make America Great (MAGA) and QAnon networks. His heavy investments in the far right’s Anglo-European and trans-Atlantic relations have not only swelled the ranks of his online followers; they have also helped him attract significant financial support from donors across the world, including the Middle East Forum and the David Horowitz Freedom Centre.

Conspiracy theory networks

The QAnon community has expanded quickly to Europe over the past few months, with groups such as Q Europe, Q Britannia and Q Deutschland counting a total of tens of thousands of followers and linking US-centred conspiracy theories to local contexts. These conspiracy-theory groups have coordinated their activities on the gaming app, Discord, and established a presence across the entire social media space, producing their own videos and mobilising for protests. European QAnons have recently focused on boosting the Yellow Vest movement, the #BrexitBetrayal and #StandUp4Brexit campaigns, as well as the #FreeTommy protests.

Activities and Tactics

Creating online safe havens

The introduction of stricter anti-hate speech frameworks across Europe, in particular the German NetzDG and the removal of many prominent far-right accounts, have prompted many extremists to migrate to the so-called alt-tech space. Such platforms range from alt-right social media platforms and crowdsourcing apps to white-nationalist dating apps. Generation Identity has even developed its own messaging app, Patriot Peer, which promises to ‘connect the silent majority’ and was advertised on AltRight.com^{Footnote 7} .

Apart from extremist in-house creations and ultra-libertarian platforms such as Gab, coordination and recruitment activities also take place on hijacked platforms such as Discord and fringe forums on platforms like 4chan, 8chan and Voat.

There are four different types of alt-tech platforms:

• Extremist in-house creations. Those platforms created for the purpose of offering a safe haven for extremists (ie, Hatreon, MuslimCrypt, PatriotPeer);
• Ultra-libertarian platforms. Those platforms created by libertarians or commercially driven developers which tend to operate in the name of free speech, tolerate violent/extremist contents, do not proactively take down any contents, and are not willing to cooperate in any CVE efforts (ie, Gab, Minds);
• Hijacked platforms. Those platforms created for an entirely different purpose which have been hijacked by extremists but are proactively engaging in CVE efforts (ie, Discord, justpaste.it); and
• Fringe platforms. Popular platforms that serve as the engine rooms for Internet culture, and often serve as a home for ‘chaos agents’ (ie, #chan imageboards).

Rebranding and covert operations

The growing popularity of nipster brands in Europe reflects a wider trend in the changing optics of neo-fascists, both on the streets and in their online campaigns. By using twisted swastikas and word games, which escape legal prosecution by a narrow margin and serve as internal codes and jokes, they [neo-fascists] have created a new counter-culture.

Similar to the US alt right’s ‘It’s okay to be white’ campaign on university campuses, European far-right activists have also piloted covert operations to inject their ideologies into the mainstream. For example, Generation Identity has championed this approach with its 120 Dezibel and AHA (Alternative Help Association) initiatives, which attempt to create new brands under which they can pretend to campaign for women’s and human rights.

Gamified influence campaigns

Since the 2016 election victory of Donald Trump in the United States, European far-right networks have adopted the alt-right playbook of media manipulation operations and memetic warfare tactics to influence the outcomes of elections in favour of populist parties. Analysts at ISD have found evidence of European alt-right mobilisation in the run-up to the national elections in Germany, Italy, Sweden as well as in the Bavarian state election^{Footnote 8} . These interference campaigns followed similar mobilisation patterns, with its actors tapping into various online sub-cultures by gamifying their recruitment and propaganda. For example, the German neo-Nazi trolling army Reconquista Germanica, which counted 7,000 members on the day before the German national elections in 2017, used military-like structures and reward systems for its disinformation operations^{Footnote 9} . Currently, a range of nationalist and traditionalist groups across Europe are gearing up for influence campaigns around the European Parliament elections. In January 2019, Right Wing United even started a competition for Eurosceptic and nationalist memes they can use in the campaign, with monetary prizes being awarded to the best ideas.

Political infiltration

UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader Gerald Batten appointed Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) as his grooming gang advisor in November 2018, despite party rules banning former members of the EDL and BNP from UKIP membership^{Footnote 10} . There have also been reports that Batten is planning on making Yaxley-Lennon his successor after he retires. Far-right Youtubers Paul Joseph Watson, who was reporting for the Alex Jones’ Infowars, Mark Meechan (aka Count Dankula), who was convicted of hate crime for teaching his girlfriend’s dog to perform the Hitler salute in response to calls for a Jewish genocide^{Footnote 11} , and Carl Benjamin (aka Sargon of Akkad)^{Footnote 12} , who was heavily involved in the misogynist Gamergate scandal, all joined UKIP as new members in 2018^{Footnote 13} .

Hijacking protest movements

In November 2018, the Yellow Vests started out as a non-partisan, pro-democratic street protest movement triggered by French President Macron’s fuel tax increases. Both left- and right-leaning activists descended into the streets to voice their discontent with the government’s socio-economic policies. As the demonstrations morphed into a much wider mobilisation against the political establishment and frustrations started growing among its protestors, extreme-right groups such as Bastion Social, Action Française and Groupe Union Défense (GUD) seized the opportunity to infiltrate and hijack the movement^{Footnote 14} . Some of the Yellow Vests spin-off movements in countries such as the UK, Germany and Canada have been strongly encouraged or even initiated by far-right actors. European conspiracy theory communities of QAnon have also joined campaigns across Europe.

Outlook and Conclusions

On at least three levels, far-right actors across the ideological spectrum are currently ahead of those institutions and networks that are trying to counter them: the use of modern technology, the creation of international alliances and the weaponisation of youth culture have allowed them to expand their reach far beyond their traditional audiences. Over the next few years, we can expect far-right actors to build out these comparative advantages in an effort to launch even more sophisticated radicalisation campaigns targeting their sympathisers, manipulation campaigns targeting the ‘normies’, and intimidation campaigns targeting their opponents.

In the UK, a softer Brexit deal or a new referendum could exacerbate grievances among Brexit voters that the British far right could exploit to kick off mass protests. In France, a failure to provide a response to the demands of the Yellow Vests might create a similar scenario by increasing the vulnerability of these protestors to far-right radicalisation. Likewise, new cases of Islamist terrorism, migrant crimes, grooming gangs, media scandals or anti-hate speech laws could set in motion fresh waves of frustrations that the European far right can use to lure more people into its networks.

When such trigger events are coupled with sophisticated disinformation operations backed by Russian media networks and conspiracy theorist communities like QAnon, the damage can go far beyond the political fringes. Reciprocal radicalisation dynamics—both in the form of mutual amplification of Islamist and far-right extremism, and far-left and far-right escalations—are likely to further polarise Europe and might exacerbate the risk of far-right terrorism.

Additionally, the far right is likely to continue targeting its enemies with coordinated harassment and doxing campaigns. The latest hacks and data leaks of hundreds of German politicians and left-leaning activists demonstrated the far right’s willingness to silence and discredit political opponents and undermine trust in democratic institutions and processes. The use of more high-skill hacking techniques to steal sensitive data or the use of more cutting-edge technology (ie, deep fakes) to manipulate evidence would allow for an entirely new level of disinformation and intimidation campaigns.