Rapid-Fire Article: Where Does Our Military Knowledge Come From? 

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge. It explores the nature, origin, and limits of human understanding, addressing fundamental questions about what knowledge is, how it is acquired, and how it can be validated. Epistemologists examine the relationship between belief, truth, and justification. This discipline also delves into skepticism, doubting the possibility of specific knowledge, and seeks to determine the criteria for reliable information in various contexts, including scientific, moral, and practical domains.

As the military must apply practical (and lethal) methods to deliver tangible results, it is unsurprising that militaries approach military epistemology in very practical way—with a system (in which we all play a part).

So, how does a military produce its knowledge? This rapid-fire article introduces thoughts on the subject, hopefully enabling readers to dig into this crucial subject. After all, it is our base of knowledge that guides how we educate, train, equip, and fight.

Figure 1 is my representation of the military’s epistemological onion. At its core, military knowledge starts with a Warfighting Philosophy. What is war? What is its nature? What is the fundamental purpose of war? What is the “right” way to engage in war and warfighting? These central (and thorny) questions have been debated by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz and continue today. While actual answers are elusive and likely do not exist, our warfighting philosophy is at the heart of how we think about fighting and winning, even if we do not realize it.

With our warfighting philosophy providing a core, theories may be derived. Warfighting theories are frameworks for understanding, explaining, and communicating how we believe we must fight in order to win. Warfighting theories consist of concepts, definitions, and propositions that aim to explain what warfighting elements we need, how to combine them, and what patterns and methods to employ to succeed. Theories also help guide further research and help us evaluate performance. Critically, military theories need to be constantly tested, refined, and sometimes replaced as new evidence emerges, making them dynamic components of any military’s evolution. Essentially, theories bridge the gap between abstract ideas and empirical reality.

Recent history has many examples of military theorists wrestling with changing societies, advancing technologies, larger army’s, and new organizing methods. Look at Napoleon’s introduction of the Corps system with La Grande Armée, Jomini’s warfighting theories in his Art of War, the theories for deep battle from Soviet theorists Vladimir Triandafillov, Alexander Svechin, and Mikhail Tukhachevsky, or JFC Fuller’s theories of mechanized warfighting. Theories provide robust foundations for military thinking, and even today, the influence of the military theorists mentioned above is still at the core of the Canadian Army’s preferred way of fighting.

With military theories in hand, doctrine can be developed. Put simply, military doctrine is the crystallization of military theories into a more formal set of guidelines and principles for military operations. Doctrine also serves as a repository for knowledge gained through historical military experiences while attempting to integrate new military adaptations and innovations. As military doctrine is in written form and formally published, it is often the most tangible and readily available reflection of a military’s fundamental philosophy and its warfighting theories. And, since warfare is constantly evolving, so should doctrine.

The next layer of the onion is Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Notably, military doctrine is not the same as TTPs. TTPs are founded on doctrine, but they are not the same thing. TTPs are the specific methods and practices employed to accomplish tasks and missions. Unlike military doctrine, which provides broader guidelines and principles, TTPs offer detailed and actionable steps to follow in the field. These steps are rooted in practical experience and continuous learning, enhancing operational effectiveness and adaptability. TTPs may encompass various activities, from movement techniques and resupply drills to the discrete steps for a hasty attack. TTPs must be highly adaptable and constantly evolving to reflect new technologies, changing threat TTPs, and lessons learned, ensuring that military forces remain agile and capable in diverse combat scenarios.

The final layer of the knowledge onion, Practice, is when we use our knowledge against real problems in the real world. Lessons learned and experience come from the practical use (i.e., practice) of TTPs, doctrine, warfighting theory, and warfighting philosophy. Practice enables learning in action, and learning in action drives the evolution and advancement of our thinking. Whether we achieve success or failure, all practice can force a reconsideration of our philosophy, theories, doctrine, and/or TTPs.

Critically, experience and lessons become a part of our historical experience and cultural heritage. And military history and culture significantly influence how we as military professionals view the world and understand war and warfare. As such, Historical Experience and Cultural Heritage are represented in Figure 1 as providing a foundation on which our knowledge onion rests. While this article is too short to delve into the details of how history and culture affect our institution, readers who want to know more should explore Institutional Theory. Institutional Theory is a framework for understanding how rules, norms, and routines come to be and act to shape views and behaviours. It provides valuable insights into how and why organizations and personnel therein adopt particular views and practices and how they can change over time. 

Finally, a challenge for all military education and training systems is to judge when to teach what layer of the onion. Starting too deep too soon in one’s career is likely not required but to leave parts of the onion out of military education risks producing senior leaders who do not understand how the parts fit together. Typically, militaries focus on teaching recruits and junior personnel TTPs and some trade-specific doctrine. Then, as personnel advance in their careers and gain experience, military education programs add more profound studies of doctrine, including the doctrine from other trades, allies, and adversaries. Eventually, a professional military education system should include study of theory and philosophy to develop senior, advanced thinkers capable of evolving the military institution at those deeper levels.

To close, it is critical to the effectiveness of our army that military leaders understand where our knowledge comes from. The Canadian Army must be a learning organization, and that is not just a meaningless bumper sticker. Adversaries watch, learn, and continuously adapt to beat us and our allies and partners. The safety and security of Canadians, the lives of our personnel, and our ability to win depends on us learning and evolving everyday. So, Figure 1 provides my conception of a military epistemological logic model, and, as they say, “all models are wrong, but some are useful.” Hence, I hope this rapid-fire article is useful in stimulating curiosity about the question: Where does our military knowledge come from? 

Colonel F.G. Auld
Commandant