Can Unmanned Aircraft Systems Meet Canadian Air Power Needs? (RCAF Journal - SUMMER 2016 - Volume 5, Issue 3)

By Conrad Edward Orr

Editor’s note: At various times, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has referred to these types of aircraft as drones, uninhabited air vehicles, unmanned air vehicles, unmanned aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems and remotely piloted vehicles. This article uses the current label of unmanned aircraft system (UAS), unless a historical term is appropriate.

The use of unmanned air assets by militaries has been a concept which has existed almost as long as the idea that aircraft had military applications. From Hap Arnold’s Kettering Bug, through the development of early steerable bombs such as the Fritz, glide bombs and target drones such as the Dennymite, there has always been an understanding of the value they held, and that more was possible.^[1] The sophisticated reconnaissance and offensive semi-autonomous systems found in the form of today’s Avengers, Eitans, Reapers and other similar UAS are finally beginning to scratch the surface of the potentially revolutionary capabilities they present; these new developments create substantial concern about what comes next and what it means for air power.^[2] This paper investigates current developments in the technology and its employment by militaries around the world and evaluates its impact on air power, force structures, operations and culture, presenting how or if Canada should move forward with adopting a more comprehensive use of unmanned systems as a means of providing Canadian air power in the near future. It is the position of this paper that Canada should foster capability, operational knowledge and technical familiarity in order to stay competitive and be capable in the future; however, doing so should not radically alter the Royal Canadian Air Force’s (RCAF’s) force structure in the immediate future. The approach of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) to UASs represents one which is most compatible with Canadian air power needs, and should the RCAF commit to adopting UASs beyond the tactical scale, emulation of this approach and the UASs considered would most appropriately conform with Canadian air power needs and financial/political realities. Outside of this approach, contemporary manned systems already slated for acquisition or currently in use will continue for some time to adequately fulfil Canada’s air power needs without additional dramatic cost or disruptive effect upon RCAF culture, doctrine or capabilities.

A good place to start when evaluating Canada’s future with UASs is its relevant past. Canada’s national history with UASs is almost as long as the use of UASs by militaries, having had its start in the 1960s with projects such as the CL-89 surveillance drone (1963), CL-327 helicopter-like surveillance drone (1977) and ROBOT-X target drone (1985), with industry-leading Canadian companies such as Canadair developing these indigenously.^[3] These early developments make Canada one of the nations with the longest and most intimate familiarity with the military use of UASs. This fact makes Canada’s current lack of wide-spread use of UASs,^[4] while other early adapters such as Israel continue to excel,^[5] all the more compelling to investigate. At present, CAF makes use of UASs on a small scale across the various environments, employing only “tactical” sized systems^[6] such as the ScanEagle^[7] and Raven-B;^[8] the former being deployed on all Navy frigates in the Gulf of Aden since 2012, and both being used by the Army.^[9] These tactical systems are all directed at intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) work, lack any kind of strike capabilities and are intended for short-range, short-duration tasks. The RCAF has previously used UASs, having employed the French-made, truck-launched Sperwer^[10] as well as several leased Israeli medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Herons^[11] in support of Army and Navy operations abroad.^[12] Both of these UASs were unarmed, intended for ISR and have since been retired from Canadian use.

Both the Canadian Government and CAF have explicitly expressed a contemporary interest in and intention to acquire more sophisticated UASs, through the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) and the Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) programme respectively.^[13] The CFDS, published in 2008, was a strategy for force-structure reorganization and defence posturing to meet the Conservative government’s “vision for defence.”^[14] The JUSTAS programme was established in 2000 by the Department of National Defence in order to “establish a joint direction for concept development and experimental activities,”^[15] is led by the Air Force Experimental Centre and was originally intended to produce an operational unmanned air vehicle (UAV) capability for Canada by 2009.^[16] Currently, the program has a delivery date of 2025 and a budget estimate of between $500 million and $1.5 billion.^[17] Both initiatives present Arctic and maritime sovereignty as a key focus for CAF and, though in unspecific terms, both indicate UASs will have a role in that mission. In CFDS, six core objectives are identified, the first of which is “daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic,”^[18] an objective that would be supported through JUSTAS that has the stated goal “to acquire an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) weapon system to support Canadian Armed Forces … [that] will complement existing ISTAR [intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance] capabilities, [and] increase maritime and Arctic domain awareness.”^[19]

However, since its commission, the JUSTAS programme has been stalled or significantly slowed due to lack of funding and shifting priorities, and though Arctic surveillance with space assets in the form of Project Polar Epsilon has moved forward, Canada remains without UAS beyond the tactical scale.^[20] In 2008, a parliamentary study, now known as the Manley Report, was conducted into CAF’s immediate needs regarding UASs.^[21] The Manley Report stated that Canada needed to quickly adopt UAS capabilities, lest it miss its opportunity and suffer operationally as a result. This report and its sense of urgent need to adopt UASs led to the leasing of the Israeli Herons in 2009, the programme having been twice renewed, but following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2011, the Herons were turned over to the RAAF and Canadian MALE UAS capability was lost.^[22]

The question that emerges quite clearly is “why was UAS capability beyond small systems allowed to languish?” particularly in the face of apparent enthusiasm and articulated need to be a part of what is increasingly seen as a transformational change in air power. Dutch researcher Gary Shuab offers that it is because UASs represent for the RCAF a disruptive and expensive change at a time when budgets are otherwise occupied; while for the Army and Navy, smaller UASs presented a cost-efficient technology that could be adaptively integrated into current methods of operation and which extended/enhanced their methods of operation non-disruptively.^[23]

Stephen Rosen, a theorist on military change, adds weight to this idea with his theory that the independent services of a nation’s armed forces have unique cultures and interests, defined internally as well as through interservice struggle, and that this shapes their perceived/preferred “way of war.”^[24] According to military change theorists Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, each service must approach military change at its own pace and in accordance with its own understandings/limitations, doing so through either indigenous innovation, adaptation of existing means/practices or emulation of other armed forces by importing foreign tools and methods of fighting.^[25] The Army began its familiarity with UASs in the form of the Sperwer while in Afghanistan from October 2003 to April 2009^[26] and saw immediately the benefits it offered in situations of regular use of indirect fire, mountainous terrain and difficulties obtaining up-to-date intelligence. The Army’s choice of UAS surprised and frustrated the RCAF, as the Sperwer was a larger, fixed-wing design, and the RCAF was of the opinion it, therefore, was an aircraft and theirs to control.^[27] The resultant tensions and issues in command and control (C2) of the Sperwer led to the Chief of the Defence Staff ordering that the environments “sort it out” and culminated in the 2006 publication of the Canadian Forces UAV Campaign Plan.^[28] This document placed all but mini-UAVs,^[29] such as the ScanEagle or Raven-B, under the control and responsibility of the RCAF. The Canadian Forces UAV Campaign Plan also established the Director of Joint Capability Development, essentially an RCAF organization, and tasked it with coordinating all UAS development and acquisition efforts across the Canadian military.

Published two years later, the Manley Report created the expressed immediacy in need for the RCAF to move forward with the leasing of the Israeli Herons for use in Afghanistan, following the 2009 retirement of the Sperwer. At the same time, the Navy moved ahead with its investigations into the use of embarked mini-UASs, resulting in the 2011 adoption by the Navy of the ScanEagle, used previously by the Army. The Navy’s newfound sentiment expressed by Navy Commander Canadian Fleet Atlantic Commodore Scott Bishop was that “without embarked UAVs, the ability of surface ships to conduct ISR was severely limited.”^[30] The then Chief of the Maritime Staff, Vice Admiral Paul Maddison, further pointed out that the ScanEagle did not replace the capabilities offered by the Sea King helicopters but “enhance[ed] the warship’s existing capability”^[31] and was easily incorporated into operations without substantially altering operational procedures.

It would seem that for Canada, UASs have thus far come to find homes within the Army and Navy as force multiplying tactical systems which have been integrated into how these environments conduct their operations and, as a result, extended their capabilities. With regard to Canadian air power within the RCAF however, UASs have not made a significant impact, as the RCAF has not indigenously developed them nor attempted to adaptively integrate UASs into existing RCAF means of operating.

The third option for approaching change, emulation, is the approach attempted by the RCAF thus far, exemplified by the leasing of the Israeli systems and the more common endorsement in Canadian military writing of purchasing or modifying systems off the shelf, such as the Global Hawk or Predator used by the United States Air Force (USAF).^[32] An exemplar of this approach elsewhere is the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Royal Air Force (RAF) and its method for adopting UASs.^[33] With this in mind, it is valuable to next evaluate the roles through which the RCAF provides Canada with air power and question—in light of how other nations’ air services have changed and what current fleet upgrades Canada is undertaking—whether these roles could be fulfilled in the future more suitably through UASs.

Looking at the roles that air power serves for Canada domestically as well as abroad, it becomes less surprising that the RCAF has been less than enthusiastic about dramatically incorporating UASs into Canadian air power. The three principle objectives of the RCAF outlined by the Canadian government are the defence of Canada, the defence of North America as well as a contribution to international peace and security abroad.^[34] The actual roles provided for by air power in achieving these objectives are air-combat capability, ground-strike capability, search and rescue (SAR), maritime/Arctic surveillance, airlift capability, general ISR, disaster response and support of the other environments through integrated operations.^[35] When seeking to understand how these roles are currently undertaken, what immediate needs exist and whether these could be addressed through UASs, a look to recent operations and fleet improvements, as former Canadian Chief of the Air Staff Lieutenant-General André Deschamps provided in 2010,^[36] is illuminating. Canada contributed significantly to the disaster in Haiti through Operation (Op) HESTIA by providing a massive airlift effort using CC177 Globemasters and CC130 Hercules transporting people, equipment and aid.^[37] In Op PODIUM, the RCAF conducted extensive airlift and provided “multinational, and interdepartmental air security”^[38] for the Vancouver Olympic Games; this was done using CH146 Griffon, CH124 Sea King, CP140 Aurora and CC138 Twin Otter aircraft as part of the Joint Task Force Games’ Air Component. Further, CF188 Hornets, CH146 Griffons, CC130 Hercules, CC150 Polaris tankers and deployable radar units were used to provide aerospace warning and control.^[39] Looking at kinetic operations, Canada most recently participated in Op IMPACT against the so-called Islamic State.^[40] In Op IMPACT, the RCAF has made use of CC150T Polaris aerial refuellers, CP140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft for ISR and CF188 Hornets for air-strike operations.^[41] An examination of how these capabilities are being maintained/improved for the future reveals that acquiring new CC177 Globemaster IIIs, CH147F Chinooks and CC130J Hercules will update airlift capability;^[42] new CH148 Cyclone shipborne helicopters will replace the aging CH124 Sea Kings;^[43] and the CF188 combat aircraft fleet is set to be replaced following an open competition,^[44] as the new Liberal Government opposes the originally slated F-35 acquisition.^[45] As well, though no airframes have been selected, there is an ongoing effort to replace the aging CC115 Buffalo and CC130 legacy Hercules aircraft used for fixed-wing SAR.^[46] When identifying what kind of air power can be provided by MALE or HALE (high-altitude long-endurance) UASs, the roles achievable are maritime/Arctic ISR, overseas ISR, communications relay and, potentially, air-ground or air-air strike capability. In filling these roles with UASs, the United States (US), the UK, France and Australia each stand out as distinct exemplars of different approaches worth evaluating comparatively, as was done by Colonel Ryoji Shirai of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force in 2014^[47] and will be summarized/explored below.

The US has been operating UASs across all three services since the late 1970s and, similar to Canada and nearly all allied nations with UASs, has relegated smaller tactical-scale systems to control by the Army and Navy while what it refers to as class 4 and class 5 UAS (MALE and HALE UASs, respectively) are viewed “as airplanes” and are controlled by USAF. Dissimilar to Canada, the Army and Navy operate a vast and varying fleet of tactical systems for different needs, with the USAF fleet of MALE and HALE UASs being both robust and capable of ground strike. USAF organizes its UAS usage in the traditional form of squadrons, establishing its first in 1995. As of the 2008 reactivation of the 556th Test and Evaluation Squadron,^[48] USAF has eight such squadrons and recognizes/trains its UAS operators as pilots. After experiencing significant friction between the new UAS pilots and the traditional manned-aircraft-pilot centric culture within USAF, a special set of “organizational wings” for UAS pilots was created, and the requirement that UAS operators undergo typical pilot training was instated.^[49]

In terms of operational gains, USAF has flown UASs continuously, often in sorties upwards of 24 hours with “about three dozen USAF UAVs and a much larger number of smaller Army variants”^[50] in the air over conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria at any given time. While it is hard to quantify the benefits of UAS usage comparative to what USAF operations with traditional means would have looked like without substantial HALE or MALE UASs, it is informative that as of 2014 USAF UASs were “conducting over 500 strike missions per year.”^[51] These figures, combined with the increased intelligence gathering and reduced risk to human pilots through reduced need for humans to perform the “Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous”^[52] missions these sorties carry out, would seem to preliminarily indicate a significant return on the US’s investment. However, it is important to be mindful of the infrastructure, operational tempo and budgetary concerns that set the American situation apart from the Canadian.

While American defence and security priorities require high and continuously global operational tempo, Canadian priorities are less demanding, and thus, the incredible costs of infrastructure procurement and maintenance become substantially more pronounced in light of actual operational needs. Obtaining a HALE UAS such as the Global Hawk, favoured by those advocating Canadian UASs^[53] for maritime/Arctic ISR, would require upwards of a billion dollars in initial investment,^[54] and as such systems are reliant on satellite communication (SATCOM) for control,^[55] it would likely require the launch of Canadian controlled secure military-communications satellites.^[56] With Canada having already invested upwards of $445 million in the Polar Epsilon satellite-reconnaissance project for northern ISR^[57] (with $100–$249 million planned for Polar Epsilon 2),^[58] being aware of the disruptive cultural frictions and interservice tensions adopting UASs created for the US and in the costly midst of updating its core air power capabilities via conventional contemporary aircraft, the RCAF’s lack of enthusiasm for emulating a structure similar to that of USAF becomes understandable.

Looking elsewhere, the UK’s RAF emulated USAF with a nearly identical though significantly smaller force structure regarding MALE and HALE UASs.^[59] As a result, the RAF has faced similar problems of cultural friction internally. RAF leadership has addressed this problem in part, as the Americans have, by requiring full pilot training as well as by granting UAS pilots their “wings.”^[60] However, slight coloration differences in the wings worn on the uniform continue to set UAS pilots apart from their traditional counterparts.^[61] Regarding set-up costs, the RAF circumvented much of them through close cooperation with USAF via use of shared facilities, infrastructure and training; their first of two squadrons having been based at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada until 2013.^[62] However, according to a 2014 UK House of Commons Defence Committee report, “the consequence of this strategic partnership is a significant continuing UK dependence on the USAF for support infrastructure and future upgrades to Reaper systems, and access to the USAF training programme for Reaper pilots and sensor operators.”^[63] What this shows is that while purchasing off-the-shelf models used by the US presents a lower cost of acquisition, it creates a relationship of dependency for expertise, training, parts and infrastructure. It also demonstrates the disruptive effect to service culture that introducing UASs to an air force can have as well as the importance of properly choosing whether to adapt/integrate another’s technology or to indigenously develop it along the lines of the RCAF’s own culture and needs.

The French Air Force (FAF), while only beginning its use of tactical-sized systems in 1995^[64] with the Israeli-designed RQ-5 Hunter,^[65] quickly graduated in 2007 to using a SATCOM-reliant MALE reconnaissance UAS known as the Harfang,^[66] a modified Heron. In 2013, under the Projet de loi de programmation militaire 2014-2019,^[67] the FAF began its transition to using the popular Reaper, currently possessing three, with a plan to have twelve operational by 2019;^[68] it is worth noting, however, that as of 2015, though possible, these UASs have not been armed due to public sentiment.^[69] Unlike the RAF, the FAF has opted to purchase a European C2 system, which it will have full ownership of; however, it did cooperate with USAF in training its initial Reaper crews at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico.^[70]

The RAAF stands out as a case study for Canadian UAS integration purposes. Similar to Canada, maritime and overland ISR have been identified as critically important areas of national security and defence for Australia; these ISR missions are also ones in which air power plays a substantial and growing role. Furthermore, the RAAF is both a part of the F-35 acquisition programme and is in the midst of updating its maritime/overland ISR capability under the multiphase Air 7000 programme.^[71] This programme is a plan outlining the creation of a balanced force of manned-unmanned systems to serve ISR purposes and continue to foster HALE UAS familiarity within the RAAF. Also like Canada, Australia has been involved with UASs since the 1960s, was home to UAS research initiatives and had a fledgling UAS industry from early on.^[72] Furthermore, the Australian Army and Navy operate their own tactical systems;^[73] the SHADOW 200^[74] and ScanEagle (the same one used by the Canadian Navy) respectively, with the RAAF remaining focused on HALE- and MALE-scale systems. Also using the squadron model of organization, the RAAF currently has one squadron, created in 2010, which operates Herons, the same UASs that were originally leased by Canada until 2011, the initial training notably having been provided in Canada as well, though this has since shifted to Australia.^[75] It is difficult to accurately gauge how disruptive to internal air force culture the introduction of UAS pilots has been for the RAAF; however, RAAF pilots are required to train to the same standards of normal manned-aircraft pilots and are then selected upon certification to serve in the specialized role.^[76] Some friction can be discerned, however, from the language used in related writings; Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel Tim Rutherford wrote in 2014 about the rise of the “warrior geeks” in reference to UAS and cyber-warfare operators, and articles such as the one titled “Boys Toys a Part of Defence” still appear in civilian papers.^[77] Particularly interesting from a Canadian perspective is the UAS that the Australian government committed to purchasing pursuant to the Air 7000 program in a 2016 defence White Paper,^[78] the MQ-4C Triton.^[79] The Triton is a HALE/MALE UAS designed specifically for broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS); it relies only on ground-based C2, has an enhanced anti/de-ice capable airframe^[80] and has the capability to act as a mobile network-relay node.^[81] The latter capability means that the UAS itself can be an alternative to in-theatre reliance on satellites, provide data transfer and cross-theatre networking capabilities as well as offer a redundant form of theatre-wide communication. Seemingly, this could be the ideal UAS for Canadian purposes, and close attention should be paid to the RAAF experience with it in the coming years.

While Canada has not expressed an explicit interest in the possibility of armed UASs down the road, it is worth considering what is possible and developing. Currently, the offensive capabilities of the most sophisticated UASs are limited to ground strikes, though with the advent of projects such as the X-47 and Dassault Neuron, unmanned air combat appears to be an impending reality.^[82] Both of these projects are aimed at delivering an air-to-air combat UAS, the former being a US project and the latter a French, and both are in their early phases. Some, such as Captain Michael W. Byrnes of USAF,^[83] have speculated that an air-air UAS reality is closer at hand than most would think and is only a matter of combining presently available or developing systems. The imagined result is a UAS capable of completing the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop, conceptualized by John Boyd, with such efficiency and maneuverability without regard for human restrictions such that it would render manned fighters nearly obsolete,^[84] if not relegated to “mothership” status.^[85] This mothership concept is actually focused on the current development of the Neuron, a “swarm” functionality being planned for use with the new Raphael fighters.^[86] The UAS in this conceptualization screens ahead for threats, provides sensor data to the Raphael pilots over a wide area, serves as a decoy against enemy systems and even engages enemy air assets.^[87] This swarm concept and the advantages of having an ambient swarm of integrated air-air capable air cover is not lost on the naval thinkers of the world either, with Ian Shields and James Spencer putting forward a vision of naval air power in the form of “commando carriers,” filled and protected by such UASs.^[88] The benefits being more air assets per ship, persistent air cover and ISR by virtue of long loiter times as well as a reduction of the need for large carriers and their extensive crews.^[89] Exciting and revolutionary as these capabilities are, many within the Canadian military purport that they are still far from reliably attainable within the time frame that the F-35’s lifespan is expected to provide for. Preparing for the arrival of these technologies, such as with the example of planned integration with Raphael, is an excellent strategy and one which the incoming F-35s may become capable of further into their lifespan, as recent proof-of-concept tests with the F-16 have hinted at as a possibility.^[90] At present, though shunned by the current Liberal Government, the F-35 certainly has the confidence and support of many within the RCAF, even when considered in light of the developing X-47, as was done by former Chief of Force Development Lloyd Campbell.^[91] Campbell, and others, find it “inconceivable that an operationally viable, multirole UCAV [unmanned combat aerial vehicle] will become available in time to realistically replace the CF188 fleet at the end of this decade.”^[92]

Having considered Canadian air power needs, current fleet improvement projects as well as how and which UASs have been integrated into several major air forces, the emulation of the RAAF stands out as Canada’s best option. With the current budget proposal for the JUSTAS programme being between $500 million and $1.3 billion,^[93] Canada could theoretically emulate an American scheme on a smaller scale in a way similar to what was done by the RAF; this would include the launch of a SATCOM constellation, possibly a merger of capabilities with the Polar Epsilon 2 satellite constellation project and would likely involve the purchase of a currently conceptual modified Global Hawk system capable of Arctic flight known as the Polar Hawk. This approach is not only among the most expensive, a not unsubstantial problem in itself with regard to the amounts already being spent on other procurements, but the ISR capabilities it would generate come with the introduction of complications and vulnerabilities associated with relying on SATCOM for C2 of the UAS. These issues include maintaining space assets, the vulnerabilities presented by potential loss of control in the event of SATCOM failures, risk of cyberattack, all in light of the fact that for all the cost/complications, the role could be filled by a small manned aircraft.

Emulating the RAAF, with its slimmer dedication to UASs and planned combination of manned-unmanned systems to complement one another specifically for the roles of maritime and overland surveillance, has obvious benefits for Canada, particularly the adoption of a UAS not reliant on SATCOM. The Triton (the system recently committed to by the RAAF, with its network-relay capability, incredible range/loiter time, maritime-specific design and high vertical manoeuvrability) would seem to be the perfect fit for Canadian needs with regard to identifying and tracking ships and people, providing additional communications/networking capabilities in remote regions and enhancing day-to-day ISR overland, in both the maritime regions and the North. With the JUSTAS timeline currently set to only reach the first phase, definition approval, in 2017, and contract award / implementation approval by 2020,^[94] there is plenty of time to observe the RAAF scheme and experience with the Triton specifically; the close relationship between the RCAF and RAAF allows for a potential fostering of domestic knowledge and familiarity with the system, force structure and application of UASs to maritime security. Thus, Canada should, for the immediate future, keep abreast of developments with a keen eye on the RAAF and should not rush to emulate our allies to the south simply to gain UAS capability where current fleet improvements and initiatives will provide for the RCAF’s actual air power needs. The reality of such emulation would require a retooling of current procurements and their budgetary needs, likely creating only further unproductive costs and delays across the board. Canada’s immediate air power future may not be a robotic one, but the door is certainly not closed to having robotic systems alongside manned capabilities down the road; it is merely a matter of finding the right fit, possibly with a later version of the Triton, and a force structure similar to the RAAF.

Conrad Orr is currently a civilian postgraduate student at the Royal Military College of Canada studying for a master’s in War Studies. Conrad also holds a Bachelor of Arts in Law from Carleton University and is currently focusing his academic research on air power, small wars and intelligence methodologies.

C2―command and control
CAF―Canadian Armed Forces
CFDS―Canada First Defence Strategy
DND―Department of National Defence
FAF―French Air Force
HALE―high-altitude long-endurance
ISR―intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JUSTAS―Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System
MALE―medium-altitude long-endurance
Op―operation
RAAF―Royal Australian Air Force
RAF―Royal Air Force
RCAF―Royal Canadian Air Force
SAR―search and rescue
SATCOM―satellite communication
UAS―unmanned aircraft system
UAV―unmanned air vehicle
UK―United Kingdom
US―United States
USAF―United States Air Force

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