Summary of Key Observations and Recommendations: National Joint Board of Investigation into the Release and Supervision of an Offender in relation to a Tragic Incident in Quebec in January 2020

Introduction

On January 22, 2020, at around 11:34 p.m., an offender on day parole, arrived at a police station to report that he had murdered a woman in Ste-Foy, Quebec. On February 27, 2020, the offender pleaded guilty to a first-degree murder charge and, that same day, was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years.

On February 3, 2020, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the Parole Board of Canada (PBC) convened a National Joint Board of Investigation (BOI) to examine the circumstances that led to this tragic event. The purpose of the investigation was to analyze the various aspects of the offender’s case management and to make recommendations to CSC and PBC to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. The BOI was comprised of five members with the skills and experience required to carry out this investigation, including two external co-chairs, who are criminologists. The BOI conducted 25 interviews as well as a review of relevant documents.

The BOI noted shortcomings in the supervision in this case. The BOI found that there were warning signs that the case management team did not properly assess and therefore did not adequately take into consideration to implement the required interventions to ensure better risk management. Additionally, the visits to a massage parlour for sexual purposes were a contributing risk factor given the offender’s history of domestic violence.

The BOI made five recommendations to optimize CSC’s practices related to offender community supervision. The BOI did not make any recommendations related to the PBC. The BOI’s key observations and recommendations are grouped into four main themes: information collection and sharing, community supervision, training and the PBC decision-making process.

Themes

Information Collection and Sharing

Following the offender’s admission to federal custody in December 2006, the BOI noted that CSC had requested documents from the judge and the Crown prosecutor, including the police report and the criminal record detailing his history of criminal offences. However, the BOI concluded that CSC should have taken the appropriate and necessary steps to obtain information on previous convictions for serious offences. The BOI also noted that the definition of a serious offence was not explained in the policy on Information Collection.

As such, the BOI determined that there were shortcomings in the collection of information in the offender’s file, resulting in an absence of information from official sources. The BOI also found that the policy for naming documents required for information collection and updating the collection was confusing.

The BOI concluded that the communication and sharing of information between the releasing institution, the Quebec Parole Office; the Maison Painchaud, a Community Residential Facility (CRF) under contract with CSC; the PBC; and the police services were adequate with respect to the offender’s release to the community.

The BOI noted shortcomings in the accessibility and sharing of information in the offender’s file between CSC and the Maison Painchaud CRF during his supervision in the community. However, during this period, it found that the communication and sharing of information between CSC and its other partners was adequate.

BOI Recommendation:

The BOI recommends that CSC revise Commissioner’s Directive 705-2 – Information Collection, to: a) define a serious offence; b) specify the documents required, including source documents such as trial transcripts for sentenced offenders with a history of violent offences as set out in Schedule I of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA); and c) ensure a mechanism for monitoring information collection throughout the sentence.

Community Supervision

The BOI found that the case preparation leading up to the offender’s release was structured and based on a progression of consistent and timely correctional interventions in accordance with the offender’s needs and contributing factors. Case preparation was consistent with policy and met the criteria of the general principles of gradual reintegration into the community.

Following numerous escorted and unescorted temporary absences, the offender was granted day parole by the PBC and resided at the Maison Painchaud CRF. While caseworkers at Maison Painchaud had both case management and direct supervision responsibilities for this offender, CSC Parole Supervisors were responsible for ensuring the quality control of case management documents and overseeing the work of the CRF caseworkers.

The BOI found that there were many pre-incident indicators of disorganization in the offender’s life that were directly related to his offence cycle. The Case Management Team (CMT) did not adequately assess these indicators and therefore did not give them the attention needed to implement the interventions required for better risk management.

The BOI concluded that visiting a massage parlour for sexual purposes on more than one occasion, including three authorized by his CMT, was a contributing risk factor in the incident given the offender’s history of domestic violence.

The BOI found that the CMT underestimated the offender’s likelihood of developing an emotional connection with an employee at a massage parlour for sexual purposes and the need to intervene accordingly.

The BOI found major shortcomings with respect to the corroboration of information with collateral contacts (e.g. employer, psychologist) did not allow for the adequate management of the offender’s risk and the special and standard conditions to which he was subject on his release.

The BOI found that all caseworkers involved in the offender’s case management met the essential qualifications in terms of academic qualifications. Both CSC and Maison Painchaud CRF caseworkers met the respective requirements for continuous and mandatory training. The BOI found that the continuous training and compliance requirements of these two organizations differed considerably from each other, creating a major discrepancy between the quality required for CRF clinical workers and CSC Parole Officers.

The BOI noted that the caseworkers’ roles and responsibilities by both organizations were not clearly defined. The BOI concluded that the quality of the clinical supervision by the case management workers was lacking, particularly with follow-up responsibilities associated with the role of clinical workers.

The BOI was not able to judge the quality of the content of the case conferences because the policy is vague and non-binding regarding the specific content of the case conferences. It was determined that the discussions held during these case conferences did not identify any major deficits in the offender’s supervision or an elevated risk in time to implement the necessary interventions.

The BOI found that the direct supervision of offenders by the Maison Painchaud CRF was not at the same level as that conducted by CSC. Caseworkers at the CRF did not receive the training provided by CSC to its Parole Officers, and did not benefit from the guidance or clinical supervision provided by a Parole Officer Supervisor.

The BOI found that despite the contract agreement between the two organizations, there was much confusion regarding the caseworkers’ roles and responsibilities on the file at both CSC and the Maison Painchaud CRF. Although all of the caseworkers agreed on CSC’s accountability for final decisions, the sharing of responsibilities with respect to risk management strategies and the quality of supervision activities lacked clarity and direction.

BOI Recommendations:

The BOI recommends that CSC develop a case conference instrument that includes a minimum of indicators that must be discussed.

The BOI recommends that CSC revise Commissioner’s Directive 715-1 – Community Supervision, to include a quality control mechanism with a network of collateral contacts.

The BOI recommends that the direct supervision component set out in the contract agreement be taken away from the Maison Painchaud CRF and given back to CSC, and that CSC review the service models with all other CRFs that are currently responsible for the direct supervision of offenders.

Training

The BOI found that CSC case management workers had not received recent and specialized training on domestic violence, which is essential for good risk management.

BOI Recommendation:

The BOI recommends that CSC integrate training on domestic violence into the Parole Officer Induction Training (POIT) and that this training be offered during the Parole Officer Continuous Development (POCD) training.

PBC Decision-Making Process

The BOI noted that the Board members fully applied the Risk Assessment Framework, as stipulated in policy 2.1, Assessment for Pre-Release Decisions, in the Parole Board of Canada’s Decision-Making Policy Manual for Board Members, in the decisions made on March 26, 2019, for the first day parole review, and on September 19, 2019, for the continuation of day parole and a review of full parole.

The BOI found that the written decision from March 26, 2019, complied with the CCRA principles and the requirements of PBC’s policy 2.1.

In the PBC decision made on September 19, 2019, and finalized on September 20, 2019, the BOI noted a disparity between the decision shared verbally with the offender at the hearing and the written one. The written decision included a summary of many relevant elements. However, the information relating to the permissions granted to the offender by the CMT to attend massage parlours for sexual purposes, as well as the explicit interdiction by the Board members to frequent such parlours, was not clearly reflected in the written decision. 

The BOI noted that the Board members correctly applied the CCRA criteria in imposing the special conditions in the decisions made on March 26, 2019, and September 19, 2019, and that they clearly set out the reasons for these conditions on day parole, in keeping with PBC’s policy 7.1.

The BOI found that, as a whole, the PBC had at its disposal all the relevant and available information for sound decision-making.

Lastly, the BOI found that the Board members who made the conditional release decisions on March 26, 2019, and September 19, 2019, met all of the PBC training requirements and had the level of knowledge necessary to perform their tasks. The BOI also concluded that the PBC training plan for new Board members was well structured and complete.

BOI Recommendation:

The BOI did not make any recommendations to the PBC.

Conclusion

This arm’s length investigation has played an important role in examining the various components of this case from an administrative standpoint, based on the principles of accountability, responsibility and transparency.

Building on this, the BOI findings have provided the opportunity to understand the circumstances that led to this incident and focus on a lessons learned approach to respond to the issues raised. This will result in the implementation of corrective measures and actions that work to prevent such an incident from happening again.