Audit of the implementation of the deployment standards, 2011

• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• GLOSSARY
• STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
• 1.0 INTRODUCTION
  • 1.1 Background
  • 1.2 Scheduling and Deployment System
  • 1.3 Reporting Structure
  • 1.4 Legislative and Policy Framework
• 2.0 AUDIT OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
  • 2.1 Audit Objectives
  • 2.2 Audit Scope
• 3.0 AUDIT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
• 4.0 AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
  • 4.1 Management Framework for the Implementation of the Deployment Standards
    • 4.1.1 Policy Framework
    • 4.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities
    • 4.1.3 Training
    • 4.1.4 Staffing Levels and Resource Allocation
    • 4.1.5 Monitoring and Reporting
  • 4.2 Compliance with Commissioner’s Directives and policy guidelines for the implementation of the deployment standards
    • 4.2.1 Schedules
    • 4.2.2 Operational Adjustments
    • 4.2.3 Scheduling and Deployment System
    • 4.2.4 Overtime and Leave
    • 4.2.5 Post Orders
• ANNEX A
• ANNEX B
• ANNEX C

The Audit of the Implementation of the Deployment Standards is being conducted as part of Correctional Service Canada’s (CSC) Internal Audit Branch (IAB) 2010-2012 Audit Plan. CSC has identified six corporate priorities, including the “safety and security for staff and offenders in institutions¹” which relates to the deployment standards.

CSC is a large decentralized organization that manages 57 institutions, 16 Community Correctional Centers, and 84 Parole Offices and sub-offices across the country. As of November 2009, CSC had a workforce of approximately 17,400 employees, of whom 84% work in institutions and communities. The Correctional Officer group represents 39% of all staff within the Service. The Deployment Standards have been developed to assist in the management of this occupational group.

The correctional environment is seeing an increase in the number of offenders with histories of violence, gang or organized crime affiliations, and with high levels of substance abuse. This complex offender population, along with anticipated offender population growth, has placed increased demands on institutional operations and a renewed focus on institutional security and inmate population management.

The deployment standards exist to promote consistency, equity, efficiency and transparency across institutions, which will in turn enhance the security of the public, staff and inmates and provide site specific staffing levels for correctional officers. These standards were implemented in April 2009 after the Executive Committee approved the plan to proceed with the implementation of the deployment standards in December of 2008. The site deployment levels are reviewed prior to the start of each fiscal year.

As part of the risk-based audit planning process, this audit was identified for fiscal year 2010-2011 and the objectives were to:

• Provide reasonable assurance that the management framework in place supports the effective implementation of the deployment standards; and
• Provide reasonable assurance that CSC is complying with the policy directives with regards to the implementation of the deployment standards.

The key elements of a management framework are in place to support the implementation of the deployment standards. The CD and policy guidelines related to the deployment standards have been created and roles and responsibilities are typically defined and understood. Training courses exist and are being delivered to ensure institutional management can obtain the required knowledge to implement the standards. Institutions are being provided with the resources required to fund their allocated correctional officer positions in accordance with the standards. Finally, we found that regular reporting on topics related to the deployment standards were occurring.

Our audit showed that attention is required in the following areas:

• A need to clarify various policy requirements including areas concerning operational adjustments and the use of multi-function positions as discussed further in Section 4.2;
• Provide direction regarding the duties to be completed by the correctional managers working on the operations desk versus those responsible for scheduling and deployment in order to ensure all tasks are being completed while minimizing the duplication of work; and
• Ensure that regular monitoring is occurring with the institutions to verify their conformity with the deployment standards.

Our audit also found that, in general, the deployment standards have been implemented at all sites. We found that all schedules were mathematically correct and that substitute relief positions were equally distributed throughout them. The audit noted that the Scheduling and Deployment System is the sole scheduling source being used at the institutions. Furthermore, controls exist surrounding the use of correctional officer overtime and post orders have been created and customized for most posts as needed.

Nevertheless, our audit showed that attention is required in the following areas:

• Ensure that vacant lines and double banked lines do not exist on the same schedules to minimize the possibility of overtime;
• The threat risk assessment tool must be completed for all operational adjustments where changes to routine occur;
• There is a need to ensure all transactions are entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System so that the information contained within is both accurate and timely;
• A process should exist to ensure the leave information within the Scheduling and Deployment System is captured within the Human Resources Management System within a few days of the correctional officer’s return; and
• Sites must adhere to the peak leave periods agreed upon within the Correctional Officer Collective agreement.

Recommendations have been made in this report to address these areas for improvement. Management has reviewed and agrees with the findings contained in this report and a Management Action Plan has been developed to address the recommendations (see Annex C).

Annual Leave Quota: number of correctional officers by rank to be authorized pre-approved vacation leave at the same time.

Correctional Manager Operations Desk: position within institutions responsible for ensuring all security posts are staffed for the current shift², coordinating overtime for security staff to fill any absences and overall supervision of the institution to ensure a safe, secure and efficient operating environment.

Correctional Manager Scheduling and Deployment: position within institutions responsible for the supervision of correctional activities through the effective planning, scheduling and deployment of correctional staff within a federal correctional institution to ensure a safe, secure and efficient operating environment.

Double Banked Lines: multiple employees occupying the same line within a schedule in production.

Line: a listing in a schedule stating the time of the employees shift for the week and the security post to which they will be assigned.

Multi Function: a multi-function position within the Inmate Movement and Control Sector is defined as a position that has numerous duties that do not necessarily confine the officer assigned to that position to one particular post, area or section of an institution for the duration of his/her shift.

National Generic Post Orders: define the primary duties set for correctional officer security activities at all institutions³.

Operational Adjustment: relates to situations whereby the complement of security staff is reduced for a full or partial shift⁴.

Over-burning: a strategy whereby there are a larger number of correctional officers employed by the institution when compared to the levels prescribed in the deployment standards. The purpose of this strategy is to ensure that all lines are filled in the schedules during periods of planned and unplanned vacancies.

Roll Call: daily listing of correctional officers scheduled to work and states the security post to be covered by each correctional officer.

Schedules: a document which reflects an employee’s shift start and end time, duration of shift and rest day rotation.

Security Posts: a correctional officer position to provide security in an institution.

Shift Exchanges: where two employees, or an employee and a vacant post, undertakes the post assigned to another officer.

Slow Rotation Posts: those posts where a level of continuity and consistency in operations is required for a prolonged period of time.

Substitute Relief: correctional officers on the schedule to cover both planned and unplanned staff absences and training.

Under-burning: a strategy whereby there is a lower number of correctional officers on strength then the number prescribed by the deployment standards.

Vacant Lines: a line in the schedule with no officer assigned.

This audit engagement was conducted with an audit level of assurance.

In my professional judgment as Chief Audit Executive, sufficient and appropriate audit procedures have been conducted and evidence gathered to support the accuracy of the opinion provided and contained in this report. The findings and conclusions are based on a comparison of the conditions, as they existed at the time, against pre-established audit criteria that were shared with management. The findings are applicable only to the areas examined.

_ Date:
Sylvie Soucy, CIA
A/Chief Audit Executive

The Audit of the Implementation of the Deployment Standards is being conducted as part of Correctional Service Canada’s (CSC) Internal Audit Branch (IAB) 2010-2012 Audit Plan. CSC has identified six corporate priorities, including the “safety and security for staff and offenders in institutions⁵” which relates to the deployment standards.

CSC is a large decentralized organization that manages 57 institutions, 16 Community Correctional Centers, and 84 Parole Offices and sub-offices across the country. As of November 2009, CSC had a workforce of approximately 17,400 employees, of whom 84% work in institutions and communities. The Correctional Officer group represents 39% of all staff within the Service. The Deployment Standards have been developed to assist in the management of this occupational group.

The correctional environment is seeing an increase in the number of offenders with histories of violence, gang or organized crime affiliations, and with high levels of substance abuse. This complex offender population, along with anticipated offender population growth, has placed increased demands on institutional operations and a renewed focus on institutional security and inmate population management.

Prior to the implementation of the deployment standards in April 2009, the approach to the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers to the security posts did not allow for a method to consistently address the many challenges occurring in institutions. To address this issue, a working group of national, regional and institutional subject matter experts was created to develop a better model for deploying correctional officers to security activities for all institutional posts. The group found that there was some variance from site-to-site in the number of officers deployed to similar security activities. In response, they developed a system for the deployment based on pre-approved standards. These are the “deployment standards”.

In December 2008, the Executive Committee approved the implementation of the deployment standards, which were to start being implemented in April 2009. These standards exist to promote consistency, equity, efficiency and transparency across institutions, which will in turn enhance the security of the public, staff and inmates. Site deployment levels are reviewed prior to the start of each fiscal year.

The Scheduling and Deployment System (SDS) is a web-based system used in the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers to varying security posts in accordance with institution’s pre-approved standards.

The primary users of the system are at the site level where schedules are inputted, developed, maintained and updated. Some employees at both Regional and National Headquarters also have access to the schedules to provide assistance to sites and to review and approve schedules.

The Scheduling and Deployment System also serves as an effective management tool, as reports generated by the system permit the analysis of information for more efficient and equitable scheduling, attendance management and allocation of overtime, while still ensuring adherence to all collective agreements.

The Senior Deputy Commissioner is responsible for ensuring that the standards, the site deployment levels and the national generic post orders are managed and maintained. Regional deputy commissioners are responsible for the timely implementation of the standards in their respective areas⁶. The institutional heads, including the warden, deputy warden and assistant warden of operations ensure that effective risk management strategies are in place, provide direction and manage the correctional operations and security activities within the facility to provide a safe and secure environment. Institutional heads also ensure that their institution complies with the deployment standards and scheduling guidelines⁷ and are responsible for communications and consultations with staff, unions and other stakeholders along with the local implementation of the standards.

Within the institution, institutional heads are aided by correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment and correctional manager working the operations desk. Correctional managers working the operations desk are responsible for the day-to-day scheduling and updating of correctional officer roll calls. This includes redeploying staff to meet changing requirements, incidents and emergencies. The correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment takes more of a strategic planning role by addressing pre-planned absences, planned operational shutdowns, scheduling correctional officer training and moving the substitute relief officers.

The Commissioner’s Directive (CD) related to the deployment standards is “The National Standards for the Deployment of Correctional Officers (CD 004).” There are a number of accompanying annexes and policy bulletins directly related to CD 004, these include:

• CD 004: Annex A – Terms of reference Committee on Correctional Officer Deployment Standards (CCODS)
• CD 004: Annex B – National Standards for the Deployment of Correctional Officers
• CD 004: Annex C – Threat Risk Assessment Tool
• CD 004: Annex D – Site Deployment Levels
• CD 004: Annex E – National Generic Post Orders
• Guideline (GL) 004-1 – Operational Adjustments (2009-06-08)
• GL 004-2 – Scheduling of Correctional Officers (2009-06-08)

Furthermore, institutions must ensure they are aligned with Appendix K of the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement (letter of understanding with respect to the effective scheduling for the Correctional Service of Canada).

The objectives of the audit were to:

• Provide reasonable assurance that the management framework in place supports the effective implementation of the deployment standards.
• Provide reasonable assurance that CSC is complying with the policy directives with regards to the implementation of the deployment standards.

Specific criteria related to each of the objectives for this audit are included in Annex A.

The Audit of the Implementation of the Deployment Standards was national in scope and included site visits to 17 federal institutions covering all five regions (see Annex B). The audit examined the effect the implementation of the scheduling and deployment standards had on institutional operations including security, scheduling and overtime. Interviews, document review, analysis and observations were conducted in order to assess the management framework and to assess compliance with the national standards regarding correctional officer schedules, specifically, the completeness of them and ensuring all security posts were covered.

Sites selected did not include the Regional Treatment Centres / Regional Psychiatric Centre in this audit because specific standards for these types of institutions were being written as we performed the audit.

In addition, the audit focused upon the implementation of the Scheduling and Deployment System. As this was not an audit of the system itself, aspects such as access controls and user roles were not examined. Furthermore, while the audit examined controls around overtime and leave, no data reconciliations between the various systems was conducted as such work was completed as part of the Follow Up Audit Review of the Recording of Employee Leave which the Internal Audit Branch conducted in 2010.

It should also be noted that we did not visit, or include in our scope, any of the institutions incorporated into the management review completed by the Senior Deputy Commissioner sector since the review team had already brought attention to how these institutions implemented the standards.

In reviewing the management framework, the audit team reviewed the Commissioner’s Directive, along with the accompanying annexes and policy guidelines relating to scheduling and deployment, and the roles and responsibilities of the key individuals involved in the process. The audit team also examined if applicable training was being provided to and being taken by management level institutional staff and determined if staffing levels and resources were being allocated to the sites in accordance with the standards and resource indicators respectively. Finally, we determined if the sites were completing any formal reports and if processes were in place to monitor the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers.

In assessing compliance with the relevant Commissioner’s Directive and policy guidelines, the audit team examined the schedules currently in production at each institution to determine compliance with the CD and the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement. Overtime and leave were examined to verify if controls were in place, and being used by institutional managers, to monitor them. Furthermore, the Scheduling and Deployment System was reviewed at each site to determine if the system was the exclusive scheduling system being used and if it was fully implemented at the sites. Post orders and operational adjustments were also examined to determine compliance.

The methodology employed both qualitative and quantitative measures. Information used to facilitate these analyses was collected through:

• Review of Documentation: Relevant documentation, including CD 004 and accompanying annexes, policy guidelines and local procedures relating to scheduling and deployment were reviewed and analyzed.
• Site Visits: Site visits were conducted at 17 federal institutions representing a mix of security levels from all five regions. Furthermore, the sites selected included a mix of institutions between those located in urban settings and those located in more rural settings.
• Interviews: Interviews with key members of institutional management teams, including the warden, deputy warden, assistant warden operations, and correctional managers working the operations desk and those responsible for scheduling and deployment, were conducted. Interviews were also conducted with institutional chiefs of finance, union members from the Institution Committees, regional project officers responsible for scheduling and deployment and regional comptrollers.
• Documentation Reviews: A review of relevant local documentation including operational adjustment plans, threat risk assessments, post orders and weekly scheduled roll calls as well as human resources plans was conducted. Reports from the Scheduling and Deployment System, including overtime, leave, extra duty posts and operational adjustments were also examined.
• Observation: Walk-arounds were conducted at each institution to determine the implementation status of both the system and the standards.

4.0 AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We assessed the extent to which an appropriate management framework is in place to support the effective scheduling and deployment of correctional officers. This included a review of policies, roles and responsibilities, training, staffing and financial resource allocation and monitoring and reporting mechanisms.

We expected to find that Commissioner’s Directives and policy guidelines exist and that they support the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers.

A Commissioner’s Directive and policy guidelines exist for the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers; however confusion regarding some of the policy requirements was noted.

CD 004, the National Standards for the Deployment of Correctional Officers, includes five annexes and two policy bulletin guidelines (See Section 1.4). The majority of staff interviewed stated that they had read the CD and the various annexes and policy bulletins. Interviewees also stated that, for the most part, the policies and guidelines are fairly clear and easy to understand and that there were no areas of the policy which were not attainable.

Having said that, we found that the Service has issued policy guidelines to clarify requirements; however some of the compliance issues noted in Section 4.2 may be due to policy not always being fully understood. For example, during interviews we noted confusion regarding the use of both operational adjustments and multi-function positions. Our file review showed that operational adjustments were not always being entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System as required. In regard to the role of the multi-function position, we found variation in the usage of these posts at the various institutions. These examples illustrate that institutional staff do not fully comprehend all aspects of the policy, and as such, the institutions are not taking full advantage of the flexibility around them. Further details regarding both operational adjustments and multi-function positions can be found in Section 4.2.

We expected to find that the roles and responsibilities of those involved with the implementation of the deployment standards are clearly defined and understood.

Roles and responsibilities relating to the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers are defined and documented.

Roles and responsibilities for those responsible for the implementation of the deployment standards are documented in various sources including CD 004, GL 005 (Institutional Management Structure: Roles and Responsibilities), the national generic job descriptions and the various generic post orders. With the exception of the correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment, the primary focus of the institutional management positions are not the scheduling and deployment of the correctional officers, and as such, the actual defined roles and responsibilities relating to this function are brief. Although the defined roles are minimal, during interviews, the majority of interviewees stated that they clearly understand their roles and what is expected from them with regards to the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers.

In addition to having individuals responsible for scheduling and deployment, two committees also exist to assist in the process; the Institutional Committee and the National Committee. These committees are comprised of both union and management representatives and are involved in the creation of all schedules. The Institutional Committee creates the schedules for their site and sends their draft schedules to the National Committee for approval. The National Committee approves all schedules prior to implementation and ensures that the schedules are in-line with the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement and policy directives surrounding deployment standards.

Roles and responsibilities of the correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment vary between the institutions.

According to generic job descriptions the correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment is responsible to schedule and deploy correctional managers and correctional officers for all shifts to ensure the security of the facility and safety of employees, inmates and visitors. They are also responsible for the management of the daily annual leave quota, maintenance of the automated scheduling system and preparation of the human resource utilization reports. The duties pertaining to the correctional manager working the operations desk include ensuring all security posts are staffed for the current shift, coordinating overtime for security staff to fill any absences, and deciding to operationally adjust a post when appropriate⁸.

We noted that most medium security, maximum security and women’s institutions had a different way of using their correctional managers who are responsible for scheduling and deployment. Many of these sites had one full-time correctional manager assigned to this position. However, we found one institution that had two full-time correctional managers assigned to manage scheduling and deployment while some other sites had assigned a clerical employee to assist the correctional manager assigned to scheduling and deployment. At minimum security institutions and healing lodges we found that one of the correctional managers would be assigned the portfolio of scheduling and deployment, but this would be above their normal duties assigned to them on the operations desk.

We noted inconsistencies in the roles being performed by the correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment. During interviews with both correctional managers responsible for the scheduling and deployment and the correctional managers working the operations desk we found that there is not always a clear separation of responsibilities between the two correctional manager positions. This is particularly so for the scheduling and deployment of shifts in areas such as approving leave, moving substitute relief positions and entering shift exchanges and operational adjustments into the Scheduling and Deployment System. A number of correctional managers working the operations desk stated that many of the duties they were performing, including the entering of transactions into the Scheduling and Deployment System should be the responsibility of the correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment.

During interviews, we were also informed that some of the correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment saw their job as primarily administrative. On the other hand, others were heavily involved in monitoring how the schedules and deployment standards were being implemented at their site and in the reporting of various areas, including overtime and leave.

The majority of correctional managers, both those working the operations desk and those responsible for scheduling and deployment that we interviewed stated that they have a strong understanding of what is expected from them. That being said, in the end we found that the majority of the functions associated with these roles were being fulfilled. Therefore, although there is an obvious lack of consistency surrounding the roles and responsibilities for which correctional managers are responsible versus what is actually being done, other than possible inefficiencies in the use of resources, the risks associated with this are minimal.

We expected to find that those individuals with responsibilities related to the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers are completing the required training.

Not all managers have completed the Management of the Correctional Officer Workforce Course and the Scheduling and Deployment System Course as defined in the National Training Standards.

The National Training Standards (NTS) represent the fundamental learning and development requirements employees must receive to be able to perform certain aspects of their roles and responsibilities. All NTS activities are compulsory and must be completed by the deadline indicated for each training activity.

As part of the NTS, wardens, deputy wardens, assistant warden operations, manager of operations and correctional managers are required to complete the Management of the Correctional Officer Workforce course. This course provides the targeted employees with the tools and knowledge to standardize management practices surrounding the management of the correctional officer workforce. This includes improving overtime management and scheduling skills and standardizing the application of the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement as it relates to schedules and deployment. Training is required to be taken by all correctional managers, assistant warden operations, deputy wardens and wardens within 12 months of appointment. Furthermore, for correctional managers, there is an additional training requirement - a course on the Scheduling and Deployment System.

During interviews and through a review of the training data contained within the Human Resources Management System, we confirmed that not all required attendees had completed the training as stated in the NTS. Some of the non-compliant participants stated that they were away when the initial training had been offered, and as of yet, had not been able to attend the course when offered.

Previous audits conducted by the Internal Audit Branch have raised concerns regarding the accuracy of the training data being entered into the Human Resources Management System. It has been noted that it is the responsibility of the various institutions to enter their training information into the system, however; our audits have noted that this is not always being done consistently. As such, the audit team was unable to calculate compliance statistics as there was no complete data readily available to differentiate those who have been in a position (substantive or acting capacity) for longer than 12 months from those who have been in for a shorter time and thus not yet required to have taken this training.

Training courses related to the deployment standards are not being delivered as required.

As previously discussed, the Management of the Correctional Officer Workforce course is a required training course as per the NTS. The length of training varies depending on the employees’ position and ranges between three and five days.

During our interviews, we found that the opinions on the training were varied. While many of the correctional managers found the training to be extremely beneficial in assisting them to think like managers, many of the wardens felt that they were not learning any new concepts. One common theme through many of the interviews was that as the training was delivered early on, there was obviously no opportunity for people to share problems yet to be encountered at their institution following the implementation of the standards. Some interviewees stated that they would have benefited from an opportunity for additional training following the implementation of the standards, especially if given the opportunity to learn best practices from other sites. The NTS state that, with the exception of correctional managers, an additional day of training is to be provided eight months following the initial training. We found no evidence that this additional day of training was being provided. Upon further discussion with National Headquarters, it was stated that this extra day of training is in the process of being removed from the standards.

As an addendum to the Management of the Correctional Officer Workforce course, correctional managers are also required to complete a training course on the Scheduling and Deployment System. This course is designed to be two days in length for the correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment and one day in length for all other correctional managers. The two-day training is designed to allow the correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment to then teach the system to the other correctional managers within their institution. In our interviews with the correctional managers, we heard that the length and quality of the training varied significantly depending on the site. Many correctional managers stated that they received no formal or very minimal training and were required to educate themselves with the system. During interviews we were told that correctional managers were initially apprehensive regarding the mandated use of the Scheduling and Deployment System. However, at all institutions we found that the system is now the sole scheduling system used.

We expected to find that staffing levels and resources are allocated and distributed in accordance with the deployment standards.

Institutions are funded and generally staffed to cover all security posts as per the deployment standards. However, there is limited room for contingencies.

The deployment standards define the complement of officers assigned to each security activity throughout the institution. The standards represent the pre-determined resource requirements allocated to cover all security duties by correctional officers⁹ based on the security level of institutions. Institutions are allocated salary dollars for correctional officer positions based on the approved site specific deployment standards.

Through our analysis, we determined that in most regions the monies received from National Headquarters for correctional officer security was allocated to the institutions in its entirety. It was noted that some regions were making minor changes to the site allocation but we confirmed that all resources for correctional officers’ salaries were allocated to the regions and provided to the institutions. For example, in one region we noted that the institutions were being provided with 96% of the resource indicators provided to cover correctional officer salary. The remaining four-percent was added to their overtime budget.

The current resource allocation formula covers for regular absences such as statutory holidays, annual leave, sick leave, other paid leaves such as family or personal leave, allocation for attendance to training, etc. However, it does not take into consideration long-term sick leave or correctional officers not assigned to security duties. At any given time an institution has correctional officers who are not covering security posts. Reasons for this include injury on duty, accommodation to officers in special circumstances and opportunities for correctional officers to undertake different jobs for a determinate period.

During our fieldwork, we found that many officers on duty to accommodate status were still able to complete certain security duties fitting accommodation requirements. In any case, the site is still required to pay the correctional officers salary even when they are unable to complete their security functions. Although sites must remain operational at all times, they are not provided with additional funding for those correctional officers unable to complete their role and must absorb the cost for additional staff (over-burn) through their standard salary allocation.

Many institutions deal with this funding pressure while trying to remain within their salary allotment by carrying an over-burn of five to ten percent of CX positions above the levels currently approved by the standard. For example, if an institution is funded for 200 correctional officers, it would not be out of the ordinary for the site to have 220 correctional officers on the payroll as some of those officers may not be active (maternity, long term sick leave with disability, etc..). By having on the payroll more security officers then the standard allows, they can ensure that all posts are covered as required. This over-burn is also used to assist sites in minimizing overtime by allowing them more flexibility in covering schedules as it is cheaper to pay employees straight time versus overtime premiums.

Although many sites over-burn on the number of correctional officers hired at the institution, our analysis showed that 13 of the 17 institutions visited had less officers on the roll call performing security duties than required to cover all posts in the standards. Even though on paper the institutions had more correctional officers on staff than funded positions, they were purposely not manning all scheduled positions in order to save and offset the cost of correctional officers not performing security duties.

One of these 13 sites, although over-burning the number of correctional officers on strength by 20%, in reality was short nine-percent on the number of correctional officers required to run security duties. This site was purposely using fewer correctional officers to operate all the required posts.

Institutional management is informed during the Management of the Correctional Officer Workforce Course that all vacant lines within the schedules must be filled. Interviewees stated that it would be unfeasible to backfill every correctional officer position where the incumbent is inactive or unavailable for a period of time. Institutions would not be able to cover this situation financially as the site has to be prepared for the possible return of officers not performing security duties. As no additional funding is provided to cover the salary of these correctional officers, institutions state this is why they manage their rosters in this manner.

Another institution visited was under-burning on the number of correctional officers on strength within the institution. At this site we found that, due to various factors, including their geographic location, they were having trouble recruiting and retaining correctional officers. This had a financial impact as they required overtime to ensure the security posts were covered as per the standards.

Another area of concern raised by the sites was the overtime allocation. The overtime budget for fiscal year 2010-2011 was $21M for security as per the resource indicators. Through interviews with regional comptrollers, we determined that all the funding was allocated to the sites. During discussions with institutional chiefs of finance, we found that many sites were over their budgeted allotment within the first half of the fiscal year. Although sites are monitoring and reporting their overtime expenses, institutional management stated that the overtime budget did not always take into consideration the unforeseen; for example, institutional construction security requirements, security incidents and correctional officers being accommodated. Overtime is discussed in further detail in section 4.2.4.

Part of the reason for the implementation of the deployment standards was to remove any unfunded security posts. Currently, many institutions choose to fund the correctional manager responsible for scheduling and deployment position through its overtime budget. During our on-site interviews, we were repeatedly told that the savings acquired from the position in schedule and overtime management more than offset the cost of the unfunded position.

We expected to find an established process to monitor and report on performance regarding the deployment of correctional officers at the institutional, regional and national levels.

All institutions are completing regular reports on various topics relating to the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers.

At all sites visited, we found that regular reports were being prepared and shared with Regional and National Headquarters on various topics including components affecting the scheduling and deployment of correctional officers such as overtime, staffing levels and financial position of the institution. While these reports have been in existence prior to the implementation of the standards and do not exist solely for reporting on the deployment standards, they do assist the institution in best managing their correctional officer workforce.

At each site, the chiefs of finance are completing a regular cash forecast which is shared with the regional comptrollers. This report, which is a snapshot of the financial position of the institution, includes information on the current salary expenses for correctional officers, the projected surplus or deficit in the correctional officer salary expenses and the overall overtime expenses for the institution. The primary focus of this report is overall financial management, and as such, the information although useful as part of the correctional officers deployment standards is very brief and at a very high level.

Our audit also found that sites were maintaining a staffing matrix to account for all of the correctional officers currently on strength within their institution and to track how many are currently performing security functions. This information directly affects the deployment of correctional officers as it provides key information on staff available for security duties as well as the overall staffing complement. While this report was already in existence at most sites prior to the implementation of the standards, it is still quite useful in regard to determining how many correctional officers the institution needs to have in place to ensure all security posts are covered and at the same time minimize overtime. Institutional management needs to be cognizant of the fact that many correctional officers who are currently on strength, but temporarily away from the institution may return to their regular schedule at some point.

We also found that all institutions were completing regular reports on overtime. While we found that these reports varied between the regions, all institutions were required to report on overtime regularly and provide this information to the regional project officers working at Regional Headquarters. This report typically includes a high level of detail and is used to identify the reasons for overtime usage at sites, such as training and sick leave. While reporting on overtime has been a requirement for many years, with the introduction of the Scheduling and Deployment System, we were told that tracking the cost drivers is much easier than it once was. At most institutions, we were informed that on a daily basis overtime is examined by the assistant warden of operations and when issues or concerns are identified, regular discussions with the correctional managers occur. Many institutions stated that daily overtime discussions were held during the morning briefings of the management team. Overtime usage is also monitored by Regional Headquarters in order to ensure institutions are best managing their correctional officer workforce where possible.

Minimal monitoring of the institutions on the implementation of the deployment standards exists.

During the audit, we found minimal continuous monitoring was taking place to ensure sites were implementing the standards appropriately. One exception to this, as previously mentioned, was the monitoring and reporting surrounding the overtime of correctional officers.

In interviews at the sites, we were informed that overtime is one key component which is being highly monitored.

Nationally, the Deployment Standards and Scheduling Branch under the Senior Deputy Commissioner did a review of the implementation of the deployment standards at eight sites across the country in the spring of 2010. The completed review examined many components of the deployment standards. Following the site review, an institution specific report was completed and a summary report of all common themes noted was provided to all institutions in October 2010. A national report summarizing the eight institutions visited is in the process of being finalized.

Overall, we found very little ongoing monitoring in place to ensure that the sites had implemented the standards appropriately. For example, we found no monitoring taking place on how the sites were applying the standards to their specific requirements.

The key elements of a management framework are in place to support the implementation of the deployment standards. The CD and policy guidelines related to the deployment standards have been created and roles and responsibilities are typically defined and understood. Training courses exist and are being delivered to ensure institutional management can obtain the required knowledge to implement the standards. Institutions are being provided with the resources required to fund their allocated correctional officer positions in accordance with the standards. Finally, we found that regular reporting on topics related to the deployment standards was occurring.

Our audit showed that attention is required in the following areas:

• A need to clarify various policy requirements including areas concerning operational adjustments and the use of multi-function positions as discussed further in Section 4.2;
• Provide direction regarding the duties to be completed by the correctional managers working on the operations desk versus those responsible for scheduling and deployment in order to ensure all tasks are being completed while minimizing the duplication of work and;
• Ensure that regular monitoring is occurring with the institutions to verify their conformity with the deployment standards.

Recommendation 1 ¹⁰

The Senior Deputy Commissioner in collaboration with the Assistant Commissioner Policy should clarify the policy guidelines regarding the deployment standards, specifically surrounding the areas of multi-function, operational adjustments and post orders.

Recommendation 2 ¹¹

The Senior Deputy Commissioner in collaboration with the regional deputy commissioners should implement a process to monitor how the institutions are continuously applying the standards.

We assessed the extent to which CSC is in compliance with the relevant Commissioner’s Directive and policy guidelines relating to the implementation of the deployment standards. This included interviews, observations and data analysis.

We expected to find that schedules for correctional officers are in accordance with both CSC policy and the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement and that institutions are maximizing the use of their resources.

All schedules ensure that correctional officers work an average of 40 hours per week. They are mathematically correct, utilize the correct shift start times and most use the shift lengths deemed most efficient.

As agreed to under the current Correctional Officer Collective Agreement, officers are scheduled to work an average of 40-hours per week over the number of weeks in a schedule. The Scheduling and Deployment System will not allow for schedules where officers do not work the required hours. As well, schedules must receive the approval of the National Committee before being placed into production. During our audit, we reviewed all regular schedules in production for the institutions visited, to ensure that they were mathematically correct and were aligned with the deployment standards.

As part of effective scheduling, institutions are required to use three standardized shifts in a day to optimize available resources and ensure that substitute relief is maximized in the most cost effective manner. These shifts include the morning, typically between 2300h and 0700h, the day shift and the evening shift, which typically begins late afternoon. Policy requires that the evening shift must end 16-hours after the day shift begins. Through our analysis of on-site schedules, we found no evidence of this policy requirement not being followed.

With the introduction of modified hour schedules, institutions must ensure their shift lengths follow those approved by National Committee. The most efficient shift lengths are normally 8.5, 9, 12.5, 12.75 and 16 hours. Sites must ensure that employees work an average of 40 hours per week over the number of weeks in a schedule. As such, it is sometimes necessary for a site to use the odd less efficient shift length to ensure that the correctional officers are working the correct number of hours (i.e. 13 hours). We noted that six of the 17 sites were using less efficient shift lengths; however; in most cases these were used only to ensure individual correctional officer schedules were mathematically correct. However, at one site, we found that 12 of the 31 regular schedules contained regular shifts of 8.75 hours. While this may be appropriate as per the Collective Agreement, this may not ensure scheduling and resource efficiency.

Institutions are not maximizing economies as some schedules contained both vacant and double banked lines.

As stated in the guidelines to effective scheduling, once a vacant line in any schedule occurs, those employees that are double banked in a schedule should be moved to a vacant line¹². A vacant line in a schedule increases the possibility that overtime may be required to ensure coverage of all security posts.

During our analysis, we determined that nine of the 17 institutions visited had at least one schedule where there was both a double banked and a vacant line. This represented 10% (19/200) of the total schedules in production for these nine sites. During interviews with correctional managers responsible for scheduling and deployment, we noted that sites were often aware of this scheduling anomaly as it was often done purposely since schedules are not typically changed for most short term variations including acting assignments. If not managed effectively, these scheduling concerns could cause increased overtime costs to the institution as they could be short correctional officers on some days.

Substitute relief positions are equally distributed.

Substitute relief positions are lines within the schedule that exist to cover for correctional officers on scheduled leave, unscheduled leave and training. When a correctional officer is assigned to a substitute relief post for a shift, that officer is used to cover any security post for which there is no available officer. The Correctional Officer Collective Agreement, in conjunction with the Guidelines on the Scheduling of Correctional Officers, establishes the parameters for the management of substitute relief. There is a requirement to maximize substitute relief coverage in schedules and to have an equitable distribution each day, as per institutional requirements when it is known that there will be more demand on another shift.

Through our analysis of the schedules in production for each institution visited, we found that the substitute relief positions provided equally distributed coverage throughout the week. During interviews, we were informed that substitute relief increased with the implementation of the standards and has helped to minimize overtime hiring.

The schedules in the Scheduling and Deployment System are aligned with the site deployment levels; however, in practice some sites are not fully following the standards as they have re-assigned certain duties to various posts.

Annex D of the Deployment Standards provides sites with the deployment levels and required post coverage for each institution. Sites must ensure that security posts are covered as per the standards. Furthermore, customization to the standards is not allowed without the approval of National Headquarters¹³ as one goal of the standards was to increase consistency between the institutions.

We analyzed a week of security roll calls per visited site to ensure that the schedules in production assigned officers to the required posts as per the deployment standards. We found that, as per the roll calls, all posts were covered with few exceptions. These exceptions were later explained during interviews with correctional managers and we were able to confirm that the posts were covered; however there are limitations with the roll calls within the Scheduling and Deployment System.

While on site, we observed that three site roll calls had an unauthorized security post. Officers on the roll call were assigned to specific posts but upon further observation, these officers were actually assigned duties that were different than the duties assigned to the post under the standards. For example, at some sites we found that the officer assigned to the inmate movement control sector coordinator post was actually assigned the duties of an assistant to the correctional manager. With the implementation of the standards sites have been instructed not to use this position. Sites must ensure that posts within their institution are aligned with the standards as customization is only allowed with proper justification and formal approval¹⁴.

Institutions apply the multi-function position inconsistently.

A multi-function position is defined as a position that has numerous duties to perform during their shift. It does not necessarily confine the officer assigned to that position to one particular post, area or section of an institution for the duration of his/her shift.

With the creation of the standards, sites became more rigid in the duties assigned to individual security posts. For additional flexibility, the standards include the multi-function position to allow the site to deploy officers where needed for security purposes, while increasing response capacities. Some of the duties of the multi-function position include assisting with methadone clinic, internal escorts, hearings with the Parole Board of Canada, meal supervision and general searching¹⁵. Sites that are not optimizing the multi-function role may have to hire overtime to complete these duties.

During our site visits, we noted that the use of the multi-function position varied depending on the institution. Some sites would assign the multi-function officer to a specific post for the duration of the shift, essentially removing the intended flexibility of the position. Other sites visited would not pre-assign any duties to the multi-function officer, opting instead to situate the officer to assist in the operations at the institution on that particular shift (i.e. canteen and health care).

Multi-function positions may be subject to operational adjustment dependent upon the duties assigned to the position, the institutional operational adjustment plan, the post orders, the reassignment of those duties, and/or the adjustment of the institutional routine, and a threat risk assessment to operationally adjust.

We found discrepancies between whether or not multi-function posts were subject to operational adjustment. Some sites would never operationally adjust their multi-function positions; while others did and assigned an officer to a specific post, if short staffed.

As discussed in section 4.1.1, confusion still surrounds the role of the multi-function position. These examples illustrate that institutional staff do not fully comprehend all aspects of the policy, and as such, the institutions are not fully leveraging the flexibility of the multi-function position as the standards intended.

We expected to find that operational adjustments are being used in accordance with the standards.

All institutions visited had completed an operational adjustment plan.

Operational adjustments provide institutions the flexibility to redeploy correctional officers to other identified security activities while maintaining the required staffing levels for public, staff and inmate safety. Operational adjustments are typically used when there is no security activity required at a given time for a specific post such as external escorts officer post when there are no escorts to occur. An operational adjustment can also take place when a correctional officer is not replaced when absent¹⁶; for example when the officer is assigned to a post that requires specialized training, such as the security maintenance officer¹⁷. It is the responsibility of the institutional heads to ensure that their sites have a current operational adjustment plan which identifies the parameters as to how the institution will adjust security activities in-line with the deployment standards. Our audit found that all sites visited had completed an operational adjustment plan although there was no consistent format used. Furthermore, there is no requirement in policy that the operational adjustment plan be formally approved.

Institutions are not entering operational adjustments into the Scheduling and Deployment System.

An operational adjustment relates to situations where the complement of correctional officers is reduced for a full or a partial shift¹⁸. While it is the responsibility of the institutional heads to ensure that their site is complying with the standards, it is the correctional managers who are responsible for conducting an assessment for each shift to determine what security activities, if required, are to be operationally adjusted for a full or partial shift.

Through our audit, we found that all interviewees understood the purpose behind operational adjustments and the positive effect these adjustments had on lowering overtime costs. During interviews with correctional managers, we noted confusion on whether an operational adjustment could be used for a partial shift and what positions could be operationally adjusted.

In our audit, we examined the operational adjustments that were completed at each site between July 1st and September 30th, 2010. At three of the 17 sites, we found evidence that very few operational adjustments had been entered in the system even though it was clear that operational adjustments were regularly occurring. Upon discussion with the correctional managers we noted, as mentioned in Section 4.1.1, confusion around the policy for operational adjustments. For example, many believe operational adjustments only occur if a security activity is being adjusted for an entire shift, such as canceling all visits, when in reality, an adjustment can occur for a partial shift as well.

During interviews, correctional managers working the operations desk stated that while they operationally adjust a post by either redeploying a correctional officer from an area where there are no security duties to be performed or by not replacing an employee who takes leave; these adjustments are not always accurately recorded in the Scheduling and Deployment System. In many instances, the correctional manager is leaving the post on the roll call vacant as opposed to completing the operational adjustment in the system. As further discussed in Section 4.2.3, institutions that are not accurately entering operational adjustments into the Scheduling and Deployment System minimize the management team’s ability to use the system as a tool to accurately reflect what is occurring at the site at a specific time.

The operational adjustment threat risk assessment tool is not being regularly completed.

When correctional managers operationally adjust a post which affect the normal operational routine of the institution, there is a requirement that a formal threat risk assessment be completed. The operational adjustment threat risk assessment tool has been created to assist in the decision making process and to improve consistency. The completion of this tool is only required in instances when the operational adjustment will have an impact on the routine of the institution. For example, operationally adjusting a unit officer would require the completion of a threat risk assessment, since it affects the normal routine of an institution by requiring that offenders be locked in at the range level.

We found that there was some confusion regarding the policy requirement to complete the threat risk assessment tool. For the threat risk assessments completed, we found that they contained very minimal information. One of the primary intentions of the threat risk assessment is to assist in the decision making process and to ensure institutional security. If institutions are not adequately completing this tool, as required, they may be unaware of the potential risks that exist when that officer is removed and the post is operationally adjusted.

We expected to find that sites are using the Scheduling and Deployment System as the sole scheduling system.

All institutions are using the Scheduling and Deployment System as their sole scheduling system.

With the implementation of the deployment standards in April 2009, CSC also developed a new electronic scheduling application to ensure consistency, accuracy and continuity across the Service in managing the schedules and deploying correctional officers to security posts. The Scheduling and Deployment System allows for the development of work schedules that define the post and shift that the employee is to work. At this time, the system requirements are defined only for security operations.

During our audit, we found that all sites are now using the Scheduling and Deployment System as their official scheduling source. Through our interviews with correctional managers, it was discussed that upon initial implementation, the Scheduling and Deployment System was met with some resistance; however, sites have since acknowledged the fact that system usage is mandatory. Transition to complete system usage has been slow, as some sites continue to use additional documentation such as in-house roll calls; however, no site is using another scheduling system.

Although all institutions are using the Scheduling and Deployment System, not all information is being entered into the system as required.

The purpose of the Scheduling and Deployment System is more than purely a scheduling tool; it is also a management tool. For the Scheduling and Deployment System to fully meet its intended goal and purpose, the information contained within must be both timely and accurate. The audit found that not all sites were entering all transactions into the Scheduling and Deployment System. For example, we found that leave and overtime transactions were entered almost immediately by all sites, but shift exchanges between correctional officers were often not entered into the system. Using the information in the Scheduling and Deployment System during our walk-arounds, we observed that the correctional officers on the roll call were working during the shift scheduled; however, they were not always in the security posts as scheduled by the roll call.

During interviews with correctional managers we were told that not all information is entered into the system as data entry is time consuming, especially considering the other duties required of the managers. We also heard that data was not always accurate as correctional managers were unclear of what information was required to be entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System.

A lack of completeness of system information suggests that sites are not using the system to its full ability. As such, Regional and National Headquarters cannot fully rely on the data to assist in decision making, investigations and monitoring as the data contained may not always be complete, accurate or available.

The Scheduling and Deployment System is regularly being upgraded for improvements.

The IT Support Desk notifies all users via email when disruptions are planned to the Scheduling and Deployment System. We were told that these outages, which are typically brief in duration, do not typically hinder the institution as long as adequate notice is given to allow the site to print copies of roll calls and overtime availability. However, long term system outages make it more challenging for the sites to ensure all relevant information is entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System and to ensure that they are able to properly deploy their staff.

Many correctional managers felt that the Scheduling and Deployment System was implemented before the system was entirely ready for rollout; however, during our interviews, staff acknowledged that they have seen vast improvements with the system. Since implementation, weaknesses within the system as identified by its users include the lack of correlation between Human Resources Management System (HRMS) and the Scheduling and Deployment System and the difficulties entering and correcting information within the system.

We expected to find that controls are in place and are being used by institutional management to monitor both overtime and leave for correctional officers.

There are strong controls surrounding the management of overtime.

CSC is committed to the effective control, including planning, management, allocation and monitoring of overtime to ensure that resources are managed with due regard for efficiency, effectiveness and economy¹⁹. The commitment to controlling overtime has become a focus for the Service over the last few years as demonstrated by the attention that the senior management team now gives it.

During our audit, we found that all sites have a strong process in place to monitor overtime usage. We noted that senior management at all sites monitor overtime, often discussing and justifying the overtime hired during the daily briefings. As well, all institutions are required by Regional Headquarters, and subsequently National Headquarters, to complete overtime monitoring reports. These reports are used as management tools to ensure reoccurring issues are being addressed.

The correctional manager working the operations desk is responsible for hiring overtime during his/her shift. As discussed previously under Section 4.2.3, one of the Scheduling and Deployment System’s purposes is to be used as a local monitoring tool. All transactions entered into the system, including the hiring of overtime, are traceable, thus creating correctional manager accountability. At many sites, the assistant warden operations or the manager of operations will discuss any questionable overtime transactions with the responsible correctional manager to verify the necessity of the hiring. With increased monitoring, we were told during interviews that correctional managers working the operations desk know what is expected of them in terms of managing and hiring overtime.

During interviews with the management team, we were told that overtime has decreased in the past year and a half. Financial monitoring of overtime expenditures supports these views, although Internal Audit did not audit this information as it was outside of the scope of this engagement. However, institutional management was not sure if the reason behind this decrease was the deployment standards or the increased corporate focus to monitor correctional officer overtime.

Not all institutions have a strong monitoring process to ensure that correctional officers are entering their leave into the Human Resources Management System upon their return to work; however all sites are performing reconciliations to ensure data accuracy.

Regular attendance by all staff is essential to achieving the mission, values and corporate objectives of the Correctional Service of Canada. It is important that employees report to work regularly and in a punctual manner. Leave for a correctional officer is entered into two independent electronic systems; the Scheduling and Deployment System and the Human Resources Management System. Correctional managers are responsible for entering leave, both planned and unplanned, into the Scheduling and Deployment System once notified, in order to ensure roll call accuracy. However, it is typically the responsibility of employees to enter all leave requests into the Human Resources Management System, which is a fully integrated system that combines all HR activities, including the entry of employee leave, in one easy-to-use application, in a timely manner.

During the audit we regularly heard concerns from interviewees that the Human Resources Management System does not pull leave data from the Scheduling and Deployment System. As a result there is a requirement to ensure that the employee’s leave is also entered in the Human Resources Management System. We found that all sites are entering their leave into the Scheduling and Deployment System upon being notified by the correctional officer of their absence. During interviews, institutional management stated that they were confident that the leave being entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System is current as the system is updated instantly since it is required to maintain a current roll call. We observed that not all sites ensure that leave is being entered into the Human Resources Management System. Many institutions only rely on reports provided by National Headquarters to reconcile and correct the discrepancies between the two systems.

At the present time, all sites have a process in place to ensure the data between the independent systems match; however, this reconciliation is not done at consistent intervals. National Headquarters provides sites with a report containing a list of system discrepancies which they are required to reconcile. These discrepancies typically include issues surrounding leave coding; for example, the report from region may code the transaction to “Family Related Leave Appointments” whereas the transaction within the Human Resources Management System may be coded to “Family Related Leave Other.” We regularly heard that this is a very time consuming process and sites are having trouble finding resources to complete the reconciliation. Sites with on-going monitoring to ensure that correctional officers entered their leave into the system stated that they did not find the reconciliations between the two systems as time consuming as other sites with no on-going monitoring. For further information on the accuracy issues surrounding the leave of correctional officers, please refer to the 2010 Follow-up Audit Review of Recording of Employee Leave conducted by the Internal Audit Branch.

Institutions are not always following the leave allotments as stated within the Correctional Officer Collective Agreement.

During the year, there are designated leave periods. The different periods allow for either four or nine-percent of correctional officer staff to be on approved planned leave at any one time. The Correctional Officer Collective Agreement states that high request periods, such as the period between June 1st and the first Monday in September, along with two weeks during the December holiday season and one week in spring are identified as nine-percent periods while all other times are considered four-percent periods. The leave allotment provides the maximum number of officers at each level who can be approved planned leave at any given time.

We reviewed the leave percentages within the Scheduling and Deployment System for summer, winter and spring peak leave periods. We found that only five of the 17 sites had entered their peak leave periods correctly. Of the 12 that had errors with their leave allocation, two institutions were extending their summer leave period until late September. The remaining 10 institutions were missing at least one leave period with three of those institutions not entering any peak periods at all. When sites have not entered peak leave periods into the system they are unable to address site needs, for a specific day, to ensure appropriate security coverage throughout the institution. This can cause additional overtime costs to be incurred.

During interviews with correctional managers, we were told that they would regularly grant leave in excess of the allotment only if no additional overtime costs would be incurred; this aligns with the current Correctional Officer Collective Agreement. However, we noted that at one site, one additional officer was authorized leave regardless of the effect on overtime. We also noted at another site that the leave allotment for correctional officers had been summed together regardless of level, thus not following the correctional officer collective agreement²⁰.

We expected to find that post orders have been created for each security post in accordance with the Commissioner’s Directive.

Post orders have been created for the majority of posts; however, there was some confusion on when post orders were required.

As an annex to the CD on deployment standards, national generic post order templates have been created for all institutional types. The stated purpose of these generic post orders is to provide a consistent foundation of duties that each site will use to develop a set of site specific post orders that will correspond to the new deployment standards²¹.

In our analysis of the post orders created by the 17 sites visited, we found 87% (264/304) of the required post orders had been created. We noted that many of the post orders which sites have not completed were for those posts which were not regularly rotated including the detector dog handler, the security maintenance officer and the admission and discharge sector coordinator. During interviews, some interviewees questioned whether post orders were required for posts which were not rotational ones.

Institutions typically customized their post orders to some extent to meet their unique operational requirements; however, post orders are perceived to be overly generic.

Annex E of the deployment standards states that each site’s security operations cannot be reflected in a generic post order. As such, sites must review the duties contained in each post order and adapt it to the local environment by adding, removing or revising the duties where needed²².

Of the required post orders which had been completed for the sites we visited, we found that 82% (217/264) had been customized to some degree. For the majority of the remaining ones we noted that the site post orders were a direct copy of the national generic ones. During our interviews with correctional officers, we frequently heard that the post orders were found to be highly generic and not a true reflection of the duties they perform.

In general, the deployment standards have been implemented at all sites. We found that all schedules were mathematically correct and that substitute relief positions were equally distributed throughout them. The audit noted that the Scheduling and Deployment System is the sole scheduling source being used at the institutions. Furthermore, controls exist surrounding the use of correctional officer overtime and post orders have been created and customized for most posts as needed.

Nevertheless, our audit showed that attention is required in the following areas:

• Ensure that vacant lines and double banked lines do not exist on the same schedules to minimize the possibility of overtime;
• The threat risk assessment tool must be completed for all operational adjustments where changes to routine occur;
• There is a need to ensure all transactions are entered into the Scheduling and Deployment System so that the information contained within is both accurate and timely;
• A process should exist to ensure the leave information within the Scheduling and Deployment System is captured within the Human Resources Management System within a few days of the correctional officer’s return; and
• Sites must adhere to the peak leave periods agreed upon within the Correctional Officer Collective agreement.

Recommendation 3 ²³

The Regional Deputy Commissioners with the assistance of the Senior Deputy Commissioner, should develop an accountability mechanism that better establishes and monitors institution’s compliance with the deployment standards, including the areas of concern identified in this report such as:

• Minimizing occasions when vacant and double banked lines occur on the same schedule;
• Ensuring that only security posts identified in the deployment standards are being used at the institutions unless approved by National Headquarters;
• Entering into the Scheduling and Deployment System all information, including operational adjustments, correctional officer post exchanges, leave and overtime, and ensuring that the information is current;
• Using the threat risk assessment tool when a change to the operational routine occurs;
• Reconciling the information contained within the Human Resources Management System with the Scheduling and Deployment System;
• Ensuring that all sites enter peak period leave and follow the predetermined allotment and Correctional Officer Collective Agreement; and
• Ensuring all required participants complete the courses required as part of the National Training Standards.

Audit of the Implementation of the Deployment Standards
Management Action Plan (MAP)

¹ Correctional Service Canada Report on Plans and Priorities 2011-2012.

² CD 004 - Annex E – National Generic Post Orders. Correctional Manager – Operations Desk.

³ CD 004, para 14

⁴ CD 004, para 13

⁵ Correctional Service Canada Report on Plans and Priorities 2011-2012.

⁶ CD 004: National Standards for the Deployment of Correctional Officers, para 36, 37.

⁷ CD 004-2: Scheduling of Correctional Officers, para 8.

⁸ CD 004 - Annex E – National Generic Post Orders. Correctional Manager – Operations Desk.

⁹ CD 004 – Annex B – National Standards for the Deployment of Correctional Officers. Introduction.

¹⁰ Recommendation requires management�s attention, oversight and monitoring.

¹¹ Recommendation requires management�s attention, oversight and monitoring.

¹² GL 004-02, para 15.

¹³ CD 004, para 15, 19.

¹⁴ CD 004, para 19.

¹⁵ CD 004 – Annex E - National Generic Post Orders. Multi-Function Officer CO-1 Day, Evening and Morning Shifts.

¹⁶ GL 004-1, para 7

¹⁷ GL 004-1, para 15b

¹⁸ CD 004, para 13

¹⁹ National Direction – Policy on the Management of Overtime for Correctional Officers (2009-40). November 1, 2009.

²⁰ GLOBAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA (CSC) AND THE UNION OF CANADIAN CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS – Section 4.

²¹ CD 004 – Annex E – National Generic Post Orders. Background.

²² CD 004 – Annex E – National Generic Post Orders. Background.

²³ Recommendation requires management�s attention, oversight and monitoring.