Modernizing in an Interwar Period – Impression from the CA Modernization Team Working Groups

By LCol Todor (Ted) Dossev and LCol Matt Rolls - April 7th, 2025

Reading Time: 12 min

There is a tension in the Canadian Army (CA) between resources, structures, capabilities, and tasks. We have been trying to modernize our structures and capabilities since the mid 2010’s to better respond to both the changing character of war, and to better align our tasks and structures.¹ But changing an institution is difficult, so the CA has stood up the Army Modernization Team (AMT), drawn from the Army HQ staff, to modernize the CA force structure as part of a ready, resilient, and relevant CAF. Recently, the AMT invited a handful of experienced planners to a working group to develop capability options for a future CA. This was a rewarding but challenging effort because the CA is a complex adaptive system with competing imperatives. Its structures are contingent on emerging capabilities (as seen in Ukraine), on its own capacity to manage change, as well as on shifting resources and concurrent missions which can be difficult to forecast.

Over two weeks in January, six teams composed of experienced leaders, representing all corps and components, were asked to consider “the army we have” (AwH) and imagine how we might transition it to “the army we need in 2040,” (AwN) while taking into account a number of proposed design characteristics and statements. To prepare us, the AMT had done their homework. They had conducted and analyzed a survey of over 150 currently serving leaders, assessed the wargames of the last senior army leaders’ symposium, and initiated interviews with current and former army commanders and chiefs of defence. The AMT had also examined the most recent Force 2025 army restructure effort and considered those lessons in their own pre-mortem to imagine how current modernization effort could fail. Broadly, they conceived several paths to failure, of which a poor design was one small part (which our teams were there to reduce). The AMT also imagined failures to decide, to follow-through, to gain institutional support, or even a black swan change in the strategic context. This premortem highlighted the complexity of the system, in that the act of change itself is a key portion of the problem set.  They identified four layers that make up the AwH: the field force, the reserves, the auxiliary (Canadian Rangers), and the institution. This framing served as a common lexicon of groupings to help discuss current structures while also setting apart this modernization effort from previous ones like F2025 which focused only on the field army and reserves. By including the institution in the considerations, the AMT explicitly acknowledged the interrelatedness of the CA and that force generation could not be considered separately from force management or force development. The AMT gave us dedicated time, a common language, and facilitators to explore these questions.

What the AMT could not give us, however, was the operating concepts and higher strategic concepts linking current defence policy and the army’s role in future conflict and could only estimate future resource levels. These are all still works in progress, and in fact the CA’s own future concept is only now circulating in draft. As a result, our team had to explicitly make assumptions and to define our terms just to refine our shared understanding of language and not get bogged down during discussions. The first conceptual component to establish was the actual military problem the team was trying to solve. For team 5, we saw the problem set broadly as how the Army would contribute relevant forces to integrated, joint, combined forces in theaters of interest to protect Canada, Canadians, and their interests.² Next, we discussed so-called general purpose and specialized forces. Often these terms are used with little definition or discussion which leads to misunderstanding. Our group came to an understanding that specialist forces would be those developed to exclusively integrate into an allied formation without any capacity for independence. Lastly, we discussed the characteristics of Major Combat Operations / Large Scale Combat Operations (MCO / LSCO) and forces that would succeed in such an environment. We determined that a land force in such an environment would be required to seize and control key terrain and populations, and to destroy rival conventional land forces. This led us toward certain attributes of the force such as the capacity to combine arms and operate in a pan domain environment, while being sustainable, able to force project strategically, have operational reach once in theater, and still able integrate emerging capabilities. Only once we had clarified these assumptions and definitions, could we attack the problem.

Next, team 5 explored our individual preconceptions, leading to a philosophical discussion. In effect, the AMT gave us a structured method to use Col John Boyd’s destruction and creation methodology of disintegrating the army into its smallest elements, then recombining them.³ But the design statements had competing imperatives: to design an army that can fight across the spectrum of conventional mechanized conflict, but also in the arctic and at home; and in the Euro-Atlantic, and the Pacific, as well as sustainable at intercontinental distances, capable of protecting itself, also exercising command and control using emerging technologies like AI, cyber, and EW, resistant to disinformation, in a combined, joint, whole of government setting. In this regard, the draft Capstone concept uses a great turn of phrase: “A vision of the Army... that is multi-purpose, but not all purpose.”⁴ Teams were invited to make assumptions about additional investment in personnel and funding, even beyond 2% of GDP, and to recommend what units or capabilities could be divested, rerolled, retained, or added. The ideas were then also considered against their sustainability in the current and near future mission sets like deterrence, large scale combat operations, arctic operations, disaster relief (at home and abroad), and short notice surge operations.

It was both a daunting and invigorating task, given the interrelations of design imperatives. We knew that we would be tempted to tweak existing structures because we were anchored to our experiences and training. As historian Jack Watling notes, “instead of transforming their combined arms elements, armies today are largely seeking to retain tried and tested structures while adding new capabilities onto their platforms.”⁵ This is the conservative instinct of our branches and army, because we could not possibly know what the future holds, we are tempted to retain every possible capability, just in case. Historic inertia both teaches and constrains us, and we struggle to preserve hard-earned skills. But, we were encouraged by two other considerations. The first, to paraphrase a comment made by Hew Stachan during The Cold War, was that whatever we are working on, we would get it wrong. What matters, though, would be our capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.⁶ That encouraged us to place emphasis on adaptability and scalability. Secondly, though we never discussed it explicitly, we had to recall this had been done well enough in the past, “…in spite of low military budgets and considerable antipathy… military institutions were able to innovate in the 1920s and 1930s with considerable success.”⁷ So we plotted the types of missions we might be tasked to perform, against where we might have to perform them, and began developing the capability sets that would be suited for these potential missions by modifying the four layers of AwH. 

From these discussions emerged the themes and tensions with which the CA and AMT would have to wrestle. The first was the requirement to balance force generation for the priority theaters and their varying threats while retaining forces which were usable for both short-notice contingencies and enduring missions. Our group endeavored to create a force able to operate domestically, as well as in the arctic, while remaining capable of fighting in Eastern Europe and Asia Pacific. Secondly, the influence of the war in Ukraine required us to balance between exquisite, high end, but low-density forces versus cheaper, more robust, and numerous forces. Thirdly, we needed an Army that was sustainable, or at least able to regenerate itself following attrition to maintain persistence in a theater of operations. Next, we identified a tension between positional and maneuver operations, and how each would lead to designing a slightly different force. It is unclear what the future of warfare holds, however, Ukraine provides a clear example that positional fighting remains a viable and potentially inevitable form that the Army does not develop doctrinally, organize or train for structure itself. Lastly, all these themes were considered through the lens of readiness expressed as personnel, equipment, training, and sustainment. Readiness, however, is meaningless unless one can respond to the question of ready for what, with what, and by when.⁸ Finally, the details of the force were almost less important than identifying these tensions, and the unenviable task of the AMT to critically assess and reconcile them.

The experience was difficult but positive and left our team optimistic. Unlike the relatively simple tactical decisions of a frontal, or flanking movement, there are countless possibilities for how to organize, equip, and train an army – even one as small as ours. Given a nearly blank slate, and surrounded by talented professionals, the act of designing a system as complex as an army for an unknown future was surprisingly difficult. When extended over a longer period, with the uncertainties of government needs, technologies, resourcing, and the changing character of war, it becomes even more daunting. But the process used by the AMT was both deliberate and open-ended. They created an environment to gather ideas, identify tensions, and map the challenges of getting from the AwH to the AwN.

On the final day, all teams provided separate briefs back to the AMT, while COS Strat circulated as we worked. The collected data is still being analyzed by the AMT, and was not shared between the teams. It is unlikely that the proposals of any one team would make the complete design of the future army, but rather that ideas from all would be integrated and presented for decision. From this limited exposure, it seemed that this effort was not to propose a structural solution to a perpetual under-resourcing problem, but instead is much farther reaching than Force 2025 ever was. It is not simply an act of modernization, which we sorely need, but of adaptation, both to our environment, and in habituating the CA to adapting. So, to paraphrase the proverb, though the best time to begin change was 20 years ago, the second-best time is now.

It is easy now to feel empathy for the armies of the interwar periods of the last century. They were probably filled with too few effectives stretched too far, and could see the potential for their future wars, but did not have the time or resources to invest in all possible emerging capabilities. And though we know that whatever modernization path we choose will be at least a little wrong, the effort is more than worthwhile. We know that the next army will be slightly better prepared than the one we have, that we will have practiced changing, and we would be establishing the process for adapting ourselves. Finally, we have examples of successful modernization in past interwar periods, so whatever our leaders decide, we know that we could only get better at responding to the needs of our nation. 

About the Author(s).

LCol Ted Dossev is a husband, father, and cavalry officer currently serving as the Chief of Staff at the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown, NB. He is an Art of War Scholar, and a graduate of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. 

LCol Matt Rolls is a member of The RCR currently serving in Chief Combat Systems Integration within VCDS and takes command of 2 RCR in APS 2025. He has served in CMP, CANSOFCOM, and VCDS. He is a husband and father.

End Notes

1. For comparison, the US Army of 1941 had a very similar problem in preparing for its next war.  See especially the fascinating history here: Kirkpatrick, Charles E. An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996, www.history.army.mil/html/books/093/93-10/.
2. For a philosophical discussion on contribution warfare, see for instance, Vanya Eftimova Bellinger. "When Resources Drive Strategy: Understanding Clausewitz/Corbett’s War Limited by Contingent." Military Strategy Magazine, vol. 7, no. 1, spring 2020, pp. 27-34. www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/when-resources-drive-strategy-understanding-clausewitz-corbetts-war-limited-by-contingent/.  In the Canadian case, the war limited by contingent tends to be war limited by resources – in effect, a strategy of means.
3. Boyd, John R. "Destruction and Creation." 3 Sept. 1976, www.coljohnboyd.com/static/documents/1976-09-03__Boyd_John_R__Destruction_and_Creation.pdf.
4. Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre. Canadian Army Capstone Operating Concept, Study Draft 1, dated 29 January 2025, not available yet for wide distribution; A much more blunt statement appears in Kirkpatrick’s Writing the Victory Plan, where he says: “In the end, they could only assume what the national policy might be and guess at the intentions of their own government.”, p 36.
5. Watling, Jack. The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023, 5. For an overview of these ideas, see: Huminski, Joshua C. "#WavellReviews the Arms of the Future." Wavell Room, 27 Dec. 2023, www.wavellroom.com/2023/12/27/wavellreviews-the-arms-of-the-future/.  
6. Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," RUSI Journal, Vol. 119, March 1974, pp. 3-9. The complete quote is: “I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives. It is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too badly wrong.”
7. Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, editors. "Introduction." Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 2.
8. Betts, Richard K. Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences. Brookings Institution Press, 1995..