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Dispatches from a Ukrainian UAS Strike Battalion

By LCol Todor (Ted) Dossev - December 6th, 2024

Reading Time: 24 min

 

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces operates a drone during training held at the Engineer Training Element, on Operation UNIFIER, in Poland, on June 24, 2024.  Photo Credit: MS Zach Barr, Canadian Armed Forces
Caption

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces operates a drone during training held at the Engineer Training Element, on Operation UNIFIER, in Poland, on June 24, 2024.
Photo Credit: MS Zach Barr, Canadian Armed Forces

 

Introduction – Operation UNIFIER and Battalion Staff Officer Training.

Operation UNIFIER trains, professionalizes, and builds capacity for soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). One portion of this mission is the Leadership Development Training Element (LDTE), in cooperation with Latvian National Armed Forces, which “instructs Ukrainian junior officers on battlefield responsibilities, planning and orders processes, maneuver coordination, intelligence and reconnaissance, and planning and execution.”1 The Battalion Staff Officer Training (BSOT) includes planning, coordination, and execution of battalion level operations in a brigade context. The instructors are primarily from the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC).

BSOT 2407 was special. A formed Battalion Headquarters (HQ) and staff from an Independent Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS) Strike Battalion of the AFU attended this serial from 1-21 July 2024 in Adazi, Latvia. These included the Commander (CO) and many of the key staff. The remainder of the Battalion continued real-time operations in Ukraine. The notes below are from the syndicate in which the Battalion CO was assigned and describe some of the capabilities and methods of this UAS Strike Bn. From these follow a series of possible implications for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), as well as several observations about the historical analogues for the present. Most importantly, it seems now that western armed forces are in the midst of a punctuation in military technologies as fundamental as machine guns, tanks, or aircraft carriers, and which stand to have profound impacts on the mechanized forces in which we continue to invest.

The UAS Strike Battalion.

To begin, it will help to understand the structure, capabilities, and functioning of an independent UAS Strike Battalion.2 Because they were founded as a grassroots organization at the outset of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, there were no standard structures on which the Battalion was modelled. Moreover, because the Battalion operates in a dispersed fashion, supporting up to 15 ‘fronts,’ it makes little sense to speak of how many companies it has, or how big they are. The observations below deal both with the immediate tactics of a strike platoons and their weapons, as well as the functioning of the battalion as a unit.

The Battalion comprises an HQ comparable in size to a Brigade or Regimental HQ, but lacking specialist coordination centres. It is supported by specialist platoons including Electronic Warfare (EW) for direction finding and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), engineers for force protection and survivability, as well as Combat Service Support (CSS) and Signals platoons, which will be discussed later.

The UAS Battalion defines two types of line companies. First are medium range fixed wing (FW) reconnaissance companies, though these have strike capability. Since they overlap other capabilities at the operational level, so the discussions during BSOT tended away from the FW companies, which represent about one third of the total size of the battalion. Second, and intensely relevant to BSOT, were the strike or assault companies which comprised a mix of platoons including rotary and fixed wing reconnaissance, bombers, and First Person View (FPV) strike drones.3 The reconnaissance drones are a mix of small, fixed wing and quad-copter types that are already familiar to a Canadian audience. However, it is the tactical armed UAS which are new and of special interest to this audience.

 

Figure 1. Vampire Drone, image from presentation given by UAS Bn. Note the four munitions cells on the bottom of the fuselage.

Figure 1. Vampire Drone, image from presentation given by UAS Bn. Note the four munitions cells on the bottom of the fuselage.


The two types of attack drones are not an exclusive list and are used for complementary effects. The most prolific bombers are the multi-rotor Vampire which originated as an agricultural drone (see figure 1).4 These are more commonly called Baba Yaga by Russian troops because they represent the terrifying witch of the woods of Slavic folklore. Vampires can carry four bombs, usually standard munitions like mortar bombs with high explosive payloads. One interesting tactic is that they will use one small, light bomb - usually smoke - to spot an initial fall of shot and judge wind and drift before firing for effect with the remainder of the payload. Operators have graphic overlays including a targeting reticule, ammo counts, and picture-in-picture view between thermal and day cameras to help their accuracy. Because Vampires are top attack, with good accuracy, they are quite effective against trenches and armoured vehicles.5 Total payload is about 20kg, but that imposes a reduced range. Crews will balance payload, speed, and range, like any other air vehicle.

Other tactics using Vampires, and similar large multi-rotors, is that they can be used for nuisance mining, ambush, and even sustainment. Bombers can carry anti-tank mines, which can be surface laid, particularly in canalizing terrain and defiles like bridges and roads. These can be especially effective in disrupting night movements. Their sorties are on the scale of one per hour per crew, and there could be 6-12 day and night crews in a single strike company, though not all of these would be Vampires. The ambush tactic has an armed Vampire-type bomber approach a suspected supply route and land nearby. Other reconnaissance UAS with longer loiter times will observe the route and spot targets for the bomber, which will launch an attack on short notice. Finally, these drones can conduct limited emergency resupply like ammunition, radios, or water for isolated troops and special forces. In effect, these are similar to general purpose aviation roles.

 

Figure 2. FPV drone with warhead. There are multiple variations of drones and munitions. Image source: UAS Strike Bn presentation to author.

Figure 2. FPV drone with warhead. There are multiple variations of drones and munitions. Image source: UAS Strike Bn presentation to author.


The second attack type is the FPV. It is usually a small quad-copter type modified to carry something like a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) warhead including shape charges to attack armour, high explosive to attack a trench or bunker, or even thermobaric warheads (see figure 2).6 These are functionally a TV guided, remote controlled warhead, with a range of several kilometers. There are multiple videos online of them attacking armoured vehicles, though it can take up to 10 hits to destroy something like a tank (figure 3). FPV crews will usually launch these after they have found and confirmed a target as they are not suitable for loitering. The battalion also showed videos of FPVs flying into dugouts and bunkers to attack enemy troops in enclosed spaces with thermobaric warheads.7 Russians are developing countermeasures, such as hanging chain curtains over openings, as on their ‘turtle tanks’ (visible in figure 3). FPVs are not limited to attacking ground vehicles. Helicopters are difficult, though not impossible to hit.8 More commonly, FPVs have been used to attack long-range, fixed wing, loitering UAS such as Russian Orlans.9 In effect, these are air-superiority platforms as well, though they are consumable.

 

 

Figure 3. The last image before an FPV drone impacts the target. Image source: UAS Strike Bn presentation to author.

Figure 3. The last image before an FPV drone impacts the target. Image source: UAS Strike Bn presentation to author.


One limitation is that these drones normally operate in Global Positioning System (GPS) denied environments due to persistent EW, so they navigate by line of sight, using landmarks. Crews are instructed on terrain landmarks, not unlike “take a left at the gas station.” They do require their cameras to navigate, so losing these image feeds due to EW can impact their navigation, even with inertial navigation aids and dead reckoning.

Another fascinating observation is that the drones have psychological effects on both friendly and enemy troops out of proportion to their size and complexity. Not only can they help sustain isolated troops, but drones have been used to guide separated or lost soldiers to friendly lines. Conversely, their omnipresence can wear on the nerves of soldiers on both sides and impact their personal force protection measures. The UAS Strike Battalion CO reported that they have had enemy troops surrender to drones on multiple occasions.10 This bears repeating: soldiers in this conflict have surrendered to remotely operated vehicles, marking an inflection point in our relationship with technology and human psychology in war. What might it look like when drones scale up in quantity?

The students who attended BSOT 2407 were accustomed to operating as detached platoons and crews rather than massed as a battalion. They had a great understanding of terrain and weather effects, dispersed sustainment, electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) management, and use of digital tools to plan and execute missions. Where LDTE could most help was in their understanding of ground maneuver and the integration with combined arms in which the UAS Strike battalions could take part.

The UAS battalion described maneuvering their platoons in a manner akin to ground maneuver reconnaissance but were reluctant to rely on supporting arms. Conversations focused on the close fight, on searching for and destroying targets in the space in the closest 6km, and in direct support of defending ground forces. Battalion staff also described an internally developed software tool called Vezha (Tower) to manage their data exchanges, contacts, and handovers (see figure 4) as a primary role of their signals platoon. A reconnaissance UAV could locate a suitable target and call for fire support, even from a fixed wing company operating in depth. In Vezha, this would be indicated by a red frame around the feed from that vehicle. Moreover, the tool uses some basic image recognition to indicate what is being reported and seen, as in this case (figure 4, centre image) is a self-propelled howitzer. During a live demonstration, an FPV crew responded to such a call, launched a drone, reported an expected time to target of 5-7 minutes when they crossed the forward edge, and then struck the target.

The example indicates a lack of integration with other arms at the operational level. That a UAS Battalion had to rely on organic image analysis, rather than on divisional intelligence processing capability, and that it had to provide its own attack, rather than counting on divisional artillery, suggests room for improvement in synchronization and reflects a tension with supporting arms. The lack of integration also reflects a lack of fire discipline and target prioritization across a formation. These tools can be more deliberately planned to operate together in coordination not only with Intelligence and Fires, but also with ground maneuver. The nascent synchronized effects in the recent defence of Kurakhivka11 or the offensive in Kursk12 illustrate the potential of massed, layered waves of UAS and EW working in concert with ground maneuver.

The UAS were profoundly dependent on EMS supporting plans, the likes of which current Canadian planning processes rarely consider. The UAS battalion students described a tactic by which they would fly UAS forward in a speculative way to trigger enemy jammers, then would use friendly direction finders to locate the enemy jammer, and finally attack those enemy EW with UAS which operate on different frequencies from those being attacked. Conversely, they described an instance when multiple FPVs attacked the same target simultaneously in an uncoordinated fashion and their command signals interfered. Similarly, EW emitters from flanking units could cause fratricide of friendly UAS because they all tend to use similar commercial frequencies. This is not unlike multiple people trying to simultaneously yell instructions to their friends at a crowded concert. This type of coordination is an example of the supporting plans BSOT students learn to build.

 

Figure 4. The battalion used software tools like Vezha (Tower) to manage their data, contacts, and handovers. Image from presentation provided to author.

Figure 4. The battalion used software tools like Vezha (Tower) to manage their data, contacts, and handovers. Image from presentation provided to author.


Like with EW, the UAS had unique terrain and weather considerations. While UAS were impacted by weather and foliage, they were advantaged relative to muddy, impassable terrain and obstacles. This made them particularly useful during scenarios involving breaching complex obstacle belts by templating and suppressing key enemy weapons. During an exercise, UAS crews sited and moved their ground control stations much like Artillery Maneuver Areas (AMAs), though they were very conscious of the effects of elevation and line of sight on their signals. In siting their positions, they considered overhead cover and concealment from counter UAS fires or even enemy UAS, and the effects of wet foliage and large bodies of water on reflecting radio signals. Weather impacts such as icing on control surfaces and propellers were essential to planning. The tactical implication was that weather could force UAS to fly lower, making them easier to detect or attack. Visibility, which can be impacted by fog, is also an important factor to consider, especially because UAS crews navigate by landmarks. The lesson here is that ‘terrain’ analysis that is familiar to ground maneuver forces is still essential for templating enemy and friendly maneuver but is no longer quite sufficient when considering UAS.

 

Figure 5. Portions of a UAS strike company. Image from a presentation provided to author.

Figure 5. Portions of a UAS strike company. Image from a presentation provided to author.


The UAS Bn sustained itself in a Napoleonic way, living off the land not only for connectivity, but also for food, water, and shelter. They reported using centralized army resources only for fuel, which is rationed, and munitions, which include UAVs. Of course, this approach is only workable because of their unique conditions: they work amongst a supportive and mobilized population. Even their vehicles were repurposed civilian pattern pickup trucks. Figure 5 illustrates a portion of a UAS strike company, though clearly the personnel in the image are insufficient to crew the vehicles. Even for communications the battalion relied on commercial internet, primarily through Starlink, and web-based applications.13 As a result of the spartan approach to sustainment, their entire battalion only required a small platoon to sustain it.

A final point about the sustainment system and its flexibility is that it embeds the requirements definition of new equipment directly into the battalion. One of the officers who attended BSOT 2407 had the role of investigating, testing, acquiring, and integrating new UAS into the battalion inventory in direct coordination with industry.14 The battalion goes as far as working cooperatively with industry to provide feedback on how to test and improve equipment through iterative designs. UAS battalion staff were well aware of the credibility they lend to a manufacturer when reporting a design is successful in combat. Ultimately, the battalion does not purchase directly from manufacturers but makes recommendations to central decision makers for the most suitable equipment to purchase at scale. Though it is interesting to consider that there are dramatically different approaches to equipment acquisition, this observation can stand on its own if only for contrast to the Canadian methods.

Potential Implications for the Canadian Army.

The CAF has signaled it will continue investing in mechanized platforms.15 However, the Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrates how vulnerable these are to UAS, especially when massed and unsupported by EW and air defence.16 Moreover, deploying and sustaining mechanized forces at intercontinental distances brings its own challenges. Conversely UAS are strategically responsive and effective even against armoured vehicles, at a fraction of the cost. As demonstrated by the UAS Strike battalion, they are sustainable in permissive environments by relying on local resources rather than on exquisite lines of sustainment, even for digital communications. Alternatively, the Canadian Army (CA) could continue invest in mechanized maneuver and effectively enter an arms race to protect its vehicle fleets.17 Modern vehicles have already integrated various protection methods like multi-barrel smoke grenade dischargers, laser warning receivers, and reactive armour, so adding new Counter-UAS suites is conceptually continuous. Supported by industry and suitably resourced, the CA could pursue development of both armed UAS and Counter-UAS capabilities simultaneously.18 If forced to make a choice, the CA should carefully consider continued investment in bespoke vehicles even older fielded designs in a UAS prolific world. In concert, Canada could mobilize its significant industry to compete in manufacturing UAS and become the Toyota Hilux of this vehicle type.

The CA may be several years behind materially, but it can close the conceptual gap within a few months. Current CA doctrine does not have a clear space for UAS strike, though there is inspiration and analogues to be drawn from fires, cavalry, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance, and even (attack) aviation. The key critique of current doctrine is that the operational functions tend to align with trades: the act and command functions are associated with combat arms, sustain with logistics, shield with engineers, etc.19 This is not to say these associations are exclusive, or that all trades do not consider all functions, but to illustrate that UAS work across all functions. A further critique of the doctrine and training is that EW, which is so central to UAS operations, does not normally feature as a supporting plan alongside fires, engineering, sustainment, or intelligence collection plans. One way to close these gaps is to revisit CA publications like Brigade Tactics with a view to integrating UAS and EW into all operational (command, act, sense, shield, sustain) and core (find, fix, strike, exploit) functions.

As UAS span these conceptual frameworks, is it possible these should be conceived as a unique trade, or even as a separate service? This is the case in the AFU, who recently designated the Unmanned Systems Forces as a branch of service commensurate with the Army, Navy, and Airforce.20 The approach is sensical from the perspective of uncrewed systems which operate from land, but influence air or sea domains, or rely on superiority in the EMS to operate across multiple domains. The effects of uncrewed sea vehicles are evident in the Black Sea and suggest implications in other regions such as the Pacific.21 Concurrently, uncrewed ground vehicles are emerging in Ukraine as potential force multipliers, both for breaching obstacle belts and for reinforcing defensive lines.22 All of these uncrewed systems share certain considerations, so expertise in one could generalize to expertise in all. As a historical similarity, when dealing with the expansion of the space domain in the period after the Second World War, Eisenhower is said to have noted: “some of the important new weapons which technology has produced do not fit into any existing service pattern, [and] cut across all services, at every stage from development to operation.”23 There is inspiration to be drawn from other historical analogues.

Broader Implications of Historical Analogues, and Learning.

In the periodization of military affairs, historians have borrowed a concept from life sciences called punctuated equilibrium.24 It describes periods of relative equilibrium between military forces, which is occasionally punctuated by evolutionary ideas and technologies to give one side a distinct advantage. Examples include the development of the machine gun, combined with barbed wire, mass produced indirect fire artillery, and entrenchments which challenged massed infantry maneuver in the early 20th century. This is not a random example. Today, armed, mass-produced UAS, combined with Starlink, cell phones, and digital information tools, appear to be imposing a similar limitation on massed mechanized maneuver. These innovations have not yet converged with other emerging technologies like machine learning and AI, but this seems inevitable. Another analogue might be to say that UAS are to tanks as carriers were to battleships in the mid-twentieth century. Interestingly, historians of the First World War have noted that many of the technologies and methods used during that war were evident as early as the US Civil War, the Boer War, or the Russo-Japanese War.25 In fact, western observers were embedded in both Russian and Japanese headquarters observing the events firsthand.26 LDTE is in a similar paradigm today.

Operation UNIFIER is, in effect, a miniature version of what the US Army calls Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). These formations are built to grow partner capacity, they operate in small teams of experienced trainers, and deliver training and mentorship directly to their partners. Though the idea of learning from partners is not explicit in the existing doctrine, these SFABs can learn while teaching.27 CADTC formations such as the Combat Training Centre and Army Staff College are already structured very similarly to SFABs, though they lack the capacity to train the CA, before ever considering a foreign security force. Moreover, CADTC commands the Army Lessons Learned Centre and Army Doctrine Centres, so it is in an ideal position to integrate and disseminate lessons and dispatches as soon as they are brought home. The BSOT experience indicates the CA should re-examine the SFAB model more closely.

Conclusion.

The UAS Strike Battalion staff which trained on BSOT 2407 was only one of many more to come. The AFU is continuing to invest in this capability and integrate EW and UAS with maneuver into a new model for a combined arms team. Moreover, the Russo-Ukrainian War is only one of many conflicts this century to see the proliferation of drones. The ongoing Iran-Israel proxy conflict, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and even the Global War on Terror have seen armed drones continue to proliferate. In fact, there is hardly a conflict of the 21st century that has not featured armed drones, so the CA needs to close this gap, at least conceptually, but promptly.


About the Author. LCol Ted Dossev is a husband, father, and cavalry officer currently serving as the Chief of Staff at the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown, NB. He recently deployed in support of Operation UNIFIER’s Leadership Development Training Element, where he was part of a team mentoring a Ukrainian UAS Strike Battalion HQ. LCol Dossev is an Art of War Scholar, and a graduate of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies.

 


End Notes

  1. National Defence, “Operation UNIFIER,” Canada.ca, Government of Canada, last modified May 29, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-unifier.html.
  2. UAS Strike Bn CO conversation with author, July 2024. Names and unit designations are omitted throughout.
  3. “Ukraine’s Vampire Drones Terrorize Moscow’s Forces,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/vampire-drones-terrorize-moscow-forces/32805660.html.
  4. Julia Struck, “WATCH: Burning Dugout After Ukrainian ‘Baba Yaga’ Drone Strike,” Kyiv Post, April 16, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/31150.
  5. Chris Panella, “Russian Troops Call Nightmare Ukrainian Vampire Drone ‘Baba Yaga’,” Business Insider, 28 Nov 2023, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-says-russian-troops-call-nightmare-vampire-drone-baba-yaga-2023-11.
  6. David Hambling, “Thermobaric Drones Blast Russian Positions,” Forbes.com, January 23, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/01/23/thermobaric-drones-blast-russian-positions/.
  7. UAS Strike Bn staff videos shown on personal phones as recorded by FPV crews.
  8. Martin Fornusek, “Ukrainian FPV drone hit another Russian helicopter in Kursk Oblast, source says,” Kyiv Independent, August 9, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-fpv-drone-hit-another-russian-helicopter/.
  9. “Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Ukrainian FPV Drones Take Down a Zala and Orlan-10,” Defense Express, June 1, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/unmanned_aerial_warfare_ukrainian_fpv_drones_take_down_zala_and_orlan_10-10700.html.
  10. David Humbling, “Giving Up To The Drone: Ukraine Encourages ‘Non-Contact Surrender’,” Forbes.com, August 14, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/08/14/giving-up-to-the-drone-ukraine-encourages-non-contact-surrender/.
  11. David Axe, “With Drones, Artillery, Missiles & Mines, Ukraine Halted A Huge Attack,” Forbes.com, July 25, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/07/25/synchronizing-drones-artillery-missiles-and-mines-ukrainian-paratroopers-just-defeated-a-huge-russian-assault/.
  12. David Humbling, “Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive Blitzed Russia With Electronic Warfare And Drones,” Forbes.com, August 9, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/08/09/ukraines-kursk-offensive-blitzed-russia-with-electronic-warfare-and-drones/.
  13. Nick Paton Walsh, Alex Marquardt, Florence Davey-Attlee, and Kosta Gak, “Ukraine relies on Starlink for its drone war. Russia appears to be bypassing sanctions to use the devices too,” CNN.com, Updated March 26, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/25/europe/ukraine-starlink-drones-russia-intl-cmd/index.html.
  14. This can backfire. Selection is vulnerable to political interference. See for instance the Ross Rifle.
  15. Government of Canada, “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence,” Canada.ca, May 3, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html.
  16. See for instance the Yom Kippur War when Israeli Armour assaulted Egyptian positions without infantry and artillery support.
  17. National Defence, “Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems Concept Development,” Canada.ca, modified April 24, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/defence-ideas/element/sandboxes/challenge/counter-uncrewed-aerial-systems-concept-development.html.
  18. Ministry of Defence, “Policy paper: Defence Drone Strategy - the UK’s approach to Defence Uncrewed Systems,” Published February 22, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems.
  19. Army Doctrine Centre, B-GL-321-003/FP-001 Brigade Tactics, (Kingston: Army Doctrine Centre, 2018), 1-2. The alignment of warfighting functions and trades is also present in US doctrine.
  20. Alexander Khrebet, “‘We set a precedent.’ Ukraine officially presents Unmanned Systems Forces,” Kyiv Independent, June 11, 2024, accessed August 15, 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/we-set-a-precedent-ukraine-officially-presents-unmanned-systems-forces/.
  21. See for instance: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/ukraine-maritime-drone-strikes-again-reports-indicate-attack-on-novorossiysk; https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/december/usvs-work-black-sea; or https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/blasts-gunfire-reported-near-russian-black-sea-port-novorossiysk-2023-08-04/.
  22. UAS Strike Battalion staff conversations with author, July 2024.
  23. Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015), citing Dwight D. Eisenhower on the creation of DARPA.
  24. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War” in The Journal of Military History 57, no. 2 (1993): 241-278. Punctuations have also been called Revolutions in Military Affairs or RMAs.
  25. Nicholas Murray, “The Russo-Japanese War,” Chapter 4 in The Rocky Road to the Great War: The Evolution of Trench Warfare to 1914. Potomac Books, 2013.
  26. General de Négrier, “Some Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Volume L, July to December 1906, pages 910-919; and John T. Greenwood, “The U.S. Army Military Observers with the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War.” Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History, Winter 1996, 1-14.
  27. NATO, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.16: Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (Brussels: NATO Communications and Information Agency, 2016); U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2023). The CA equivalent remains in draft since 2015.

 

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