Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept

Preface
Chapter 1 – Introduction
Chapter 2 – The Army’s Challenge
Chapter 3 – The Application of Land Power
Chapter 4 – Conclusion
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept [PDF - 4.96 MB]

Preface

Aim

The aim of this concept is to provide initial guidance for the modernization of the Canadian Army (CA) so that it can meet the expected demands of the future operating environment in 2040. This concept is one part of the CA modernization process that will result in iterative, substantial changes to the CA. The concept will be followed by a strategy, modernization order and implementation directive, and directives that will communicate decisions about which specific capabilities and mission sets the Army will prioritize in terms of people, equipment, training and sustainment (PETS). The primary audience of this concept is CA capability developers; the secondary audience includes the CA and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in general; the tertiary audience is the government, public and allies.

Policy Context

This concept is aligned with the Department of National Defence (DND) and CAF policies, strategies and concepts found in the references section. The concept is specifically guided by the Chief of Force Development (CFD) Concept for the Future Force (CFF) and the DND/CAF Pan-Domain Command & Control (PDC2) Concept.

Scope

This document is divided as follows:

Chapter 1 - Introduction This chapter establishes the context, purpose and guiding principles for the document;
Chapter 2 - The Army’s Challenge This chapter describes the future operating environment and institutional challenges;
Chapter 3 - The Application of Land Power This chapter identifies the military problem, the central idea of a solution and proposes the characteristics and general capabilities that the future CA must have. It also discusses the dependencies that the CA must navigate;
Chapter 4 - Conclusion This chapter summarizes the purpose of the document; and
Annex A — High-Value Warfighting Roles and Priorities. This annex is classified to be issued separately.

Where specific information is referenced within this publication, the specific publication is mentioned within the text.

This publication shall be reviewed when CAF-level concepts are updated, major policy changes are issued and when major changes to the operating environment affecting the application of land power occur, or on order.

Associated Publications

CA Modernization Strategy (To be issued).

This document supersedes B-GL-310-001/AG-001, Close Engagement: Land Power in an Age of Uncertainty—Evolving Adaptive Dispersed Operations.

Definitions

Terms and definitions used in this publication are in accordance with the Defence Terminology Bank (DTB) and NATO Terminology Database (NATOTerm).

List of References

Military Publications

DND/CAF. Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence (2024).
DND/CAF. Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy (2017).
(U) DND/CAF, Chief of the Defence Staff and Deputy Minister Directive for the Delivery of Ready, Resilient, and Relevant Forces (2025).
(U) DND/CAF, Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept: Prevailing in a Dangerous World (2023).
DND/CAF, Pan-Domain Command and Control Concept (2024).
DND/CAF, Operational Sustainment Modernization Strategy (2023).
DND/CAF, Joint Logistics Modernization Campaign Plan (2024).
(S//REL FVEY) CFD, Concept for the Future Force, v2.0 (2025).
A-PP-007-000/AF-001, Modernization Vital Ground: Digital Transformation (2022).

Other Publications

NATOTerm.
DTB.

The Military Problem

How will the CA detect, deter, defend against and defeat adversaries in pan-domain operations in a sustained and persistent manner in 2040?

Central Idea

The CA will develop division-level warfighting capabilities that can be synchronized to manoeuvre, conduct deep operations and sustain operations.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

The Case for Change

The Russian war on Ukraine and China’s increased integration across all instruments of state power provide examples of changes in the character of conflict. The growing threat of great power conflicts and the re-emergence of persistent state-on-state competition as a dominant trend in the global security environment drive the need for significant changes to the CA in order to be ready for major combat operations (MCO).

Authoritarian-state adversaries are challenging the rules-based international order upon which Canada’s security and prosperity depend. They are skilled at undermining and attacking Canadian and allied interests below the threshold of armed conflict, in ways national security institutions are not optimized for. At the same time, they engage in open conflict, blurring the lines between peace and war.

These aspects of the strategic environment are expected to intensify and evolve. As the demand for modern capabilities to fight these varied threats grows, the CA can no longer rely on allies to provide high-demand, low-density capabilities. The pace of modern threats creates an advantage for militaries that are deployed early, at the right scale and with the right capabilities. The CA cannot afford to wait until the outbreak of armed conflict to begin scaling up and building modern capabilities to fight in MCO. Canada also faces a renewed focus on domestic operations in general and on detecting, deterring and, if necessary, defeating threats to the Arctic in particular. The Arctic’s increasing strategic importance, brought on by the accelerating pace of climate change leading to ever-greater accessibility, also increases the potential for adversarial activity. The CA must be prepared to defend Canada and the Arctic, asserting sovereignty and protecting national interests.

The CA must prepare for MCO at the division level, where the full range of modern tactical capabilities are best organized and synchronized. The CA must learn faster and must plan, support and operate in a joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP) and pan-domain environment. The CA must modernize quickly to prepare to fight to defend Canada and its interests in a sustained and persistent manner in multiple theatres at once. Investing in future capabilities now will give Canada the agile and scalable combined arms land forces it needs to be valued, credible and relevant across the spectrum of conflict.

Purpose

This document identifies a military problem set and a central idea in order to focus CA modernization efforts, so that the CA can defend Canadian national interests alongside our key allies. This concept establishes the characteristics envisioned as necessary for the CA of 2040 and broadly outlines critical capabilities to form of the basis of capability development. As a future concept, it is aspirational and informed by current institutional challenges but not restricted by them.

Principles Guiding the Concept

The CA’s purpose is to fight to defend Canada. This will be achieved through high-value warfighting roles to be developed in alignment with the Concept for the Future Force and subsequent documents. These roles will in turn be achieved by employing land forces in tactical activities across the spectrum of conflict. The CA will therefore move away from a multi-purpose mindset to a mindset of having multiple high-value warfighting roles.

The CA will be considered “One Army,” and all capability development must consider the roles of the Regular Force (Reg F), Army Reserves (ARes), Canadian Rangers (CR) and Public Service employees. To support enduring strategic aims and to align with current policy, the CA must prepare to operate in three theatres: Canada and North America; the Euro-Atlantic; and the Indo-Pacific. The CA must seamlessly integrate with other Level 1 (L1) organizations across the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and key allies to synchronize effects and accomplish the likely missions associated with the three theatres.

This paper focuses on modernization in the CA, within the Commander Canadian Army’s authorities to decide and execute. However, the CA must be in lockstep with CAF efforts to enable successful pan-domain operations. Making changes within the CA depends on support from DND/CAF, other government departments and agencies (OGDA) and broader Canadian society. The CA must invest in relationships and cooperation with these elements to get the support it needs and to be able to support these elements.

Chapter 2 – The Army’s Challenge

The Future Operating Environment: Land Perspective

Introduction

The future operating environment (FOE) assessment is a pan-domain tool for understanding potential needs, and is not a concrete prediction of what will happen. This section will discuss aspects of the FOE with key implications for land forces.

The critical high-level deduction of the FOE assessment is that there will be implications for land forces that span the operational functions, necessitating changes to current models and outputs of force generation (FG) and force development (FD). Both FG and FD will need to change substantially to address the requirement for the CA to detect, defend against and defeat adversaries in the pan-domain battlespace in a sustained and persistent manner in 2040.

Assessment

The FOE will see increased competition from authoritarian states like Russia and China across the three priority theatres. These states will share more military technology, conduct joint military exercises, and supply soldiers and materiel in theatres of conflict. Given the interconnectedness of theatres and increasing cooperation between Russia and China, crisis and conflict in one region can quickly escalate and spread to others, including the priority theatres. Adversaries will keep adapting as they try to offset Canadian and allied operational, decision and information advantages using hybrid tactics with more emphasis on conventional means. These tactics will include missile threats, small- to large-scale attacks, sabotage, and maritime and air threats. Adversaries will seek to exploit weaknesses created by gaps in capabilities, low interoperability and ineffective integration.

Adversaries will continue to compete with the intent to weaken democratic societies, interfere with critical infrastructure and degrade military effectiveness, often in ways that are hard to trace back to them. If states weaken and poorly governed areas emerge, adversaries could gain more influence, and as global powers compete more, the risk of conflict will rise. The line between competition and conflict will continue to be blurred, making it harder to see when adversaries intend to transition to conflict. Non-state actors will continue to pose threats, with or without foreign influence or support.

Alongside terrorism, espionage, sabotage and organized crime, subversion will become a greater threat to public support for government institutions. This could weaken military capabilities and increase the risk of civil unrest growing beyond the control of police and security services. Technologies that expose military operations to the public and enemies can weaken military strength and security by facilitating misinformation and disinformation, which undermine trust and legitimacy.

The evolution of emerging and disruptive technologies will continue to be fastest in industry, not militaries, increasing access and decreasing cost. These emerging technologies include artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, uncrewed systems, and additive manufacturing (i.e. 3D printing).

These will enhance adversaries’ ability to conduct pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, increasing the transparency of the battlespace.
Technical evolution will lead to the proliferation of increasingly lethal and effective low-tech and sophisticated weapon systems employed from and into all domains. A wider number of state and non-state actors will have access to them.
Continuously improving weapon reach, targeting speed and sustainment in the contested logistics^{Footnote 1} environment will enable information, decision and operational advantages.
Adversaries’ increasing technical abilities to exploit the space, cyber and electromagnetic operating environments will threaten land forces, and put Position, Navigation, and Timing, and communications-enabled weapon systems.

These technical advancements will require more natural resources, leading to more competition and a higher risk of conflict through proxy and hybrid methods. Increasing amounts of data and information will need to be processed, which could overwhelm organizations that have not kept pace with digital technologies. However, relying more on modern technology will create vulnerabilities in networked infrastructure, which can disrupt government activities, industry, civilian life and the CA’s ability to prepare, project, sustain and employ land forces.

Climate change will cause more natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies. This will worsen access to resources, like food and clean water, and lead to more migration, which could destabilize regions and increase the risk of conflict in the three theatres. This combination of issues will lead to increased calls for CA support. Authoritarian regimes will exploit these crises to increase their regional influence, creating further potential for military deployments. Deployments will be driven by a range of strategic requirements and humanitarian and emergency conditions and will need to be initiated quickly to prevent adversaries from gaining influence in response to those conditions.

Figure 2-1: Threats and Challenges

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Future Operating Environment

These branches of the Future Operating Environment are:

Impact of Operations in the Information Environment
- Focuses on how adversaries use information warfare, including disinformation and perception management, to shape outcomes.
Expanded Manoeuvre Space
- Indicates the extension of military operations into cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains.
Transparent Battlespaces
- Reflects the reduced ability to conceal forces due to pervasive surveillance and open-source intelligence.
Reliance on Networks
- Highlights the dependence on digital infrastructure for command, control, communications, and logistics.
Pan-Domain
- Emphasizes the need for integrated operations across all domains of warfare.
Hybrid Threats
- Describes adversaries using a mix of conventional, irregular, cyber, and information tactics.
Blurring of Conventional & Unconventional Threats
- Suggests the erosion of clear distinctions between state and non-state actors and between military and non-military means.
Rapid Transitions from Competition to Conflict
- Points to the unpredictable and fast-paced escalation from strategic competition to open hostilities.
Emerging Disruptive Technologies
- Covers the influence of innovations such as AI, robotics, quantum computing, and autonomous systems.

Each branch is connected showing how these challenges collectively define the strategic context for Canadian Army modernization toward 2040.

Theatre-specific Considerations

Key threats and challenges specific to the priority theatres are the following:

Table 2-1: Threats and Challenges Specific to Priority Theatres
Region	Threats and Challenges
Canada/North America	Climate change will increase access to the Arctic and northern regions, offering opportunities for the increased presence and influence of adversaries. Adversaries’ commercial and industrial activities in Arctic and northern regions could be used to obscure operations in the information environment (OIE), espionage, sabotage and subversive activities. Adversaries’ scientific interests in the Arctic and northern regions could be used to mask espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities. Critical infrastructure could be targeted from multiple domains to reduce the effectiveness of government, foment civil unrest and reduce the ability to recover in the event of an attack. Russia and China will continue to develop long-range missiles that pose a threat to critical infrastructure. Russia could conduct limited, small-scale, short-duration military incursions into the Arctic and northern regions under the guise of scientific or commercial activities, violating Canadian sovereignty and security in the region. Legacy industrial materials will continue to pose a chemical hazard.
Euro-Atlantic	Contested logistics with increased threats to friendly strategic lines of communication, operational sustainment and support. Congested information environment with aggressive and pervasive adversarial OIE. Theatre entry may be contested by adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Increasing adversarial use of uncrewed systems for ISR, targeting and sustainment to enable operations. Increased attacks on space-, cyber-, and electromagnetic-enabled systems related to C5ISRT^{Footnote 2} to reduce land force effectiveness. Russian military activity in Arctic regions to restrict access could lead to military confrontations.
Indo-Pacific	Increasing below-the-threshold-of-conflict activities to degrade friendly ability to access and operate in the region. Theatre entry will be contested by adversary’s A2/AD capabilities. Contested logistics along very long strategic lines of communication, with increased threats to friendly operational sustainment and support. Increased threat of missile strikes by short-, medium- and intermediate-range systems. Increasing adversarial use of uncrewed systems for ISR, targeting and sustainment to enable operations. Increased attacks on space-, cyber- and electromagnetic-enabled systems related to C5ISRT to reduce land force effectiveness. Lack of region-level standardization/alliance creates challenges for intelligence-sharing, support, theatre transit, etc.

Institutional Challenges

Innovation & Learning

Successful armies are those that adapt faster than their adversaries to new technology, tactics and operational approaches. Since the character of a conflict can change monthly, the challenge is to create a culture, principles, policies, processes and structures that promote innovation and allow the CA to quickly acquire, update and upgrade capabilities to gain advantages.

To innovate, the CA must develop a learning mindset. The CA must learn from allies, other CAF elements and industry. Lessons must be institutionalized, and this process must be done faster than the adversary. This innovation must be reinforced by the understanding that changes to one part of the system will require changes to others.

Professional military education (PME) is part of the foundation for innovation. While the CA has had success in sending officers for PME in allied nations where they receive advanced education in campaigning, warfighting and strategy, this education is not specific to the Canadian context. The CA needs to review its PME programs and tactical education to develop soldiers and leaders who have a strong understanding of division warfighting, critical thinking skills and a spirit of innovation.

The procurement process is essential to innovation. The CA must understand the procurement process and optimize its inputs and internal processes to make the best use of it. This challenge will require the CA to better understand and work with its partners both inside and outside of DND/CAF.

Digitalization^{Footnote 3}

Sustained digital transformation^{Footnote 4} will be essential to making the CA a more effective institution that produces more effective land forces. Digitalization will improve the speed and accuracy of the decision-action cycle. This will permit land forces to have information, decision and operational advantages.

The CA must exploit an integrated data environment where data from all areas is shared between sensors, effectors and decision-makers. This will require more automation in existing and new processes, balanced with easy access to digital tools. To protect C5ISRT systems, redundancy, including through reachback capacity and capabilities, must be included in digitized systems to ensure they are available and effective. Digitalization will support the shift from a single-domain kill chain to a multi-domain kill web with cross-domain engagement.

Digitalization will help personnel synthesize and understand large amounts of information, allowing them to focus more on leadership, decisions, and actions rather than on moving information through traditional hierarchies. To support digitalization, the CA must continue to grow the ability to use advanced technology, which is linked to the challenge of innovation and learning. The CA’s efforts must be integrated with CAF solutions to use resources responsibly and efficiently.

This can be done by using the knowledge and civilian experiences of the ARes and connecting the right people from the CA with those in other commands and the CAF. When the CA invests in its own software development, it should use industry’s agile and lean best practices.

To achieve mature digital transformation, the CA must invest in building a digital culture, processes, software, data, facilities, and the training to use and maintain these elements in both unclassified and classified environments. The challenge will be in accepting the risks of failure that increase with encouraging initiative and innovation in these areas.

Access & Influence

The CA will need to be persistently involved in the priority theatres during competition. This could be achieved through exercises, joint and combined planning efforts, operations or presence. This will ensure that land forces can access OGDA, allied and partner facilities and networks quickly if conflict arises and can position and maintain necessary equipment and supplies. This includes having army-to-army agreements and legal authorities in place during competition to prepare for potential conflict. These preparations will help land forces get the access they need to support CAF operations. The challenge will be coordinating which aspects of access are within the CA’s control and ensuring CA preparations are integrated with CAF and other services’ plans.

Building the necessary relationships and offering value to allies and partners can be done through more liaison officer positions, embedded personnel, education and training exchanges, and prioritizing training team deployments. The challenge will be managing resource constraints, ensuring these efforts align with CAF priorities and centralizing efforts through a strategic-thinking CA. The CA will also need to stay actively involved in the information environment, countering harmful narratives about our soldiers and credibility as a fighting force. The CA must develop a strategic communication capability that complements the CAF’s efforts to influence both internal and external audiences. All OIE activities must align with a CAF-led, pan-domain and whole-of-government approach to ensure that the activities of the CA and employed land forces support the strategic narratives of the CAF and government.

Chapter 3 – The Application of Land Power

The Military Problem

How will the CA detect, deter, defend against and defeat adversaries in pan-domain operations in a sustained and persistent manner in 2040?

Central Idea

The CA will develop division-level warfighting capabilities that can be synchronized to manoeuvre, conduct deep operations^{Footnote 5} and sustain operations.

Figure 3-1: Characteristics of the Canadian Army 2040

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Canadian Army of the Future

This concept map illustrates the envisioned attributes of the Canadian Army of the Future

Adaptable
- The Army must be capable of adjusting to diverse missions and environments.
- Emphasizes learning from experience and allies, institutionalizing innovation, and fostering an operational mindset.
Persistent
- The Army must sustain operations over time with adequate resources and support.
- Involves strategic communication, force flow, and scalable logistics.
Resilient
- The Army must withstand and recover from adversity across strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- Includes survivability, redundancy, dispersion, and depth in personnel and materiel.
Relevant
- The Army must deliver effects aligned with national and allied strategic objectives.
- Requires lethality, survivability, and technological superiority.
Agile
- The Army must respond quickly to changing conditions and mobilize effectively.
- Involves institutional flexibility, rapid learning, and scalable force projection.
Interoperable & Integrated
- The Army must operate cohesively with other CAF elements, OGDA, and allies.
- Prioritizes coalition readiness, shared resources, and trust-building.
Technologically Integrated
- The Army must leverage advanced technologies to enhance operations and reduce costs.
- Includes AI, machine learning, software optimization, and digital transformation.

Adaptable

The CA must be able to adapt to the demands of different missions and environments in order to achieve Canada’s strategic objectives and support allies. This requires a tolerance for risk and an openness to change. To adapt, the CA must learn from its own experiences and those of allied and partner militaries and study recent conflicts to improve methods and skills. Innovation is part of adaptability and includes the institutionalization of these new practices in doctrine, training and structures. Underpinning this must be an operational mindset, which recognizes that CA processes, structures and institutions exist to enable land operations.

The CA will need to turn immediate battlefield lessons and adaptation into institutional changes in doctrine, training and materiel so that the CA stays relevant and maintains a competitive advantage. Soldiers must be encouraged to embrace innovation and experimentation, and the chain of command must embrace that initiative. Culture, training and personnel evaluation must actively recognize and reward such initiative. To be agile, ongoing education and training will be needed that not only teach skills and knowledge of historical and current operations but also foster creative and critical thinking. CA PME should aim to match or exceed that of our allied and partner armies.

Persistent

The CA must be capable of persistence in its operational commitments. This involves having the necessary resources, resilience and determination to keep going until the objectives are achieved. Fundamental to this is ensuring that combat forces are enabled by sufficient combat support and combat service support (CSS). Persistence requires adequate force flow, which involves the recruitment, training and readiness of personnel. A sustainable field force needs institutional depth and appropriate scale. For force structure, this means balancing brigades capable of different missions with the ability to rotate brigade- or battalion-sized forces to support persistent commitments to division-level operations. FG, FD and force employment (FE) must be aligned with this balance.

More broadly, persistence means creating the right conditions for operations. This includes strategic communication with the Canadian public, industry and government to explain the importance of the CA’s mission and its connection to Canadian interests. It is crucial to manage relationships with allies and partners for ongoing operations. Maintaining the CA’s credibility means making sure soldiers, the Canadian public, national leaders and allies understand and value the Army’s capabilities. Persistence also requires working with industry to ensure a steady and scalable supply of munitions, equipment and platforms.

Resilient

Resilience has strategic, operational and tactical features. Strategic resilience means being flexible with personnel, equipment and training, while aligning with existing and likely commitments to support Canadian policy and strategy. This must be built with an operational mindset that prioritizes the ability to project, employ and sustain land power in support of pan-domain operations.

At a system level, strategic resilience is dependent on sustained investment in key national infrastructure to ensure that CA bases and facilities can withstand threats and hazards. This will allow the CA to maintain its ability to respond quickly when needed.

At the operational level, resilience requires a shift to capabilities enabled by emerging technologies, including small and consumable platforms. It requires senior officers with the education and training to plan and lead operations across the spectrum of conflict and in any land environment, while considering the non-military factors crucial to military operations. When deployed, resilience will mean ensuring the survival of C5ISRT systems, headquarters and supply lines. It will be critical that the CA has echeloned, redundant and hardened CSS capabilities throughout the theatre to enable survival and success in MCO. This will require changes to doctrine, training and the use of technology while maintaining the ability to survive and fight in a degraded environment.

Resilience at the tactical level includes survivability at the soldier level. Avoiding detection will be harder, as soldiers, vehicles and equipment must be hidden not only visually but also throughout the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Dispersion is also a key to tactical resilience and survivability, which creates new challenges for command and control (C2), supply and security. When soldiers are detected, survivability means a more intensive approach to battlefield casualty care. Tactical resilience after taking casualties requires soldiers and leaders to adapt and reconstitute for combat effectiveness, based on a foundation of training, physical and mental resilience and discipline. The CA is also likely to be engaged by adversary espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout competition and conflict across an expanded battlespace, from the theatre of operations all the way to non-operational garrison locations. This requires the CA to increase resilience through operational security, counter-intelligence and denial and deception activities to protect the effectiveness of the institution and land forces.

Depth is also a vital aspect of resilience. Reserves of personnel, munitions, platforms and all classes of supply makes land forces more survivable and more able to adapt after setbacks and take advantage of opportunities. This requires clear roles for the ARes, which complement the Reg F. It will also mean having the quantities of personnel, equipment and parts needed for replacement and repairs.

Relevant

To be relevant in the conflicts of 2040, the Army must be able to deliver the effects required by the Government of Canada and its allies. This requires lethality, survivability and sustainability to achieve tactical and operational objectives in order to support strategic objectives. The capabilities that the CA must be able to deploy, enable and sustain must be aligned with threats to Canada and its national interests, which are determined by national policy and strategy. Implicit in this is the ability to provide valued contributions to coalition operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Relevance at the strategic level requires a credible deterrence force, and at the operational and tactical levels requires a lethal force able to deliver the right effects on the adversary across all domains. The range, lethality and speed of our capabilities and situational awareness need to remain superior to those of our adversaries, and our forces must be adequately trained for pan-domain operations. In the coming years, the key to relevance and the capabilities that deliver the desired effects will likely involve machine learning and uncrewed platforms, which will enhance or otherwise facilitate the roles of soldiers and commanders in warfighting and will require different and additional skills.

Agile

The CA must balance ongoing and future missions across multiple theatres and be able to react quickly. It will need to manage ongoing missions and commitments with the pace of operations and their demands on soldiers and units. Additionally, it will need to balance current warfighting capabilities with the need to develop new ones as warfare changes. Institutional agility will be key to finding these balance points.

The CA must be able to mobilize effectively and efficiently to increase its presence in a given theatre when required by Canadian national interests. The relationship between the Reg F, ARes, and CR is essential for mobilization. The balance between the number of Reg F and ARes soldiers, the role of the ARes as a strategic, operational or tactical reserve (or combination of those) and the obligations between the Army and its reservists must align to make mobilization possible. The roles that the CR have within Canada must complement those of the Reg F and ARes. This will require careful consideration of the DOTMLPFP-I^{Footnote 6} factors that mobilization demands. Mobilization also requires a high degree of personnel and equipment readiness, which is enhanced by common equipment between the Reg F and ARes.

Apart from large-scale mobilization, additional Reg F personnel and equipment will need to be quickly and effectively moved into theatre. This will be necessary to balance the demands on the CA with the need for the right-sized presence as missions evolve or circumstances change. The Army will need to project forces within Canada and overseas. Operational mobility will require clear relationships with other L1 organizations across DND/CAF or agreements with private or allied transportation providers. The ability to project forces and deter will also require transportation and entry capabilities in various climates and terrain.

Institutional agility is more abstract than the ability to mobilize and project forces. It will involve quickly learning from current operations and implementing changes to training, tactics and procedures and higher doctrine, training, structures, facilities or procurement projects. Institutional agility is built upon systems and processes to move information to and from institutional decision-makers rapidly and a culture of risk acceptance to get the best available solution now rather than the best possible solution later.

Interoperable

Figure 3-2: Interoperability in the Canadian Army

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Canadian Army

This concept map illustrates the Canadian Army’s need to operate effectively within a network of domestic and international partners. Ten organizations and entities with which the Canadian Army must be interoperable.

The organizations and entities are:

Canadian entities:

OGDA (Other Government Departments and Agencies)
- Includes federal departments and agencies that support or coordinate with the Army in domestic and international operations.
RCAF (Royal Canadian Air Force)
- Provides air mobility, tactical aviation, and joint operational support.
RCN (Royal Canadian Navy)
- Supports maritime operations and joint force projection.
CFINTCOM (Canadian Forces Intelligence Command)
- Delivers intelligence capabilities and integration for decision advantage.
CAFCYBER COM (Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Command)
- Enables cyber operations and electromagnetic spectrum defense.
CANSOF COM (Canadian Special Operations Forces Command)
- Conducts specialized missions and supports joint operations.

Non-Canadian entities:

ABCANZ (America, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)
- A multinational interoperability program focused on standardization and cooperation among Five Eyes partners.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
- Provides alliance-based operational frameworks and multinational force integration.
NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command)
- Supports continental defense and aerospace warning/control in partnership with the United States.
US Military

Represents bilateral interoperability with the United States Armed Forces across all domains.

This reflects the Canadian Army’s requirement to be technically, procedurally, and culturally interoperable with these entities to support coalition operations, joint missions, and whole-of-government approaches.

The CA of 2040 will need to work better internally, with other L1 organizations across DND/CAF and with allies and partners. It will likely operate as part of a CAF campaign within a whole-of-government context and in a multinational alliance or coalition. Therefore, interoperability^{Footnote 7} with the other CAF services, OGDA, and allies is essential.

Interoperability is a way to achieve goals, such as shaping the strategic environment, increasing multinational capabilities and reducing resource demands. Benefits include better access to locations and populations, using partner capabilities, filling gaps in forces, increased political legitimacy and stronger deterrence.

Complete integration with all organizations is not practical or cost-effective. Sometimes, steps to work better with one group may not work with another. The Army will need to prioritize working with the rest of the CAF, OGDA, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), FVEY (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States of America) and NATO allies. Land forces must be trained, prepared, equipped and self-sustained for coalition operations and capable of independent operations at the right level.

Sharing resources with allies can help address the challenges of contested logistics, scarce resources and long lines of communication. Interchangeable resources, such as ammunition for example, enable this sharing. Land operations will place soldiers and leaders in situations of close cooperation with their counterparts from allied militaries. As such, the CA must hone its culture and training to establish trust, solve tactical problems and defeat adversaries as part of an alliance or coalition team.

The CA will need to be more flexible, adaptable and interoperable in supporting non-traditional missions with other government partners and in responding to adversarial activities below the threshold of armed conflict.

Technologically Integrated

Recent conflicts show how important data and technology are for optimizing older weapons and platforms and especially for using newer systems effectively. Technological integration is relevant to the Army well beyond warfighting, as it can reduce the financial and time costs of routine administrative tasks, freeing resources for operations. Software and machine learning can combine information from all sources to speed up intelligence cycles, targeting and battle damage assessments. While terms such as FLOT^{Footnote 8} , FLET^{Footnote 9} , and FEBA^{Footnote 10} will still be relevant, additional doctrinal control measures may need to be established, such as a “forward line of robotics,” for example. Technological integration will require constantly improving hardware, software, security, processes and training so the Army can remain a key member of military alliances and intelligence-sharing agreements.

Many of the capabilities described in this document support more than one operational function depending on how they are used at the time. To achieve the needed capabilities aligned with the identified characteristics of the CA of 2040, a series of transformative changes is required (Summarized in Table 3-3).

Table 3-3: From the Army We Have to the Army We Need
Current	Modernized	In Order to
Ad-hoc global contributions	Three priority theatres	Detect, deter & defeat adversaries from projecting effects to Canada.
Brigade level investments	Division level investments	Synchronize pan-domain effects & joint integration.
Multi-purpose land force	Multiple high-value warfighting roles	Converge land power to support pan-domain operations.
Land manoeuvre	Manoeuvrable, survivable, lethal, organically sustainable	Optimize the land force for pan-domain threats.
Force generation focused	Operational culture where FD, FG, all activities are linked to FE	Provide coherent land forces to enable, support & conduct operations.
Interoperable with allies	Interchangeable with key allies	Create decision and operational advantages.
Challenges to ARes employment	Complementary, defined roles	Optimize employment of ARes within “One Army.”
Dated, cumbersome logistics	Survivable, deployable, persistent logistics, interchangeable with allies	Enable CSS as high-value capability to joint & multi-national ops.
Crewed, manual systems	Optionally crewed, robotic, autonomous, uncrewed, or human-machine teamed	Achieve information, decision & operational advantages.
Limited integration of space, cyber, EMO, OIE effect	Effects synchronized & integrated at division level	Enable enhanced manoeuvre across domains.

Command

The Command function integrates all the operational functions into a single comprehensive strategic, operational or tactical-level concept. To achieve the integration and interoperability needed in the FOE, the CA must ensure that its C5ISRT systems are compatible if not common with other DND/CAF L1 organizations and allies. Integrating all the operational functions is not only about systems and equipment; there is also a human element that endures and will require effective education and training, doctrine, policies, infrastructure and processes that are adapted to the FOE.