Appearance before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE)

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Paul Lynd, and I am the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for intelligence collection at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (or, CSIS, for short). I am responsible for the management and oversight of all regional collection activities and operational capabilities – both foreign and domestic.

I’m joined today by Rene Ouellette, Director General of Engagement.

CSIS investigates threats to the security of Canada, in order to protect Canada’s prosperity, national security, and the safety of Canadians.  Our work in the Arctic is guided and informed through cooperation with federal, Indigenous, and territorial partners.

The economic and strategic importance of the region has been steadily increasing, along with the diversity and tempo of threats to Canada’s national security. Protecting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security is more critical than ever to Canada’s prosperity and national interests, as well as North American continental and maritime security.

Contemporary threats to the Arctic stem not only from growing militarization and the effects of climate change, but also increasingly from espionage and foreign interference activities, including through cyber means.

 

CSIS seeks to help enhance Canada’s resilience against various threats in the region. Our mandate with respect to the Arctic includes but is not limited to:

-      Investigating activities in the Arctic and North that are suspected to be threats to the security of Canada;

-      Taking steps to mitigate or reduce these threats where possible,

-      Advising the Government and partners in the region on these threats;

-      Engaging with Indigenous governments and organizations, the private sector, and the public, among others.

Contacts and relationships built over time with Arctic communities and the different orders of government have resulted in valuable threat-related information being shared proactively with CSIS. The unique insights and experiences that Arctic and Northern partners bring to CSIS help us better understand the threat landscape as it relates to the region and its people.

As commercial and international interests in the Arctic have grown, the number and diversity of threats to Canada's security and sovereignty in the region have also increased. CSIS has intensified its focus and efforts to investigate these threats.

Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established. This includes the waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways often referred to as the “Northwest Passage,” which are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title.

Governments, Indigenous peoples, and local communities across Canada exercise Canada’s enduring sovereignty over its Arctic lands, ice, and waters, every day.

CSIS is building on strong, trusted relationships with key partners within and outside the Government and likeminded Arctic states, to share information and coordinate efforts with respect to the Arctic. This includes providing relevant information to help inform decision-making, and to build and maintain resiliency against threats to the region.

We have been sharing information on the threat landscape with Territorial and Indigenous governments and partner organizations across the Canadian Arctic and North.  We continue to work closely with First Nations, Inuit, and Métis organizations and governments, to support decision-making in relation to resource development on Indigenous-People’s land. For example, we have provided multiple briefings on critical minerals, economic security, and the activities of hostile foreign state actors, to empower partners with relevant national security insights to consider, as part of their decision-making processes.

Our engagement with Indigenous partners is aligned with the commitment CSIS made in the Action Plan for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act, to share information with Indigenous partners to support informed decision-making and self-determination.

As CSIS pursues our mandate in a complex, dynamic, and challenging environment, we remain committed to doing so in a way that aligns with the Government’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and Arctic Foreign Policy. As part of these efforts, CSIS maintains an evergreen internal Arctic and Northern Framework. It aims to ensure a strategic and coordinated approach to CSIS’s engagement in the Arctic and North, and to underscore our commitment to collaboration with government and Indigenous partners, especially those who make their home in the region.

While CSIS was not involved in the 2019 FAAE study on the Arctic, we are glad to contribute to the new study and appreciate the invitation today.

Thank you.

KEY MESSAGES

• The economic and strategic importance of the region has been steadily increasing, and protecting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security is more critical than ever to Canada’s prosperity and national interests, as well as North American continental and maritime security.
• Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is longstanding and well established. This includes the waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, including the various waterways often referred to as the “Northwest Passage”, which are internal waters of Canada by virtue of historic title. Governments, Indigenous peoples, and local communities across Canada exercise Canada’s enduring sovereignty over its Arctic lands, ice and waters, every day.
• Canada’s Arctic and North comprise a strategic region for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and CSIS has a unique mandate with regards to safeguarding Canada’s interests in the Arctic and the security of Northerners.
• CSIS seeks to protect Canadian national security interests in the region and to enhance Canada’s resilience against various threats. Our mandate with respect to the Arctic includes but is not limited to:
  • Investigating activities in the Arctic/North that are suspected to be threats to Canada’s security;
  • Advising the Government and stakeholders in the region on these threats;
  • Engaging with Indigenous rights holders and organizations, the private sector, and the public, among others; and
  • Collecting intelligence on regional activities and actors.
• While both the volume and breadth of threats to Canada’s security and sovereignty in the Arctic have grown in tandem with increasing commercial and international interests in the region, so have CSIS’s investigations on such challenges.
• CSIS is building on strong, trusted relationships with key partners within and outside the Government and likeminded Arctic states to share information and coordinate efforts with respect to the Arctic.
• As CSIS pursues our mandate in a complex, dynamic, and challenging environment, we remain committed to doing so in a way that aligns with the Government’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and Arctic Foreign Policy. As part of these efforts, CSIS maintains an evergreen internal Arctic and Northern Framework.
• To ensure a strategic and coordinated approach to CSIS engagement in the Arctic and the North, and to provide transparency to GOC partners regarding our interest in the region, CSIS has developed this framework to establish its priorities, guiding principles, lines of effort, administration, and its commitment to collaboration with government and Indigenous partners, especially those people and communities who make their home in the Arctic and North.

Foreign Interference Activities

• CSIS works hard to defend and strengthen Arctic security and Canada's sovereignty. The economic and strategic importance of the Arctic has been continuously growing over the past 15 years, along with the diversity and tempo of threats to Canada's national security.
• Contemporary threats to the Arctic stem not only from growing militarization and the effects of climate change, but also increasingly from espionage and foreign interference activities, including through cyber means, as well as illicit economic activities.
• CSIS continues to closely monitor foreign state intentions, including from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, regarding the Canadian Arctic, assessing their impact on Canadian sovereignty.
• CSIS also engages with Arctic partners, including Indigenous organizations and governments, both domestic and foreign, in various outreach capacities. This includes providing relevant information to help inform decision-making, and to build and maintain resiliency against threats posed by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and other hostile foreign state actors towards Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.
• As well, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not see international borders when it comes to foreign interference. Also of note is the PRC’s update to its national security laws, requiring all companies with operations in China to provide information to their security services upon request, regardless of where the company is based.
• CSIS engagement contributes to an environment that is safer, more secure, and prosperous for Arctic residents and all Canadians.

Strengthening Engagement

• The new powers granted under C-70 in Section 19 of the CSIS Act have enabled the Service to more fully engage with key partners, including provinces, territories, Indigenous organizations, the private sector and cultural, ethnic and religious organisations — providing them with information and sharing expertise so that they can build resiliency to a range of threats. As primary providers of critical infrastructure, services and economic development and investments, these partners play a vital role in maintaining the region’s stability and security. This increased collaboration has helped to enhance the security posture of these partners against different types of high-impact threats.
• CSIS continues to prioritize and invest time and resources for in-person engagements in the Arctic with these key partners and ensure that they are actively engaged at all levels in Government of Canada forums focused on Arctic and Northern issues.
• CSIS also bolsters engagement with likeminded and trusted international allies and partners, and is ensuring that Indigenous priorities and partnership opportunities are included in bilateral or multilateral discussions on national security matters related to the region.
• Contacts and relationships built over time with Arctic communities and the different levels of government have resulted in valuable threat-related information being shared proactively with CSIS. This would not have been possible without CSIS’ dedication to expanding and deepening relationships with key partners.
• We continue to travel regularly to the region to offer and participate in threat briefings, panel discussions, and other engagement opportunities. Over the last two years, CSIS has visited: Iqaluit, Rankin Inlet, Cambridge Bay, Yellowknife, Inuvik, Whitehorse, and Haines Junction. Of note was [the attendance of the CSIS Assistant Director Collection/my attendance] at the April 2025 Nunavut Mining Symposium, and other engagement by high-level CSIS Executives in summer 2025.
• CSIS has planned travel in the coming weeks to Iqaluit, Cambridge Bay, Yellowknife, Whitehorse, and Kuujjuaq.
• Additionally, CSIS has received numerous requests from both domestic and foreign partners for advice on best practices for engagement in the North. Overall, Arctic political leadership, media, and citizens have positively recognized CSIS’s effort in the Arctic, and we will continue to work to mature our efforts and impact in the region.
• To promote collaboration within the Service across different lines of effort, CSIS launched its internal Arctic Working Group in 2024. The Working Group meets regularly and ensure greater awareness of work across the Service, clarity on key developments, and cohesion across the Service’s various streams of Arctic-related work. Canada’s Arctic Ambassador, Virginia Mearns, attended a meeting of the CSIS Arctic Working Group in November as a special guest.

Information Sharing

• CSIS has been sharing information on the threat landscape with territorial governments and Indigenous partners across the North over the last four years to build and maintain resiliency against new and emerging threats.
• The unique insights and experiences that Northern partners share with CSIS through our multiple engagements have helped CSIS better understand the threat landscape as it relates to the region and its people. CSIS remains committed to its efforts in the Arctic and North, which include working with various Northern partners to enhance the collection of information on suspected threats to national security.
• Our engagement with Indigenous partners is aligned with the commitment CSIS made in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (UNDA) Action Plan to sharing information with Indigenous partners to support informed decision-making and self-determination. Across all regions, Indigenous peoples possess unique and critical insights that are specific to distinct regional security challenges.
• CSIS continues to work closely closely with Inuit organizations and governments to support decision-making in relation to resource development on Inuit land. We have provided multiple briefings on critical minerals, economic security and hostile foreign state actors to allow Inuit organizations to consider the national security lens in their decision-making process. These partnerships contribute to a safer, and more secure and prosperous environment for their residents and all Canadians.

UNDA Action Plan

• Under the UNDA Action Plan, CSIS co-developed an Action Plan Measure (APM) with ITK and the four Inuit Treaty Organizations, which prioritizes information sharing to empower Inuit self-determination and self-governance, aligning with the principles of reconciliation.
• The implementation of the APM is ongoing, with CSIS engaging in bilateral discussions with Inuit organizations and governments to facilitate the exchange of information and foster a collaborative approach to addressing the unique security concerns of the Arctic and Inuit communities.
• This includes providing information to help build resiliency against national security threats. This initiative demonstrates CSIS’s commitment to meaningful partnership and cooperation, recognizing the importance of Inuit-led decision-making and governance in the pursuit of national security and community well-being.
• CSIS also has Action Plan Measures related to information-sharing with both First Nations and Métis, including those in Northern Canadian. CSIS remains committed to sharing threat information with Indigenous partners across all distinctions and work continues to implement these APMs in partnership with Indigenous organizations and governments.

Partnership with U.S.

• CSIS has strong and well-established relationships with many international partners, including the U.S. Information-sharing arrangements enable CSIS to leverage partnerships to gain valuable insights on threats to the security of Canada. Through these relationships, CSIS advances its own investigations into threats to the security of Canada and gains a greater understanding of the scope and nature of such threats.
• Strong international partnerships are an important part of the national security eco-system.
• Canada and the U.S. have been strong intelligence partners for decades. When it comes to security and intelligence, the U.S. remains an important partner and our closest ally. It is in our shared interest to continue working together.
• Furthermore, CSIS has robust information handling and intelligence sharing measures in place to protect sensitive activities, techniques, methods, and sources of intelligence. These are essential to ensure the safety of our people as well as the safety, security, and prosperity of Canada.
• We share information on a case-by-case basis in accordance with Canadian and international law. The information sharing relationship with all of our allies, including the U.S., is governed by policies and procedures all aimed at ensuring the respect of our legal and international obligations. These policies and procedures are followed by each side of an arrangement, which ensures the protection of each other’s equities, regulations and laws.