Oral Interview Major-General (ret'd) Julian Thompson, CB, OBE

The Staff College Oral Interview Series

The Falklands War of May 1982 was the largest Sea and Air operation conducted by the British Army since the Second World War. One of the most compelling actions during the war was the capture of Goose Green by 2 Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jones on 28-29 May. 2 PARA was part of 3 Commando Brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Julian Thompson.  

Below are a series of questions posed by Captain John N. Rickard, Canadian Army Command and Staff College, and graciously answered by Major-General (Ret) Julian Thompson, CB, OBE (23 February 2018).

Capt Rickard

Given the breach of security and the intelligence gathered by the capture of the Argentine Recce Platoon commander, did you consider reinforcing Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jones prior to H-hr?

General Thompson

I warned 42 Commando that they might be required to reinforce 2 PARA, initially with a company, and if necessary, with the whole Commando.  I also had my Tac HQ stand by to come down to Goose Green with me if I deemed it necessary to take command.  A Coy of 42 Commando was at short notice to fly down, and eventually did so.

Capt Rickard

Did you accept the intelligence indicating the size of the force that LCol Jones would have to fight through? The force ratio, derivable from what you state in your book, appears to be 1:1. How concerned were you with the force ratio?

General Thompson

I believed that we could win with a 1:1 force ratio, possibly because I was not convinced by the Intelligence picture.

Capt Rickard 

Did you and LCol Jones wargame an Argentine air-mobile reinforcement of their positions?

General Thompson

We did not war game anything in this war.  It was a pity that the war game system now being used over here was not around then.  I would not have war-gamed this battle but would have war gamed other aspects of the campaign, such as amphibious operations, [and] the brigade design for battle for various phases of the land campaign.  But no such facility existed.

Capt Rickard 

When did you give full brigade orders, and do you think LCol Jones had enough time for battle procedure?

General Thompson

I did not deliver full brigade orders for the Goose Green operation.  I think he had enough time for battle procedure, bearing in mind that he had been warned for a raid some days before, and carried out recce and other preparations.

I gave full Brigade Orders on the following occasions:

• Before the amphibious assault
• Before phase one of the attack on Port Stanley. These orders included intentions for phase 2.
• Before phase 2 of the attack on Port Stanley, but these were for phase 3.

Capt Rickard

Did you issue a written operation order or was everything verbal?

General Thompson

Full written operation order was issued before the amphibious assault.

Confirmatory notes issued after the two other O groups above.

No operation order was issued for Darwin/Goose Green

Capt Rickard 

Did you establish H-hour or did LCol Jones?

General Thompson

He did.  It is important to understand the effect the air situation had on this, and many other operations.  We did not have air superiority; arguably the first time the Brits had operated in such a situation since half way through the Second World War.  Jones’s H-hour was dictated by the time that three guns plus ammunition, plus two mortars, could be flown down to him, which had to be in darkness, in order that the people at Darwin, and any Argentine OP s, would not see the move.  Furthermore, the move of the ammunition to Darwin was delayed by the fact that the netted loads of ammunition had been all destroyed by Argentine air attack just before last light that evening, while they were sitting by the helipad at the Brigade Maintenance Area.  Among numerous fires and exploding ammunition my ‘loggies’ had to net up replacement ammunition.  The enemy air force remained a threat up to the end; including attacking my HQ on the last evening of the war; and the air threat was something we all had to bear in mind  (the Falklands War was the biggest air/sea battle since the Second World War).

Capt Rickard

What was your exact mission statement to LCol Jones? Were you still thinking in terms of a raid when you issued your Warning Order at 26 1515Z May?

General Thompson

I am pretty sure I told him to attack Darwin and Goose Green and hold them.

Capt Rickard 

Did LCol Jones back-brief you on his concept of operations? If so, what were your thoughts and recommendations? Did you think six phases introduced excessive complexity?

General Thompson

No.  We did not operate like that.  I ran my brigade on Mission Command principles, although we did not call it that, and indeed at that time had never heard the phrase.  I told my Commanding Officers what I wanted done, but not how to do it.  I might impose limitations on them, perhaps to avoid conflict.  

Capt Rickard

What was LCol Jones’s reaction when you denied him the use of the Scorpions and Scimitars?

General Thompson

As far as I remember, nothing.

Capt Rickard

The fact that the armour might not be able to cross the boggy ground seems like an entirely reasonable deduction. However, could the vehicles not have provided some support from the MSR that bisected Darwin Hill and led to Goose Green? What was the condition of the MSR at that time?

General Thompson

Actually, the armour could have made it. I was wrong in assuming that they could not.  The section that worried me was the portion north of Camilla Creek House. I should have asked one of the troop leaders.  I was wrong not to have done so and regret it to this day. If by MSR you mean Main Supply Route, there was a track, hardly an MSR (there were NO roads then, unlike now).  Once on the Darwin isthmus, the going is not too bad, it has been compacted by the hooves of myriads of sheep and cattle, so the going is not too bad and easily crossed by four- wheeled vehicle, it was the terrain on the way that was difficult.  It is important to understand that in most parts of the Falklands an unloaded land rover could drive at a slow walking pace, with frequent halts to dig it out.  Towing a trailer, a gun, or heavy load, such a vehicle would get nowhere.