House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs - February 9, 2023

Key Messages

CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

• CSIS’ mandate is to identify and advise the Government of threats to Canada’s national security, which are clearly defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and include espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced-activities, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion.
• CSIS’ 2021 Public Report makes clear that foreign interference and espionage threats to Canada are real, persistent, and increasing in some areas. These threats are not new and they undermine Canadian sovereignty, national interests, and democratic values.
• In his 2021 speech at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), the Director of CSIS noted that the greatest strategic threat to Canada’s national security comes from hostile activities by foreign states who are leveraging all elements of their state apparatus to advance their national interests at Canada’s expense.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.
• Our democratic institutions are a significant focus of foreign interference. Foreign interference targets all levels of government, be it federal, provincial, or municipal, as well as political parties, candidates, elected officials and their staff, and elections themselves.
• Certain state actors, such as the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Foreign states or their proxies also threaten and intimidate persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours. These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS uses its full authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the lives and well-being of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities. CSIS may also use its threat reduction mandate to counter this threat.
• Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
• That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.

CSIS role in election security, including in Canada’s DI, CEIPP, P5

• CSIS is responsible for investigating and advising the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to national security.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying, and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine foreign interference activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are suspected of targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• As a member of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• While I cannot provide more detail on specific cases, CSIS takes all allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state very seriously.
• Indeed, CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada in relation to the election, and provided classified briefings on these threats to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel – the CEIPP, and the Panel of 5, or P5.
• In some instances CSIS also provided classified briefings to cleared political party members.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

General Election 44 (2021) & 43 (2019), and recent media reports

• Although Canada’s electoral system is strong, foreign interference can erode trust and threaten the integrity of our democratic institutions, political system, fundamental rights and freedoms, and ultimately, our sovereignty.
• As indicated in our public report on foreign interference threats to Canada’s democratic process, CSIS continues to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, foreign interference activity by state actors.
• Foreign interference directed at our democratic institutions and processes can be effective ways for foreign states to achieve their immediate, medium or long-term strategic objectives.
• These activities can pose serious threats to Canadians both inside and outside Canada, and threaten Canada’s prosperity, strategic interests, social fabric, and national security.
• Given the nature of today’s geopolitical environment, we assess these activities will almost certainly intensify. As such, addressing foreign interference requires sustained efforts and the right tools.
• However, both in 2019 and in 2021, the Panel of senior civil servants responsible for the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol determined that the Government of Canada did not detect foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, and that warranted public communication. 

If pressed on China

• We know that certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
• These states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as proxy agents to assist them in conducting various forms of threat activities.
• CSIS uses its full authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the lives and well being of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China. China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political, and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians.
• That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.

If pressed on other countries

• Multiple foreign states, including Russia and Iran, continue covert attempts to gather political, economic, and military information in Canada. They also continue to monitor and intimidate Canadian communities in support of their own strategic goals.
• CSIS does not publicly comment on, confirm, or deny the specifics of our investigations and methodologies. However, Canadians can rest assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference very seriously and uses the authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, reduce, and advise the Government of threats. Our goal is to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

Elections at other levels of government (provincial & municipal)

• Foreign interference affects all levels of government (federal, provincial, municipal) and targets all facets of Canadian society, including civil society, communities, media, voters, political parties, candidates, elected officials and their staff, and elections themselves.
• That is why CSIS routinely engages with all levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous), as well as Canadian communities, advocacy groups, businesses, industry associations, and academic institutions to ensure they are aware of the national security threats facing our country. By doing so, CSIS ensures that they have the information they need to protect their interests and our collective national security.
• CSIS delivers these briefings to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of hostile actors in order to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.

Defensive briefings and threat reduction measures

• CSIS routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders, including government and public officials to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada, and to provide briefings regarding specific threats.
• This engagement can include elected officials and party members. Which notably was the case in recent federal elections where CSIS provided  classified briefings to some cleared political party members.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference seriously and is making use of the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and take measures to reduce this threat.
• This includes use of CSIS’ threat reduction mandate, which provides an important tool for the Government of Canada to respond to threats.
• While I can’t get into specifics, CSIS may take threat reduction measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada or Canadians.
• As previously indicated, CSIS monitors threat-related activity closely, advises the Government on these threats, and uses its full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security, if necessary – while meeting its legal obligations and respecting Canadians’ rights.

Foreign Agents Registry

• Foreign states use a range of methods to influence policy-making in Canada and promote their national interests.
• CSIS participates in discussions within the security and intelligence community as to what tools are needed to protect Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• We also engage with our close partners to discuss their experiences in dealing with similar issues of foreign interference and espionage.

Addressing Anti-Asian Hate in Canadian Communities

• Unfortunately, we have seen anti-Asian hatred on the rise in Canada, and many Canadians communities increasingly face threats stemming from IMVE.
• CSIS has seen how the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated xenophobic narratives, resulting in tragic and fatal consequences for some Canadian communities.
• CSIS is strongly engaged on this issue, and engages stakeholders within Canadian communities to ensure threats are thoroughly investigated and when possible, reduced. 
• CSIS expresses sincere support for Chinese and Asian-Canadian communities who face ongoing acts of harassment and violence that have increased over the course of the pandemic.
• Xenophobia and racist hatred is intolerable in Canada. Our cultural mosaic is all the richer because of the presence of Chinese-Canadians across Canada, in large cities and in small towns dotting every corner of this country.

Recent media reporting concerning PRC police stations

• CSIS is aware of this reporting, and we take seriously any reporting of foreign interference.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the authorities under CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.

Parliamentary Security

• Violent rhetoric, both online and in-person, targeting elected officials represents a deeply concerning threat to public safety and an area of focus for CSIS.
• CSIS works with law enforcement partners to thoroughly investigate and advise the Government of Canada on threats to elected officials that reach the threshold set out in section 2 of the CSIS Act.
• CSIS intelligence and analysis helps to support the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre’s role in bolstering Parliamentary security.   
• Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has the potential to grow, lead to more acts of serious violence, and cause further erosion of trust in our institutions of government
• The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives. Many IMVE threat actors have adopted conspiracy theories about the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
• These narratives have contributed to efforts to undermine trust in the integrity of government and confidence in scientific expertise.
• While aspects of conspiracy theory rhetoric are a legitimate exercise in free expression, online rhetoric that is increasingly violent and calls for the arrest and execution of specific individuals is of concern.

Modernizing CSIS authorities

• CSIS’ authorities must remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• Keeping pace with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.
• However, these decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the CSIS Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, and relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Foreign Interference in Canada - General

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat?

Key Messages

• Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
• Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
• It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
• Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.
• In 2021, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process. As this report shows, foreign states and their proxies target politicians, political parties, and electoral processes in order to covertly influence Canadian public policy, public opinion and ultimately undermine our democracy and democratic processes.

Foreign Interference Manifestations

Democratic institutions

• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
• Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
• For instance, state-sponsored cyber threat actors use computer network operations to interfere with elections.

Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.

Media

• Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent.
• Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process.

Techniques Used to Conduct Foreign Interference

• The first and most important step you can take as an elected official is to be aware that you and your staff are of immediate and constant interest to certain hostile state actors seeking to interfere in Canada’s democratic and electoral institutions and processes. You should also be aware of how they target you and their tradecraft.
• In July 2021, CSIS released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process. If you have not already done so, I invite you to consult it.
• A section of this report serves to inform the public of the techniques foreign states use to conduct foreign interference. They include from elicitation, cultivation, coercion, illicit and corrupt financing, cyber attacks, as well as disinformation and espionage.
• Elicitation is when a targeted individual is manipulated into sharing valuable information through a casual conversation.
  
  • For example, a threat actor could knowingly seek to provide someone with incorrect information, in the hope that the person will correct them. A threat actor may also share some form of sensitive information with the individual in the hopes that the individual will do the same − a technique referred to as the “give to get” principle.
  • How to avoid it: Be discreet, avoid “over-sharing”, and assume public conversations are monitored.
• Cultivation: Effective threat actors seek to build long-lasting, deep, and even romantic relationships with targets.
  
  • These relationships enable the manipulation of targets when required, for example, through requests for inappropriate and special “favours”.
  • Establishing a relationship first comes via cultivation, all while the threat actor’s affiliation to a foreign state is not readily known. Shared interests and innocuous social gatherings are often leveraged for cultivation, and it begins with a simple introduction with the end goal of recruitment over time.
  • How to avoid it: Be aware and keep track of unnatural social interactions, frequent requests to meet privately, out-of-place introductions or engagements, gifts and offers of all expenses paid travel, and odd attempts to seek employment with your office.
• Coercion such as blackmail and threats are two of the most aggressive types of recruitment and coercion.
  
  • If a threat actor acquires compromising or otherwise embarrassing details about a target’s life, they can seek to blackmail the person. Sometimes, blackmail or threats may occur after a long period of cultivation and relationship-building. A threat actor may also attempt to put someone in a compromising situation, just to blackmail the person later.
  • Threat actors may also use covert operations, such as intrusions, to steal or copy sensitive information and later use that information to blackmail or threaten the individual. 
  • How to avoid it: Avoid sharing compromising details or personal information with untrusted individuals, both in-person and online. Avoid placing yourself in compromising situations, and seek assistance if someone seeks to threaten or blackmail you.
• Illicit and corrupt financing are inducements that may occur innocuously via a simple request for a favour.
  
  • For example, a threat actor may ask a target to “pay someone back” or relay money to a third party on their behalf.
  • Political parties and candidates may also receive funds (e.g., donations) seemingly from a Canadian, though this may have originated from a foreign threat actor.
  • How to avoid it: Be aware of inappropriate requests which involve money, and question the source of suspicious donations or “gifts”.
• Cyber attacks: Threat actors can compromise electronic devices through a range of means. Socially-engineered emails (i.e., spear-phishing emails) can trick the recipient into clicking a specific link thereby sharing details about their devices, or can potentially introduce harmful malware into their systems.
  
  • These cyber attacks enable threat actors to collect potentially useful information (e.g., voter data, compromising information about a candidate) that can be used in a foreign influenced operation.
  • How to avoid it: Practice good digital hygiene. Use strong passwords, enable two-factor authentication, don’t use untrusted applications, and don't click on links or open attachments unless you are certain of who sent them and why. Avoid mixing personal and professional devices.
• Disinformation: Threat actors can manipulate social media to spread disinformation, amplify a particular message, or provoke users (i.e., “troll” users) when appropriate to serve their interests.
  
  • A growing number of foreign states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their daily business. These online influence campaigns attempt to change voter opinions, civil discourse, policymakers’ choices, government relationships, the reputation of politicians and countries, and sow confusion and distrust in Canadian democratic processes and institutions.
  • How to avoid it: Be critical of what you are consuming online, careful what you share (or repost from others), and take note of unexpected online interactions.
• Espionage: While distinct threats, foreign interference and espionage are often used together by foreign actors to further their goals.
  
  • For instance, information collected or stolen through espionage can be very useful in planning and carrying out a foreign influence or public disinformation campaign.
  • How to avoid it: Follow security of information protocols, don’t disclose information to individuals who don’t have a reason to access it, and be discrete about how you handle sensitive information.
• If you ever feel like you or your staff are being targeted by a hostile state or state-linked threat actors, please contact us. We are here to help as much as possible, whenever we can.

Disinformation campaigns

• With regard to state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, CSIS has observed social media being leveraged to spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to confuse or divide public opinion, or interfere in healthy public debate.
• Foreign states attempt to manipulate social media to amplify societal differences, sow discord, and undermine confidence in fundamental government institutions or electoral processes.
• They may use a coordinated approach to amplify a single narrative while also promoting inflammatory content. Foreign states may also use cyber-enabled tracking or surveillance of dissidents, those who challenge their rhetoric, or do not support their interests in Canada.
• Such behaviour can lead to threats or blackmail if the individual fails to cooperate.
• In fulfilling our crucial mandate, CSIS developed publicly available resources on foreign interference, which were published in a range of foreign languages in order to ensure that vulnerable communities can access threat information in their language of choice.
• CSIS continues to engage with Canadian communities, advocacy groups, businesses, industry associations, academic institutions, and all levels of government (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous) to ensure they are aware of the national security threats facing our country and give them the information they need to protect their interests.
• These efforts are aimed at listening, better understanding the communities that we serve, establishing trusted relationships, and conveying threat-related information to increase awareness and resilience to foreign interference in particular.

Hotlines

• As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
• Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

Freedom Convoy protests and funding

• During the protests in Ottawa and across Canada last year, CSIS remained committed to continue assessing threats to Canada's national security during the important operational activities underway by law enforcement partners.
• While the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is an important part of our democracy, individuals are not justified in breaking the law or engaging in violence. CSIS supported the City of Ottawa and the enforcement actions being taken by the Ottawa Police Service, and their law enforcement partners.
• On financial reporting, CSIS continued to work within the parameters of the CSIS Act to support the Government of Canada in implementing measures that were in effect under the Emergencies Act.
• The Emergencies Act did not expand CSIS’ powers to investigate or take threat reduction measures. CSIS continued to work within the existing authorities of the CSIS Act.
• Under the Emergencies Act, other designated entities had expanded requirements to report to CSIS certain activities linked to designated persons. CSIS engaged with its financial partners to ensure that disclosures specifically related to its national security mandate.
• With respect to foreign sources of funding, CSIS’ mandate is engaged when funds are provided at the direction of or with the support of a foreign state or when those donating the money are doing so to support an act of serious violence or terrorism.
• CSIS did not observe that this had occurred in the context of the Convoy.

FI in Canada – Targeting of Canadian Communities

Issue: How are Canadian communities being targeted by foreign interference?

Targeting of Canadian Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups in order to influence their opinions or behaviours, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS has and continues to invest significant effort into building relationships with individuals, communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust. In times of crisis, we offer our support and our commitment to work in partnership to help protect and safeguard individuals in communities across Canada.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the authorities under CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.

Chinese and Asian-Canadian communities

• To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China.  China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political, and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• Our cultural mosaic is all the richer because of the presence of Chinese-Canadians across Canada, in large cities and in small towns dotting every corner of this country.
• CSIS expresses sincere support for Chinese and Asian-Canadian communities who face ongoing acts of harassment and violence that have increased over the course of the pandemic.

United Front Work Department (UFWD)

• While we do not publicly comment on, confirm, or deny the specifics of our investigations and methodologies, open sources have noted that United Front Work Department activities of the Chinese Communist Party incorporate co-opting elites, persuasion, and facilitate espionage.
• The PRC uses its United Front Work Department (UFWD) in Canada and around the world to stifle criticism and manipulate Canadian communities.
• The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference. When individuals in Canada are subjected to such tactics by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• Again, I want to assure members that CSIS is actively investigating foreign interference and espionage and views efforts by any organization to clandestinely influence or deceive individuals as a threat to national security.

Harassment on university campuses

• Canada’s academic institutions are centres of excellence that rely on open, creative, and collaborative environments to innovate and develop understanding of critical global issues. 
• Some foreign intelligence services and government officials, including of China, exploit this culture of openness to monitor and coerce students, faculty, and other university officials.
• In some instances, students are pressured to participate in activities, such as demonstrations and reporting on other students, which are covertly organized by a foreign power. Universities can also be used as venues for “talent-spotting” and intelligence collection, in specific circumstances.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups or students studying in Canada, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to our collective security.
• I can assure Canadians that CSIS is working diligently to protect Canadian communities as well as research and academic institutions – particularly by ensuring they understand the threat and that those at risk have the necessary tools to protect themselves.

FoxHunt

• Certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
• These states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as proxy agents to assist them in conducting various forms of threat activities.
• States may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals outside their country ostensibly in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts or to bring criminals to justice. These tactics can also be used as cover to silence dissent, pressure political opponents, and instill a general fear of state power, no matter where a person is located.
• When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals may not have the means to protect themselves or may not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities.
• The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can coerce individuals to submit to foreign interference.
• When individuals in Canada are subjected to such harassment, manipulation, or intimidation by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies and actions, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• Canadians can rest assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference very seriously and uses the authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, reduce, and advise the Government of threats.  Our goal is to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

Iranian FI

• CSIS takes the threat of foreign interference very seriously and uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act in order to investigate, advise government partners, and respond accordingly.
• As mentioned in our 2021 Public Report, CSIS has and continues to investigate credible reports of several Canada-based relatives of Flight PS752 victims having experienced harassment and intimidation from threat actors linked to proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
• ‎Following tragic events such as the downing of flight PS752, we work with allies and other government departments. Just as important, we work with those we aim to protect.
• While we cannot comment on individual cases, Canadians and all individuals living or visiting in Canada, regardless of their nationality, should feel safe and free from criminal activity. Anyone who believes a crime is or has been committed against them or is concerned for the well-being of an individual should report it to their local police immediately.
• Canadians can be confident that Canada’s law enforcement and security agencies have the skills and resources necessary to detect, investigate and respond to such threats. We will always take the necessary action to keep Canadians and those on Canadian soil safe and we invite people to report any such threats to law enforcement authorities.

Russian Federation and foreign interference

Key Messages

• In the past several years, CSIS has observed espionage and foreign interference activity at levels not seen since the Cold War.
• Foreign interference activities are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign country using both state and non-state entities, including state proxies and co-optees. These activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten national security.
• State-sponsored disinformation campaigns represent one of the many vectors of foreign interference. Hostile states have been involved in actively spreading such disinformation in an effort to discredit our government institutions, negatively impact social cohesion and gain influence for their own strategic objectives.
• For instance, as noted in its 2021 Public Report, CSIS is aware of several Russian military and intelligence entities that are engaged in information confrontations targeting Ukraine. These activities include the spread of disinformation and propaganda attempting to paint Ukraine and NATO as the aggressors in the current conflict. Such measures are intended to falsely influence populations into believing that Ukraine has provoked a global conflict.
• Additionally, as CSIS indicated in its 2020 Public Report, Russia and the Russian Intelligence Services have, for example, been actively engaged in disinformation campaigns since a March 2020 in an effort to blame the West for the COVID-19 pandemic. This is part of a broader campaign to discredit and create divisions in the West, promote Russia’s influence abroad, and push for an end to Western sanctions.
• While I cannot go in into detail on specific measures, Canadians can rest assured that the CSIS uses the full suite of tools at its disposal to investigate and counter foreign interference.
• Our work ensures the Government of Canada receives intelligence on the critical issue that is foreign interference, and that actions to reduce the threat are taken as appropriate.
• Considering the current situation in in Ukraine, CSIS remains vigilant to any threat activities against Canada and Canadian interests.

Cyber

• Cyber actors conduct malicious activities to advance their political, economic, military, security, and ideological interests. They seek to compromise both government and private sector computer systems by manipulating their users or exploiting security vulnerabilities.
• In 2020, a cyber espionage group linked to Russian intelligence services conducted Computer Network Operations (CNOs) directed towards Canadian, British, and American-based organizations that were involved in COVID-19 response and recovery efforts.
• These malicious cyber activities were believed to be an attempt to steal information and intellectual property related to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines.
• Non-state actors, including terrorist groups, have also attempted to conduct CNOs to further their ideological objectives, recruiting supporters, spreading propaganda, or encouraging violence against specific individuals or groups.
• In 2021, Canada joined the United States and international partners in voicing concerns related to a Russian cyber-espionage campaign that exploited the SolarWinds Orion platform.
• Although I cannot discuss specifics about the Solar Winds compromise, I can say we are seeing an increase in the exploitation of cyber tools to steal sensitive information, conduct ransomware attacks, and cause disruption.
• CSIS is also observing an increasing level of sophistication by malicious cyber actors. This includes the use of cybercriminal tactics, like ransomware attacks, by state actors and their proxies.
• Let me use the opportunity to remind Canadians, individuals and companies, of the importance of adopting best practices recommended by industry as well as the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

Espionage and Economic Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed by state-owned enterprises and their investment in Canada?

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for state actors seeking to gain information, intelligence, and influence to advance their own national interests through hostile means.
• Canada’s abundance of natural resources, advanced technology, human talent, and expertise makes us a world leader in many sectors. We have powerful allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships.
• All these factors make Canada, Canadians, and Canadian companies a target. CSIS assesses that a number of state actors seek to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy and critical sectors in particular.
• CSIS’ 2021 Public Report makes clear that foreign interference and espionage are persistent and increasing in some areas, such as Canada’s economy and critical sectors.
• This activity can occur through the foreign acquisition of and/or investment into sensitive Canadian intellectual property and technology, which may directly threaten Canada’s economic prosperity and national interests.
• In fact, CSIS is seeing an increased risk of foreign interference and espionage due to the extraordinary effort of Canadian businesses and research centres during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, CSIS is conducting outreach and working with these organizations to ensure that their work and proprietary information remains safely in their control.

On CSIS’ role in the Investment Canada Act

• CSIS continues to support Government of Canada national security reviews under the Investment Canada Act, and provides advice on national security threats associated with certain foreign investments and acquisitions. 
• This advice is limited to intelligence and analysis relating to threats to the security of Canada.
• Part IV.1 of the Investment Canada Act sets out national security provisions which are used to assess proposed or implemented foreign investments into Canadian businesses.
• The Governor-in-Council may take into account a number of factors related to national security, including; the potential impact of the investment on the security of Canada’s critical infrastructure; the potential impact on the supply of critical goods and services; and the potential impact of Canada’s defence capabilities and interests, to name a few.

Responsive

• While I cannot comment on any specific advice CSIS has provided or on any specific transactions, I would note that it is ultimately within the prerogative of the Governor in Council to allow, disallow or impose mitigation measures on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security. The perspectives of multiple partners and their relevant areas of expertise inform these decisions.

Research Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed to Canada’s research and intellectual property?

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for persistent and sophisticated threat activity by state actors.
• Foreign states target Canadian businesses as well as academic and research institutions to advance their interests to the detriment of Canada’s technological progress and future prosperity.
• Foreign states seek to acquire Canadian technology and expertise by using a range of traditional and non-traditional collection tradecraft, including by targeting academic research and conducting computer network operations against entities to gain access to proprietary information
• Certain sectors, including biopharma, health, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology, and aerospace, face particularly heightened threat activity.
• Emerging technology in these sectors is vulnerable to espionage by state actors.  Academia and small start-ups are attractive targets because they may have a less-developed security awareness culture and fewer protections in place.
• We are especially concerned about threat activities in this realm conducted by China, and to a lesser degree Russia and other states.
• CSIS is working closely with partners to ensure that Canadian entities are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.
• For example, CSIS participates on the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group, led by Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada, with other government partners and Canadian universities and research institutions.
• Key results of this work can be found on the Government of Canada’s Safeguarding your Research portal, which includes threat briefings, checklists for stakeholders, national security guidelines for federally funded research partnerships, and other resources.
• Our recent outreach to post-secondary institutions and affiliated associations is an example of how CSIS is connecting with stakeholders to ensure Canadian interests are protected. CSIS has leveraged its expertise and footprint in every region of the country to launch a nationwide outreach initiative to raise awareness of the risks of economic espionage.
• The objective is to build resilience in key sectors, including biopharmaceutical and healthcare industries and businesses – and by extension protect the interests of all Canadians. 
• This initiative has already had an important impact. We have briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals who are now well-informed about the possible threats and have the tools to protect themselves, their research, and their employees.

PRC specific

• In our 2021 Public Report, we reported that the PRC relies on non-traditional collectors of intelligence – individuals without formal intelligence training who have relevant subject matter expertise (i.e. scientists, business people) – and other non-transparent means of conducting interference in Canada.
• The PRC’s Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) seeks to exploit the collaborative, transparent, and open nature of Canada’s private sector, universities and colleges using scholarships, sponsored trips and visiting professorships to recruit individuals to advance PRC objectives.

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: How is CSIS engaging with external stakeholders, including on cyber threats?

Key Messages

• CSIS is committed to engaging with industry, academia, civil society, and communities.
• These efforts are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians, listening, and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation.
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

• These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Intelligence and Evidence

Key Messages

• CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges.
• While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
• Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
• This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.

CSIS Screening

Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?

Key Messages

• CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
• Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
• High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
• Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.

Government security screening mandate

• Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
• Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
• On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.

Possible recourse action when a clearance is denied or revoked

• Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
• CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.

If pressed on specific complaints:

• I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.

PRC Balloon Incident

Key Messages

• CSIS is concerned by any activity that threatens Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• CSIS is mandated to investigate all threats to the security of Canada, and in doing so works closely with our allies.
• Canada’s intelligences agencies are working with American partners and continue to take all necessary measures to safeguard Canada’s sensitive information from foreign intelligence threats.
• While I cannot get into specifics on any given incident, we know that China and other state actors seek to conduct espionage and gain covert access to the sensitive proprietary information of Canada and our allies.
• CSIS will continue to investigate and identify espionage threats to Canada’s national interests, and will work closely with domestic and international partners to address them.

Espionage

• CSIS is mandated by the CSIS Act to investigate, advise, and take action on threats to the security of Canada, include espionage.
• Canada is an advanced economy and an open and free democracy. We also have powerful allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships.
• All these factors make Canada and Canadians a target for state actors seeking to gain information, intelligence, and influence to advance their own national interests through hostile means.
• Espionage efforts are at levels not seen since the Cold War. Today, CSIS assesses that a number of state actors engage in espionage activities not only to acquire government secrets, but also cutting-edge technology and research.

Hotlines

• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including espionage.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”