« La pleine volonté du commandant » : Doctrine du commandement avancé allemand pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale

The combat effectiveness of the German Army in the Second World War is frequently attributed to a narrow, post-war interpretation of Auftragstaktik (“mission-type orders”), a German concept that stressed considerable subordinate freedom to achieve the superior’s intent. Decentralized decision-making supported German operations dispersed over the vast frontages of the war, but commanders exercised a greater degree of control over operations and subordinates than the currently accepted interpretation of Auftragstaktik would suggest. This article will argue that commanders controlled operations by practising Führen von vorn (forward command), a command philosophy that was both a derivative of Auftragstaktik and insurance against its weaknesses. Forward command was absolutely essential to achieve the tempo demanded by the German doctrine of manoeuvre and annihilation (Vernichtungsschlacht), and it compensated for human weakness in a way that pure Auftragstaktik could not. Post-war interpretations of Auftragstaktik require revision because they do not accurately capture the degree to which forward command enabled tactical and operational success.