Appearance before the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

Key Messages 

• CSIS was not consulted on this procurement activity and did not provide advice to the BC government regarding this decision.
  • However, CSIS continues to provide advice to support the national security review of foreign investment in Canada under the Investment Canada Act. The Act does not review procurement decisions at the provincial level.
  • In collaboration with the other members of the Canadian security and intelligence community, CSIS continues to provide GoC policymakers with intelligence to inform their decisions on mitigating national security risks posed by foreign investment.
  • In 2024, CSIS screened 1,220 ICA notifications for potential national security concerns.
  • The BC Ferries procurement decision would not be subject to the ICA, or CSIS review.
• CSIS was not asked for advice that would help determine the procurement of the vessels.
• When CSIS became aware of BC Ferries’ representatives travelling to PRC in July 2025, CSIS’s British Columbia Region provided a robust travel briefing that would cover personal, cyber, and information security risks.
  • The briefing provides information such as how or why Canada or its delegations may be targeted, the safe use of technology, and protecting physical security. This is standard for travel security briefings.
• CSIS works closely with Canadian entities and national security partners so they are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to make informed decisions.
• For example, CSIS can provide general overview of threats or travel security briefings for individuals or delegations travelling abroad to ensure they are aware of any potential safety or security risks in the destination.
  • A travel brief would not be an assessment of the procurement bid related to BC Ferries. 
  • A briefing on general overview of threats would not be considered an assessment of the procurement bid.
• CSIS engages with Provinces and Territories (PTs) at various levels to sensitize them to the broad threat landscape.
  • CSIS provides briefings to PTs on threats such as foreign interference, espionage, and information on economic and cyber security, including in areas such as procurement, in order to ensure they are more informed and resilient against threats.
• A further example is CSIS’s role in support of preparations for the Prime Minister’s trip to Beijing.
  • CSIS was consulted by and shared the relevant intelligence and assessments with the Privy Council Office (PCO) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) to inform their decision-making on a range of trade and investment issues.
  • Given the sensitive nature of our intelligence and the advice we provide, it would be inappropriate to discuss their substance in a public venue.
• CSIS always encourages anyone to report any concerns they have regarding national security.
• Working closely with trusted domestic and foreign partners, CSIS actively takes steps to investigate and reduce threats to the security of Canada posed by hostile cyber actors
• We also provide guidance and educational resources, for example, regarding foreign interference.
• We have contacts available that could be leveraged if asked.
• When appropriate, CSIS also takes steps to reduce threats to the security of Canada and Canadian critical infrastructure using its threat reduction mandate.