Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA)

Senate Standing Committee

October 6, 2022

Appearance before Senate Standing Committee

for Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA)

CSIS Opening Remarks

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr. Chair and Members of the Committee. My name is Newton Shortliffe and I am the Acting Deputy Director, Operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak to you today and to respond to your questions on this topic.

CSIS MANDATE

To begin this morning, I would like to speak briefly to the mandate of the Service in order to help situate our activities and presence abroad. Everything we do at CSIS is grounded in the CSIS Act which clearly articulates our mandate and authorities. First and foremost, we investigate threats to the security of Canada. Our Act clearly defines the threats we are authorized to investigate: espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and extremism, and subversion.

We provide advice to government on these threats including through the production of intelligence assessments and reports. CSIS may also take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.

Lastly, at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence and with the consent of the Minister of Public Safety, CSIS may collect foreign intelligence, only within Canada, including in relation to the intentions, capabilities or activities of a foreign state.

CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE

The increasingly interconnected and global nature of security threats means that CSIS cannot fulfill its mandate in isolation. Information sharing has been and remains fundamental to the Government of Canada’s national security requirements.

Cooperation with domestic federal partners and foreign agencies provides CSIS access to timely information linked to any number of potential or specific threats to Canada, which might otherwise not be available.

Relationships with federal partners are essential to active CSIS investigations and facilitate both lawful sharing of information and provision of advice, as well as operational deconfliction.

CSIS officers stationed in various countries around the world, including France, the UK and the United States, collect and share security intelligence information related to threats to Canada, its interests with its allies. Under section 12 of the CSIS Act, the Service may investigate threats to the security of Canada both within and outside of Canada. This international work often relies on the support of our domestic partners such as GAC, the RCMP and the Department of Defense.

CSIS has more than 300 foreign relationships in 150 countries and territories, each authorized by the Minister of Public Safety, and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the CSIS Act. The process to establish arrangements with foreign agencies is stringent and takes into consideration a wide range of issues, including Canadian security requirements, respect for human rights, and the reliability of the agency. Prior to seeking the Minister’s approval for new arrangements, CSIS proactively consults with GAC in instances where there are specific human rights or foreign policy considerations.

CSIS engagement with foreign entities must align with Canada’s laws and legal obligations. This includes ensuring CSIS remains fully compliant with the requirements outlined in the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (ACMFE) Act. CSIS provides an annual report to the Minister of Public Safety outlining CSIS’s implementation of those requirements during the previous calendar year and publishes public information on that implementation process.

CSIS, working alongside its GC partners including Global Affairs Canada (GAC), plays an integral supporting role in helping to advance Canada’s broader foreign policy priorities. The Service does so principally by leveraging its overseas footprint and intelligence partnerships. When synchronized with other GC efforts, and augmented by the Service’s other intelligence capabilities, these additional channels of communication and coordination can have a “force-multiplier” effect in the protection of Canadians and Canadian interests.

Recent global crises, including the fall of Kabul to the Taliban and the illegal invasion of Ukraine, have reinforced the importance of cooperation with international partners. As global tensions and conflicts continue to shape geo-political dynamics, CSIS remains committed to working with our Canadian partners, including the RCMP and GAC, and our global partners to ensure CSIS is delivering on its mandate to protect Canadians at home and abroad.

With that, I am happy to take your questions. Thank you.

Key Messages

• CSIS is mandated to collect intelligence on threat to national security both within and outside Canada.
• CSIS officers stationed in various countries around the world collect and share security intelligence related to threats to Canada working closely with essential allies and partners to inform active CSIS investigations and facilitate both lawful sharing of information and provision of advice, as well as operational deconfliction.
• CSIS has more than 300 foreign relationships in 150 countries and territories that facilitate lawful and timely access to information linked to any number of potential or specific threats to Canada, which might otherwise not be available.
• CSIS, working alongside its federal partners, including Global Affairs Canada, plays an integral supporting role in helping to advance the Government of Canada’s broader foreign policy priorities.
• As the geopolitical environment becomes more complex and unpredictable CSIS will continue to contribute to a coherent and collaborative approach, and leverage its partners to help protect Canadians and our national interests.
• Of course, as you know the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, since we cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements.
• That said, we remain committed to our continued engagement with your colleagues on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), where we can discuss important classified issues.

Postings and human resources

Co-location at diplomatic missions

• CSIS and GAC have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that governs cooperation on operations and support at diplomatic missions.
• This MOU outlines the financial responsibilities of partner departments when engaging staff to support missions, and the reporting expectations of partner staff.
• As you can understand, there are limits to what I am able to discuss for security reasons, but I can assure you that CSIS works closely with our GAC colleagues to ensure both our mandates can be fulfilled, including through our international missions.

Secondment arrangements

• Secondments can be a vital avenue to ensure effective and efficient information sharing and collaboration between CSIS and federal partners.
• CSIS employees are eligible for secondments to other departments, including GAC, to improve the breadth and depth of their professional skills.
• Seconded CSIS employees remain employees of the Service during their secondment, and should they wish to become substantive employees of their seconded department, they must resign as CSIS employees to be hired by another department.

CSIS Status as Separate Employer

• Generally, CSIS’ status as a separate employer means that we are not subject to the Public Service Employment Act, and the Director has the authority for all Executive appointments.

Information sharing

CSIS works closely with GAC and the Canadian Foreign Service to ensure information is shared in a timely and effective manner, for the betterment of both our organizations and mandates.

Working Relationship with GAC

• GAC is an essential partner in CSIS investigations and assessments. Further, the Service maintains a close relationship with GAC, rooted in the CSIS Act, to support the Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to the collection of foreign intelligence.
• CSIS proactively consults with GAC when establishing arrangements with foreign agencies, where there are specific human rights or foreign policy considerations.
• CSIS also consults GAC as part of the risk framework that CSIS must use to assess risks associated with its operational activities.
• Recent crises have shown the importance and impact of collaboration between federal partners, including between CSIS and GAC, to support Government of Canada policy objectives.
• Although CSIS and GAC have separate and distinct mandates that support the priorities of the Government of Canada, the Service always aims to work collaboratively with federal partners to ensure coherent approaches to complex problems.

Russian invasion of Ukraine

• Russia’s aggression in Ukraine will have, and is already having, deep and long-term geopolitical consequences. Its impact is reaching well beyond the borders of Ukraine. The rules-based international order is under direct threat.
• CSIS remains vigilant against the potential threat of Russian foreign interference against Canadians and Canadian interests in retaliation for Canada’s support for Ukraine and our sanctions against Russia.
• This retaliation could be undertaken either directly or indirectly and could take place both at home and abroad.
• CSIS will continue to support an integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and by working closely with partners both domestically and abroad.
• Russia is a capable threat actor. It will use all the tools at its disposal to support its strategic objectives.
• For example, state-sponsored disinformation campaigns represent one of the many vectors of foreign interference. Hostile states have been involved in actively spreading such disinformation in an effort to discredit our government institutions, negatively impact social cohesion and gain influence for their own strategic objectives.
• We also know that Russia covertly gather political, economic, and military information in Canada through targeted threat activities in support of their own interests.
• While I cannot go in into detail on specific measures, Canadians can rest assured that CSIS uses the full suite of tools at its disposal to counter foreign interference.

Recent media reporting concerning CSIS operations

• There are necessary limits to what CSIS can say on intelligence given the need to protect sensitive operations and sources of intelligence from harm.
• The Service is steadfast in its commitment to protecting Canada’s national security in an ethical and transparent manner.
• We are subject to rigorous review as we work to keep Canada and Canadians safe in a very dangerous world.
• Canadians can be assured that Canada’s accountability regime for intelligence activities is one of the most robust in the world. We are bound by strict rules.
• All of CSIS’ activities must comply with Canadian law, including the CSIS Act and the Charter, as well as Ministerial Directions.
• Our activities are also subject to review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Listing of terrorist entities

• Listings are an important tool for the Government of Canada and send a signal that extremist activities are not tolerated in Canada.
• CSIS is a partner in the Public Safety-led terrorist listings regime. The Service is one of several departments and agencies charged with informing the Minister of Public Safety as to the threat that violent extremist entities may pose to Canada, from a national security perspective.
• Intelligence and evidence guide the terrorist listing process and are primary determinants for which entities are considered for listing under the Criminal Code.
• CSIS also works closely with its international partners on understanding the evolution of the global extremist landscape and emerging threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement as appropriate.

Modernizing CSIS authorities

• CSIS’ authorities must remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• Keeping pace continually with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.
• However, these decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Foreign Interference in Canada - General

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat?

Key Messages

• Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
• Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
• It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
• Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.

Foreign Interference Manifestations

Democratic institutions

• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
• Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
• For instance, state-sponsored cyber threat actors use computer network operations to interfere with elections.

Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.

Media

• Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent.
• Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process.

Targeting of Canadian Communities

• Foreign states or their proxies have threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
• State-sponsored cyber threat actors have used computer network operations against Canadians and Canada’s interests, including through disinformation campaigns, in order to achieve their geopolitical objectives. 
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups in order to influence their opinions or behaviours, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS has and continues to invest significant effort into building relationships with individuals, communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust. In times of crisis, we offer our support and our commitment to work in partnership to help protect and safeguard individuals in communities across Canada.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the authorities under CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.

Harassment on university campuses

• Canada’s academic institutions are centres of excellence that rely on open, creative, and collaborative environments to innovate and develop understanding of critical global issues. 
• Some foreign intelligence services and government officials, including of China, exploit this culture of openness to monitor and coerce students, faculty, and other university officials.
• In some instances, students are pressured to participate in activities, such as demonstrations and reporting on other students, which are covertly organized by a foreign power. Universities can also be used as venues for “talent-spotting” and intelligence collection, in specific circumstances.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups or students studying in Canada, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to our collective security.
• I can assure Canadians that CSIS is working diligently to protect Canadian communities as well as research and academic institutions – particularly by ensuring they understand the threat and that those at risk have the necessary tools to protect themselves.

Hotlines

• As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
• Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

FI in Canada – Democratic Institutions

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democracy?

On CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democratic institutions

• CSIS is responsible for investigating foreign interference threats to national security and advising the Government of Canada on those.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine foreign interference activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are believed to be targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• CSIS also routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders including government and public officials, the private sector and other organizations to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada and to provide briefings regarding specific threats. This can include elected officials.
• CSIS delivers these briefings in order to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of other hostile actors and to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.
• As a member of the SITE Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada in relation to the election, and provided classified briefings on these threats to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel.
• While I cannot provide more detail on specific cases, CSIS takes all allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state very seriously.

General Election 44

• As we did in 2019, in 2021 CSIS continued to work with its partners to advise the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to our democratic institutions, including through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.
• As was the case in 2019, no public announcement was made in 2021.
• CSIS continues to prioritize outreach and engagement to raise awareness of the foreign interference threat across key sectors and civil society.
• That is why, ahead of the most recent federal election, we released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

Threat reduction measures

• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s threat reduction mandate provides an important tool for the Government of Canada to respond to threats.
• While I can’t get into specifics, CSIS may take threat reduction measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada or Canadians.
• As previously indicated, CSIS monitors threat-related activity closely, advises the Government on these threats, and uses its full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.
• I am committed to ensuring CSIS can act effectively protect national security while meeting its legal obligations and respecting Canadians’ rights.

Foreign Agents Registry

• Foreign states use a range of methods to influence policy-making in Canada and promote their national interests.
• CSIS participates in discussions within the security and intelligence community as to what tools are needed to protect Canada’s national security and sovereignty.
• We also engage with our close partners to discuss their experiences in dealing with similar issues of foreign interference and espionage.

Russian Federation and foreign interference

Key Messages

• In the past several years, CSIS has observed espionage and foreign interference activity at levels not seen since the Cold War.
• Foreign interference activities are almost always conducted to further the interests of a foreign country using both state and non-state entities, including state proxies and co-optees. These activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten national security.
• State-sponsored disinformation campaigns represent one of the many vectors of foreign interference. Hostile states have been involved in actively spreading such disinformation in an effort to discredit our government institutions, negatively impact social cohesion and gain influence for their own strategic objectives.
• For instance, as noted in its 2021 Public Report, CSIS is aware of several Russian military and intelligence entities that are engaged in information confrontations targeting Ukraine. These activities include the spread of disinformation and propaganda attempting to paint Ukraine and NATO as the aggressors in the current conflict. Such measures are intended to falsely influence populations into believing that Ukraine has provoked a global conflict.
• Additionally, as CSIS indicated in its 2020 Public Report, Russia and the Russian Intelligence Services have, for example, been actively engaged in disinformation campaigns since a March 2020 in an effort to blame the West for the COVID-19 pandemic. This is part of a broader campaign to discredit and create divisions in the West, promote Russia’s influence abroad, and push for an end to Western sanctions.
• While I cannot go in into detail on specific measures, Canadians can rest assured that the CSIS uses the full suite of tools at its disposal to investigate and counter foreign interference.
• Our work ensures the Government of Canada receives intelligence on the critical issue that is foreign interference, and that actions to reduce the threat are taken as appropriate.
• Considering the current situation in in Ukraine, CSIS remains vigilant to any threat activities against Canada and Canadian interests.

Targeting of Ukrainian–Canadian Community

• The Ukrainian Canadian community is not new to dealing with disinformation and foreign interference against their community.
• Unfortunately, these kinds of threats are all too real to them. We’ve also seen concerning instances of harassment and intimidation against them.
• The key is to be vigilant and informed.
• We continue to be on the lookout for potential Russian threat activity within Canada. This may include espionage, cyber attacks, and foreign interference – notably against the Ukrainian-Canadian community and against Canadian elected officials of Ukrainian descent.

Cyber

• Cyber actors conduct malicious activities to advance their political, economic, military, security, and ideological interests. They seek to compromise both government and private sector computer systems by manipulating their users or exploiting security vulnerabilities.
• In 2020, a cyber espionage group linked to Russian intelligence services conducted Computer Network Operations (CNOs) directed towards Canadian, British, and American-based organizations that were involved in COVID-19 response and recovery efforts.
• These malicious cyber activities were believed to be an attempt to steal information and intellectual property related to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines.
• Of similar concern, non-state actors, including terrorist groups, have also attempted to conduct CNOs to further their ideological objectives, such as recruiting supporters, spreading propaganda, or encouraging violence against specific individuals or groups.
• In 2021, Canada joined the United States and international partners in voicing concerns related to a Russian cyber-espionage campaign that exploited the SolarWinds Orion platform.
• Although I cannot discuss specifics about the Solar Winds compromise, I can say we are seeing an increase in the exploitation of cyber tools to steal sensitive information, conduct ransomware attacks, and cause disruption.
• CSIS is also observing an increasing level of sophistication by malicious cyber actors. This includes the use of cybercriminal tactics, like ransomware attacks, by state actors and their proxies.
• Let me use the opportunity to remind Canadians, individuals and companies, of the importance of adopting best practices recommended by industry as well as the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

Use of chemical weapons

• Russian state actors have also demonstrated a concerning willingness to use chemical weapons both domestically and abroad.
• As CSIS also noted in its 2020 Public Report, in August 2020, evidence indicates that Russian state threat actors used a nerve agent of the Novichok group to poison leading Russian opposition figure, Alexei Navalny.
• This attack contravened international norms prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and was strongly condemned by the Government of Canada.
• The event is also particularly troubling as it represents another instance of Russian state actors using chemical weapons to stifle dissent.
• The Government of Canada, in conjunction with its Allies, also condemned the use of Novichok – likely by officers from the Russian military intelligence service (the GRU) - in Salisbury, United Kingdom in March 2018.

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: How is CSIS engaging with external stakeholders, including on cyber threats?

Key Messages

• CSIS is committed to engaging with industry, academia, civil society, and communities.
• These efforts are focused on building bridges between CSIS and Canadians and supporting a common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• In order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• CSIS engages with community leaders and members to better understand their concerns and to reinforce that there is no place in Canada for racial prejudice, discrimination and hate. 
• These discussions provide an opportunity to affirm CSIS’ commitment to ensure the safety and security of all Canadians – and to seek input on how CSIS can build greater trust with racialized communities including through increased transparency.
• As I stated at my recent speech at UBC for Asian Heritage Month, there is no place in Canada for Islamophobia, Antisemitism, or hate in any form. It is categorically unacceptable and reprehensible.
• To this end, CSIS continues to engage with anti-racism and counter-radicalization groups, as well as those focused on addressing the social impacts of national security laws and policies on racialized communities.
• These efforts are aimed at listening to and better understanding the communities that CSIS serves.
• CSIS has offered briefings to community groups on topics, including Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism and foreign interference.
• This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.

Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism

Issue: is CSIS still concerned about religiously motivated violent extremism?

Key Messages

• While CSIS has made IMVE investigations a priority in the last several years, this should not be understood to mean that the Service has deemphasized its Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE) investigations.
• RMVE remains a top investigative priority for CSIS and remains a threat to Canadian national security as attacks can be planned and executed swiftly with little warning.
• Recent acts of RMVE violence in Canada and abroad have been characterized by low-sophistication, high-impact attacks, frequently targeting civilians and public spaces.
• The October 2014 attacks in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu and on Parliament Hill and the National War Memorial here in Ottawa, remind us that Canada is not immune to the threat of RMVE.
• Canadians and Canadian interests abroad have been and continue to be the targets of acts of religiously-motivated extremist violence in an ever-evolving global threat landscape.
• CSIS works very closely with the RCMP to inform possible criminal investigations or enforcement action as appropriate.
• As a result of individuals spending more time online and therefore potentially becoming more exposed to online messaging, CSIS assesses that COVID-19 has potentially increased the threat of RMVE radicalization among certain threat actors.

Canadian Extremist Travellers

Key Messages

• CSIS and the Government of Canada have continued to monitor and respond to the threat of Canadian extremist travellers (CETs).
• CETs who seek to return to Canada can pose a threat to national security.
• While I cannot go into specifics about individuals, I can generally say that individuals who travelled abroad to engage in extremist activities are of concern to CSIS.
•  These individuals may leave Canada to support, facilitate, or participate in violent extremist activities.
• These individuals may have been further radicalized, and may have acquired training and combat experience abroad. Their personal experiences may also be instructive to others who are radicalized.
• Individual CETs are assessed on a case by case basis.
• CETs pose a wide range of security concerns, both while abroad and if they return to Canada. Broadly speaking, CETs have affiliations with multiple violent extremist groups and movements, and may represent IMVE, politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE), and/or RMVE perspectives.
• As you can appreciate, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations for reasons of national security. But, I can assure you that CSIS takes very seriously the threats to Canada posed by violent extremists, both at home and around the world.
• Global Affairs Canada remains the Government of Canada lead on this issue given that the majority of cases are consular. GAC continues to provide guidance to the Government of Canada for the provision of urgent or extraordinary assistance to a detained CET and any children facing difficult circumstances.
• The Service continues to be part of interdepartmental discussions and as per its mandate, provides advice to government partners on possible threats to Canadian national security. 

If pressed on children in the camps:

• CSIS’ concern is with individuals who may pose a threat to the security of Canada. As the cases of young children are consular in nature, enquiries should be directed to Global Affairs Canada.

Afghanistan

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in supporting the humanitarian effort with regards to Afghanistan?

Key Messages

• CSIS understands the humanitarian imperative of assisting vulnerable Afghans and unquestionably wants to protect those whose lives are at risk. However, we must ensure that threat actors cannot take advantage of Canada’s humanitarian efforts to support terrorism. This is true of any major funding programs or initiatives.
• CSIS remains a key partner to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in its efforts to evacuate vulnerable Afghans in support of this humanitarian imperative. The Service plays an important role in ensuring that threat actors cannot leverage immigration pathways to Canada.
• In light of the situation in Afghanistan, and the potential new security risks that it creates, CSIS has prioritized its collection and assessment efforts, specifically as they relate to supporting the security screening process.
• CSIS is continuing to engage domestic and international partners to assess what best practices can be applied to ensure the most robust process.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)

Issue: What is ideologically motivated violent extremism? What is CSIS’ role and assessment of this threat?

Key Messages

• CSIS takes the long standing threats of religiously, politically and ideologically motivated violent extremism very seriously.
• The uncertain environment caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic is ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
• It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of motivations and personal grievances and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of threat actors.
• IMVE can stem from a range of ideologies and is driven by hatred and fear. These ideologies can be:
  • xenophobic and linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism, and ethno-nationalism;
  • anti-authority and targeted at governments and law enforcement;
  • gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny; and
  • based on other grievances without clear affiliation to an organized group or external guidance.
• Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including, books music, and of course, online discussions, videos and propaganda. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by leveraging an online audience in an attempt to legitimize their beliefs and move from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
• As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in the CSIS Act.
• As such, CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest or dissent. While the internet is filled with racist, bigoted and misogynistic language and narratives, much of it falls under the category of ‘awful but lawful’.

Threat Landscape

• Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is a complex and constantly evolving threat. It has the potential to grow, lead to more acts of serious violence, and cause further erosion of trust in our institutions of government.
•  IMVE is often driven by a range of grievances and ideas from across the ideological spectrum. The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative that centre on an extremist’s willingness to incite, enable and / or mobilize to violence.
• These last few months and years have shown the threat that IMVE represents in Canada The combination of major disruptive global events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media and its global reach, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an uncertain environment ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
• Canada is not immune to acts of violent extremism; Individuals in Canada are exploiting this environment by spreading violent rhetoric online and some have engaged in violence.
• Since 2014, IMVE related attacks have resulted in 26 individuals who have been killed and 40 injured on Canadian soil. As you all remember, last year on June 6^th in London, Ontario, we saw the threat itself in a tragic attack where four members of the same family were run down and killed because of their faith. Quite simply, this act was despicable and has no place in our society.

Rise of IMVE threat in Canada

• As reported by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in January 2016, CSIS concluded that the extent and nature of the Right Wing Extremist (RWE) threat no longer met the CSIS threshold for investigation. As such, CSIS ended its investigation into RWE in March 2016.
• In January 2017, following the attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City, CSIS reopened its investigation into RWE.
• At that time, CSIS observed that the motivations behind this type of violent extremism had become more complex. Individuals were no longer influenced by a singular and definable belief system, but a range of very personal and diverse grievances.
• For that reason, CSIS took a leading role in developing an understanding and terminology that more accurately depicts the broad range of motivations behind this particular extremist threat facing Canada.
• Based on its findings, CSIS decided to stop using the terms “right-wing” and “left-wing” to define the threat. Instead, it uses ideologically motivated violent extremism – which has now been adopted by both Australia and New-Zealand.
• It is clear from the 2017 Mosque attack, the 2018 van attack, the 2020 spa attack in Toronto, and the 2021 van attack in London, that Canada is not immune to acts committed in whole or in part by IMVE.

Online threat environment

• Violent extremism online continues to represent a deeply concerning threat to public safety and a significant area of focus for CSIS, as it evolves in complexity.
• Online threats represent a modern challenge and demonstrate the clear need for CSIS to be equipped with the tools and authorities it requires in order to protect Canada and Canadians in the digital age.
• As technology and applications proliferate, extremist online collectives can replicate disinformation and interference campaigns that were once the reserve of state actors or large non-state organizations.
• Threat actors have access to a wealth of information online and CSIS has seen a surge in violent extremist content proliferating in that environment. Propaganda is easily disseminated using both mainstream and alternative media and social media platforms.
• We have seen a combination of misinformation and disinformation pollute the global information environment. This manipulation and propagation of information can erode confidence in our democratic values, institutions, and polarize societies while undermining trust in our democratically elected governments.
• Many of these platforms can be used anonymously or leverage encryption technologies to enable threat actors to conceal their identity and evade detection by law enforcement and security agencies, while spreading their message, inciting violence and recruiting link-minded individuals.
• If violent extremists are spreading propaganda online to recruit and fundraise for their cause, inspiring acts of violence or conducting a live terrorist act for an online audience, CSIS and law enforcement need to be informed of the threat and equipped to investigate and prevent further threat activity.

CSIS Screening

Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?

Key Messages

• CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
• Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
• High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
• Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.

On Government security screening

• Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
• Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
• On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.

On recourse when a clearance is denied or revoked

• Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
• CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.

If pressed on specific complaints:

• I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation.
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

• These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Intelligence and Evidence

Key Messages

• CSIS and the RCMP collect information for different purposes. Under its mandate, CSIS collects intelligence to advise the Government on national security threats, whereas the RCMP collects evidence to prosecute offences. Sharing intelligence to inform evidence collection presents unique challenges.
• While sensitive CSIS intelligence may be relevant to criminal investigations and legal proceedings, its use for those purposes carries risk, including CSIS’ ability to protect and recruit human sources and its relationships with partners.
• Recognizing the need for better operational collaboration, the RCMP and CSIS had proactively a third party conduct a review of intelligence and evidence issues, and since 2018, the agencies have implemented the 76 recommendations outlined by the Operational Improvement Review.
• This is a complex environment and addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.

CSIS Federal Court Decision (En Banc)

Issue: The Federal Court released its third ruling on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) duty of candour obligation on February 4, 2022.

Key Messages

• This is the ruling on the third and final warrant application that formed part of the En Banc matter. The Court determined that the warrant at issue could have been issued even if the information derived from potentially illegal activities was excluded.
• As I have stated since the first decision became public, protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.
• Importantly, the issue raised by the En Banc decisions has now been addressed with the passage of the National Security Act 2017, which provides CSIS with a limited justification framework to conduct activities that would otherwise constitute offences.
• The potentially illegal activities involved in this case are, in fact, routine intelligence collection activities, used around the world by national security and law enforcement agencies to investigate terrorism and keep people safe, such as: paying a source for information, or providing a cell phone to a source to assist them in undertaking their work.
• CSIS has taken concrete steps to address the Court’s concerns, which include proactively commissioning reviews conducted by external partners to ensure that CSIS duties are conducted in accordance with the law.
• The Service has also taken concrete steps to improve organizational awareness. Additional training is being provided to employees to enhance internal understanding of CSIS’ role and its obligations to the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians.
• CSIS has also cooperated fully with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency’s review requested by the Ministers of Public Safety and Justice.
• In addition to these measures, I would like to reiterate that CSIS works hard to protect our country and Canadians from a wide range of national security threats. The Court has acknowledged this and recognized that the consequences of failure are significant. At no time was the safety of Canadians at risk, nor were our rights and freedoms threatened.     

Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion

Issue: Is CSIS willing to recognize there is systemic racism in our society?

Key Messages

• CSIS is working to reflect the population it serves and is committed to increasing diversity in its workforce.
• I cannot comment on the class action currently before the Federal Court.
• But I can say that CSIS acknowledges that there are social and administrative structures and systems in place in our organization that result in – or fail to prevent – disadvantaging certain people or groups. This is systemic racism.
• As our Director has said numerous times, CSIS takes any allegation of inappropriate behaviour, including harassment and discrimination, very seriously. Over the past few years, in response to some serious allegations, we have been taking steps to ensure CSIS is a healthy and respectful work environment.
• CSIS is working hard to integrate strategies and approaches that help to reverse systemic barriers and broaden the organization’s understanding, appreciation, and valuing of diversity of all types. We are looking at our people, our systems and our culture to effect this change.
• For example, CSIS published its Code of Conduct on its public website for the first time. This is an important step in our commitment towards a healthy and respectful workplace, and signals our values to the public. It clearly articulates what is expected of employees and it has been built into the performance evaluations of every employee at all levels to ensure that the responsibility of creating a respectful workplace is shared.
• Each and every CSIS employee is responsible for ensuring that their actions, behaviours and decisions are inclusive and respectful and that any instances of exclusion, bias, or disrespect – systemic or otherwise – are addressed.
• Operationally, CSIS does not employ racial profiling. CSIS targets threats, not groups. Profiling is not only unethical but it also does nothing to further our mission and national security investigations.
• Simply put, systemic racism exists in Canada. It is something that cannot be tolerated within any part of Canada’s national institutions, including ours.

Workplace Climate

• Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
• Our Director is personally committed to working to ensure that CSIS is a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• Given the complexity of the current threat environment, I need to make sure all of my employees are at their best. And certainly in these challenging times, this is a growing organizational priority.
• I have made it clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace; the safety and security of our operations depend on this
• A safe and healthy workplace is a successful workplace and contributes to national security. We take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce. Our people are CSIS’ most valuable resource.

Promotion of diversity and inclusion

• CSIS is taking deliberate steps to increase diversity and inclusion across the Service. That is why in 2019 CSIS established its Gender Based Analysis+ Unit (GBA+) to further ensure its policies and operations are bias-free and evidence-based.
• CSIS employees speak more than 117 languages and dialects, with 67% of employees speaking both official languages.
• CSIS’s workforce in 2021 was 49% female and 51% male.
• In 2021, 19% of CSIS employees identified themselves as Visible Minorities, 2% as indigenous and 5% as persons with disabilities.
• CSIS is launching a new Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Strategy for our organization. This strategy was the result of considerable review and consideration of systemic barriers, discrimination, and racism in the organization and was co-developed with employees. It includes a concrete action plan with measurable objectives and timelines as well as steps to ensure accountability and transparency in implementation.
• CSIS recently launched an Intelligence Officer recruitment campaign aimed at increasing representation amongst employment equity groups and focusing recruitment efforts across Canada to draw on talent pools outside of the National Capital Region.
• CSIS also works proactively with employment equity groups, fosters mentorship programs internally to support diverse employees in preparing for competitions, and has a diverse Talent Acquisition and Student Hiring team, with resources dedicated to ensuring diversity. We are in the midst of building a new, comprehensive and multi-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as well as an Accessibility Strategy that are both built on research and consultations with employees.
• As an agency, we are committed to working to ensure that CSIS’ workplace is free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• To this end, the task of creating a respectful workplace has been built into the performance evaluations of each and every employee and CSIS has revised its Code of Conduct to clearly outline expectations. Comprehensive training equips employees to meet these requirements.

Actions taken

• As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our internal processes, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• That is why I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
  • Adding enhanced mandatory training for supervisors and a common performance objective for all CSIS employees and executives on promoting a healthy workplace,
  • Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
  • Renewing our Code of Conduct and making it a condition of employment, and
  • Holding numerous informal meetings and town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
• Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
• Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the   right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
• CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.
• As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.