Appearance before House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI)

CSIS Opening Remarks

April 25, 2023

Introduction

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and Members of the Committee. My name is Nicole Giles and I am the Deputy Director and Senior Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategic Partnerships at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). Responsibilities for disclosure, access to information and privacy requests fall under my portfolio.

I would like to thank the Committee for inviting CSIS to be part of this important study. Transparency and accountability are core values for CSIS, and access to information and privacy systems are foundational for this. 

CSIS Mandate

First, I would like to briefly talk to you about CSIS’ mandate to help you put our activities in context. Our mandate and powers are defined in the CSIS Act, which guides everything we do.

We primarily investigate threats to the security of Canada; namely, espionage and attempted sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and subversion.   

We provide information and advice to the Government of Canada on these threats, including through the production of intelligence assessments and reports. As well, CSIS may take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada. 

CSIS also provides security assessments on individuals who require access to classified information or sensitive files within the Government of Canada as well as security advice relevant to the exercise of the Citizenship Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Foreign intelligence collection within Canada is conducted by CSIS at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence.

Access to Information

Despite being an organization that must keep secrets, CSIS is not a secret organization. 

As a national security organization, many of our activities need to be protected from disclosure. The release of classified information can reveal sensitive sources, methodologies, and techniques, which can be detrimental – even work counter – to CSIS’ efforts to protect Canada and Canadians from national security threats. For this reason we take the protection of information very seriously. The release of classified information can jeopardize the integrity of our operations, pose risks to the physical safety and security of our human sources, as well as our employees, and hinder our ability to protect Canadians. 

This is why CSIS maintains robust mechanisms, such as oversight and review, and have policies and procedures which seek to safeguard information. This includes necessary segregation, safe handling, retention, and destruction practices. CSIS’ stringent policies are supported by regular training, as well as rigorous auditing, compliance and review.

While we need to keep secrets and protect information, we also need to be transparent. This presents a unique challenge for CSIS more so than for some other government organizations. The public’s right to access information is balanced against the legitimate need to protect sensitive information and to maintain effective functioning of government.

CSIS conducts line-by-line reviews to ensure we release as much information as possible, while protecting information that could be detrimental if disclosed. 

As you can imagine, line-by-line reviews take time. Despite this, CSIS has a strong record of providing high quality and timely responses to requests for information. For example, in 2021-2022, CSIS’s on-time compliance rates for Privacy Act and access to information requests was 94%. 

This is not unusual for CSIS: our access to information on-time compliance rate has stood in the mid-to-high 90s over the past decade. 

In addition, CSIS regularly publishes information as part of proactive publication requirements, as well as summaries of recent Access to Information Act releases to allow the public to access previously released records. 

Access to information and privacy requests are just one way CSIS communicates information to Canadians. Over the past several years, we have taken concrete steps to increase our transparency and engagement with Canadians. We communicate publicly through various resources, such as our annual public report and annual Access to Information and Privacy Act reports, publications in multiple languages, briefings to engage with provinces and territories, indigenous groups, the business sector, academia and community organizations, and social media engagement. 

All these transparency efforts are intended to better inform the population, since all Canadians have a role to play to protect Canada’s national security. 

Conclusion

CSIS constantly seeks to strike the right balance between promoting transparency and accountability in government institutions and protection of national security interests. As an Intelligence agency, CSIS faces unique disclosure challenges, which we strive to meet in the best interest of Canadians. I would be happy to take your questions now. Thank you. 

Privacy and ATIP

Key Messages

• CSIS’ mission is to protect Canada’s national security and the values that keep us strong, these values include the right to privacy, and checks and balances on power, including that of CSIS. 
• CSIS takes the privacy of Canadians very seriously, and privacy rights are foremost consideration for CSIS, both in its collection activities and in its information management policies and practices.
• All the activities undertaken by CSIS in the pursuit of its mandate are consistent with Canadian law and values, including the Privacy Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
• CSIS is committed to ensuring that its activities are transparent, accountable and in compliance with privacy legislation, guidelines, and best practices.
• CSIS’ Access to Information and Privacy Section (ATIP) is under the Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships Directorate.  
• CSIS’ ATIP Section is dedicated to the administration of the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act, and provides high quality and timely responses to internal and external requests. 
• During 2021-2022, CSIS received 1,182 Privacy Act Requests and 844 Access to Information Requests. In 2022, CSIS’ on-time compliance rates stood at 94% for both Privacy Act requests and Access to Information requests.  
• CSIS is continuing to seek ways to improve its ability to provide the public with access to information and is taking steps to modernize CSIS’s ATIP section.
• Further information about this initiative and CSIS's compliance with the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act can always be found in the CSIS’ Annual ATIP Reports, which are available to the public on our website. 

If pressed for more recent statistics

• In the next few weeks, the Treasury Board Secretariat is expected to provide institutions with directives and requirements for the 2022-2023 ATIP reports, which will be tabled in Parliament in September 2023.
• Given this, and the fact that CSIS is still closing some 2022-2023 files, CSIS cannot provide official statistics. However, in 2022-2023, CSIS received approximately 1,486 requests under the Privacy Act¬ – an estimated 51% increase and approximately 1,275 requests under the Access to Information Act – an estimated 26% increase. 
• Official statistics will be made available in CSIS’ upcoming public ATIP reports for 2022-2023.  

Impact of COVID-19

• The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the on-time compliance rate during 2020-2021. During the pandemic, there were eight weeks throughout the fiscal year that CSIS’ ATIP section was reduced to partial capacity due to provincial lockdowns and/or COVID outbreaks. However, for forty-four weeks, the ATIP section was able to process requests at full capacity while still respecting established COVID guidelines. 
• The most significant affect was the inability of certain institutions to receive and process Secret and Top Secret records, which resulted in more requests in deemed refused, partial responses and lengthy extensions. 
• Despite the challenges, CSIS still delivered on its legislative obligations and the CSIS’s on-time compliance rate improved substantially the following year.

Exemptions and Redactions 

• The Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act allow institutions to exempt information from being released for a variety of reasons. 
• In 2021-2022, under the Access to Information Act, CSIS’ ATIP Section invoked 2,084 exemptions and 1,523 exemptions under the Privacy Act. 
• Under both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the most common exemptions applied were due to information that was obtained under lawful investigation. As specified in the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act, these exemptions can only be invoked by investigative bodies.

ATIA			Privacy
Section of the Act	Times invoked	%	Section of the Act	Times invoked	%
s.16 : Obtained or Prepared by an Investigative body performing lawful investigations	949	46	s.22 : Personal information obtained or prepared by an Investigative body performing lawful investigations	546	37
s.15 : Injurious to the conduct of international affairs, defence of Canada, or the detection/prevention/suppression of subversive/hostile activities	429	21	s.18 : Personal information contained in a personal information bank (exempt bank)	542	36
s.24 : Records where there are statutory prohibitions against disclosure (CSIS Act). (ex: CSIS Employee names/Sources)	292	14	s.21 : Personal information expected to be injurious to the Government of Canada in the conduct of International Affairs, and subversive/hostile activities and the defence of Canada	314	21
s.19 : Records containing personal information	176	6	s.26 : Personal information of individuals other than the individual who made the request	106	7

• The Access to Information Act and Privacy Act do not apply to information already publically available or excludes materials such as Cabinet Confidence.
• In 2021-2022, CSIS’ ATIP Section invoked exclusions under the Access to Information Act 153 times, and under the Privacy Act 3 times. 
• Under s.24 of the Access to Information Act, CSIS can exempt information for the protection of its sources and employees. This includes redacting personal information, all third-party information unless consent is received, as well as solicitor/client information.

Audit and Quality Management

• There have not been any audits of CSIS’ ATIP Section. In fact, the CSIS ATIP Section was the recipient of the Information Commissioner’s Award in 2019 for its excellence in communication, innovation, leadership, and service. 
• CSIS’ ATIP Section has rigorous review process, which includes consultation with subject matter experts, and the Office of the Information Commissioner. While ATIP analysts conduct the initial review and assessment and apply exemptions, their assessments also undergo head and chief review, and when necessary director general review. When required, as DDP, I am also consulted on necessary ATIP requests. 
• Further to the Office of the Information Commissioner’s recommendations in December 2022, CSIS’ ATIP Section made several changes including using positive redactions in disclosures to requestors, and specifying exemptions on requests. 

CSIS’ Access to Information and Privacy Section

• CSIS ATIP analysts administer both the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, in consultation with subject matter experts. 
• All extension requests must be approved by the Chief of ATIP. For extensions over 30 days, a copy of the extension request is sent to the Office of the Information Commissioner. 
• Along with regular ATIP production, CSIS’ ATIP Unit is also involved in the redaction process for documents produced to review bodies and committees. 
• As a member of the ATIP Professional Community Development Office (APCDO), CSIS ATIP analysts participate in offered training sessions. Additionally, there is training and onboarding plans for new ATIP employees, as well as Treasure Secretariat Board guidance material made available to guide employees. 
• During 2021-2022, the ATIP section consisted of twenty full-time positions, and one part-time analyst working on historical records under the Access to Information Act.  
• Full-time positions included one chief coordinator, one deputy chief, three team leaders, thirteen analysts, two administrative officers and zero consultants.
• For 2021-2022, CSIS’ ATIP Section had a 10% vacancy rate. 

Challenges

• Internal and external consultations can cause delays as internal branches already overtaxed, and many other government departments do not have the ability to process classified requests quickly.
• Government of Canada transparency initiatives, such as proactive publication, have led to an increased demand in ATIP requests, however, this has not been met with an increase in resources to meet this demand.
• CSIS has a small ATIP unit, which faces similar challenges as other ATIP units in the GoC – lack of increase in resources, insufficient funding, and issues with hiring and retention. 
• There are also technological challenges, given that the classified environment that CSIS works in, and associated security requirements prohibits interoperability and standardization with other Government of Canada ATIP Units.
• There are currently no active litigation cases against CSIS related to the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act.

Bill C-58

• Bill C-58, which received Royal assent in June 2019, amended the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act. These amendments included making the proactive publication of certain types of information mandatory. 
• While Bill C-58 provided necessary updates, the amendments also resulted in an increase in requests without additional resources to meet this increase.   
• Since July 2019, the proactive publication of briefing notes and tracking number has resulted in an increase in ATIP requests. For example, in 2021-2022, there were 50 requests made under the act further to proactive publication of briefing notes titles and tracking number. These requests are expected to continue to increase, as CSIS continues to deliver on its legislative obligations.

Statistics

2022-2023 ATIP Stats

Note:  These are preliminary numbers and are not official statistics. As CSIS’ ATIP unit is still closing some 2022-2023 files, not all files are accurately captured in the below.

	Privacy Act	Access to Information	Consultations Received	Informal Requests	Total requests received	Complaints received
2022-2023	1,486	1,275	128	929	3,828	36
2021-2022	1,183	844	120	719	2,866	44
% difference over 2021-2022	↑ 51 %	↑ 26 %	↑ 6 %	↑ 31 %	↑ 34 %	↓ 22 %

Access to Information 2021-2022

Fiscal year	Requests received	Outstanding requests	Requests closed	Requests carried over	Number of pages processed	Number of pages released	On-time compliance rate
2021-2022	844	84	752	176	45,243	17,428	94%
2020-2021	624	119	658	85	41,415	11,887	81%*
2019-2020	1,029	105	1,014	120	76,863	26,782	95%
2018-2019	1,146	143	1,181	108	40,146	16,304	98%

• CSIS received 844 requests between April 1, 2021 and March 31, 2022 – a 35% increase from the previous reporting period.
  • 54% of requests came from members of public, largely seeking status of their citizenship and immigration application or seeking to discover whether CSIS had investigative information on them. 
  • 12% came from businesses, such as law offices looking for the immigration and citizenship information of their clients. 
  • 12% came from members of the media.
  • 9% came from academics.
  • 13% of requesters declined to identify.
• There were 84 outstanding requests at the end of the 2020-2021 reporting period.
  • Of those 84 requests, 74 were received during the 2020-2021 fiscal year and 10 were received before April 1, 2020.
  • Outstanding requests are requests that had not been closed as of March 31, as they were still being processed, in consultation, being approved, or received later in the fiscal year. 
• At the end of 2021-2022 fiscal year, 176 requests were carried over to the next fiscal year.
  • Ninety-two percent (92 %) of those open requests were within their legislated timelines as of March 31, 2022 and eight percent (8 %) were beyond their legislated timelines as of that same date. 

Exemptions 

In 2021-2022, the ATIP Section invoked 2,084 exemptions under the Act 

Section of the Act	Type of Exemption	Number of Times
Section 13	Records obtained in confidence from other levels of government	75
Section 14	Records expected to be injurious to federal-provincial relations	0
Section 15	Records expected to be injurious to the Government of Canada in the conduct of international affairs, the defense of Canada and subversive activities	429
Section 16	Records containing law enforcement, investigations and security information	949
Section 17	Records expected to threaten the safety of individuals	14
Section 19	Records containing personal information	176
Section 20	Records containing third-party information	1
Section 21	Records containing information related to the internal decision-making processes of government	122
Section 22	Records containing test procedures, tests and audits	3
Section 23	Records related to solicitor-client privilege	23
Section 24	Records where there are statutory prohibitions against disclosure	292
Section 26	Records where information is to be published within 90 days	0

Complaints

• In 2021-2022, CSIS received four complaints under the Access to Information Act. The complaints were deemed to be well founded, and all four complaints were successfully resolved.
• Two of the complaints claimed that CSIS failed to conduct a reasonable search, and in both cases, CSIS conducted an additional search and provided supplementary information.
• One complain was related to the fact that CSIS did not respond to the request within the time limits set out under the Act. This was largely due to the effects of COVID-19 and CSIS complied in providing the information within a specific date.
• The last complaint claimed that CSIS improperly withheld additional information and in this case, CSIS issued a supplementary response. 

Privacy Act 2021-2022 

Fiscal year	Requests received	Outstanding requests	Requests closed	Requests carried over	Number of pages processed	Number of pages released	On-time compliance rate
2021-2022	1,183	61	1,179	65	21,688	9,842	94%
2020-2021	725	62	725	62	38,188	8,895	87%*
2019-2020	844	73	854	63	25,427	10,267	96%
2018-2019	1,048	92	1,071	69	23,564	10,125	97%

• CSIS received 1,183 requests between April 1, 2021 and March 31, 2022 – a 63 % increase from the requests received during the previous reporting period. 
  • 83% came from members of public, largely seeking the status of their citizenship and immigration application or seeking to discover whether CSIS had investigative information on them.
  • 6% came from businesses, such as law offices looking for the immigration and citizenship information of their clients.
  • 2% came from academics.
  • 1% came from organizations.
  • 8% of requesters declined to identify.
• There were 61 outstanding requests at the end of the 2020-2021 reporting period. 
  • Of those 61 requests, all were received during that fiscal year and none remained outstanding for more than one reporting period.
• As of the end of the 2021-2022 fiscal year, 65 requests were carried over to the next fiscal year.
  • Seventy-seven (77%) percent of those open requests were within their legislate timelines as of March 31, 2022 and twenty-three percent (23%) were beyond their legislated timelines as of that same date.

In 2021-2022, the ATIP Section invoked 1,523 exemptions under the Act 

Section of the Act	Type of Exemption	Number of Times
Section 18	Exempting personal information contained in a personal information bank (exempt bank)	542
Section 19	Exempting personal information obtained in confidence	9
Section 21	Exempting personal information expected to be injurious to the Government of Canada in the conduct of international affairs, and subversive/hostile activities and the defense of Canada	314
Section 22	Exempting personal information obtained from an investigative body in the course of lawful investigations	546
Section 23	Exempting personal information obtained for the purpose of determining whether to grant security clearances	0
Section 25	Exempting personal information that could harm the safety of individuals	2
Section 26	Exempting personal information of individuals other than the individual who made the request	106
Section 27	Exempting personal information subject to solicitor-client privilege	4

Review Bodies

• CSIS operates under a robust system of independent review and oversight bodies including the Intelligence Commissioner (IC), the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), and the Federal Court. 
• CSIS cooperates with review bodies further to the disclosure of their reviews, and works with them if there are any concerns regarding the redactions applied. 

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)

• NSIRA is a fully independent body responsible for reviewing national security and intelligence activities across the Government of Canada. NSIRA reviews CSIS’ activities to ensure they are lawful, reasonable, and necessary.
• CSIS submits regular and exceptional reports to NSIRA to inform its review of CSIS activities. 

National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)

• NSICOP is a committee of Parliamentarians that reviews and reports on CSIS’ activities. The scope includes the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence, as well as any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence, unless it is assessed that the review would be injurious to national security.
• NSICOP can also review any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee.

PSAC Strike

• It is not expected that the PSAC strike will directly effect CSIS’ ATIP operations.
• We will continue to deliver on our ATIP obligations, and seek ways to improve our ability to provide the public with access to information. 

Declassification

Key Messages

• Declassification of classified records can lend nuance to CSIS’s mandate and requirements by providing members of the public, academia, and the media insight into historical threat environments such as the Cold War, to better understand current and emerging threat environments. 
• That said, declassification inherently presents risks to national security agencies, as some historical information, though dated, can contain methodologies and operational approaches that are still in place today.
• Another challenge is the fact that declassification of CSIS’ documents requires a line-by-line review, meaning automatic declassification is not feasible without a dedicated team and resources.  
• This is why CSIS’ involvement in the declassification process is essential to ensuring a balance between the right to information by the public, and the protection of sensitive information by intelligence agencies. 
• CSIS proactively publishes briefing notes and tracking numbers, transition binders for new Ministers, and binders prepared for parliamentary committee appearances. 

Duty of candour and accountability

Key Messages

• As our Director has stated since the first En Banc decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
• In the furtherance of CSIS’ mandate to keep Canada and Canadians safe from national security threats, we often rely on human sources who have access to individuals or organizations that pose a threat to our country. 
• At times, we are required to pay these sources for information, or offer logistical support, such as providing a cell phone to assist them in undertaking their work. 
• While it was never the intent that anti-terror provisions in the Criminal Code would capture these routine activities carried out in furtherance of our mandate, they may nonetheless constitute offences under the Criminal Code.
• For several years, CSIS relied on the legal doctrine of Crown immunity as a defence from criminal liability when engaging in these activities. However, as outlined in the En Banc decision, CSIS’ ability to rely on this defence and the legal advice relating to it evolved and changed over time.
• Let me be clear, the potentially illegal activities involved in this case are, in fact, routine intelligence collection activities, used around the world by national security and law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism and keep people safe. 
• Importantly, the issue raised by the En Banc decisions has now been addressed with the passage of the National Security Act 2017, which provides CSIS with a limited justification framework to conduct activities that would otherwise constitute offences. 
• CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
• CSIS has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
• CSIS has also welcomed and cooperated fully with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s review of the En Banc decisions, as requested by the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice.
• In fact, CSIS has created internal procedures that ensure we proactively report emerging issues to review agencies and the Federal Court. 
• In addition to these measures, I would like to reiterate that CSIS works hard to protect our country and Canadians from a wide range of national security threats. The Court has acknowledged this and recognized that the consequences of failure are significant. 

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: How is CSIS engaging with external stakeholders, including on cyber threats?

Key Messages

• CSIS is committed to engaging with industry, academia, civil society, and communities. 
• These efforts are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians, listening, and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage. 

Transparency

• CSIS recognizes the importance of transparency within the national security community, which includes open communications with Canadians. 
• CSIS continues to seek out ways to communicate with Canadians including public briefings and appearances by senior executives, developing publicly available resources, and social media campaigns on various platforms to raise awareness on the threat environment and issues pertinent to Canadians. 
• As part of these efforts, CSIS actively works with the National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG), to contribute to increasing transparency across Canada’s national security and intelligence departments and agencies. In 2021, CSIS’ Director General for Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement (AOSE) participated in one of NS-TAG’s meetings, which included discussions on transparency.
• CSIS’ ATIP branch also regularly publishes information as part of proactive publication requirements, as well as summaries of recent Access to Information Act releases to allow the public to access previously released records. 

Public communications

• CSIS dedicates considerable efforts to engage with the public, including proactive publication, developing publicly available resources, such as our annual public report, social media engagement on various platforms, and public briefings and appearances by senior executives at various public events.  
• In May 2022, the Director of CSIS made public remarks on Protecting National Security in Partnership with all Canadians at the University of British Columbia. Previously, in 2021, the CSIS Director also gave public speeches on foreign interference and espionage at the Center for International Governance Innovation and at the Economic Club of Canada in 2018.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation. 
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

• These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice. 
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Intelligence and Evidence

Key Messages

• CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges. 
• To fulfil its mandate, CSIS must have access to information collected from a variety of sources. This collected information is then assessed to produce intelligence. Those conducting CSIS’ assessments are experts, trained in intelligence assessment, and use robust methodologies to assess the confidence on the reliability and verifiability of collected information.
• While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
• Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
• This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.