- The national terrorism threat level is currently set at Medium. This level is set by the Director of CSIS based on advice of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre. At present, [REDACTED]. However, the domestic terrorism threat in Canada, stemming from Sunni Islamic extremism, emanates largely from individuals inspired by actors, entities (such as Al Qaeda and Daesh), or movements, and tends not to be formally directed by overseas groups. Daesh messaging claiming responsibility for inspired attacks supports the theme of Daesh’s endurance and its expansion / global presence, and reinforces the notion that extremists do not need to leave their countries to advance Daesh’s objectives. Daesh leadership occasionally makes specific mention of Canada in propaganda, which may increase its prominence as a valuable target for Daesh inspired extremists.
- [REDACTED] Efforts continue to focus on identifying potentially violent ideologues and proselytizers as well as individuals who may mobilize to violence.
- Canada’s state adversaries [REDACTED] use cyber operations to conduct espionage and foreign influence activity against Canadians and Canadian interests in pursuit of their unique national objectives.
- Canada is a target of illicit and covert procurement and technology transfer perpetrated by a number of state actors – [REDACTED] – in support of Weapons of Mass Destruction and missile programs, and other military capabilities and strategic interests.
- [REDACTED] human intelligence, cyber and foreign influence activities are sophisticated and highly effective. The leveraging of [REDACTED] compliment more traditional tradecraft that uses both clandestine and overt means. These activities target individuals well placed to contribute [REDACTED].
- [REDACTED] have also approached [REDACTED] in an effort to recruit them and gain access to classified information. [REDACTED] foreign influence activities have primarily focused [REDACTED] used media and social media platforms, [REDACTED] to engage in influence activities against Canada.
- Global: At present, Canada-based extremists who support violent means [REDACTED] but they will likely continue to use Canada as a base for fundraising, attack-planning, and recruiting.
- [REDACTED] both through their own officials in Canada and through Canadian proxies, have some intent and some capability to engage in foreign interference against Canadian democratic processes and against Canada-based individuals of interest to those respective states. However, [REDACTED] are currently low-level foreign interference threats to Canada.
- [REDACTED] a multifaceted threat to Canada and its interests. It conducts intelligence collection against Canada and its allies, poses a direct security challenge to current Canadian operations [REDACTED] is a leading state-sponsor of terrorism that has recently undertaken its own lethal operations against dissidents. [REDACTED]
- Identify recruitment, radicalization, facilitation, and attack planning by individuals and/or cells linked to violent ideologies and terrorist groups such as Daesh, Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and their supporters within Canada
- Identify ideologically motivated violent extremism entities from across the left/right ideological spectrum who incite/enable/mobilize to serious violence – and determine the extent of the threat they pose
- Collaboration with Federal, Provincial and local police services
- Collaboration with other Government of Canada departments (Canadian Border Services Agency, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Communications Security Establishment)
- Collaboration with foreign partners
- Leveraging human sources and casual contacts
- Consider the use of threat reduction measures, where appropriate
- Leveraging relationships with Canadian and foreign partners
- Investigate malicious cyber activity and identify new cyber threat capabilities that pose a threat to national security
- Provide intelligence and cyber threat advice with a focus on espionage, foreign influence, elections interference, economic espionage and security of critical infrastructures
- Collaboration on operations with foreign partners
- Provide strategic threat advice to Canadian government policy consumers (e.g. Communications Security Establishment, Privy Council Office, Public Safety, Global Affairs Canada, Department of National Defence) and information sharing with allied partners
- Engage in awareness and outreach activities with public and private sector businesses and organizations
- Consider the use of threat reduction measures where appropriate
- Identify efforts [REDACTED] to procure, from or via Canada, goods, technologies and information that are dual-use or sensitive military technologies
- Strong cooperation with domestic partners, including Canadian Border Services Agency, Global Affairs Canada, Privy Council Office, Department of National Defence, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada
- Robust information sharing with Five Eyes and other partners
- Identify and collaborate with Industry and academic entities to gain visibility on activities of concern
- [REDACTED] interference activities [REDACTED] tradecraft and priorities Identify and understand [REDACTED] activities. Identify and investigate [REDACTED] targeting of technology, data, and critical infrastructure, which can compromise Canada’s national security
- Joint operations with partner agencies, [REDACTED]
- Determine methods by which to recruit productive new sources
- Identify and deter threats to Canada/Canadian interests emanating from activities [REDACTED]
- Leveraging of the Five Eyes human intelligence and signals intelligence communities
- Collaboration with other Government of Canada departments, (e.g. Communications Security Establishment, Department of National Defence, Canadian Border Services Agency, Global Affairs Canada, [REDACTED]
- Actively seeking and developing other agreements with established and non-traditional foreign partners
- Identify and disrupt [REDACTED] activities
- Identify and deter the threat in Canada of extremists who support violent means [REDACTED] as well as identify foreign influenced activities against Canadian democratic processes and institutions by [REDACTED] and extremists who support violent means [REDACTED] with the objective of protecting those processes and institutions
- Primary domestic relationship is with Global Affairs Canada and Communications Security Establishment
- Working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canada Revenue Agency
- Increased number of human sources will begin to fill collection gaps
- Increase cooperation with both domestic and foreign partners
- Open source research on social media to identify and ultimately attempt to [REDACTED] campaigns to interfere in Canadian elections and target dissidents
- Identify and deter threats to Canadian interests [REDACTED]
- Leverage allies and foreign partners to inform our understanding of the evolving threat landscape, as it pertains to Canada and Canadian interests [REDACTED]
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