Evaluation Report: Institutional security, 2015

The evaluation team would like to express its appreciation to the many people who contributed to this evaluation and provided valuable information on institutional security.

First, we would like to thank the many institutional managers, staff members, and offenders who took the time to participate in the interviews held at various institutions. We would also like to thank the institutional management and staff members who participated in a number of questionnaires. In addition, we want to thank the staff at National Headquarters and Regional Headquarters, as well as people from a number of Correctional Service Canada’s (CSC) partner organizations who participated in interviews.

The team greatly appreciates the assistance and input provided by CSC’s Security Branch, including the Preventive Security and Intelligence Division, the Departmental Security Division, as well as the Security Operations Division.

We would also like to thank the many branches and sectors of CSC who helped provide data for this evaluation, including the staff in Financial Management Services in the Comptroller’s Branch who provided financial data, the staff in Performance Management who provided assistance with incident data from Performance Direct, staff from Strategies, Planning, Measurement and Reporting who provided human resource data, and the Labour Relations Branch for internal CSC data. Additionally, we would like to thank Employment and Social Development Canada for providing data on complaints and work refusals under the Canada Labour Code.

The team would also like to thank the Internal Audit Sector and the Research Branch, who provided us with additional information from their audits and research reports.

Other groups within CSC who provided valuable information and advice include the Human Resources Planning, Reporting and Systems Directorate, the Learning and Development Branch, in particular staff in the Implementation of National Learning Programs, Partnership and Infrastructure Division, the Facilities Branch, and the Schedules and SDS Division.

The team would also like to express our thanks to the Union of Canadian Correctional Officers.

We would also like to extend our thanks to all those in the Evaluation Division who contributed to this evaluation, by conducting interviews, coding data or reviewing drafts of the report.

Finally, the evaluation team would like to thank everyone else who contributed to this evaluation, whose names do not appear here.

Institutional security is relevant and responsive to the daily operations of correctional institutions and to the safety and security of all Canadians. Institutional security activities, as legislated by the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (1992), align with the federal government’s new legislations such as the Safe Streets and Communities Act (2012). Institutional security activities also support the federal government and Correctional Service Canada’s strategic priorities.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Treasury Board’s Policy on Evaluation (TBS, 2009) and the Evaluation Division’s Five-Year Plan. The scope of the evaluation was determined through a number of activities aimed at identifying evaluation priorities. As such, the evaluation focused on three key components: 1) Human Resource Management and Staff Safety; 2) Preventive Security and Intelligence; and 3) Institutional Security Operations. The evaluation incorporated both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods.

Human resource management and staff safety is essential to operating a safe and secure correctional institution. The evaluation examined issues identified by institutional staff as they perform their security related duties. The topics that emerged from the analyses included: recruiting appropriate candidates; staff experience and development; staffing and deployment levels; and staff safety concerns. Recommendations focussed on tracking and monitoring new recruits; on-the-job coaching for new Correctional Officers (CO) and Primary Workers (PW); and enhancing communication and information sharing as part of the Employee Protection Protocol (EPP). Management Action Plans (MAP) addressing the issues were presented and approved. The MAPs will ensure tracking and monitoring of new recruits; the development of a standardized framework for on-the-job coaching for new COs and PWs; and the appropriate and timely provision of information and services throughout the EPP process to persons threatened.

Intelligence information contributes to institutional safety and security by preventing security incidents, eliminating illegal activities and supporting the offender case management process. The evidence centered on the gathering, development and communication of intelligence information. It was recommended that tools be provided to Security Intelligence Officers to engage and debrief staff, and that there be monitoring and reporting on the production and sharing of intelligence. A MAP addressing the issues was presented and approved. The MAP focused on streamlining and restructuring the Intelligence Program.

The evaluation investigated daily operational security activities and how they contribute to a safe and secure institutional environment. The finding developed from the examination of evidence was that dynamic security is apparent and it is making a contribution to the safety and security of the institutions.

Financial data were examined along with incident, staff and offender data. The rate of institutional security-related spending remained relatively stable from 2008/2009 to 2013/2014 despite an increase in the number of CX staff^{Footnote 1} and offenders in CSC institutions. The analyses also showed a decrease in serious security incidents and escapes, an increase in drug-related seizures and an increase in negative urinalysis results.

CSC’s institutional security activities continue to be relevant. Specifically, these activities align with the federal government roles and responsibilities, support the priorities of the federal government and CSC, and are responsive to the needs of Canadians.

Issues were reported with the CX recruitment processes which were most commonly associated with the selection and identification of CX candidates with appropriate experience and personal suitability. The implications of these issues were noted as barriers to effective institutional security. However, the recent implementation of an enhanced CX recruitment process has demonstrated positive results with regards to addressing the identified gaps.

Lack of experience among CX staff members was found to be associated with higher levels of security incidents and security related offender grievances. Although recent strategies may help mitigate the associated security risks, research shows that mentoring and coaching initiatives may also help increase knowledge and skills attained through experience.

Many evaluation respondents reported issues with insufficient staffing and deployment levels. Nevertheless, an examination of staff complaints and refusals to work revealed that one tenth were related to deployment issues, and one percent resulted in a ruling supporting the presence of risks to staff safety.

There is a reported need for the Employee Protection Protocol (EPP) to address institutional staff members’ safety concerns and issues impacting security operations. However, issues related to communication and inadequate security measures were reported by EPP client questionnaire respondents.

Intelligence is important to maintaining the safety and security of institutions; however, various challenges were reported in the areas of gathering and developing intelligence and communicating intelligence information.

Dynamic security is being conducted and contributes to the safety and security of correctional institutions.

While spending on Institutional Security remained relatively stable, rates of escapes and serious security incidents have decreased, suggesting a cost-efficiency for CSC. In addition, several areas of opportunity were identified to further enhance the cost-efficiency of CSC’s institutional security activities, as well as the overall safety and security of staff and offenders in CSC’s institutions.

CSC should track and monitor the performance of new CXs through the recruitment, training and probation phases to ensure the appropriate candidates are hired and retained, and that the process is improving the organization’s ability to successfully meet safety and security requirements. Monitoring should be done on outcomes such as: success during training and while on probation, disciplinary actions, terminations, promotion, retention, and ability of the process to meet required capacity.

CSC should enhance the transition of new Correctional Officers by strengthening the links between new recruits and the sites which they are assigned to. This should be facilitated through the development, implementation and monitoring of a standardized approach for on-the-job coaching for new CXs and ensure there is a sound institutional capacity to deliver these initiatives.

The Employee Protection Protocol (EPP) should be supported and improved through tools and processes which enhance communication and the sharing of information. Processes and tools should ensure staff members receive appropriate and timely communication of information and services, and there is appropriate monitoring and follow up regarding the employee’s safety.

The Preventive Security and Intelligence Division should ensure the tools provided to SIOs are used to engage and debrief staff and management, and improve the gathering, development and communication of intelligence. This should be achieved through consistent, timely, and standardized monitoring and reporting of the production and sharing of intelligence.

The Management Action Plan (MAP) will ensure that recruits are tracked and monitored for 12 months. There will also be a review and update national selection criteria and tools used to promote CXs to the CM level. Additionally, national standards and guidelines for the recruitment, training and performance management of Correctional Officers (COs) and Primary Workers (PWs) will implemented, monitored and adjusted, as required.

The MAP will include the development of a standardized framework for on-the-job coaching for new COs and PWs. Additionally, a Middle Manager Mentoring Program (MMMP) will be implemented and the Management Development Portal will be launched.

The MAP contains an action that will ensure the appropriate and timely provision of information and services to persons threatened. Staff safety will also be monitored and followed-up on by supporting and improving the EPP through new tools and processes.

The Intelligence Program will be streamlined and restructured. The Intelligence Program will be supported and improved through the use of intelligence systems, tools and assets. Communication and intelligence information sharing with key CSC clients, stakeholders and operational and senior managers will be increased. Additionally, communication will be enhanced to create collaboration and liaison with external partners and stakeholders by re-establishing local, regional and national intelligence committees.

In accordance with the Five-Year Evaluation Plan, the Correctional Service Canada (CSC)^{Footnote 2} conducted an evaluation of institutional security. The evaluation process followed the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s (TBS) Policy on Evaluation (2009), by examining the continued relevance of the institutional security activities and their alignment with CSC and federal government priorities, roles and responsibilities, as well as CSC’s performance in delivering institutional security activities, including effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Effective institutional security allows CSC to mitigate potential risks, such as the Corporate Risk that "CSC will not be able to maintain required levels of operational safety and security" (CSC, 2013b, p. 11), and strengthens CSC’s ability to handle challenges related to this risk. As such, this evaluation identifies what challenges exist, and provides recommendations on how CSC can continue to meet its priority of the "safety and security of staff and offenders in our institutions and in the community" (CSC, 2013b, p. 7). Additionally, the evaluation results and recommendations contained in this report will assist CSC’s senior management with strategic policy and investment decision-making regarding institutional security.

In 2001, the CSC Task Force on Security developed a Security Framework to optimize staff and offender interactions and promote safe reintegration. The framework contained four components: safety, respect, leadership and learning, as well as 80 recommendations that aimed to advance CSC as a "professional, humane and restorative correctional system" (CSC, 2001, p. 1). For example, recommendation #19 advised "that CSC develop a framework and standards for the gathering and analysis of security information" (CSC, 2001, p. 96), and recommendation #33 advised "that CSC standardize and fully communicate the implementation of approved security technologies" (p. 97). Many of the recommendations from the Report of the Task Force on Security have been implemented.

In 2007, a CSC Review Panel produced A Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety which outlined 109 recommendations, mostly in the area of institutional security. Some of these recommendations were addressed through changes following the Safe Streets and Communities Act (2012; e.g. The Roadmap recommended the inclusion of an "offender accountabilities" section in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act [CCRA, 1992] which was completed with the amendment of CCRA section 4(h), a principle guiding offender behaviour). In addition, five key recommendations from the Panel have been outlined in the Transformation Agenda Report on Safety and Security Initiatives (CSC, 2010b, p. 4):

• More stringent control of entry to institutions, including perimeter controls, searching and offenders visits;
• Expansion of detector dog teams;
• Stronger security intelligence capacity and capability;
• Improved correctional officer training; and
• Better equipment, electronics and associated measures to support safety and security initiatives.

The CCRA (1992) provides CSC with the legislative mandate to contribute to public safety by administering court imposed sentences through safe custody and supervision of offenders. Institutional security activities are an essential aspect of how CSC provides a safe and secure working and living environment in correctional facilities across Canada for staff members, offenders, and the broader Canadian public. Specifically, these activities contribute to the safety of correctional institutions by supporting the prevention of security incidents. This is accomplished through the management of offender populations, the continuous surveillance and monitoring of institutional environments, and the on-going assessment of threats and risks informed by the collection and analysis of intelligence information. Institutional security activities thereby promote a positive institutional environment which supports offender reintegration.

Recently, sections 3.1 and 4^{Footnote 3} of the CCRA were updated as per section 54 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act (2012). In addition to the CCRA, CSC’s institutional security is affected by various other federal legislations, such as the Criminal Code and the Canada Labour Code – as well as by internal CSC directives and policies, such as the Commissioner’s Directive (CD) 560 – Dynamic Security and Supervision. CSC operations, including institutional security activities, are also impacted by such legislation as the Truth in Sentencing Act, and Abolition of Early Parole Act, as well as by recent deficit reduction activities.

Institutional security activities are a sub-activity of CSC's Custody Program, as defined by the Departmental Program Alignment Architecture (PAA; see Appendix A^{Footnote 4}). These activities, along with correctional interventions, community supervision, and internal services, allow CSC to contribute to the public safety of all Canadians.

For the purposes of this evaluation, institutional security was separated into three key components: 1) Human Resource Management and Staff Safety; 2) Preventive Security and Intelligence; and 3) Institutional Security Operations. Together, these three components encompass a wide array of activities that pertain to the successful implementation of policies and procedures designed to:

• Ensure the safe and secure supervision and management of offenders in the institutions; and
• Promote the safety and security of staff members as well as the Canadian public.

A logic model is a schematic representation of the essential components of a program (Posavac & Carey, 1992). It connects the program activities to outputs and outcomes. Specific activities and sub-activities within the logic model were reorganized and integrated to better fit the scope of the evaluation. For further details, see Appendix B and Appendix C for the Institutional Security Logic Model.

CSC’s Commissioner has the ultimate responsibility for institutional security. However, daily security operations within CSC institutions are the responsibility of the Security Branch. The Assistant Commissioner, Correctional Operations and Programs reports to the Commissioner, and is responsible for the Security Branch.

The scope of the evaluation was determined through a number of activities aimed at identifying evaluation priorities, including:

• Pre-evaluation consultations with approximately 80 CSC key informants from National Headquarters (NHQ), Regional Headquarters (RHQ) and the institutions (front-line staff and management were interviewed at: Westmorland Institution, Regional Mental Health Centre, Special Handling Unit, Regional Reception Centre, Kingston Penitentiary, Edmonton Institution for Women, Pacific Institution, and Kwikwexwelhp Healing Lodge);
• Review of documentation including relevant departmental priorities and risks, research, audit and evaluation reports; and
• Institutional and operational documents.

The scope of the evaluation was further refined through consultation with the Offices of Primary Interest (OPI) and key stakeholders which assisted in identifying the evaluation priorities within the three components.^{Footnote 5} A description of each component as well as associated expected results is provided below.

The evaluation questions related to human resource management and staff safety touched upon the various challenges that may exist when managing and conducting institutional security activities. Specifically, the questions focussed on how the following themes are related to staff safety and security: staffing activities; training and knowledge dissemination; conflict resolution mechanisms; and the Employee Protection Protocol (EPP). These themes contribute to the safety and security of staff, offenders, and the institutions through the hiring of the right people, ensuring that staff develop essential experience, that posts are adequately filled, and protocols are implemented that deal with threats against employees.

Human resource management and staff safety is conducted by staff and management at the following branches:

• Recruitment and National Initiatives, using the new enhanced process, handles applications for CX^{Footnote 6} positions nationally.
• Learning & Development Branch is responsible for mandatory and optional training programs for all CSC staff and management.
• Schedules and Scheduling and Deployment System Division (SDS) is responsible for the application of deployment standards at all CSC institutions as well as operations and maintenance of the SDS system.
• Security Branch representatives assess threats to staff and management at CSC institutions and assist with an appropriate response to the situation.

The evaluation questions related to preventive security and intelligence centred around how intelligence activities are meeting their planned results by examining how information sharing contributes to the identification of security issues. Intelligence contributes to a safe and secure environment for staff members and offenders in CSC institutions and the community, although in this evaluation the focus is solely on the security within the institutions. Specifically, intelligence information, gathered through investigations, staff observations and reporting, information from outside sources (e.g. police) and also through interactions with offenders, is used in the prevention of security incidents, eradication of illegal activities, and supports the case management process.

The Intelligence Program is conducted primarily through Security Intelligence Officers (SIO) and Security Intelligence Analysts (SIA):

• Security Intelligence Officers are primarily located in the institutions. SIOs are responsible for providing assessments of threat and risk to institutions and individuals by: collecting and disseminating intelligence information, collecting Statement Observation Reports (SOR) and Situation Reports (SITREP), having contact with offenders, and reviewing grievances, individual observations of events, and video feeds.
• Security Intelligence Analysts are located in regional and national offices and focus on operational site issues. Within NHQ, SIAs report directly to the Deputy Director of the Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Monitoring Division (SIAM) and focus on strategic national intelligence collected from the regions. Furthermore, their roles are to provide decision makers with accurate and timely intelligence information and fulfill the function of strategic intelligence, analysis and assessment.

The evaluation questions focussing on institutional security operations examined how daily operational security activities contributed to a safe and secure environment. Daily operational security activities included: control of contraband and unauthorized items within institutions; population management; surveillance activities; dynamic security; infrastructure; and equipment.

Institutional Security Operations are primarily conducted by correctional officers and managers:

• Correctional Officers (CO): COs work with offenders on a continuous basis in institutions and are the primary contact for offenders. They are classified at the CX-01 or CX-02 level.
• Primary Workers (PW): PWs are COs who have been chosen and trained to work in Women’s Institutions. They are classified at the CX-02 level.^{Footnote 7}
• Correctional Managers (CM): CMs supervise the CX-01 and CX-02 ranks and report directly to the Assistant Warden Operations. They are classified at the CX-04 level.

The evaluation of CSC’s Institutional Security used a mixed method research design, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The following lines of evidence were used to address the evaluation questions.

A review of publications in the area of institutional security was conducted, including:

• Documents from professional publication databases (e.g. Sociological Abstracts, PsychInfo, Criminological Abstracts);
• CSC and other governmental documents and reports (e.g. legislation, policies, reports on plans and priorities, evaluations, research reports, audits and other operational documents); and
• An environmental scan of institutional security in correctional systems in other jurisdictions.

Interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone with various respondent groups. The evaluation team developed six complementary interview guides specific to each respondent group. The guides included both open and closed-ended questions. Data from the interview guides were analyzed using various software programs (i.e. SNAP Survey, SPSS, Excel or Word), depending on the interview question and respondent group. Qualitative data obtained through open-ended questions were analyzed using the iterative and inductive^{Footnote 8} process by members of the evaluation team to identify relevant themes. The final list of themes was constructed by consensus among team members. Qualitative data obtained through closed-ended questions were analyzed using descriptive analysis techniques. Frequencies and percentages were calculated based on the number of valid responses to the questions.

Respondent Groups

Correctional managers: In-person interviews were conducted during the months of February and March 2013 with 95 CMs at 18 institutions (see Appendix D) across all five regions and all security levels.

Institutional staff and management members (excluding correctional managers): In-person interviews were conducted during the months of February and March 2013 with 74 wardens, assistant wardens, and COs at the seven case study sites (see Appendix D).^{Footnote 9}

Security Intelligence Officers: Telephone interviews were conducted with 48 SIOs in April and May 2013. The sample was selected through stratified randomization accounting for all five regions.

NHQ Key Informants: In-person interviews were conducted with 41 key informants within CSC in August and September 2012. Respondents were selected based on their position, duties, and level to target more senior employees directly involved in institutional security activities.

CSC Partners: Telephone interviews were conducted in October and November 2012 with 35 representatives from various external partner organizations. Partner organizations were identified by the Citizen Engagement Directorate, and included those from intelligence and policing fields, volunteers, community groups, and visitors.

Offenders: In-person interviews were conducted by institutional parole officers (PO) with 286 offenders in August and September 2012. The sample was selected from the Offender Management System (OMS) through stratified random sampling across all five regions and security levels while overweighting for women’s institutions and Healing Lodges. As travel for the evaluation team was not possible at the time, the PO for each offender was contacted and asked to administer the interview to each of their offender clients in the sample, and then electronically submit the interview to the evaluation team. The POs who participated were given a set of standardized instructions to support the consistency of the administration of the interviews. The reasons for non-response were recorded by POs as a way to check for selection bias.

Staff and Management: Invitations to participate in the electronic questionnaire were sent to an initial sample of 1,394 randomly selected institutional staff and management members. A total of 254 employees responded to the questionnaire in November and December 2013 (response rate = 18%). A profile of respondents is provided in Appendix E. The questionnaire was developed using automated software (i.e. SNAP Survey), and was administered through CSC’s Intranet site (InfoNet). The questionnaire solicited respondents’ experiences with overall institutional security activities and included both open and closed-ended questions. Data were analyzed using the same process and procedures as for the interviews.

Employee Protection Protocol (EPP): A questionnaire was sent by the Departmental Security Division (DSD) in February 2014 to 178 institutional employees who had accessed the services offered by the EPP. Respondents were asked to send completed questionnaires back to the DSD to maintain employee privacy. A total of 20 questionnaires were faxed back to the DSD, which represents an 11% response rate. Data were analysed using the same process and procedures as was used for the interviews.

Formal/informal security training: A brief questionnaire was sent to the wardens and directors of all CSC institutions regarding coaching and mentoring programs at their locations, including on-the-job training, in January 2014.^{Footnote 10}

The evaluation team visited seven study sites as part of the case study for the institutional security evaluation. The main objective of the case studies was to seek responses to the evaluation question, "To what extent are dynamic and static security integrated in institutional surveillance activities?". Case studies were conducted at seven sites which included three groups^{Footnote 11} of "sister institutions"^{Footnote 12} selected based on their similar infrastructural design. Case study data included semi-structured interviews with institutional staff and management as describe above as well as naturalistic observations of front-line operations. Observations were conducted using a structured observation template to support interview data. The site visits occurred in February and March 2013.

The evaluation team members did not participate in the event or activity being observed. The observers documented the flow of the activity in the Institutional Security Case Study Observation Guide, which included information such as the area observed, the activities observed, and the people present. The notes from the Observation Guide were rolled up into an Observation Summary which linked the observations to the evaluation indicators and allowed observers to quantify activities observed. Based on the summary, the observers completed the Observation Checklist, where a scale was used to assess the indicators observed. Finally, the observers at each case study site combined their observations into the Summary of Findings, which presented key findings from each institution. Data from the Summary of Findings were collected and analyzed. The analyzed data was then used to provide support for the evaluation’s findings and recommendations.

Various sources of automated data were used in the evaluation. They are listed below.

Offender data: Data pertaining to institutional incidents, seizures, urinalysis and offender grievances were extracted from OMS and from Performance Direct and then analysed in SAS and Excel.

Human resource data: Data extracted from the Human Resource Management System (HRMS) database were provided by CSC’s Human Resources Management Section. Data on CX hires, exits, disciplinary action, level of experience as well as data specific to the recruiting process were retrieved as of December 2014 and analysed in SAS and Excel.

Financial data: Financial data for Institutional Security expenditures retrieved from the Integrated Financial and Material Management System (IFMMS) for 2008/2009 to 2013/2014 were analyzed by the evaluation team using Excel.

Data on Complaints and Work Refusals: Data on complaints and work refusals under the Canada Labour Code (CLC) was provided by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC; March 19, 2013). Internal CSC data on complaints and work refusals was provided by CSC’s Labour Relations Branch on July 4, 2014 for the period of January 1, 2012 to July 3, 2014. Data were analysed using Excel.

The institutional security evaluation presented a number of limitations. During the time of the evaluation, CSC contributed to Canada’s Economic Action Plan through a series of measures aimed at reducing financial expenditures. These changes may have impacted the way institutional security activities were perceived and thus may have impacted on the results of this evaluation.

The evaluation relied in part on the perspectives and reports of individuals internal and external to CSC. As with any interview or survey data collection method, there is an inherent risk for potential selection and response bias. This is especially true in the case of questionnaires that were conducted with offenders where the methodology required parole officers to administer the questionnaire which may have introduced bias, given the position of authority held by parole officers.

Given the number of institutional security activities that impact security outcomes, in some instances it was not possible to statistically assess the connection between the activities and the outcomes in the logic model because there were variables unaccounted for. However, the evaluation team identified and noted the strongest trends using the combined quantitative and qualitative data available.

In conclusion, institutional security is essential to ensuring the safety and security of CSC’s institutions. The evaluation found that improvements could be made in areas such as correctional officer recruitment, the EPP, as well as monitoring, reporting and sharing of intelligence information. A positive impact was found regarding dynamic security where activities are contributing to the safety and security of correctional institutions. Currently, CSC staff and management are working together to make inroads into closing gaps identified by the evaluation.

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