Standing Committee on Industry and Technology

Standing Committee on Industry and Technology
January 27, 2022
5:30 p.m. – 7:30 p.m.

Appearance before the House of Commons’
Standing Committee on Industry and Technology

Study on Critical Minerals and the Investment Canada Act

CSIS Opening Remarks

INTRODUCTION

Mister Chair, Members of the Committee, good afternoon. My name is Cherie Henderson and I am the Assistant Director, Requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Amongst other things, my Directorate is responsible for the development of intelligence assessments and national security advice that are provided to other departments and agencies across Government to inform a range of decision-making. This includes, in particular, support for the National Security Review process under the Investment Canada Act.

I want to thank you for the invitation to participate in the Committee’s study of the purchase of Neo Lithium by Zijin Mining.

CSIS’ MANDATE

J’aimerais d’abord commencer par un bref résumé du mandat du SCRS. Le Service est l’agence du renseignement de sécurité du Canada. Nous avons le mandat d’enquêter sur les activités suspectées de représenter une menace à la sécurité du Canada; de conseiller le gouvernement du Canada; et de prendre des mesures afin de réduire ces menaces.

What constitutes a threat to the security of Canada is defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act: espionage and sabotage, foreign influenced activities (also known as foreign interference), terrorism, and subversion of government through violence.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

With our innovation-driven economy, our open academic and research communities, our abundance of national resources and our expertise in the mining sector, Canada offers attractive prospects to foreign investors. Foreign investments are a key driver of Canada’s economic prosperity.

However, foreign investments can also be used by foreign state actors to advance their economic, security and military interests to the detriment of Canada’s national interests.

As the Director of CSIS stated last year in his speech at the Center for International Governance Innovation, state-sponsored economic espionage activities in Canada continue to increase in breadth, depth and potential economic impact. The economic ramifications of these activities are significant, including lost jobs, loss of intellectual property and corporate and tax revenues, as well as loss of competitive advantage.

Ces activités vont continuer de miner notre économie et notre sécurité nationale, ainsi que notre prospérité à long terme.

The threats have never been more pressing, as many important sectors of the Canadian economy attempt to recover from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many businesses have suffered economically from the pandemic. That makes them vulnerable to foreign threat actors aiming to exert influence and control through investments. We have observed similar trends with our allies and partners.

Responding to economic-based threats and building resilience against them has never been more critical to our national security as threat actors employ more sophisticated means to achieve their objectives to the detriment of Canada’s interests.

CSIS’ ROLE IN THE ICA

Let me turn now to CSIS’ role in the ICA National Security Review process. The ICA authorizes the Government to review foreign investments on national security grounds. As we have previously briefed this committee, CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the ICA. As such, CSIS provides the ICA community with intelligence assessments related to national security concerns arising from investments made by foreign entities.

CSIS works with other departments and agencies in Canada’s security and intelligence community – including the Department of National Defence, the Communications Security Establishment and the RCMP – to provide national security advice to the decision-makers at Public Safety Canada and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada in support of the national security review process.

I must note that I cannot comment publically on any specific advice that CSIS has provided or on any specific transactions. Although I cannot comment on specific cases, I can tell you that investments made in Canada by state-owned enterprises and private firms with close ties to foreign governments or foreign intelligence services can raise potential security concerns for CSIS.

STRATEGIC SECTORS

Finally, allow me to say a few words about strategic sectors of greatest concerns from CSIS’ perspective. Investments in sectors that are considered critical infrastructure or essential to preserving the safety of Canadians can raise specific security concerns. Foreign entities that gain a controlling interest in such strategic sectors could potentially exploit them in support of espionage or foreign interference activities, including illegal transfers of technology and intellectual property.

The acquisition of sensitive intellectual property, technology, or vast amounts of Canadians’ private data for foreign use, or with foreign state control, can threaten national security. Foreign investments can also provide an actor with access to or control over sensitive critical infrastructure – including the supply chains that underpin them – which can be exploited to harm the safety and security of Canadians or Canadian interests.

Critical minerals are strategically important due to their use in advanced manufacturing applications needed for both national security and economic prosperity. They are vital inputs used to make advanced electronics, renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles, and energy storage applications, as well as used in other sectors such as medicine and aerospace.

In order to raise awareness of the scope and nature of state-sponsored economic security threats, CSIS has undertaken a national outreach campaign to sensitize Canadian research institutions and businesses to the threats to Canada’s economic security, including concerns related to espionage and foreign interference.

In conclusion, CSIS continues to identify and investigate threats to Canada’s economic interests and long-term prosperity, and provide national security advice to the Government of Canada.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Key Messages

Economic Security

• CSIS’ 2020 Public Report makes clear that foreign interference and espionage threats to Canada are real, persistent, and increasing in some areas.
•  This activity can occur through the foreign acquisition of and/or investment into sensitive Canadian intellectual property and technology, which may directly threaten Canada’s economic prosperity and national interests
• Canada’s abundance of natural resources, innovation-driven economy, advanced technology, human talent, and expertise makes us a world leader in many sectors and an attractive prospect for foreign investments.
• However, these factors also make Canada, Canadians, and Canadian companies a target of state actors seeking to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy and in our critical sectors in particular.
• The Government of China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• While I cannot speak in detail about specific operational matters today, I can assure you that CSIS is actively investigating these threats.

Engagement

• National security is no longer exclusively the domain of the Government. The private sector and key industry stakeholders can be affected by threat actors seeking to advance their strategic agendas.
• CSIS continues to broaden its scope of engagement and deepen partnerships with stakeholders across Canada on issues such as the national security considerations of emerging technology, protecting Canada’s innovation ecosystem, foreign investment, and research security

Canada’s Role in the Investment Canada Act

• CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the Investment Canada Act.  We work with our partners to provide advice in support of the national security review process. 
• This advice is limited to intelligence and analysis relating to threats to the security of Canada.  CSIS does not provide policy recommendations on specific cases.  
• I cannot comment on any specific advice CSIS has provided or on any specific transactions. The perspectives of multiple partners and their relevant areas of expertise inform these decisions.

Strategic Importance of Critical Minerals

• Critical minerals are vital inputs used to make information and communication systems, renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles, and energy storage applications, and are used in other sectors such as medicine and aerospace.  This makes them strategically important.

Specific Cases

• Section 36 of the Investment Canada Act restricts what I can say publicly about any specific case. I will defer to my colleagues at Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada for broader context.
• CSIS provides advice in the ICA process but is not the only voice. Other departments and agencies also contribute their respective expertise to inform these decisions. 

If pressed on properties of lithium

• I will defer to my colleagues at Natural Resources Canada.

Modernizing Authorities

• When the CSIS Act was drafted in 1984, telephone books and alligator clips on phone lines were among the tools used to identify threat actors and collect information. The private sector was not a partner in national security.
• Clearly the world is much different in 2022; the mechanisms that were appropriate 38 years ago are no longer suitable in a world that is now digital by default and where information volume and transit of that information is accelerating exponentially every day
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.

2021 Federal Election

• The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, comprised of officials from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Global Affairs Canada, and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), helps the government assess and respond to foreign threats.
• As we did in 2019, in 2021 CSIS continued to work with its partners to advise the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to our democratic institutions, including through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.
• CSIS continues to prioritize outreach and engagement to raise awareness of the foreign interference threat across key sectors and civil society.
• That is why, ahead of the most recent federal election, we released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

CSIS Briefings to Members of Parliament

• CSIS routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders including government and public officials, the private sector and other organizations to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada and to provide briefings regarding specific threats. This can include elected officials. CSIS actively investigates threats that are carried out in a clandestine or deceptive manner or involve a threat to any person.
• CSIS delivers these briefings in order to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of other hostile actors and to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.
• All Canadians can access useful information about these threats by reading CSIS’s Foreign Interference to Canada’s Democratic Process report.

Economic Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed by state-owned enterprises and their investment in Canada?
 

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for state actors seeking to gain information, intelligence, and influence to advance their own national interests through hostile means.
• Canada’s abundance of natural resources, advanced technology, human talent, and expertise makes us a world leader in many sectors. We have powerful allies with whom we enjoy close economic, security, and defence relationships.
• All these factors make Canada, Canadians, and Canadian companies a target. CSIS assesses that a number of state actors seek to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy and critical sectors in particular.

On CSIS’ role in the Investment Canada Act

• CSIS continues to support Government of Canada national security reviews under the Investment Canada Act, and provides advice on national security threats associated with certain foreign investments and acquisitions. 
• This advice is limited to intelligence and analysis relating to threats to the security of Canada. CSIS does not provide policy recommendations on specific cases.
• Part IV.1 of the Investment Canada Act sets out national security provisions which are used to assess proposed or implemented foreign investments into Canadian businesses.
• The Governor-in-Council may take into account a number of factors related to national security, including; the potential impact of the investment on the security of Canada’s critical infrastructure; the potential impact on the supply of critical goods and services; and the potential impact of Canada’s defence capabilities and interests, to name a few.

Responsive

• While I cannot comment on any specific advice CSIS has provided or on any specific transactions, I would note that it is ultimately within the prerogative of the Governor in Council to allow, disallow or impose mitigation measures on investments that would be injurious to Canada’s national security. The perspectives of multiple partners and their relevant areas of expertise inform these decisions.

Threat Activities and Actors

• CSIS’ 2020 Public Report makes clear that foreign interference and espionage are persistent and increasing in some areas, such as Canada’s economy and critical sectors.
• This activity can occur through the foreign acquisition of and/or investment into sensitive Canadian intellectual property and technology, which may directly threaten Canada’s economic prosperity and national interests.
• In fact, CSIS is seeing an increased risk of foreign interference and espionage due to the extraordinary effort of Canadian businesses and research centres during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, CSIS is conducting outreach and working with these organizations to ensure that their work and proprietary information remains safely in their control.
• The Government of China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• While China is a partner to Canada on some fronts, it is also a sophisticated and powerful player in the field of intelligence.
• It has the capacity to conduct espionage and foreign interference activities in Canada by applying pressure and influence in a clandestine and deceptive manner to pursue its strategic objectives.
• Notably, China can compel its citizens and firms anywhere in the world to assist such efforts under its 2017 National Intelligence Law.

Critical Minerals and Supply Chains (Defer to NRCan)

• Critical minerals are vital inputs used to make information and communication systems, renewable energy technologies, electric vehicles, and energy storage applications, as well as used in other sectors such as medicine and aerospace. This makes them strategically important.

Responsive

• CSIS is aware of the past cases of the exploitation of critical mineral supply chains that have been widely reported on in the media. We are not in a position to comment on any specific cases in this forum.

Huawei and Research Funding and Collaboration

• CSIS provides classified advice to the Government on national security issues, including on espionage threats targeting sensitive technologies and know-how being developed by academic and research institutions.
• As you can appreciate, in this public setting, I cannot go into the details of the advice CSIS provides to the Government.
• What I can say, however, is what we have been communicating at the unclassified level to academia and industry in our outreach activities: foreign states are very interested in acquiring emerging and sensitive technologies.
• It is important for academia and industry to be aware of these threats so they can take appropriate measures to protect their efforts.

Responsive

• I am aware that academic institutions have sought direction from the Government before exploring further collaboration with Huawei. As I previously mentioned, we have provided and continue to provide classified advice to the Government on threats related to research and development activities.
• As part of our outreach activities, we also provide unclassified information to academia and industry on threat activities to the extent possible, to enable them to make informed decisions on their research partnerships.

Research Security

Issue: What is CSIS’ assessment of the threat posed to Canada’s research and intellectual property?
 

Key Messages

• As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada is a target for persistent and sophisticated threat activity by state actors.
• Foreign states target Canadian businesses as well as academic and research institutions to advance their interests to the detriment of Canada’s technological progress and future prosperity.
• Foreign states seek to acquire Canadian technology and expertise by using a range of traditional and non-traditional collection tradecraft, including by targeting academic research.
• Certain sectors, including biopharma, health, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology, and aerospace, face particularly heightened threat activity.
• Emerging technology in these sectors is vulnerable to espionage by state actors.  Academia and small start-ups are attractive targets because they may have a less-developed security awareness culture and fewer protections in place.
• We are especially concerned about threat activities in this realm conducted by China, and to a lesser degree Russia and other states.
• CSIS is working closely with partners to ensure that Canadian entities are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.
• For example, CSIS participates on the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group, led by Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada, with other government partners and Canadian universities and research institutions.
• Key results of this work can be found on the Government of Canada’s Safeguarding your Research portal, which includes threat briefings, checklists for stakeholders, national security guidelines for federally funded research partnerships, and other resources.
• Our recent outreach to post-secondary institutions and affiliated associations is an example of how CSIS is connecting with stakeholders to ensure Canadian interests are protected.  CSIS has leveraged its expertise and footprint in every region of the country to launch a nationwide outreach initiative to raise awareness of the risks of economic espionage.
• The objective is to build resilience in key sectors, including biopharmaceutical and healthcare industries and businesses – and by extension protect the interests of all Canadians. 
• This initiative has already had an important impact. We have briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals who are now well-informed about the possible threats and have the tools to protect themselves, their research, and their employees.

National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships

• As you can expect, we do not publicly comment on, or confirm or deny the specifics of our investigations, operational interests, or advice to government.
• What I can say, though, is that Canada has long been targeted by persistent and sophisticated state-sponsored threat activity. This activity targets Canadian entities including businesses and academic institutions, and threatens the future of Canada’s knowledge-based economy.
• As a result, CSIS provides ongoing advice to the Government of Canada on espionage and foreign interference threats to national security, including clandestine or deceptive activities of threat actors in Canada.
• CSIS also regularly provides comprehensive, unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders in a variety of sectors across Canada. These briefings are instrumental at deepening security awareness and allowing Canadian entities to build resilience and take mitigation measures against threats such as foreign interference, espionage, and malicious cyber activities.

Responsive

• I am aware that academic institutions have sought direction from the Government before exploring further collaboration with Huawei. As I previously mentioned, we have provided and continue to provide classified advice to the Government on threats related to research and development activities. As part of our outreach activities, we also provide unclassified information to academia and industry on threat activities to the extent possible, to enable them to make informed decisions on their research partnerships.

PHAC Scientists

• As you can expect, CSIS will not publicly comment on this matter.
• CSIS assesses that a number of state actors seek to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy to advance their national interests.
• CSIS has identified universities, medical research institutes and laboratories, pharmaceutical companies, and high-tech companies as potential targets of these threat actors.
• Organizations across Canada that are engaged in efforts to combat COVID-19 may be particularly vulnerable to economic espionage at this time.
• CSIS is also working closely with partners to ensure Canadian entities, including businesses, academia, and other levels of government, are aware of the threat environment and that they have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.

Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

Issue: What is CSIS doing to engage with external stakeholders and partners?
 

Key Messages

• CSIS employees have been doing important work every day to engage with those in industry, academia, civil society, and other levels of government.
• These efforts are aimed at building a bridge between CSIS and Canadians and supporting common understanding of the national security threats we face.
• We recognize that in order to better understand and combat the complex and evolving security threats we face today, in ways that maintain the trust and confidence of Canadians, we must engage directly with those whose interests it serves.
• Early in the pandemic, CSIS – in cooperation with government partners – began a comprehensive cross-country outreach initiative, ensuring the biopharmaceutical, life sciences, research, manufacturing and supply chain sectors are equipped with threat awareness and mitigation strategies.
• Ultimately, CSIS briefed thousands of individuals at over 230 entities during this outreach initiative.
• Recently, CSIS has been working with government partners to increase awareness more broadly about threats to research security and the government’s new National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships.
• CSIS continues to provide briefings on these threats for universities and research institutes, and at various public events.
• This outreach leverages decades of ongoing work at CSIS to engage with stakeholders in an effort to inform operations, support research, and facilitate discourse on national security issues.
• CSIS continues to broaden its scope of engagement and deepen partnerships with stakeholders across Canada on issues such as the national security considerations of emerging technology, protecting Canada’s innovation ecosystem, foreign investment, research security, and protecting communities against the threats of foreign interference and violent extremism.
• CSIS prioritizes engagement with diverse communities, and has begun laying the groundwork for trusted relationships with various communities and groups in Canada. This foundational trust is imperative, and helps CSIS to foster the relationships needed to better protect the communities that are directly targeted by threats including violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage.

5G and Critical Infrastructure

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in the ongoing Government review of 5G? Will the Government ban certain companies from participating in 5G implementation in Canada?
 

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is engaged in an ongoing review, led by Public Safety, to determine the Canadian approach for the implementation of 5G technologies in telecommunications networks.
• The Service is, along with its other government partners, supporting this review. Specifically, CSIS is providing advice regarding national security threats.
• At this time, I cannot speak to any specifics regarding the review or CSIS’ advice.
• It is important to note that 5G technologies have the potential to revolutionize the telecommunications sector and have a transformational impact on the lives of Canadians and the Canadian economy.
• However, these emerging technologies also have the potential to introduce new risks to the safety of Canadians and to Canada’s national security.
• We continue to work closely with Public Safety, CSE and other government partners to support Canadian efforts to protect Canada’s critical infrastructure from security threats.

Allied approaches to 5G

• Canada’s allies have taken different approaches to 5G implementation, adopting various mitigation measures to protect their national security in response to the needs of their unique environments.
• CSIS, and its government partners, are engaged in ongoing discussions with our allies on these issues.

Threats to Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure

• Malicious cyber actors seeking to steal sensitive and proprietary information have targeted Canadian companies, in almost all sectors of our economy.
• These actors may exploit cyber tools and attempt to disrupt critical infrastructure and vital services, conduct ransomware attacks, interfere in elections, and spread disinformation.
• CSIS has observed persistent and sophisticated state-sponsored cyber threat activity for many years and we continue to see a rise in the frequency and sophistication of this threat activity.
• When our most innovative technology and know-how is lost, it is our country’s future that is being stolen. 

Cyber Threats and Incident Response

• While I cannot comment on our operations, I can say that CSIS carries out investigations into cyber attacks that pose a threat to national security.
• As such, CSIS is committed to using the full scope of its mandate to collect information on the nature and intent of these threats, to advise the Government, and when appropriate, take the steps necessary to reduce such threats.
• CSIS is ready and well-positioned to cooperate with various stakeholders should a cyber incident escalate to the level of national security threat.
• While working in cooperation with relevant Government departments, such as the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and the RCMP, CSIS may engage in incident response in order to further national security investigations.

CSIS Screening

Issue: What is CSIS’ security screening mandate? What are the different screening authorities under the CSIS Act? What is CSIS’ role in advising Government on security assessments?
 

Key Messages

• CSIS’ security screening program is Canada’s first line of defence against terrorism, extremism, espionage, and proliferation.
• Upon request from other departments, CSIS’ security screening mandate supports government clearance processes and immigration-related security screening.
• High standards are applied across the board to support the integrity of these processes and to prevent national security threats from materializing.
• Though it supports an important element of the decision-making process, I must emphasize that CSIS provides advice to requesting departments; it does not make the decision on whether to grant, deny or revoke a security clearance, nor does it determine an individual’s eligibility or admissibility to Canada.

On Government security screening

• Under its mandate for Government Security Screening, CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who seek employment with the Government of Canada. This advice may also be provided to some provincial governments and other organizations, when employment requires individuals to have access to classified information or sensitive sites.
• Under reciprocal screening agreements, CSIS also provides security assessments to foreign governments, agencies and international organizations on Canadians seeking to reside and work in another country.
• On request, CSIS, in conjunction with other federal partners, conducts security checks of elected officials who are being considered for appointment as ministers, parliamentary secretaries and all Order in Council appointments.

PHAC Scientists

• As you can expect, CSIS will not publicly comment on this matter.
• CSIS assesses that a number of state actors seek to conduct espionage and interfere in our economy to advance their national interests.
• CSIS is also working closely with partners to ensure Canadian entities, including businesses, academia, and other levels of government, are aware of the threat environment and that they have the information they need to make informed decisions and implement pre-emptive security measures.

On recourse when a clearance is denied or revoked

• Individuals who have been denied a clearance or have had their clearance revoked can make a complaint to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
•  CSIS fully participates in the complaints process.

If pressed on specific complaints:

• I cannot comment on specific complaints, due to privacy concerns and to the nature of the proceedings.

Nuctech

• Any new procurements will be conducted under new contract security guidelines which will ensure that detection equipment at the port of entry are subject to higher security considerations. 
• Decisions to award contracts undergo a thorough review and are made in accordance with established GC guidelines.

Modernizing CSIS Authorities

Issue: What changes are necessary to CSIS’ authorities, and why?
 

Key messages

• As you may know, the CSIS Act benefited from some much needed updating through the passage of the National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59). I thank Parliament for its support in achieving this much needed revision to our legislation.
• CSIS’ authorities need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.
• For example, our Act sets technological limitations on intelligence collection that were not foreseen by the drafters of the legislation in 1984 and limit our investigations in a modern era.
• We need laws that enable data-driven investigations, carefully constructed to reflect the values we share in our democracy, including robust privacy protections.
• At the same time, what the COVID-19 pandemic has shown us is that threat actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities – whether it’s stealing life-saving Canadian research or indoctrinating Canadians into conspiracy theories about the virus, public health measures and the vaccine.
• CSIS’ work throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has made it even clearer that the private sector's partnership in safeguarding national security is more important than ever.
• However, section 19 of the CSIS Act only allows us to provide unclassified threat overviews to external stakeholders.
• This is another example of the way in which the CSIS Act has not kept pace with the threats of today or our operational reality.
• Keeping pace on an ongoing basis with changes in the threat, technological and legal environment will ensure that we can continue to fulfill our mandate of keeping Canada and Canadians safe – and do so in a way that is consistent with Canada’s values and the trust that Canadians place in us.

On specific amendments

• These decisions are made at the political level and with support from our other Government of Canada partners both within the Public Safety Portfolio and with the Department of Justice.
• To be clear, the purpose of amending the Act would not be to lower safeguards, but rather to ensure CSIS has the authorities to provide timely, relevant advice in line with Government and Canadians’ expectations of their intelligence service.

Foreign Interference in Canada

Issue: What is CSIS’ understanding of this threat? What is CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democracy?
 

Key Messages

• Foreign Interference is one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security because it undermines Canadian sovereignty, national interests and values.
• Foreign interference is a complex modern threat. States employ foreign interference activities against a range of Canadian interests, including the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, economy and long-term prosperity, foreign policy and military, social harmony, and fundamental rights and freedoms.
• It is also a national threat. It targets all levels of government as well as communities across Canada.
• This threat activity has long been present in Canada, but its scale, speed, range, and impact have grown as a result of globalization and technology.
• Foreign interference activities encompass a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media, and sophisticated cyber tools.
• Both traditional media outlets, such as publications, radio and television programs, and non-traditional media, such as online sources and social media, can be targeted to advance a foreign state’s intent. Mainstream news outlets, as well as community sources, may also be targeted by foreign states who attempt to shape public opinion, debate, and covertly influence participation in the democratic process
• Democratic institutions and processes, including elections, are vulnerable and valuable targets for hostile activities by state actors. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new.
• Hostile activities by certain state actors, such as the People’s Republic of China, seek to manipulate and abuse Canada’s democratic system to further their own national interests, or to discredit Canada’s democratic institutions and erode public confidence.
• Threat actors have sought to clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes, and media outlets in order to influence the Canadian public and democratic processes.
• Foreign states or their proxies have also threatened and intimidated persons in Canada, including members of Canadian communities, to attempt to influence their opinions and behaviours.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups in order to influence their opinions or behaviours, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• CSIS has and continues to invest significant effort into building relationships with individuals, communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust. In times of crisis, we offer our support and our commitment to work in partnership to help protect and safeguard individuals in communities across Canada.
• While CSIS’s work is often undertaken outside of the public eye, we are steadfast in our commitment to work in partnership with communities and individuals, alongside law enforcement, to keep them safe from harm and intimidation.
• CSIS uses the authorities under CSIS Act to investigate allegations of interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, threaten the privacy of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities.
• Canadians can be assured that CSIS is following threat-related activity closely, advising the Government of Canada, and will not hesitate to use our full mandate in order to reduce threats to national security if necessary.
• To be clear, the threat does not come from the Chinese people, but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China.  China is pursuing a strategy for geopolitical advantage on all fronts – economic, technological, political, and military – by using all elements of state power to carry out activities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.
• Our cultural mosaic is all the richer because of the presence of Chinese-Canadians across Canada, in large cities and in small towns dotting every corner of this country.
• CSIS expresses sincere support for Chinese and Asian-Canadian communities who face ongoing acts of harassment and violence that have increased over the course of the pandemic.

General Election 44

• As we did in 2019, in 2021 CSIS continued to work with its partners to advise the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to our democratic institutions, including through the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol lays out a simple, clear and impartial process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a federal election. Under the Protocol, a public announcement would only occur if the Panel determined that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.
• As was the case in 2019 and 2021, no public announcement was made.
• CSIS continues to prioritize outreach and engagement to raise awareness of the foreign interference threat across key sectors and civil society.
• That is why, ahead of the most recent federal election, we released a public report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

On CSIS’ role in protecting Canada’s democratic institutions

• CSIS is responsible for advising the Government of Canada on foreign interference threats to national security.
• CSIS distinguishes between overt – and sometimes aggressive – lobbying and clandestine or deceptive interference activities. Clandestine foreign interference activities can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes.
• CSIS has longstanding investigations into specific threat actors who are believed to be targeting Canada and Canadians through clandestine, deceptive or threatening means.
• CSIS also routinely engages with a variety of stakeholders including government and public officials, the private sector and other organizations to discuss potential threats to the security and interests of Canada and to provide briefings regarding specific threats. This can include elected officials. CSIS actively investigates threats that are carried out in a clandestine or deceptive manner or involve a threat to any person.
• CSIS delivers these briefings in order to promote awareness of foreign interference and the actions of other hostile actors and to strengthen individual security practices and protect Canadians and their interests.
• As a member of the SITE Task Force, CSIS worked closely with partners in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 and 2021 Federal Elections.
• CSIS actively investigated a number of threats across Canada in relation to the election, and provided classified briefings on these threats to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel.
• While I cannot provide more detail on specific cases, CSIS takes all allegations of interference in Canada’s democratic institutions or processes by a foreign state very seriously.

FoxHunt

• Certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies.
• These states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as proxy agents to assist them in conducting various forms of threat activities.
• States may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals outside their country ostensibly in pursuit of anti-corruption efforts or to bring criminals to justice. These tactics can also be used as cover to silence dissent, pressure political opponents, and instill a general fear of state power, no matter where a person is located.
• When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals may not have the means to protect themselves or may not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities.
• The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can coerce individuals to submit to foreign interference.
• When individuals in Canada are subjected to such harassment, manipulation, or intimidation by foreign states seeking to gather support for or mute criticism of their policies and actions, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians.
• Canadians can rest assured that CSIS takes any allegation of foreign interference very seriously and uses the authorities under the CSIS Act to investigate, reduce, and report on threats.  Our goal is to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation.

Harassment on university campuses

• Canada’s academic institutions are centres of excellence that rely on open, creative, and collaborative environments to innovate and develop understanding of critical global issues. 
• Some foreign intelligence services and government officials, including of China, exploit this culture of openness to monitor and coerce students, faculty, and other university officials.
• In some instances, students are pressured to participate in activities, such as demonstrations and reporting on other students, which are covertly organized by a foreign power. Universities can also be used as venues for “talent-spotting” and intelligence collection, in specific circumstances.
• When foreign states manipulate or intimidate Canadian community groups or students studying in Canada, these activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to our collective security.
• I can assure Canadians that our security agencies are working diligently to protect Canadian communities and research and academic institutions, by ensuring they understand the threat and that those at risk have the necessary tools to protect themselves.

United Front Work Department (UFWD)

• While we do not publicly comment on, confirm, or deny the specifics of our investigations and methodologies, open sources have noted that United Front Work Department activities of the Chinese Communist Party incorporate co-opting elites, persuasion, and facilitating espionage.
• Again, I want to assure members that CSIS is actively investigating foreign interference and espionage and views efforts by any organization to clandestinely influence or deceive individuals as a threat to national security.

Hotlines

• As is common in large, multicultural countries, Canadian communities are subject to clandestine and deceptive manipulation by foreign states. This is foreign interference. CSIS and the RCMP actively investigate this threat to our national security.
• Both the RCMP and CSIS have phone numbers and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored 24/7 for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security, including foreign interference.
• Should individuals ever be concerned for their personal safety and security, it is essential that they contact their local police for immediate action.
• CSIS’ tip line is 613-993-9620, toll-free at 1-800-267-7685. The TTY/TDD number is 613-991-9228. The online reporting mechanism is on CSIS’ web page under “Reporting National Security Information.”

Foreign Agents Registry

• Foreign states use a range of methods to influence policy-making in Canada and promote their national interests.
• CSIS participates in discussions within the security and intelligence community as to what tools are needed to protect Canada’s national security and sovereignty. We also engage with our close partners to discuss their experiences in dealing with similar issues of foreign interference and espionage.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)

Issue: What is ideologically motivated violent extremism? What is CSIS’ role and assessment of this threat?
 

Key Messages

• CSIS takes the long standing threats of religiously, politically and ideologically motivated violent extremism very seriously.
• The uncertain environment caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic is ripe for exploitation by violent extremists.
• It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of motivations and personal grievances and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of threat actors.
• IMVE can stem from a range of ideologies and is driven by hatred and fear. These ideologies can be:
  
  • xenophobic and linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism, and ethno-nationalism;
  • anti-authority and targeted at governments and law enforcement;
  • gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny; and
  • based on other grievances without clear affiliation to an organized group or external guidance.
• Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including, books music, and of course, online discussions, videos and propaganda. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by leveraging an online audience in an attempt to legitimize their beliefs and move from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
• As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in the CSIS Act.
• Online threats represent a modern challenge and demonstrate the clear need for CSIS to be equipped with the tools and authorities it requires in order to protect Canada and Canadians in the digital age.
• Though I cannot speak to any specific cases, we continue to work with our Government of Canada partners to address the threat posed by IMVE.
• For instance, CSIS is a partner in the Public Safety-led terrorist listings regime. Given the complexity of the IMVE threat, CSIS continues to investigate IMVE threat actors, assess whether they pose a threat to Canadian national security and inform the listings process accordingly.
• Listings are an important tool for the Government of Canada and send a signal that extremist activities are not tolerated in Canada.
• CSIS also works closely with its international partners on understanding the evolution of the global extremist landscape and emerging threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement as appropriate.

On CSIS’ understanding of the threat

• As reported by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), in January 2016, CSIS concluded that the extent and nature of the Right Wing Extremist (RWE) threat no longer met the CSIS threshold for investigation. As such, CSIS ended its investigation into RWE in March 2016.
• In January 2017, following the attack at the Grande Mosquée in Québec City, CSIS reopened its investigation into RWE.
• At that time, CSIS observed that the motivations behind this type of violent extremism had become more complex. Individuals were no longer influenced by a singular and definable belief system, but a range of very personal and diverse grievances.
• For that reason, CSIS took a leading role in developing an understanding and terminology that more accurately depicts the broad range of motivations behind this particular extremist threat facing Canada.
• Based on its findings, CSIS decided to stop using the terms “right-wing” and “left-wing” to define the threat. Instead, it uses ideologically motivated violent extremism – which has now been adopted by both Australia and New-Zealand.
• It is clear from the 2017 Mosque attack, the 2018 van attack and 2020 spa attack in Toronto, or the 2021 van attack in London, that Canada is not immune to acts committed in whole or in part by ideologically motivated violent extremism.
• CSIS has also changed its terminology with respect to religiously and politically motivated extremism to stop using terms that unintentionally or unfairly stigmatized any given community.

Gender-Driven IMVE

• Incel (involuntary celibate) ideology bears many of the hallmarks of more traditionally recognized ideologies, and from the Canadian perspective, conforms to our definition of terrorism and is considered within the general terrorism offence framework.
• Incels belong to a misogynistic community of males, who associate primarily through online platforms. Though they use a unified terminology, they are not an organized group and have no centralized structure or planning.
• Incels believe their genetics determine the quality of their life and relationships, meaning they blame their unattractive physical features for their inability to attract women. They attribute their perceived failings in life to women and society in general.
• The ideology/beliefs within the “Manosphere” (a network of online misogynistic and male supremacy communities) stretch from lawful discussion of men’s rights issues to glorification of violence and violent misogyny. Forums also fluidly combine their resentment of women with racist narratives involving immigrants and people of colour.
• The Manosphere community is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands of participants worldwide. A study from Cornell University which explored the evolution of the Manosphere across the Web found that groups within the Manosphere have experienced significant growth and have become more toxic and misogynistic in recent years. (Study: The Evolution of the Manosphere Across the Web, May 2020)
• Since 2014, individuals motivated, fully or in part, by Incel ideology have, through numerous attacks, killed 49 people and wounded 62 others in Canada and the United States.
• In Canada, Alek Minassian’s perception and beliefs were motivated in whole or in part by Incel ideology when he deliberately ran down pedestrians with his van, killing 10 and injuring 16. In May 2020, Toronto Police arrested a 17 year male and charged him with terrorist activity after he stabbed a woman to death and injured 2 more at a massage parlor, stating evidence showed the attack was inspired by Incel ideology.

Online threat environment

• Violent extremism online continues to represent a deeply concerning threat to public safety and a significant area of focus for CSIS, as it evolves in complexity.
• As stated in CSIS’ 2019 Public Report, increased use of the Internet and social media by threat actors represents a unique challenge for the security and intelligence community. In CSIS’ 2020 Public Report, we highlighted that violent extremists continue to exploit the pandemic by amplifying false information about government measures and the virus itself on the internet.
• Many of these individuals promote the use of serious violence as a means to accelerate societal change and major global issues, such as the pandemic, can augment extremist efforts to move their message from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
• As technology and applications proliferate, extremist online collectives can replicate disinformation and interference campaigns that were once the reserve of state actors or large non-state organizations.
• They use tools like social media platforms, Darknet libraries and encrypted messaging applications to spread and amplify extremist messaging, recruit others, incite violence, and finance and plan activities all without getting off their living room couch.
• Threat actors and their exploitation of the Internet is a broad and complex challenge. To address it requires a comprehensive and multifaceted approach involving all elements of government and civil society.
• For instance, while taking down harmful online content limits its exposure and may reduce its impact, it does not address the individual behind the content.
• If violent extremists are spreading propaganda online to recruit and fundraise for their cause, inspiring acts of violence or conducting a live terrorist act for an online audience, CSIS and law enforcement need to be informed of the threat and equipped to investigate and prevent further threat activity.

Terrorist listings

• CSIS takes the long standing threats of religiously, politically or ideologically motivated violent extremism very seriously.
• As part of its mandate, CSIS investigates and advises the Government of Canada on threats to national security.
• As such, CSIS is a partner in the Public Safety-led terrorist listings regime. The Service is one of several departments and agencies charged with informing the Minister of Public Safety as to the threat that violent extremist entities may pose to Canada, from a national security perspective.
• Intelligence and evidence guide the terrorist listing process and are primary determinants for which entities are considered for listing under the Criminal Code.
• Given the complexity of the IMVE threat, CSIS continues to investigate IMVE threat actors, assess whether they pose a threat to Canadian national security and inform the listings process accordingly.

On specific groups being listed

• It is important to understand that extremism can stem from a range of motivations and personal grievances and is driven by hatred and fear and includes a complex range of threat actors.
• Extremists draw inspiration from a variety of sources including, books music, and of course, online discussions, videos and propaganda. Those holding extremist views often attempt to create a culture of fear, hatred and mistrust by leveraging an online audience in an attempt to legitimize their beliefs and move from the fringes of society to the mainstream.
• Though I cannot speak to any specific cases, we continue to work with our Government of Canada partners within our mandate, including providing security screening assessments and ensuring threat awareness through advice.
• As a civilian security intelligence agency, CSIS works closely with its domestic and international partners on understanding the evolution of the extremist landscape and emerging threat environment so that it is positioned to provide assessments and advice to support actions, including by law enforcement as appropriate.

On specific groups being investigated

 

• CSIS does not investigate Canadians participating in lawful demonstrations or protests in Canada or elsewhere, absent other indications of threat-related activity.
• As freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, CSIS can only investigate threat actors who meet its investigative threshold – those who are mobilizing to violence or are providing support to an act of violence, as defined in section 2(c) of the CSIS Act.
• As you know, the Service is limited in what it can say in an unclassified setting, and we cannot publicly comment further on operational matters and requirements.

Afghanistan

Issue: What is CSIS’ role in supporting the humanitarian effort with regards to Afghanistan?
 

Key Messages

• CSIS understands the humanitarian imperative of assisting vulnerable Afghans and unquestionably wants to protect those whose lives are at risk. However, we must ensure that threat actors cannot take advantage of Canada’s efforts by leveraging immigration pathways or circumventing anti-terrorist financing laws.
• CSIS remains a key partner to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in its efforts to evacuate vulnerable Afghans in support of this humanitarian imperative. The Service plays an important role in ensuring that threat actors cannot leverage immigration pathways to Canada.
• In light of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, and the potential new security risks that it creates, CSIS has prioritized its collection and assessment efforts, specifically as they relate to supporting the security screening process.
• As the security situation in Afghanistan is fluid and evolving, CSIS is continuing to engage domestic and international partners to assess what best practices can be applied to ensure the most robust process.

Workplace Culture and Diversity & Inclusion

Issue: Is CSIS willing to recognize there is systemic racism in our society?
 

Key Messages

• I cannot comment on the class action currently before the Federal Court.
• But I can say that CSIS acknowledges that there are social and administrative structures and systems in place in our organization that result in – or fail to prevent – disadvantaging certain people or groups. This is systemic racism.
• As I have said numerous times, CSIS takes any allegation of inappropriate behaviour, including harassment and discrimination, very seriously. Over the past few years, in response to some serious allegations, we have been taking steps to ensure CSIS is a healthy and respectful work environment.
• CSIS is working hard to integrate strategies and approaches that help to reverse systemic barriers and broaden the organization’s understanding, appreciation, and valuing of diversity of all types. We are looking at our people, our systems and our culture to effect this change.
• For example, CSIS published its Code of Conduct on its public website for the first time. This is an important step in our commitment towards a healthy and respectful workplace, and signals our values to the public. It clearly articulates what is expected of employees and it has been built into the performance evaluations of every employee at all levels to ensure that the responsibility of creating a respectful workplace is shared.
• Each and every CSIS employee is responsible for ensuring that their actions, behaviours and decisions are inclusive and respectful and that any instances of exclusion, bias, or disrespect – systemic or otherwise – are addressed.
• Operationally, CSIS does not employ racial profiling. CSIS targets threats, not groups. Profiling is not only unethical but it also does nothing to further our mission and national security investigations.
• Simply put, systemic racism exists in Canada. It is something that cannot be tolerated within any part of Canada’s national institutions, including ours.

Workplace Climate

• Just like the people of Canada, we are a diverse and inclusive workforce. Our diversity allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect and gives us better tools to collect relevant and accurate intelligence.
• I have personally committed to working to ensure that CSIS is a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• Given the complexity of the current threat environment, I need to make sure all of my employees are at their best. And certainly in these challenging times, this is a growing organizational priority.
• I have made it clear that senior management will continue to be accountable in demonstrating leadership and commitment to building and sustaining a healthy workplace; the safety and security of our operations depend on this
• A safe and healthy workplace is a successful workplace and contributes to national security. As the Director of CSIS, I take the greatest pride in the exceptional quality of our workforce. Our people are CSIS’ most valuable resource.

Promotion of diversity and inclusivity

• CSIS is taking deliberate steps to increase diversity and inclusion across the Service. That is why in 2019 CSIS established its Gender Based Analysis+ Unit (GBA+) to further ensure its policies and operations are bias-free and evidence-based.
• Other steps include numerous targeted initiatives intended to increase overall representation of diverse groups in the Service, address gaps in specific occupational categories, and establish and entrench expectations for a bias-free, respectful organization.
• CSIS also works proactively with employment equity groups, fosters mentorship programs internally to support diverse employees in preparing for competitions, and has a diverse Talent Acquisition and Student Hiring team, with resources dedicated to ensuring diversity. We are in the midst of building a new, comprehensive and multi-year Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as well as an Accessibility Strategy that are both built on research and consultations with employees.
• Furthermore, CSIS Executives have met multiple times with the Association of Black Law Enforcers (A.B.L.E.), for thoughtful discussions on a range of issues related to diversity and inclusion, and are committed to listening and learning through employee experiences.
• CSIS is working to ensure that our workplace is free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that all employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• To this end, the task of creating a respectful workplace has been built into the performance evaluations of each and every employee and CSIS has revised its Code of Conduct to clearly outline expectations. Comprehensive training equips employees to meet these requirements.

Actions taken

• As a result of the 2017 Toronto Region Workplace Climate Assessment, I can say emphatically that we have made improvements to our internal processes, so that all our employees come to work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.
• That is why I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the cultural values of our workplace, this includes:
  
  • Adding enhanced mandatory training for supervisors and a common performance objective for all CSIS employees and executives on promoting a healthy workplace,
  • Launching The Respect Campaign to re-enforce the importance of respect in our working relationships,
  • Renewing our Code of Conduct and making it a condition of employment, and
  • Holding numerous informal meetings and town halls at our offices across the country to discuss any concerns employees may have about their workplace climate.
• Our employees are always encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal and all of our managers are required to act promptly on any issues brought to their attention, and if necessary, request a formal investigation.
• Our renewed leadership training for managers is focused on fostering the right competencies to ensure strong supervisory and people management skills at all levels, and to ensure managers exhibit the Service’s values and ethics through all of their actions and behaviour.
• CSIS will continue to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects our Code of Conduct which includes respect for people, democracy, integrity, stewardship and professional excellence.
• As the trust of Canadians is essential in order for CSIS to fulfill its mandate, I am committed to keeping Canadians informed on our progress to address these issues.

R. v. Huang: Stay of Prosecution

Issue: Can CSIS comment on the stay of prosecution of Qing Quentin Huang?
 

Key Messages

• While I cannot comment on the specifics of this case, I can say that CSIS works with the RCMP to address national security threats.
• In this case, CSIS disclosed to the RCMP information that we had collected through our intelligence investigation.
• Using intelligence as evidence in criminal prosecution continues to present significant challenges, particularly as CSIS must ensure the protection of sensitive information and methods of collection.
• Addressing intelligence and evidence issues requires concerted efforts among a range of federal government departments including CSIS, the RCMP, Public Safety, the Department of Justice and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada.
• CSIS’ authorities also need to continue to remain current so that we are able to address the challenges of the significantly more complex legal, operational and technological environment in which we operate.

CSIS’ Posture During the Pandemic

Issue: What is CSIS doing to address the COVID-19 pandemic?
 

Key Messages

• Throughout the pandemic, CSIS has been guided by two principles: the protection of its employees, and ensuring that it could continue to deliver on its critical mandate for Canadians.
• For almost two years now, CSIS maintained its vital role in producing intelligence to support the Government’s response to this global pandemic.
• Additionally, recognizing the stress caused by the pandemic, CSIS has prioritized the mental health of its employees by providing support programs and flexibilities in determining work arrangements.
• CSIS has continuously updated its health and safety measures to reflect the most recent guidance from public health officials and CSIS’ in-house medical professionals.
• CSIS takes this guidance from health professionals very seriously. Based on this advice, CSIS has instituted robust measures throughout the pandemic, including: frequent sanitization of work areas, physically-distanced workstations, modified work schedules and other measures to enable physical distancing.
• These measures, among many others, have been in place in all CSIS offices since the very first days of the pandemic and have been consistently reinforced with regular communication to all employees.
• Throughout the pandemic, CSIS has continuously assessed all aspects of its operational stance to ensure it continues to meet or exceed workplace safety standards set by PHAC and the Treasury Board Secretariat.
• As public health advice started to encourage the use of masks, CSIS tailored this advice to its own unique context. Accordingly, at various points since March 2020, masks were less common, then were later strongly encouraged, moving to being required when physical distancing was not possible, and finally made mandatory in nearly all instances. The stance on masks was based at all times on advice by public health professionals.
• Recognizing the enormous strains of the pandemic, CSIS took every measure at its disposal to address the unique circumstances of its employees, including enabling work from home where possible given the sensitive nature of its mission.
• CSIS' mission remains essential, particularly during a global pandemic, where foreign interference and ideologically-motivated discourse and violence has increased.
• Canadians should and can expect CSIS to continue delivering on its crucial mandate. I and all Canadians should take great pride in the dedication of the CSIS employees to protect Canada’s national security.