Briefing Materials prepared for the Director of CSIS: Public Safety and National Security (SECU) Committee Appearance – February 2020

2019-2020 SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES (B) Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Background:

The 2019-2020 Supplementary Estimates (B) will result in a net increase of $12.2M or 2.0% to CSIS’ authorities.

Voted Appropriations (New Spending Authorities)

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has received Treasury Board authority to increase its voted appropriations by $13.4M.

• Funding to improve core technical investigative capabilities                                                             $7,195,079

• Recovery of proceeds from the sale of homes purchased under the home sale plan.                 $4,183,500
  • Authority to recover proceeds deposited in the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) for the sale of homes purchased by the Service from employees who are relocated to meet the Service’s organizational needs.
• Recovery of proceeds from parking fees collected.                                                                             $1,311,495
  • Authority to recover proceeds deposited in the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) from parking fees collected from Service employees and visitors to cover parking related costs.

• Recovery of costs related to security screening of employees at nuclear power plants and provincial government facilities.                                                                                                                                                          $750,920
  • These entities are invoiced for the number of clearances processed and the funds received are deposited in the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF).

Total Voted Appropriations (New Spending Authorities)                                                                   $13,440,994

Statutory Appropriations

Employee Benefit Plan                                                                                                                                            $46,921

Transfers (From/To Other Government Departments)

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has transferred ($1.3M) from its appropriations from/to other federal government organizations.

• Transfer From the Department of National Defence                                                                               $85,715
  To support the Canadian Safety and Security Program, which provides science and technology solutions, support and advice for responding to the Government of Canada’s public safety and security policy imperatives.

• Transfer to Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development                                           ($1,419,172)
  To provide support to departmental staff located at missions abroad.

Total Transfers                                                                                                                                              ($1,333,457)

Total increase to Supplementary Estimates (B)                                                                                  $12,154,458

2019-2020 Supplementary Estimates (B)

Issue: What funding is CSIS requesting from Parliament and why? Does CSIS have enough resources to fulfil its mandate? What resources did CSIS receive in Budget 2019?

Key Messages

• The Supplementary Estimates (B) items represent an increase of $12.2M to CSIS’ spending authorities from $623.4M to $635.5M.
• CSIS has received Treasury Board authority to increase its Voted Appropriations by $13.4M. We also received an increase in our Statutory Appropriations of $47K. Finally, CSIS has net-transfers of ($1.3M) from/to other federal government organizations, yielding a Supplementary Estimates (B) net total amount of $12.2M. 

On why CSIS requires this funding

• CSIS’ mandate is to protect Canadians from threats to national security at home and abroad.
• The threat environment today is increasingly complex, diverse and global. A modern intelligence service must be equipped with expert personnel and tools capable of working both in the digital and physical worlds. A highly-skilled and experienced work force is essential to success.
• Regarding core technical investigative capabilities, CSIS requires new resources and updated tools to remain a modern intelligence service and to effectively fulfil its mandate in a constantly evolving technological environment.
  • CSIS is requesting $7.2M in funding which will allow it to maintain core capabilities and build resilience so it has the technical capabilities required to investigate threats to the security of Canada.
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•  Regarding the home sale plan, CSIS employees may be required to relocate to support organizational needs, including operational requirements.
  • Under the Home Sales Plan, the Service can facilitate the employee’s ability to respond to these needs, and mitigate the financial impact of their relocation, by purchasing the home and coordinating the sale. Once sold, proceeds of sale are deposited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and then recovered by the Service via the Supplementary Estimates.
• Regarding the collection of parking fees, ████████████████████
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•  Regarding our government security screening program, CSIS investigates and provides security assessments in regard to persons whose employment with the Government of Canada requires them to have access to classified information or sensitive sites, such as major ports, airports, nuclear facilities or the Parliamentary Precinct.

On whether or not CSIS has enough resources to fulfil its mandate

• Members, I appreciate that everyone around this table wants to ensure Canada’s national security agencies have the resources they need.
• Over time, CSIS must continually adapt to emerging and evolving threats, technologies and legal developments. Such changes create new requirements and may pose challenges for our agency.
• CSIS adjusts priorities to the threat environment and communicates these pressures and priorities to the government, so that we operate within the budgets allocated by Parliament.
• Appropriate funding ensures that CSIS remains a modern intelligence service equipped with the tools required in this threat environment.
• We use all the tools available to strive to fulfil our core mandate of investigating and advising the government on threats to the security of Canada.

On the resources CSIS received in Budget 2019

• CSIS received funding in Budget 2019 for a number of initiatives totaling $97M over the next five years.
• These investments are essential to deliver on CSIS’ core mandate and strategic priorities, including protecting Canada’s economic security and democratic institutions.
• Investments in technology, policy development and governance around compliance will also help CSIS deliver on excellence – meeting the highest standard of professionalism in our work, and ensuring we have the confidence of the Canadian public, review bodies, and the Federal Court.
  • This includes $32M over five years for CSIS’ efforts to modernize its framework for compliance under the theme, Protecting the Rights and Freedoms of Canadians.
• Funding also supports CSIS’ provision of advice to Government partners for security screening – an essential first line of defence.
• The Budget provides funds for CSIS in the following horizontal initiatives:
  • Protecting Democracy (democratic institutions)
    • $23M over the next five years
  • Protecting Canada’s National Security (economic-based national security threats)
    • $16M over the next five years
  • Renewing Canada’s Middle East Strategy
    • $17M over the next two years
  • Enhancing the Integrity of Canada’s Borders and Asylum System
    • $6M over the next two years
  •  Helping Travelers Visit Canada (temporary residents)
    • $3M over the next two years

Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat? What is CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democracy?

Key Messages

• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities.
• Certain hostile states seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests while others seek to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions to erode public confidence.
• The scope of observed foreign interference activities is broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber-tools.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and interfere with Canada’s democratic institutions and processes.
• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
• Over the years, the Service has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting individuals here in Canada, both in person and through the use of online campaigns.
• When community groups in Canada are subjected to such manipulation or intimidation by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.

On CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democratic institutions

• CSIS is responsible for advising the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to national security.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine “foreign interference” activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are believed to be targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• CSIS also works closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address these types of national security threats.
• While I cannot speak about this in detail as it could pose a threat to our national security, allegations of interference in any of Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state are taken very seriously by CSIS.

On CSIS’ role in the Government’s “Protecting Canada’s Democracy” Initiative

• Last year, the Government of Canada announced its “Protecting Canada’s Democracy” Initiative, which included protecting the integrity of the 2019 Federal Election from foreign interference, cyber and other threats.
• Under this Initiative, the Service provided classified threat briefings to key leaders within Canada’s federal political parties to help strengthen their internal security practices and behaviours and build awareness of foreign interference activities.
• CSIS is also a member of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force. This Task Force enabled CSIS and our partners: the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment and Global Affairs Canada, to coordinate our efforts against foreign interference into the 2019 Federal Election by raising awareness and assessing these threats, and preparing the government’s response to them.
• Even after the election, CSIS still plays an important role in protecting Canada’s democracy. CSIS continues to expand its capacity to investigate this threat, and provide assessments and advice to our government partners accordingly.

Espionage and Economic Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in countering espionage and threats to economic security? What is CSIS’ assessment of this threat? What areas are targeted?

Key Messages

• While terrorism and violent extremism remains the top threat to national security, hostile activities by state actors pose the most significant long-term strategic threats to Canada’s interests, including our economic security.
• As a world leader, Canada’s advanced industrial and technological capabilities, combined with expertise and cutting-edge research in a number of sectors, makes our country an attractive target for espionage by foreign actors.
•  Canada is the target of multiple foreign states who engage in espionage to gather political, military, economic, and industrial information – including intellectual property and proprietary information – to further their own national interests at the expense of Canada’s.
• CSIS has observed a trend of state-sponsored espionage in such key fields as artificial intelligence; quantum knowledge; 5G; biopharma; and clean technology.
• They collect this information through overt and covert means, targeting Canadian businesses, academia, research institutions and government.
• Cyber operations are one means of espionage, as the theft of information and compromise of systems belonging to Canadian private and public sector entities can be done clandestinely, often from outside Canada, and can be difficult to attribute.
• Together with Canadian and international partners, CSIS is constantly working to identify threats to national security, advise Government, and, as appropriate, take measures to reduce these threats.

On the targeting of academic research

• Foreign states seek to acquire Canadian technology and expertise by using a range of traditional and non-traditional collection tradecraft, including by targeting academic research.
• CSIS investigates a range of threats related to the transfer or misuse of sensitive technologies, information and intellectual property.
• CSIS routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders, including the private and research sectors, to advise them of potential threats to the security and interests of Canada.

On CSIS’ role in immigration security screening

• Security screening is one of CSIS’ core functions. The Service has robust measures in place to ensure that individuals seeking entry or status in Canada do not pose a threat to our national security. Upon request, CSIS provides advice to government regarding this threat.
• To be clear; CSIS does not make final decisions regarding an individual’s admissibility or eligibility. Our role is to provide advice.
• The responsibility for making a decision regarding a person’s eligibility for entry or status in Canada remains with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB).

On CSIS’ role in reviewing foreign investments

• While foreign investment is a key driver of Canada’s economic prosperity, it has the potential to impact national security interests through the acquisition of sensitive intellectual property, technology, or vast amounts of Canadian citizens’ private data for foreign use or with foreign state control.
• To assess such impacts, the Investment Canada Act authorizes the Government to review foreign investments on national security grounds.
• CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the Investment Canada Act. The Service conducts investigative efforts related to national security concerns arising from foreign investment.
• CSIS works with partners to provide advice in support of this process. The process may result in a Governor in Council divesture order or impose mitigation conditions on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security.

On recent foreign investment transactions

• I would direct any specific questions about the overall process for Investment Canada Act National Security Reviews to my Public Safety Canada colleagues.

While I cannot comment publically on any specific advice that CSIS has provided or specific transactions, I would note that it is ultimately within the prerogative of the Governor in Council to allow, disallow or impose mitigation measures on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security.

5G

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in the ongoing Government review of 5G? Will the Government ban certain companies from participating in 5G implementation in Canada?

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is currently conducting a review, led by Public Safety, to determine the Canadian approach for the implementation of 5G technologies in telecommunications networks.
• This review is taking into account a number of considerations, including economic and security impacts.
• The Service is actively engaged, along with its other government partners, in this review. Specifically, CSIS is providing advice regarding national security threats.
• At this time, I cannot speak to any specifics regarding the review that is underway or CSIS’ advice.
• It is important to note that 5G technologies have the potential to revolutionize the telecommunications sector and have a transformational impact on the lives of Canadians and the Canadian economy.
• However, these emerging technologies also have the potential to introduce new risks to the safety of Canadians and to Canada’s national security.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is engaged in this review and is providing robust national security advice.
• We continue to work closely with Public Safety, CSE and other government partners to support Canadian efforts to protect Canada’s critical infrastructure from security threats.

On Allied approaches to 5G

• Canada’s allies have taken different approaches to 5G implementation, adopting various mitigation measures to protect their national security in response to the needs of their unique environments.
• CSIS, and its government partners, are engaged in ongoing discussions with our allies on these issues.
• I can assure you that CSIS is working with all of its partners to ensure a thorough understanding of all related national security threats, including those identified by our allies to inform the government’s decision on this matter.

China

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed by China’s foreign interference activities?  

Key Messages

• Any attempt by state actors to interfere with our democratic, economic, military or industrial sectors poses significant long-term threats to Canada’s interests.
• China is a sophisticated and powerful player in the field of intelligence that has technological and technical abilities that can be used to acquire critical information.
• It has the ability to conduct foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence in a clandestine and deceptive manner in order to fulfill strategic and economic objectives.
• It has done so with increasing assertiveness.

A 2019 media report revealed that CSIS believes China is aggressively pursuing cyber activities

On the threat faced by universities

• Threats faced by universities are part of the broader espionage threat that we are confronted with.
• That’s why we routinely engage with a variety of stakeholders, including universities and have discussions about potential threats they may face.
• The goal of these briefings is to help Canadian universities protect valuable intellectual property from a variety of threat actors.
• The briefings are not focussed on a specific country or threat, but on how to best protect the intellectual property that is a valuable Canadian resource.

Foreign Arrangements

Issue: What is the purpose of CSIS’ foreign arrangements? With which foreign partners does CSIS have an arrangement? How does CSIS consider the human rights records of its foreign partners?

Key Messages

• The increased ‘globalization’ of various security threats including terrorism, extremism, espionage, foreign-influenced activities and cyber concerns cannot be countered in isolation.
• Given the complex threat environment, CSIS must continue to work with its traditional allies and other foreign countries. Effective cooperation depends on maintaining open lines of communications with our foreign partners in order to combat common threats.
• Cooperation with foreign agencies provides CSIS access to timely information linked to potential or specific threats, and allows the Service (and, in turn, the Government of Canada) to obtain information which might otherwise not be available.
• Through such relationships, CSIS advances its own investigations into threats to the security of Canada and gains a greater understanding of the scope and nature of international terrorism.
• CSIS has more than 300 foreign relationships in some 150 countries and territories, each authorized by the Minister of Public Safety and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
• The process to establish arrangements with foreign agencies is stringent and takes into consideration a wide range of issues, including Canadian security requirements, respect for human rights and the reliability of the agency.

On specific foreign arrangements

• Specific information on CSIS relationships with foreign agencies, including the agency and country in which they reside, is classified and not publicly disclosed.
• Publicly divulging the existence of such arrangements could seriously hamper the Service’s ability to liaise with foreign agencies in order to obtain security intelligence information relevant to Canadian national security. It may also cause security concerns for our officers abroad.

On the consideration of CSIS foreign partners’ human rights records

• The human rights reputations of foreign agencies with which CSIS engages is something that the Service takes very seriously.
• CSIS has robust, long-standing policies and decision-making procedures in place to ensure that information sharing with foreign partners does not contribute to the mistreatment of any individual by a foreign entity. CSIS has been following Ministerial directions on such requirements for over a decade.
• Additionally, the new Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act and related Order in Council issued to CSIS in September 2019 re-affirms that in sharing information, CSIS must act in a manner that complies with Canada’s laws and legal obligations and avoid any complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities.
• CSIS has robust processes in place to assess and mitigate potential risks of sharing information with foreign entities:
  • CSIS continuously assesses all of its foreign arrangements, including the human rights reputation of the country, and more specifically, of the agency with which it has an arrangement. CSIS therefore regularly reviews various government and non-government human rights assessments for all countries with which the Service has arrangements.
  • CSIS also applies appropriate human rights caveats on information shared with foreign partners which clearly state our expectations with regard to human rights and seeks broader human rights assurances from foreign agencies when required.
  • Where a substantial risk of mistreatment cannot be mitigated, information is not shared.

Canadian Extremist Travellers

Issue: What is the threat posed by returning Canadian extremist travellers (CETs)? How many CETs are there? What is CSIS doing to investigate and address this threat?

Key Messages

• CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, including those posed by the return of Canadian extremist travellers.
• CSIS collects information and intelligence to assess the possible threat returnees may pose, and advises the government accordingly.
• CSIS works very closely with domestic partners, in particular the RCMP, to inform possible criminal investigations or enforcement action as appropriate.
• CSIS may also share critical information to inform citizenship and immigration application decisions, including to prevent travel in support of violent extremism.
• When an extremist traveler is seeking to return to Canada, federal departments, including CSIS, come together to tailor an approach to address the threat that the individual may pose.
• Members, I would like to emphasize that it would be quite difficult for an extremist traveller to return to Canada without the government being aware of the travel.

On the number of Canadian Extremist Travellers and Returnees

• CSIS is currently aware of approximately 190 extremist travellers with a Canadian nexus who have left Canada to engage in extremist activities and are currently located abroad. Approximately half are believed to be in Syria and Iraq.
• In addition to the 190, CSIS is aware of approximately 60 individuals in Canada who have returned from engaging in extremist activities abroad.
• Of these 60, only a relatively small number of them returned from Turkey, Iraq or Syria. Canada has not experienced high numbers of returning extremist travellers from the Syria–Iraq conflict zone.
• Return to Canada from this region has proven difficult, given the risk of death or capture by extremist and other armed groups and possible lack of valid travel documents and funds with which to travel.

On CSIS’ understanding of this threat

• The activities of extremist travellers vary widely depending on their abilities and contacts: from planning operations, training, and providing logistical support, to fundraising, translating, producing propaganda, and attending extremist institutions.
• Some Canadians have directly participated in violence. Some have been used by extremist groups in suicide missions.
• As the terrorist group Daesh has lost its territory and the situation on the ground in Syria and Iraq continues to evolve, some extremist travellers are dispersing from the region.
• Given the significant operational challenges associated with counter terrorism investigations of Canadians in war zones, CSIS continues to be concerned about the number of individuals that we are not aware of, and those for whom we have incomplete information.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism

Issue: What is ideologically motivated violent extremism? What is CSIS’ role and assessment of this threat?

Key Messages

• CSIS is mandated to investigate activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada, and to advise the Government on these threats.
• Specifically, this includes investigating any group or individual who seeks to use violence for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective.
• CSIS recently decided to replace the terms “left-wing” and “right-wing” extremism with the more nuanced and accurate term “ideologically-motivated violent extremism”(IMVE) - this language was reflected in the Minister’s mandate letter.
• Ideologically motivated violent extremism is driven by hatred and fear and includes a range of individuals, groups and online communities espousing a number of issues and perceived grievances from across the traditional ideological spectrum. This includes xenophobic, anti-authority, gender-driven and  other grievance-drive and ideologically motivated violence.
• The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative which centres on an extremist’s willingness to incite, enable and or mobilize to violence. Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including books, images, lectures, music, online discussions, videos and conversations.
• Given the diverse combination of motivations and personalized worldviews of recent mass-casualty attackers, the use of such terms as “right-wing” and “left-wing” subjective and inaccurate in describing the complexity of motivations of ideologically motivated violent extremist attacks in Canada and abroad.

On CSIS’ understanding of the threat

• Worldwide, we have seen violent attacks inspired by ideologically motivated extremism. Recent examples include the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting in October 2018 in Pittsburgh that killed 11 individuals, and the March 2019 terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand that killed over 50 people in two mosques.
• As you know, Canada is not immune to acts committed in the name of ideologically motivated violent extremism. The 2017 shooting at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City, in which six people were killed and 19 injured, and the 2018 van attack in Toronto which killed 10 people, are recent examples.
• Violence committed by individuals holding ideologically motivated violent extremist views have been sporadic and opportunistic.

On CSIS’ investigation of this threat

• As you can appreciate, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations due to national security reasons.
• But I can assure you that CSIS takes the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism seriously and has increased our posture to investigate this threat.
• We are also working closely with our domestic and international partners to identify and assess threat activities.

Workplace Climate

Issue: What is CSIS doing to address the workplace issues raised by recent claims from former employees?

Key Messages

• As you know, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on matters currently before the courts. I would like to make clear that CSIS takes any allegation of inappropriate behaviour, including harassment and discrimination, very seriously.
• Over the past few years, we have been making significant improvements to ensure a healthy and respectful work environment.
• A healthy workplace is a successful workplace. As the Director of CSIS, I take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce.
• Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
• Given the complexity of the current threat environment, I need to make sure all of my employees are at their best. Our people are the organization’s most valuable resource.
• It is therefore essential to ensure that they have a healthy and respectful workplace.

On specific measures taken

• As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our reporting system, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• That is why I have taken concrete to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
  • Adding new mandatory training for supervisors on promoting a healthy workplace,
  • Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
  • Renewing our Code of Conduct, and
  • Holding numerous town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
• Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
• I have made it clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace.
• Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
• CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.

As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.

Community Engagement

Issue: How and why does CSIS engage with Canadian communities?

Key Messages

• To fulfil our mandate, CSIS must build relationships with individuals to collect information and advise our government about threats to national security.
• There may be instances in which CSIS’ lawfully authorized investigations come into contact with specific Canadian communities and individuals associated with Canadian fundamental institutions such as religious institutions and academia.
•  When CSIS seeks cooperation or assistance from Canadians, we emphasize that discussions are voluntary.
• CSIS ensures our approach is lawful, ethical, necessary and proportionate. It is important to understand that CSIS respects the confidentiality, discretion, and the privacy rights of those with whom we interact.
• It is a longstanding CSIS policy that employees must identify themselves and state the purpose of an interview. In addition, it is against CSIS policy for CSIS employees to discourage anyone from seeking legal advice.
• CSIS is actively engaged with bodies including the National Security Transparency Advisory Committee and the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to promote a robust dialogue with Canadians on national security and our activities.

Lawful Protests

Issue: Is CSIS investigating the protests and blockades currently taking place across Canada?

Key Message

• CSIS’ mandate is to identify and advise the Government of threats to our national security, and we exercise our authorities set out in law to fulfill this mandate.
• Section 2 of the CSIS Act is clear. CSIS investigates threats to the security of Canada such as espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, and terrorism and violent extremism.
• The definition of threats in the CSIS Act specifically excludes lawful protest and dissent, unless there is a significant national security threat to Canada.
• As you can understand, I cannot comment on whether or not CSIS is investigating any particular activity.

C-59 and Accountability

Issue: Do the additional review and oversight requirements in C-59 – including the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and Intelligence Commissioner –  impede CSIS’ operational effectiveness?

Key Messages

• CSIS depends on the trust of Canadians to do its work, and effective oversight and accountability mechanisms provide assurance to Canadians that we continue to operate lawfully in our efforts to protect Canada and Canadians.
• CSIS has always been subject to independent review by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
• While the effort required to meet these new requirements is significant, CSIS is well positioned to draw upon our extensive experience with SIRC to engage with these entities in a way that builds upon and reinforces public confidence in our operational activities.

Facial Recognition Technology

Issue: The Privacy Commissioner announced he is launching an investigation into the use of facial recognition technology by the U.S. firm Clearview AI? Is CSIS using this, or other, facial recognition technology?

Key Messages

• Our mandate is to protect Canadians from threats to national security at home and abroad.
• As I am sure you can appreciate, many people – including Canada’s adversaries – are interested in learning about our operational capabilities and tools.
• As you can expect, we do not comment on investigations, methodologies or activities in order to maintain the integrity of our operations.
• I want to emphasize that we take privacy considerations related to our work very seriously. Robust safeguards are set in legislation to ensure Canadians’ rights and freedoms, including privacy, are protected. CSIS respects the privacy of all Canadians – whose confidence is fundamental to our legitimacy and ability to operate effectively.
• It is important to note that the use of intrusive investigative measures also requires CSIS to obtain warrants authorized by the Federal Court.
• Further, all our operational activities are subject to rigorous review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) who have robust access to classified materials. CSIS is also accountable to the Privacy Commissioner.
• To pursue our mandate effectively, CSIS must be confident that we have the authorities and tools to investigate threats and advise Government.
• Contrary to many hostile actors, CSIS operates in a democracy governed by the rule of law. In carrying out our work, it is essential that we safeguard the rights of Canadians, including protecting Canadians’ privacy.
• As the landscape around privacy and technology continues to evolve, CSIS is committed to engaging Canadians on our authorities for conducting national security activities.

Security Advice for Travel Abroad

CSIS recently published a document entitled Far From Home which provides security advice to Canadians travelling abroad. What threats should Canadian travellers be aware of?

Key Messages

• CSIS wants Canadians to be confident travellers by having relevant security information at their fingertips before they leave home.
• Far From Home was originally developed in 2012 to help inform Government of Canada employees about the nature of foreign intelligence and security threats and provide basic steps on how to mitigate the associated risks when travelling abroad.
• Over time we have come to see that much of the information in Far From Home is useful and relevant for Canadian business and academic travellers as well.
• Therefore we have broadened the advice contained within the guide and made it available on Canada.ca so that all Canadians can access credible and relevant security information before they travel to a foreign country.

Privacy Act Breach

CSIS reported a material privacy breach in 2018-19 – how is CSIS protecting the privacy of Canadians?

Key Messages

• CSIS takes the privacy of Canadians very seriously.
• I can confirm that we had one material Privacy Breach in 2018-19 which was reported to the Privacy Commissioner and Treasury Board, and included in our annual report to Parliament on the Privacy Act.
• I would like to emphasize that this breach only affected a number of CSIS employees and quick action was taken to notify them. Steps have also been taken to prevent this issue from recurring.

Reported Mishandling of Documents

Issue: Thirty-eight agencies mishandled a total of 5000 documents in 2019; 52 of them at CSIS – what actions is CSIS taking to remedy this?

Key Messages

• CSIS is committed to safeguarding sensitive government information. I would like to emphasize that CSIS facilities are highly secure areas.
• As such, in the event that documents are stored improperly, the infraction occurs in a secure environment with strict access controls. However, we are continually working to improve security awareness of employees.
• We perform regular security sweeps to verify employees are properly safeguarding information and to promote security awareness across the agency.
•  Each employee receives training on proper security measures when they are hired and CSIS regularly reinforces these measures through awareness campaigns throughout the Service.