SECU Appearance: Rise of IMVE in Canada

May 12, 2022
11:00 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.

Key Messages

Threat Landscape

• Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has the potential to grow, lead to more acts of serious violence, and cause further erosion of trust in our institutions of government.
• IMVE is often driven by a range of grievances and ideas from across the ideological spectrum. The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative that centre on an extremist’s willingness to incite, enable and / or mobilize to violence.
• These last few months and years have shown the threat that IMVE represents in Canada The combination of major disruptive global events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media and its global reach, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an uncertain environment ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
• Canada is not immune to acts of violent extremism; Individuals in Canada are exploiting this environment by spreading violent rhetoric online and some have engaged in violence.
• Since 2014, IMVE related attacks have resulted in 26 individuals who have been killed and 40 injured on Canadian soil. As you all remember, last year on June 6^th in London, Ontario, we saw the threat itself in a tragic attack where four members of the same family were run down and killed because of their faith. Quite simply, this act was despicable and has no place in our society.
• CSIS is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada, advise the Government of Canada on them, and to take measures to reduce the threat. As such, CSIS closely monitors the evolving threat posed by IMVE and can employ a variety of national security tools currently at its disposal where appropriate.
• The bringing together of individuals with differing ideological motivations around a common cause is typical of the IMVE space. However, each radicalization pathway or mobilization to violence is highly individual, and discerning common features or triggers in order to predict action is a core challenge for CSIS and law enforcement partners.
• CSIS works closely with security and intelligence partners to assess threats, domestic and international, to investigate and assess IMVE threats.
• However, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.

CSIS’ role in the invocation of the Emergencies Act

• CSIS’ mandate is to identify and advise the Government of threats to our national security, which are clearly defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and include espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced-activities, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion.
• While the CSIS Act definition of threats to the security of Canada is how the Emergencies Act defines the threshold for invocation, it is not only CSIS intelligence that is used to determine that the threshold has been met.
• CSIS assessments are one aspect of the larger security and intelligence community, whose collective advice ultimately informed the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act.
• CSIS is specifically prohibited from investigating lawful protest and dissent. CSIS may investigate only once a threat rises to our investigative threshold; namely it must be ideologically driven, attempt to affect societal change, and be characterized by a willingness to commit or inspire serious acts of violence.
• The beginning of 2022 saw significant manifestations of pandemic-related grievances in the form of the Freedom Convoy protests.
• As demonstrated by the Breach of the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremist (IMVE) actors may exploit lawful protests, rallies, demonstrations and other gatherings to carry out IMVE-related violence or to network/recruit like-minded individuals.
• Given this trend, CSIS closely monitored the opportunities the protests could have presented to IMVE actors to promote or engage in serious acts of violence in Canada.
• CSIS was also aware that the protests could have offered opportunities to lone actors.
• CSIS remained engaged with the RCMP, as appropriate, through the One Vision Process to ensure timely sharing, as well as other appropriate law enforcement partners.
• Other streams of intelligence reporting were carefully monitored for threat information linked to the event, particularly threats of serious violence.
• CSIS was also guarding against other threats to Canada’s national security in relation to the protests, such as foreign interference.
• With respect to foreign sources of funding, CSIS’ mandate is engaged when funds are provided at the direction of a foreign state with the goal of engaging in foreign interference activities in Canada, or when those donating the money are doing so to support an act of serious violence or terrorism.
• While the IMVE threats directly implicate CSIS’ mandate, there are broader strategic considerations at play. In particular, the manifestation of IMVE activities affect policy considerations related to online harms, the resilience of our democratic institutions, the security of parliamentarians, dialogue with racialized communities, and engagements on national security issues at all levels of government.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)

Issue: What is ideologically motivated violent extremism? What is CSIS’ role and assessment of this threat?

Key Messages

• CSIS takes the long standing threats of religiously, politically and ideologically motivated violent extremism very seriously.
• The uncertain environment caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic is ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
• It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of motivations and personal grievances and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of threat actors.
• IMVE can stem from a range of ideologies and is driven by hatred and fear. These ideologies can be:
  • xenophobic and linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism, and ethno-nationalism;
  • anti-authority and targeted at governments and law enforcement;
  • gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny; and
  • based on other grievances without clear affiliation to an organized group or external guidance.
• Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including, books music, and of course, online discussions, videos and propaganda. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by leveraging an online audience in an attempt to legitimize their beliefs and move from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
• As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in the CSIS Act.
• As such, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.

Anti-authority movements and conspiracy theories

• The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives, many of which may directly or indirectly impact national security considerations. Violent extremists continue to exploit the pandemic by amplifying false information about government measures and the virus itself on the internet.
• Some violent extremists view COVID-19 as a real but welcome crisis that could hasten the collapse of Western society. Other violent extremist entities have adopted conspiracy theories about the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
• These narratives have contributed to efforts to undermine trust in the integrity of government and confidence in scientific expertise.
• While aspects of conspiracy theory rhetoric are a legitimate exercise in free expression, online rhetoric that is increasingly violent and calls for the arrest and execution of specific individuals is of concern.
• IMVE conspiracy theories are often influenced by decentralized online trends and communities of extremist influencers who interpret local, national and international events through a radical lens.
• These broader narratives are often individualized by extremists and are impacted by perceived concerns regarding economic well-being, safety and security, the COVID-19 pandemic or other special events.

Gender-Driven IMVE

• Incel (involuntary celibate) ideology bears many of the hallmarks of more traditionally recognized ideologies, and from the Canadian perspective, conforms to our definition of terrorism and is considered within the general terrorism offence framework.
• Incels belong to a misogynistic community of males, who associate primarily through online platforms. Though they use a unified terminology, they are not an organized group and have no centralized structure or planning.
• Incels believe their genetics determine the quality of their life and relationships, meaning they blame their unattractive physical features for their inability to attract women. They attribute their perceived failings in life to women and society in general.
• The ideology/beliefs within the “Manosphere” (a network of online misogynistic and male supremacy communities) stretch from lawful discussion of men’s rights issues to glorification of violence and violent misogyny. Forums also fluidly combine their resentment of women with racist narratives involving immigrants and people of colour.
• Since 2014, individuals motivated, fully or in part, by Incel ideology have, through numerous attacks, killed and wounded more than 110 individuals in Canada and the United States.
• In Canada, Alek Minassian’s perception and beliefs were motivated in whole or in part by Incel ideology when he deliberately ran down pedestrians with his van, killing 11 and injuring 15. In May 2020, Toronto Police arrested a 17 year male and charged him with terrorist activity after he stabbed a woman to death and injured 2 more at a massage parlor, stating evidence showed the attack was inspired by Incel ideology.

Rise of IMVE threat in Canada

• As reported by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in January 2016, CSIS concluded that the extent and nature of the Right Wing Extremist (RWE) threat no longer met the CSIS threshold for investigation. As such, CSIS ended its investigation into RWE in March 2016.
• In January 2017, following the attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City, CSIS reopened its investigation into RWE.
• At that time, CSIS observed that the motivations behind this type of violent extremism had become more complex. Individuals were no longer influenced by a singular and definable belief system, but a range of very personal and diverse grievances.
• For that reason, CSIS took a leading role in developing an understanding and terminology that more accurately depicts the broad range of motivations behind this particular extremist threat facing Canada.
• Based on its findings, CSIS decided to stop using the terms “right-wing” and “left-wing” to define the threat. Instead, it uses ideologically motivated violent extremism – which has now been adopted by both Australia and New-Zealand.
• It is clear from the 2017 Mosque attack, the 2018 van attack, the2020 spa attack in Toronto, and the 2021 van attack in London, that Canada is not immune to acts committed in whole or in part by IMVE.

Online threat environment

• Violent extremism online continues to represent a deeply concerning threat to public safety and a significant area of focus for CSIS, as it evolves in complexity.
• Online threats represent a modern challenge and demonstrate the clear need for CSIS to be equipped with the tools and authorities it requires in order to protect Canada and Canadians in the digital age.
• As technology and applications proliferate, extremist online collectives can replicate disinformation and interference campaigns that were once the reserve of state actors or large non-state organizations.
• Threat actors have access to a wealth of information online and CSIS has seen a surge in violent extremist content proliferating in that environment. Propaganda is easily disseminated using both mainstream and alternative media and social media platforms.
• We have seen a combination of misinformation and disinformation pollute the global information environment. This manipulation and propagation of information can erode confidence in our democratic values, institutions, and polarize societies while undermining trust in our democratically elected governments.
• Many of these platforms can be used anonymously or leverage encryption technologies to enable threat actors to conceal their identity and evade detection by law enforcement and security agencies, while spreading their message, inciting violence and recruiting link-minded individuals.
• If violent extremists are spreading propaganda online to recruit and fundraise for their cause, inspiring acts of violence or conducting a live terrorist act for an online audience, CSIS and law enforcement need to be informed of the threat and equipped to investigate and prevent further threat activity.

Protests and funding

• During the protests in Ottawa and across Canada earlier this year, CSIS remained committed to continue assessing threats to Canada's national security during the important operational activities underway by law enforcement partners.
• While the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is an important part of our democracy, individuals are not justified in breaking the law or engaging in violence. CSIS supported the City of Ottawa and the enforcement actions being taken by the Ottawa Police Service, and their law enforcement partners.
• With respect to foreign sources of funding, CSIS’ mandate is engaged when funds are provided at the direction of or with the support of a foreign state or when those donating the money are doing so to support an act of serious violence or terrorism.

Terrorist listings

• Listings are an important tool for the Government of Canada and send a signal that extremist activities are not tolerated in Canada.
• CSIS is a partner in the Public Safety-led terrorist listings regime. The Service is one of several departments and agencies charged with informing the Minister of Public Safety as to the threat that violent extremist entities may pose to Canada, from a national security perspective.
• Intelligence and evidence guide the terrorist listing process and are primary determinants for which entities are considered for listing under the Criminal Code.
• CSIS also works closely with its international partners on understanding the evolution of the global extremist landscape and emerging threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement as appropriate.

On specific groups being investigated

• CSIS does not investigate Canadians participating in lawful demonstrations or protests in Canada or elsewhere, absent other indications of threat-related activity.
• As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in section 2(c) of the CSIS Act.
• As you know, the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, and we cannot publicly comment further on operational matters and requirements.

On correctional facilities

• In 2018, CSIS and the RCMP proactively requested the Operational Improvement Review (OIR) to identify operational solutions to mitigate “intelligence and evidence” challenges.
• The OIR final report included recommendations intended to inform ongoing efforts to enhance cooperation between CSIS, the RCMP, the Department of Justice Canada, and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC).
• Since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.

Freedom Convoy 22

CSIS mandate; s.2(c) and 2(d) definitions

• As this Committee is well aware, CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, to advise the Government on these threats, and to take measures to reduce them.
• The threats to Canada’s national security are clearly defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act and include espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced-activities, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion.
• More specifically, section 2(c) defines them as: activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state.
• And section 2(d) also defines them as: activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.
• As such, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.
• As you can understand, I cannot comment on specific details regarding our operations.
• What I can say is that CSIS closely monitored the opportunities the protests could have presented to IMVE actors to promote or engage in serious acts of violence in Canada.

Anti-authority movements and conspiracy theories

• The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated xenophobic and anti-authority narratives, many of which may directly or indirectly impact national security considerations. Violent extremists continue to exploit the pandemic by amplifying false information about government measures and the virus itself on the internet.
• Some violent extremists view COVID-19 as a real but welcome crisis that could hasten the collapse of Western society. Other violent extremist entities have adopted conspiracy theories about the pandemic in an attempt to rationalize and justify violence.
• These narratives have contributed to efforts to undermine trust in the integrity of government and confidence in scientific expertise.
• While aspects of conspiracy theory rhetoric are a legitimate exercise in free expression, online rhetoric that is increasingly violent and calls for the arrest and execution of specific individuals is of concern.
• IMVE conspiracy theories are often influenced by decentralized online trends and communities of extremist influencers who interpret local, national and international events through a radical lens.
• These broader narratives are often individualized by extremists and are impacted by perceived concerns regarding economic well-being, safety and security, the COVID-19 pandemic or other special events.

Protests and funding

• During the protests in Ottawa and across Canada earlier this year, CSIS remained committed to continue assessing threats to Canada's national security during the important operational activities underway by law enforcement partners.
• While the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is an important part of our democracy, individuals are not justified in breaking the law or engaging in violence. CSIS supported the City of Ottawa and the enforcement actions being taken by the Ottawa Police Service, and their law enforcement partners.
• On financial reporting, CSIS continued to work within the parameters of the CSIS Act to support the Government of Canada in implementing measures that were in effect under the Emergencies Act.
• The Emergencies Act did not expand CSIS’ powers to investigate or take threat reduction measures. CSIS continued to work within the existing authorities of the CSIS Act.
• Under the Emergencies Act, other designated entities had expanded requirements to report to CSIS certain activities linked to designated persons. CSIS engaged with its financial partners to ensure that disclosures specifically related to its national security mandate.
• With respect to foreign sources of funding, CSIS’ mandate is engaged when funds are provided at the direction of or with the support of a foreign state or when those donating the money are doing so to support an act of serious violence or terrorism.

FC22 and way forward

• The bringing together of individuals with differing ideological motivations around a common cause is typical of the IMVE space. However, each radicalization pathway or mobilization to violence is highly individual, and discerning common features or triggers in order to predict action is a core challenge for CSIS and law enforcement partners.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from threats to the security of Canada.
• CSIS works pro-actively with the RCMP, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to align operational efforts, and seek solutions in the interest of public safety. Indeed, we have a duty to share threat-related information within the Government of Canada in order to mitigate risks to public safety.
• In addition, CSIS works closely with its domestic and international partners on understanding the evolution of the threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement where appropriate.
• While the IMVE threats directly implicate CSIS’ mandate, there are broader strategic considerations at play. In particular, the manifestation of IMVE activities affect policy considerations related to online harms, the resilience of our democratic institutions, the security of parliamentarians, dialogue with racialized communities, and engagements on national security issues at all levels of government.

Online Safety

Key Messages

• The use of online fora to carry out activities that are either harmful to Canadian society, illegal or of national security concern is growing.
• There are real threats to Canadians from harmful, illegal and national security threat activities online. This includes terrorist and violent extremist propaganda, abhorrently violent content, child sexual exploitation material, and hateful content targeting women, racialized individuals/groups and the 2SLGBTQI+ community.
• I can assure you that CSIS takes these threats seriously and we investigate threats to the security of Canada, including those in the online space.
• This also points to the need for CSIS to have the appropriate tools and authorities to investigate online threats, while protecting privacy rights.

Five Eyes response to harmful online content

• CSIS works closely with international partners, particularly the FIVE EYES: Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the US, to better understand and confront online threats.

US response

• The Biden Administration refers to IMVE as “domestic violent extremism” or “domestic terrorism” and has recently identified this threat as a priority. When referring to white supremacists, the US use the term “racially motivated violent extremism.”
• As part of the PM-POTUS Roadmap, Canada and the US are working closely on countering IMVE, including their manifestation and proliferation in online spaces. This is primarily achieved by sharing information on threats, including those related to foreign interference and in the context of COVID-19.

UK response

• A In 2010 the UK set up the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit to work with private sector actors to take down webpages that violate UK terrorism laws.
• The unit has successfully supported the removal of thousands of URLs.

NZ response

• A In the wake of the tragic attack in Christchurch in 2019, New Zealand introduced new legislation in 2020 to block violent extremist content online and put in place other safeguards.
• Based on the recommendations made by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch attack, New Zealand changed its terminology to “IMVE” referred to as Identity-Motivated Violent Extremism with the white supremacist threat termed as White Identity Violent Extremism.

Australian response

• Australia established its eSafety Commissioner as an independent statutory office under its Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015.
• Though initially established to protect children online, the Act was expanded in 2017 to enhancing the online safety of all Australians to confront cyber-bullying, the non-consensual sharing of intimate images, and illegal content, namely online child sexual abuse.
• Following the 2019 Christchurch attacks, Australia created new offences in its Criminal Code relating to abhorrent violent material. This is defined as any audio/visual material depicting any of the five listed acts, two of which include a terrorist act leading to serious injury or death and a threat to violence.
• The Commissioner also has the mandate to protect Australians from accessing material that promotes, incites, or instructs in, terrorist acts or violent crimes. As such, following the Christchurch attack, the Commissioner gave direction to Internet Service Providers to temporarily block websites providing access to the perpetrator’s video and manifesto.
• The Commissioner also works closely with law enforcement regarding illegal online content, and of note, Australia’s legislation makes it a criminal offence for internet service providers to not report illegal and abhorrently violent online content to law enforcement.
• Earlier this month, March 2021, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization announced it would also stop using the terms “left wing” and “ring wing”, and instead use Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism – akin to Canada’s terminology.

COVID-19 Disinformation online

• State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.
• COVID-19 has had a profound impact on our country and the world. This uncertain environment is ripe for exploitation by threat actors seeking to advance their own interests.
• State-sponsored information manipulation utilized by certain states to undermine the rules-based-international order is of particular concern. These states are manipulating information to sow doubt about the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it; to discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior; and to erode confidence in democratic values and human rights.
• This includes leveraging ideologically-motivated fringe narratives and conspiracies to polarize societies and undermine trust in democratically elected governments.
• Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices, including information on the COVID-19 pandemic.
• While Canadian security agencies and law enforcement cannot discuss specific investigations, we can say that the Government of Canada coordinates with hundreds of domestic and foreign partners on threats to national security, and actively investigates all threats of foreign interference to support a whole of Government collective effort to respond
• As CSIS noted in its 2020 Public Report, recent state-sponsored manipulations – such as disinformation – have sought to reshape or undermine certain narratives about the origins of COVID-19 and the how to counter it.
• Such attempts to sow doubt and discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 seek to erode confidence in Canada’s values of democracy and human rights.

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: What is CSIS doing to engage with external stakeholders?

Key Messages

• CSIS employees continue to engage with those in industry, academia, civil society, and other levels of government.
• These efforts are building bridges between CSIS and Canadians and supporting common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• This engagement leverages decades of ongoing work at CSIS to engage with academic stakeholders in an effort to inform operations, support research, and facilitate discourse on national security issues.
• CSIS engages with community leaders and members to offer support and solidarity and to reinforce the position that there is no place in Canada for racial prejudice, discrimination and hate. 
• These discussions provide an opportunity to affirm CSIS’ commitment to ensure the safety and security of all Canadians – and to seek input on how CSIS can build greater trust with racialized communities.
• CSIS has also engaged with a number of community groups to seek their perspectives on how the organization can better-support Canadians experiencing racism, discrimination, and harassment. CSIS has offered briefings to community groups on related topics, including Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism and foreign interference.
• These ongoing exchanges also provide an opportunity to affirm CSIS’ commitment to ensuring the safety and security of all Canadians and to building trust including through increased transparency.
• This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.

Intelligence and Evidence

Key Messages

• CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges.
• While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
• Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
• This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation.
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• It has become increasingly clear through the pandemic that key stakeholders in safeguarding national security extend beyond the limits of the federal government.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders, limiting the ability to build bilateral relationships and advise on threats to Canada’s national security
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

• These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism

Issue: Is CSIS still concerned about religiously motivated violent extremism?

Key Messages

• While CSIS has made IMVE investigations a priority in the last several years, this should not be understood to mean that the Service has deemphasized its RMVE investigations.
• Religiously motivated violent extremism remains a top investigative priority for CSIS.
• CSIS is not aware of any current RMVE plots targeting Canada. That said, RMVE remains a threat to Canadian national security as attacks can be planned and executed swiftly with little warning.
• Recent acts of RMVE violence in Canada and other like-minded states have been characterized by low-sophistication, high-impact attacks, frequently targeting civilians and public spaces.
• The October 2014 attacks in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and on Parliament Hill and the National War Memorial here in Ottawa, remind us that Canada is not immune to the threat of RMVE.
• Canadians and Canadian interests abroad have been and continue to be the targets of acts of religiously-motivated extremist violence in an ever-evolving global threat landscape.
• CSIS works very closely with the RCMP to inform possible criminal investigations or enforcement action as appropriate.
• CSIS assesses that the COVID-19 pandemic has not disrupted online RMVE narratives.
• In fact, as a result of individuals spending more time online and therefore potentially becoming more exposed to online messaging, CSIS assesses that COVID-19 has potentially increased the threat of RMVE radicalization among certain threat actors.

Canadian Extremist Travellers

Key Messages

• CSIS and the Government of Canada have continued to monitor and respond to the threat of Canadian extremist travellers (CETs).
• CETs who seek to return to Canada can pose a threat to national security.
• Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of CETs abroad has remained relatively stable.
• While I cannot go into specifics about individuals, I can generally say that individuals who travelled abroad to engage in extremist activities are of concern to CSIS.
• These individuals may leave Canada to support, facilitate, or participate in violent extremist activities.
• These individuals may have been further radicalized, and may have acquired training and combat experience abroad. Their personal experiences may also be instructive to others who are radicalized.
• Individual CETs are assessed on a case by case basis.
• CETs pose a wide range of security concerns, both while abroad and if they return to Canada. Broadly speaking, CETs have affiliations with multiple violent extremist groups and movements, and may represent IMVE, politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE), and/or RMVE perspectives.
• As you can appreciate, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations for reasons of national security. But, I can assure you that CSIS takes very seriously the threats to Canada posed by violent extremists, both at home and around the world.
• Global Affairs Canada remains the Government of Canada lead on this issue given that the majority of cases are consular. GAC continues to provide guidance to the Government of Canada for the provision of urgent or extraordinary assistance to a detained CET and any children facing difficult circumstances.
• The Service continues to be part of interdepartmental discussions and as per its mandate, provides advice to government partners on possible threats to Canadian national security. 

If pressed on children in the camps:

• CSIS’ concern is with individuals who may pose a threat to the security of Canada. As the cases of young children are consular in nature, enquiries should be directed to Global Affairs Canada.

Afghanistan

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in supporting the humanitarian effort with regards to Afghanistan?

Key Messages

• CSIS understands the humanitarian imperative of assisting vulnerable Afghans and unquestionably wants to protect those whose lives are at risk. However, we must ensure that threat actors cannot take advantage of Canada’s efforts by leveraging immigration pathways or circumventing anti-terrorist financing laws.
• CSIS remains a key partner to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in its efforts to evacuate vulnerable Afghans in support of this humanitarian imperative. The Service plays an important role in ensuring that threat actors cannot leverage immigration pathways to Canada.
• In light of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, and the potential new security risks that it creates, CSIS has prioritized its collection and assessment efforts, specifically as they relate to supporting the security screening process.
• As the security situation in Afghanistan is fluid and evolving, CSIS is continuing to engage domestic and international partners to assess what best practices can be applied to ensure the most robust process.

Foreign Interference in Canada - General

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat?

Key Messages

• Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
• Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
• It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
• Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.

Foreign Interference Manifestations

Democratic institutions

• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
• Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.

Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.

Media

• Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent.
• Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process.

Hotlines

• As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
• Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

Foreign Interference in Canada – Democratic Institutions

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democracy?

On CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democratic institutions

• CSIS is responsible for investigating foreign interference threats to national security and advising the Government of Canada on those.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine foreign interference activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are believed to be targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• CSIS also routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders including government and public officials, the private sector and other organizations to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada and to provide briefings regarding specific threats. This can include elected officials.
• CSIS delivers these briefings in order to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of other hostile actors and to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.
• As a member of the SITE Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada in relation to the election, and provided classified briefings on these threats to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel.
• While I cannot provide more detail on specific cases, CSIS takes all allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state very seriously.

General Election 44

• As we did in 2019, in 2021 CSIS continued to work with its partners to advise the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to our democratic institutions, including through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.
• As was the case in 2019 and 2021, no public announcement was made.
• CSIS continues to prioritize outreach and engagement to raise awareness of the foreign interference threat across key sectors and civil society.
• That is why, ahead of the most recent federal election, we released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

Threat reduction measures

• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction mandate provides an important tool for the Government of Canada to respond to threats.
• While I can’t get into specifics, CSIS may take threat reduction measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada or Canadians.
• As previously indicated, CSIS monitors threat-related activity closely, advises the Government on these threats, and uses its full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.
• As has been publicly reported, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) did not find that CSIS violated the Charter in its conduct of threat reduction measures.
• I welcome increased discussion on national security issues, which includes the important work of NSIRA and will carefully consider its recommendations.
• I am committed to ensuring CSIS can act effectively protect national security while meeting its legal obligations and respecting Canadians’ rights.

Foreign Agents Registry

• Foreign states use a range of methods to influence policy-making in Canada and promote their national interests.
• CSIS participates in discussions within the security and intelligence community as to what tools are needed to protect Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• We also engage with our close partners to discuss their experiences in dealing with similar issues of foreign interference and espionage.

CSIS Screening

Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?

Key Messages

• CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
• Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
• High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
• Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.

On Government security screening

• Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
• Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
• On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.

On recourse when a clearance is denied or revoked

• Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
• CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.

If pressed on specific complaints:

• I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.

Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion

Issue: Is CSIS willing to recognize there is systemic racism in our society?

Key Messages

• I cannot comment on the class action currently before the Federal Court.
• But I can say that CSIS acknowledges that there are social and administrative structures and systems in place in our organization that result in – or fail to prevent – disadvantaging certain people or groups. This is systemic racism.
• CSIS takes any allegation of inappropriate behaviour, including harassment and discrimination, very seriously. Over the past few years, in response to some serious allegations, we have been taking steps to ensure CSIS is a healthy and respectful work environment.
• CSIS is working hard to integrate strategies and approaches that help to reverse systemic barriers and broaden the organization’s understanding, appreciation, and valuing of diversity of all types. We are looking at our people, our systems and our culture to effect this change.
• For example, CSIS published its Code of Conduct on its public website for the first time. This is an important step in our commitment towards a healthy and respectful workplace, and signals our values to the public. It clearly articulates what is expected of employees and it has been built into the performance evaluations of every employee at all levels to ensure that the responsibility of creating a respectful workplace is shared.
• Each and every CSIS employee is responsible for ensuring that their actions, behaviours and decisions are inclusive and respectful and that any instances of exclusion, bias, or disrespect – systemic or otherwise – are addressed.
• Operationally, CSIS does not employ racial profiling. CSIS targets threats, not groups. Profiling is not only unethical but it also does nothing to further our mission and national security investigations.
• Simply put, systemic racism exists in Canada. It is something that cannot be tolerated within any part of Canada’s national institutions, including ours.

Workplace Climate

• Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
• The Director of CSIS is personally committed to working to ensure that CSIS is a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• Given the complexity of the current threat environment, I need to make sure all of my employees are at their best. And certainly in these challenging times, this is a growing organizational priority.
• I have made it clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace; the safety and security of our operations depend on this.
• A safe and healthy workplace is a successful workplace and contributes to national security. We take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce. Our people are CSIS’ most valuable resource.

Promotion of diversity and inclusion

• CSIS is taking deliberate steps to increase diversity and inclusion across the Service. That is why in 2019 CSIS established its Gender Based Analysis+ Unit (GBA+) to further ensure its policies and operations are bias-free and evidence-based.
• Other steps include numerous targeted initiatives intended to increase overall representation of diverse groups in the Service, address gaps in specific occupational categories, and establish and entrench expectations for a bias-free, respectful organization.
• CSIS also works proactively with employment equity groups, fosters mentorship programs internally to support diverse employees in preparing for competitions, and has a diverse Talent Acquisition and Student Hiring team, with resources dedicated to ensuring diversity. We are in the midst of building a new, comprehensive and multi-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as well as an Accessibility Strategy that are both built on research and consultations with employees.
• Furthermore, CSIS Executives have met multiple times with the Association of Black Law Enforcers (A.B.L.E.), for thoughtful discussions on a range of issues related to diversity and inclusion, and are committed to listening and learning through employee experiences.
• As an agency, we are committed to working to ensure that CSIS’ workplace is free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• To this end, the task of creating a respectful workplace has been built into the performance evaluations of each and every employee and CSIS has revised its Code of Conduct to clearly outline expectations. Comprehensive training equips employees to meet these requirements.

Actions taken

• As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our internal processes, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• That is why I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
  • Adding enhanced mandatory training for supervisors and a common performance objective for all CSIS employees and executives on promoting a healthy workplace,
  • Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
  • Renewing our Code of Conduct and making it a condition of employment, and
  • Holding numerous informal meetings and town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
• Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
• Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
• CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.
• As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.

R. v. Huang: Stay of Prosecution

Issue: Can CSIS comment on the stay of prosecution of Qing Quentin Huang?

Key Messages

• While I cannot comment on the specifics of this case, I can say that CSIS works with the RCMP to address national security threats.
• In this case, CSIS disclosed to the RCMP information that we had collected through our intelligence investigation.
• Using intelligence as evidence in criminal prosecution continues to present significant challenges, particularly as CSIS must ensure the protection of sensitive information and methods of collection.
• Addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.
• CSIS’ authorities also need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.

CSIS Federal Court Decision (En Banc)

Issue: The Federal Court released its third ruling on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) duty of candour obligation on February 4, 2022.

Key Messages

• This is the ruling on the third and final warrant application that formed part of the En Banc matter. The Court determined that the warrant at issue could have been issued even if the information derived from potentially illegal activities was excluded.
• As I have stated since the first decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
• Importantly, the issue raised by the En Banc decisions has now been addressed with the passage of the National Security Act 2017, which provides CSIS with a limited justification framework to conduct activities that would otherwise constitute offences.
• The potentially illegal activities involved in this case are, in fact, routine intelligence collection activities, used around the world by national security and law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism and keep people safe, such as: paying a source for information, or providing a cell phone to a source to assist them in undertaking their work.
• CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
• The Service has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
• CSIS has also cooperated fully with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s review requested by the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice.
• In addition to these measures, I would like to reiterate that CSIS works hard to protect our country and Canadians from a wide range of national security threats. The Court has acknowledged this and recognized that the consequences of failure are significant. At no time was the safety of Canadians at risk, nor were our rights and freedoms threatened.     

CSIS’ Posture During the Pandemic

Issue: What is CSIS doing to address the COVID-19 pandemic?

Key Messages

• Throughout the pandemic, CSIS has been guided by two principles: the protection of its employees, and ensuring that it could continue to deliver on its critical mandate for Canadians.
• For two years now, CSIS maintained its vital role in producing intelligence to support the Government’s response to this global pandemic.
• Additionally, recognizing the stress caused by the pandemic, CSIS has prioritized the mental health of its employees by providing support programs and flexibilities in determining work arrangements.
• CSIS has continuously updated its health and safety measures to reflect the most recent guidance from public health officials and CSIS’ in-house medical professionals.
• CSIS takes this guidance from health professionals very seriously. Based on this advice, CSIS has instituted robust measures throughout the pandemic, including: frequent sanitization of work areas, physically-distanced workstations, modified work schedules and other measures to enable physical distancing.
• These measures, among many others, have been in place in all CSIS offices since the very first days of the pandemic and have been consistently reinforced with regular communication to all employees.
• Throughout the pandemic, CSIS has continuously assessed all aspects of its operational stance to ensure it continues to meet or exceed workplace safety standards set by PHAC and the Treasury Board Secretariat.
• As public health advice started to encourage the use of masks, CSIS tailored this advice to its own unique context. Accordingly, at various points since March 2020, masks were less common, then were later strongly encouraged, moving to being required when physical distancing was not possible, and finally made mandatory in nearly all instances. The stance on masks was based at all times on advice by public health professionals.
• Recognizing the enormous strains of the pandemic, CSIS took every measure at its disposal to address the unique circumstances of its employees, including enabling work from home where possible given the sensitive nature of its mission.
• CSIS' mission remains essential, particularly during a global pandemic, where foreign interference and ideologically-motivated discourse and violence has increased.
• Canadians should and can expect CSIS to continue delivering on its crucial mandate. I and all Canadians should take great pride in the dedication of the CSIS employees to protect Canada’s national security.