Foreign Election Interference - March 9, 2023

1. Opening remarks

The Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, P.C., K.C., M.P.
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities
To the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
Foreign Election Interference
Ottawa, ON
March 9, 2023

Check against delivery.

Madame Chair,

I wish to thank the Committee for inviting me to appear again as part of this very important study of foreign election interference. I am accompanied here today by Al Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions.

I am confident that the findings and recommendations stemming from this Committee’s study can be key to further strengthening Canadian democracy, Canadian institutions, as well as Canadian society more broadly.

Let me be very clear: protecting our democracy and institutions against threats of foreign interference is a key priority for our government. We do not, under any circumstances, tolerate any form of foreign interference or any attempts to undermine our democratic processes.

This is why the Government announced on Monday the appointment of an Independent Special Rapporteur who will have a wide mandate to formulate specific recommendations on the protection of our democracy.

In the coming weeks, the independent rapporteur will be asked to inform the work of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security Intelligence and Review Agency, as well as other processes underway to identify any gaps in our system. The independent rapporteur’s recommendations will be made public, which could include a formal inquiry or some other independent review process, and the Government will abide by the recommendation.

It is critical that our democratic institutions are safe from foreign interference and that Canadians have confidence that it is so.

Since I last appeared in December, there have been a lot of new pieces of information circulating in the public sphere.

And this Committee heard from a number of witnesses last week who helped shed light on the nature of intelligence and the importance of context in contributing to a full and complete story.

I want to reiterate the robust process that is in place whenever national security agencies are made aware of information that may impact our national and public security. It is important that Canadians be aware of all the steps that are undertaken to continuously protect Canadians and our democracy.

It starts with speaking frankly with Canadians on the threats facing the country and by continuing to adapt to an evolving threat.

I would note, for example, the threat reports released publicly by the Communications Security Establishment in 2017 and updated in 2019 and 2021, as well as the report released by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in advance of the 2021 general election, entitled Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

Additionally, Canada - through the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace - joined forces with Microsoft, the Alliance for Securing Democracy and other international, trusted partners from government, industry and civil society, to hold a series of workshops and share, publicly, good practices in combatting interference in the electoral process including preventing and addressing disinformation, and empowering citizens.

I would also note that my predecessor and I have both regularly mentioned the threats of foreign interference faced by our democratic institutions, including before this Committee.

These are but a few examples of our efforts to continue to build trust in our democratic institutions and ensure that citizens remain engaged and informed, which is democracy’s best defence.

I do want to reiterate that Canada is recognized as having stepped up as a global leader in responding to election interference. And we are continuing to build on the actions we have taken because, not only is this an important responsibility, but also because threats to democracy continue to evolve, and so must our responses.

Among the measures in place is the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which is a key aspect of the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy.

Allow me to point out the basic facts. The Protocol establishes a Panel, which is a group of senior, non-partisan public servants mandated to communicate clearly, transparently and impartially with Canadians during an election in the event of an incident or series of incidents that threaten the integrity of a federal election.

This Panel is supported and briefed regularly by the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, or the SITE Task Force, a coordination entity for Canada’s national security agencies, and from whom you heard testimony last week.

This measure was implemented to reassure Canadians that the decision to intervene, or not to intervene in any election, was impartial and non-partisan.

Madam Chair, while a lot of attention has been given to the Panel, it is by no means the only measure under the Protocol.

The Cabinet Directive on the Protocol states very clearly that whenever national security agencies become aware of interference in a general election, they can consider all options to effectively address the interference.

This is to say, Madam Chair, that the Panel is but one element outlined within the Protocol. It is a robust and integrated process meant to counter threats of foreign inference in our federal elections. But it does not override the mandates and responsibilities of national security agencies.

And I am pleased to say that the independent evaluation of the Protocol was recently completed and the public version released last week.

We are seriously considering the recommendations made by Mr. Rosenberg with a view to continuous improvement of our measures to protect our institutions from foreign interference.

As proof of this commitment, we will release a plan for the implementation of recommendations from Mr. Rosenberg, among others, in the next 30 days.

Now, it is also important to note that some of the allegations that we have seen in the media could include breaches of the Canada Elections Act or other Canadian laws.

Let me be clear: law enforcement mechanisms are in place. The Commissioner of Canada Elections is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Elections Act.

Last week, this Committee heard from the Commissioner directly when she stated that her office has received complaints regarding potential foreign interference and that they are looking into them.

I am sure members of this Committee recognize the importance of carrying out investigations that are thorough and based on complete and sound evidence. I am confident the Commissioner will be carrying out her mandate diligently.

Madam Chair, to conclude, I am hoping that my opening remarks today will reassure Canadians, including the members of this Committee, that the integrity of our elections has not been compromised and that the Government of Canada is taking all the necessary steps to identify, prevent and counter any threats to our electoral institutions and democratic processes.

This includes the recent announcement relating to the appointment of an Independent Special Rapporteur, and requesting that work be undertaken by both NSICOP and NSIRA, to further study the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Thank you.

2. Key messages

Baseline of foreign interference

There is baseline interference from foreign states occurring in Canada that is monitored and investigated on an ongoing basis. Foreign interference is a global problem also faced by Canada’s allies. Canada works together with its partners, including Five Eyes partners, to combat this threat.

Foreign interference is not new, and this has been communicated to Canadians

Over the last few years, Canada’s national security agencies have issued public reports to raise awareness about the nature of the foreign interference threat in Canada. Such reports have been made publicly available since 2017.

2019/2021 elections

The integrity of the 2019 and 2021 elections was not compromised.

The Panel did not observe any activities that met the threshold for public announcement or affected Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

Coordinated response

The threat posed by foreign interference continues to evolve. This is why the Government of Canada is committed to a cohesive and coordinated response as first announced through its Protecting Democracy Plan in 2019. The Plan was updated in 2021 to further enhance our response to ever-evolving threats to Canada’s democracy. Action taken as a part of this plan include but are not limited to:

Creation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol
Investing in digital media literacy efforts
Creation of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) task force
Creation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, housed at Global Affairs Canada
Publication of unclassified threat reports by CSE and CSIS on foreign interference threats
Work with political parties to enhance their cyber security to better protect themselves

I am committed to continuously assessing and adapting the Plan to ensure it is standing up to the challenges brought on by rapidly evolving threats to Canada’s democracy.

Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, Panel and security agencies

The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol is a robust and integrated process meant to counter threats of foreign inference to our federal elections. It does not, however, override the mandates and responsibilities of national security agencies.

The Protocol provides a mechanism to publicly inform Canadians about incidents that threaten our ability to have a free and fair election.

The Panel draws its authority from the Caretaker Convention and the role of the public service to ensure the continuity of government during the election period. Outside the election period, Ministers have the authority and role.

Independent review

An independent review of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol is undertaken after each election.

Mr. Morris Rosenberg, a former senior public servant who served as Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Canada (1998-2004), Deputy Minister of Health Canada (2004-2010), and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2010-2013), completed the independent evaluation following the 2021 election. The report was recently provided to the Prime Minister and to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The public report was released on February 28, 2023.

The independent evaluation affirms the Panel’s value as part of the wider structure in place to safeguard Canada’s election processes and democracy. Work is presently ongoing to assess recommendations made in the report.

Law enforcement

Allegations that would constitute a violation of an Act of Parliament would be investigated by the proper law enforcement agency.

The Commissioner of Canada Elections, an independent officer, is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Canada Elections Act. Investigations are confidential.

Independent Special Rapporteur

An eminent Canadian will be appointed with a wide mandate to make expert recommendations on protecting and enhancing Canadians’ faith in our democracy. If the Independent Special Rapporteur recommends holding a public inquiry, the Government will abide by the recommendation.

The Independent Special Rapporteur will be responsible for informing the work of NSICOP and NSIRA and any other existing processes and investigations that may be carried out by independent bodies such as the Commissioner of Canada Elections.

3. Questions and answers

In this section

Short list
Protecting Democracy Plan
Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and the Panel
Evaluation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol
Combatting disinformation
Specific incidents
Other questions
March 6, 2023 announcement

Short list

1. Can you elaborate on the selection, role, and mandate of the recently announced Independent Special Rapporteur?

The selection of the Independent Special Rapporteur is critical.

Uncovering and learning from foreign interference attempts and threats to Canada’s elections and institutions is an issue that is beyond partisanship. We will consult with other parties and remain open to suggestions on eminent and credible individuals for this Special Rapporteur role.

The Independent Special Rapporteur will be an eminent Canadian with a broad mandate to make expert recommendations on protecting and enhancing Canadians’ faith in our democracy. The Rapporteur will be responsible for informing the work of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and any other processes and investigations that may be carried out by independent bodies such as the Commissioner of Canada Elections.

The Rapporteur will work to identify gaps in our instruments, processes, practices or machinery that may still remain in the protection of our democracy and their recommendations will be public. Such recommendations could include a formal inquiry or some other independent review process should they be deemed necessary by the Independent Special Rapporteur, and the Government will abide by their recommendation.

2. How will the Government implement recommendations from NSICOP, NSIRA, and recommendations contained in the independent evaluations of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol by Jim Judd and Morris Rosenberg?

The Government is committed to continuously enhancing measures in place to keep Canadians, Canada’s institutions, and our democratic process secure. Action taken by the Government include implementing recommendations put forth by various bodies.

Mr. Jim Judd’s independent evaluation of the 2019 Protocol was released in May 2020. The Government implemented all but one of Mr. Judd’s recommendations which was to extend the Protocol outside of the Caretaker period.

Expanding application of the Protocol beyond the writ or Caretaker period would run counter to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which applies when established mechanisms for addressing interference are already in place and the Government is expected to fully discharge its responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities to Parliament.

Mr. Morris Rosenberg’s independent evaluation of the Protocol in place for the 2021 election was released in February 2023. He made16 thoughtful suggestions that we are carefully considering. For example, his advice regarding early preparation, communicating to Canadians, as well as ensuring appropriate review and assessment of the measures in place to combat electoral interference provide valuable insights.

The Government will provide a plan for the implementation of recommendations by Mr. Rosenberg within the next 30 days.

3. Should the Panel’s threshold be lower, and/or should the Panel exist outside of the Caretaker Period?

The threshold is high, and purposefully designed that way given that a key consideration for the Panel is whether an incident will affect the outcome of the election.

In his independent assessment, released on February 28, 2023, Morris Rosenberg notes that having a high threshold underscores the importance of not being overly reliant on public notification as the main instrument for countering foreign interference. Mr. Rosenberg recommends studying the possibility of communicating with Canadians even if an incident is below the threshold. This is an interesting idea that merits assessment. To my mind, it is not unlike what we have seen in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine where together with other NATO allies, Canada has engaged in debunking and even prebunking efforts to refute Russian disinformation.

I would also note that the evaluation following the 2019 elections also recommended that the threshold for an announcement remain unchanged. The high threshold helps to avoid the Panel becoming a frequent intervener in any general election.

As Senator Shugart, former Clerk of the Privy Council, indicated during an interview: “for the panel to decide to go public with an issue of foreign interference as an election is underway would create new problems, with the power of such allegations themselves having the potential to distort the outcome of an election”.

With respect to expanding application of the Protocol beyond the writ period, this would run counter to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which applies when established mechanisms for addressing interference are already in place and the Government is expected to fully discharge its responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities to Parliament.

Countering threats to national security, including foreign interference, remains an active priority of security and law enforcement agencies both during and outside the application period of the Caretaker Convention.

4. Did the Panel make the right choice in not informing the public about foreign interference during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections?

I do not have detailed information on specific incidents the Panel may have considered, or the nature of their deliberations. I am, therefore, not in a position to re-evaluate the Panel’s decisions, nor would it be appropriate for me to do so.

However, I am confident that the members of the Panel exercised their best judgment in making any determination during the 2019 and 2021 elections based on the information available to them at the time.

The Panel members have unique national security, foreign affairs, democratic governance and legal expertise, as well as considerable experience. They bring that perspective and experience to this role, with the utmost of care, integrity and due diligence.

5. Was the Minister/Prime Minister briefed on [allegation], if so when, and what actions were taken?

To be clear, I will not comment on the accuracy of information reported in the media, nor am I at liberty to disclose publicly the details of those national security briefings.

As has been repeated by earlier witnesses, the Prime Minister, and Ministers, including myself, would have received regular intelligence briefings on foreign interference from non-partisan national security experts within the public service, which would have included the National Security and Intelligence Advisor.

6. What further changes could be made to the Canada Elections Act and when?

Work is ongoing to consider recommendations put forth by the Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Canada Elections following the 43rd and 44th general elections.

A number of these recommendations provide an opportunity for the Government to bring forward amendments to safeguard the integrity of the electoral system, delivering on ministerial mandate letter commitments to combat foreign interference and disinformation, and ensure the safety and security of the electoral process. Examples include:

Tightening restrictions on potential foreign donations to ensure greater transparency on where funds from third parties originate.
Facilitating Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE) enforcement and investigations with explicit authorities to enable CCE and security agencies to better share information, and to encourage greater and more timely cooperation when it comes to investigations.
Extending the ban on deliberate false statements that intend to disrupt the conduct of the election in addition to outcomes (e.g., “your mail-in ballot will not be counted if you voted for party X”) and extending existing bans on foreign undue influence and misleading publications beyond the election period.

Additionally, the Government looks forward to receiving any further recommendations from this Committee’s study.

7. What is the relationship between the national security agencies, Elections Canada, and the Commissioner of Canada Elections?

During elections, national security agencies (Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) continue to discharge regular duties specified in their mandates and under their authorities.

They also come together to share information and coordinate briefings as part of two different coordination groups:

The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) task force, which consists of the CSE, CSIS, GAC, and the RCMP. The SITE task force is a venue for intelligence sharing and briefing coordination relating to security and intelligence threats to elections. SITE regularly briefs the Panel.
The Election Security Coordination Committee (ESCC), which is a venue for operational coordination. In addition to SITE members, the ESCC includes representation from Elections Canada, Commissioner of Canada Elections, the Privy Council Office, Public Safety, Public Health Agency of Canada, and Health Canada.

Elections Canada is the independent officer of Parliament in charge of administering the Canada Elections Act. During election periods, Elections Canada receives information from national security agencies and national security agencies receive information from Elections Canada through the ESCC.

The Commissioner of Canada Elections is the independent officer of Parliament entrusted with enforcement of the Canada Elections Act. During elections, the Commissioner receives information from national security agencies through the ESCC. National security agencies and Elections Canada also refer suspected breaches of the Canada Elections Act to the Commissioner for enforcement action during and outside of election periods.

I would say that over the last 5 years there has been an important sea-change in the relationship between the national security agencies and the Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Canada Elections. There has been far more engagement in order to protect, in particular, the cyber-systems of Elections Canada. It is a credit to all those involved that they have come together to protect our electoral system.

8. Are opposition parties presently being briefed on potential foreign interference, and if so, how?

As part of the broader Protecting Democracy Plan, briefings were offered to all of the parties represented in the House of Commons in the lead up to the 2019 and 2021 elections.

Classified briefings focused on issues such as foreign interference, cyber security, violent extremism, and disinformation. They also facilitated information exchange amongst participants and provided an opportunity for political parties to learn more about the mandates of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force member agencies and how they may act on different threats.

Based on his interviews with participants, Mr. Rosenberg recognized the benefits of these briefings in his recent evaluation. He recommended that unclassified briefings be provided to Parliamentarians on foreign interference and election interference threats.

Protecting Democracy Plan

9. Why does Canada need a plan to protect democracy?

The Government of Canada is committed to protecting our democratic institutions. Malicious foreign actors have demonstrated their intent to undermine democratic societies, electoral processes, sovereignty and our security by targeting us or some of our partners and allies.

It is important that Canadians be aware of the threats facing the country. This is why security agencies have released reports to explain the threat. This includes the report by the Communications Security Establishment in 2017 and updated in 2019 and 2021, as well as the report released by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in advance of the 2021 general election, entitled Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process.

As noted in these reports, “democratic processes remain a popular target” and “the vast majority of cyber threat activity affecting the democratic processes can be attributed to state-sponsored cyber threat actors”.

A healthy democracy is built on fair and free elections. Protecting our democracy matters to everyone: Canadians, political parties, governments and the private sector. We recognize that, in any election, Canada may face threats of foreign interference and we must be prepared.

10. How was the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy developed?

Attempts by foreign actors to interfere in elections around the world have become commonplace. As a result, leading up to the October 2019 general election, the Government announced the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy (the Plan) to safeguard Canadian democratic institutions and processes.

Since 2019, elements of the Plan have undergone internal and independent assessments, which have confirmed their utility but also underscored the need to continuous evolve to changing threats. We have built upon and improved these measures, continuing to ensure a government-wide approach to protecting our democratic institutions and processes.

11. Does the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy cover domestic threats and interference activities? Or foreign actors that use Canadians as proxies?

One of the hallmarks of democratic societies is freedom of expression, and open debate and dialogue, particularly during election campaigns. Such dialogue and engagement are cornerstones of a healthy democracy.

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy encompasses efforts to protect this dialogue and engagement, but also to protect our democratic processes and institutions from threats, be they foreign, homegrown, or a combination of the two.

Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and the Panel

12. Who are the members that compose the Panel?

The Panel is a group of senior, public servants who are working with the national security agencies within the agencies’ existing mandates.

This Panel is comprised of:

the Clerk of the Privy Council;
the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister;
the Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General;
the Deputy Minister of Public Safety; and
the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

13. How can you ensure the integrity of the Protocol when the members were hand-selected by the government in power?

The members of the Panel are all senior officials within Canada’s professional and non-partisan public service. It is not the members themselves that were hand-selected by the government in power, but rather the positions they occupy.

I have great confidence in the integrity of Canada’s non-partisan public service. It has been recognized as one of the most effective civil services in the world.

The Clerk of the Privy Council – the head of Canada’s public service – and the other four deputy ministers have unique national security, foreign affairs, democratic governance and legal expertise, as well as considerable experience. They bring that perspective and experience to this role, with the utmost of care, integrity and due diligence. They are also able to call on their respective organizations to support them in their roles as required.

There is an independent review of the Protocol undertaken after each election, and a report with recommendations is provided to the Prime Minister and to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. NSICOP is a committee of parliamentarians with secret clearances empowered to dig into the work done by our intelligence agencies.

The unclassified public version of the most recent evaluation was made available to the public on February 28, 2023.

14. What is the threshold for making an announcement?

The threshold is limited to addressing exceptional circumstances that could impair Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election, whether based on a single incident or a series of incidents. The context and details will matter in making the determination of whether the incident or incidents meet the threshold.

There are multiple considerations in making this judgment, including:

the degree to which the incident or incidents undermine Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election,
the potential of the incident or incidents to undermine the credibility of the election, and
the degree of confidence officials have in the intelligence or information provided.

The threshold for making an announcement is high because the Panel is meant to be a last resort measure. In his evaluation following the 2019 election, Mr. Judd recommended that the threshold for an announcement remain unchanged.

The decision rule for an announcement is consensus and, without consensus, there is no announcement. The Panel should and will inform Canadians should there be a threat to Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election.

The Protocol is a robust and integrated process meant to counter threats of foreign inference to our federal elections. It does not, however, override the mandates and responsibilities of national security agencies.

15. Based on the premise that a small number of ridings (and a small percentage of vote) could affect who forms government, do you think the threshold should be lower?

The threshold is high, and purposefully designed that way given that a key consideration for the Panel is whether the incident or incidents will affect the outcome of the election.

16. Some changes were made to the Protocol between the 2019 and the 2021 general elections. Could you explain why?

Cabinet issued an amended Cabinet Directive in May 2021, removing reference to the Protocol’s application during the 43rd general election. As a result, it will be in place for future general elections until revoked or amended by Cabinet.

Additional key amendments include:

Alignment of the Protocol’s application period with that of the Caretaker Convention;
Explicit provision for the Panel to consult with the Chief Electoral Officer, as appropriate;
Provision for the ability of political parties to alert security agencies of incidents that could threaten a free and fair election; and
Recognition of the Panel’s ability to examine domestically-driven interference, as well as to receive information from sources other than security agencies, at its discretion.

17. How can political parties alert security agencies of incidents?

The changes to the Protocol recognize that incidents can be reported by a variety of sources, including political parties. The regular briefings with political parties in the lead up to an election provide an effective venue for parties to engage directly with security agencies.

It is important to remember that information received by intelligence agencies, irrespective of the source, needs to be properly reviewed and assessed. During his appearance last week, Deputy Minister Morrison provided helpful insights about how intelligence supports decision-making.

18. One of the changes made to the Protocol between the 2019 and 2021 general elections is the removal of the reference to “foreign”. Could you explain why?

The removal of the reference to “foreign” clarified the broad nature of interference. It was removed to clearly recognize that interference may not be limited to foreign actors. It may come from domestic actors, foreign actors and domestic actors working with foreign actors.

Additionally, as the Protocol recognizes, it may sometimes be difficult or impossible to ascertain who is behind the interference, particularly within the short time frame that the Protocol is in place.

19. Can the Prime Minister stop the Panel from making an announcement?

No, during the caretaker period when the Protocol is in place, no one, including the Prime Minister has the authority to veto any decision by the Panel to inform Canadians.

20. Why were the Chief Electoral Officer or the Commissioner of Canada Elections not included in the Protocol?

The Protocol Cabinet Directive is clear that the Panel is to look at issues that are outside of Elections Canada’s or the Commissioner of Canada Elections’ (CCE) respective legislated mandates.

The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) is Canada’s independent, non-partisan election administrator that reports directly to Parliament and who is responsible for administering the Canada Elections Act. The CCE is responsible for ensuring compliance with and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act. This means that interference that impacts the administration of the election falls under their remit.

The changes to the Protocol that were made in 2021 recognize that there may be a need for the Panel to consult with the CEO if the circumstances warrant, while respecting his independence. The Panel engaged with the CEO and the CCE during both the 2019 and 2021 election periods. The nature of this engagement was precautionary and focused on ensuring that there was a clear understanding of respective roles.

21. What is the role of the Panel in relation to national security agencies?

The national security agencies provide regular briefings to the Panel on emerging national security developments and potential threats to the integrity of the election.

As indicated in the Protocol, if the head of a national security agency becomes aware of interference in a general election, they will consider all options to effectively address the interference. Barring any overriding national security/public security reasons, the agencies will inform the affected party (e.g., a candidate; a political party; Elections Canada) of the incident directly.

The Protocol is a robust and integrated process meant to counter threats of foreign inference to our federal elections, but it does not override the mandates and responsibilities of national security agencies. The Panel, which is but one part of the Protocol, provides a mechanism to publicly inform Canadians about incidents that threaten our ability to have free and fair elections.

22. Do political parties have a role in the Protocol?

Under the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, briefings are offered to all of the parties represented in the House of Commons in the lead up to the elections. Parties nominate key leaders involved with the national campaigns to receive security clearances.

Classified briefings are offered on issues important to safeguarding our elections such as foreign interference, cyber security, violent extremism, and disinformation. They also serve as a valuable opportunity to facilitate information exchange amongst participants and learn about the mandates of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force member agencies (CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC) and how they may act on different threats.

In the most recent independent evaluation of the Protocol, Mr. Morris Rosenberg recommends that unclassified briefings be provided to Parliamentarians on foreign interference and election interference threats. As announced by the Prime Minister on Monday, the Government will provide a plan to implement recommendations from Mr. Rosenberg in the next 30 days.

23. What is the Panel’s responsibility if interference comes to light after the Caretaker period?

The Panel was created to ensure coherence and consistency in Canada’s approach to publicly informing Canadians during the Caretaker period about incidents that threaten Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

Response to, investigation of, and communications about potential election interference outside of this period would fall to various actors, including law enforcement agencies and the Commissioner of Canada Elections, depending on the specific nature of the incident.

Evaluation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol

24. There have been 2 reviews of the CEIPP in the last 4 years. Does this mean that the Government lacks confidence in the Protocol and Panel?

Not in the slightest. The Cabinet Directive contains a provision requiring that an independent report be prepared after each general election. It is part of good governance that key processes, especially new ones, are subject to rigorous, independent evaluation. It is important to note that the evaluations done by Jim Judd in 2019 and Morris Rosenberg in 2021 validated the usefulness of both the Protocol and the Panel.

25. Why was there a delay in completing the assessment of the Protocol and its public release?

Mr. Morris Rosenberg, a former senior public servant, was selected in Summer 2022 to prepare the independent report assessing the implementation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and its effectiveness in addressing
threats to the 2021 general election. Mr. Rosenberg’s comprehensive evaluation is based on multiple sources, including interviews with a wide variety of actors, as well as the review of government documents and publications from foreign governments and non-governmental organizations.

A classified version was provided to the Prime Minister and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. An unclassified version of the report was released on February 28, 2023.

26. Why and how was Mr. Morris Rosenberg chosen as the independent evaluator for the 2021 election?

Mr. Rosenberg had a long and distinguished career in the federal public service, spanning decades and multiple different governments and leadership roles. He is also a Member of the Order of Canada, which recognizes his sustained commitment to Canada and his effective and ethical leadership as a senior public servant.

As demonstrated throughout his career, Mr. Rosenberg has the necessary subject matter familiarity, technical skills, and high ethical standards that are required when writing an independent assessment of a complex process such as the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.

Mr. Rosenberg was chosen as the independent evaluator by the Privy Council Office.

27. How will the Government implement recommendations put forth by Mr. Rosenberg?

Pleased to see that the assessment concluded that the Protocol remains a useful tool to protect Canada’s democracy and electoral integrity. As the nature of these threats continues to evolve, the government is thoroughly reviewing the report and its recommendations to determine what next steps are needed.

Mr. Rosenberg made thoughtful suggestions that we are carefully considering. For example, his advice regarding early preparation, communicating to Canadians, as well as ensuring appropriate review and assessment of the measures in place to combat electoral interference provide valuable insights.

As announced by the Prime Minister on Monday, we will provide a plan for the implementation of recommendations from Mr. Rosenberg in the next 30 days.

28. Mr. Rosenberg suggests that the threshold for announcement by the Panel would benefit from clarification. How will the Government respond to this recommendation?

Morris Rosenberg notes that having a high threshold underscores the importance of not being overly reliant on public notification as the main instrument for countering foreign interference. Mr. Rosenberg recommends studying the possibility of communicating with Canadians even if an incident is below the threshold. This is an interesting idea that merits assessment. To my mind, it is not unlike what we have seen in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine where together with other NATO allies, Canada has engaged in debunking and even prebunking efforts to refute Russian disinformation.

I would also note that in the review following the 2019 election, Mr. Judd had also recognized the need for a high threshold to “help avoid the Panel becoming a frequent intervener in any election.”

The Government is committed to carefully studying each of Mr. Rosenberg’s recommendations. As announced by the Prime Minister on Monday, we will provide a plan for the implementation of recommendations from Mr. Rosenberg in the next 30 days.

29. Mr. Rosenberg notes in his report that national security agencies saw attempts at interference. Can you speak to why no announcement was made regarding these attempts?

I will note that I was not a member of the Panel nor am I in a position to speak on the actions of national security agencies.

However, as Mr. Rosenberg notes, the Protocol includes a provision that if a head of a national security agency becomes aware of interference in a general election, they will, in consultation with other national security agencies, consider all options to effectively address the interference.

It is important to highlight that attempts at influence does not automatically mean that it has impacted the outcome of our elections.

I have full confidence in Canada’s national security agencies protecting Canada and Canadians from foreign interference both during and outside of election periods.

30. How did the Government implement recommendations put forth by Mr. Judd?

Mr. Judd released his independent evaluation of the Protocol in place for the 2019 general election in May 2020.

The Government implemented almost all of Mr. Judd’s recommendations. This includes maintaining the Panel with a similar institutional composition and maintaining relationships with political parties and the Chief Electoral Officer.

The only recommendation that the Government did not implement is to extend the Protocol outside of the Caretaker period. Expanding application of the Protocol beyond the writ period would run counter to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which applies when established mechanisms for addressing interference are already in place and the Government is expected to fully discharge its responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities to Parliament.

It should further be noted that countering threats to national security, including foreign interference, remains an active priority of security and law enforcement agencies both during and outside the application period of the Caretake Convention.

31. Should the composition of the Panel be changed? Should it include the Chief Electoral Officer?

In their respective evaluations, both Mr. Judd and Mr. Rosenberg found that the composition of the panel was adequate.

With respect to having the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) serve as a Panel member, Mr. Rosenberg commented that having the ability to consult with him as per the wording of the Protocol is more appropriate given the differing mandates.

The CEO’s focus is properly on administering the election fairly and efficiently. If there are attempts to interfere with the administration of the election, then this is directly within his area of responsibility and authorities.

Combatting disinformation

32. What is the Government of Canada doing to combat disinformation?

Democracies face a growing threat from those seeking to weaken and undermine citizens’ trust in their government. This is why the Government continues to take coordinated action to help Canadians build resilience against disinformation.

The Government established the Digital Citizen Initiative in 2019 to contribute to these efforts. This initiative provides funding to civil society organizations undertaking research or citizen-focused activities, such as public awareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians become more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online.

We are also working with prominent members of the academic community to have a better understanding of the state of disinformation in Canada. One objective is to develop policies and tools to ensure the public service is better equipped to mitigate the impact of disinformation.

In addition, on Monday, the Prime Minister announced a $5.5 million dollar investment into strengthen the capacity of civil society actors to counter disinformation. I am looking forward to shortly announcing the details of how this money will be used.

33. How is the Government of Canada working with social media companies to combat disinformation?

Social media companies have a vital role to play in safeguarding our democratic institutions by enforcing their terms and conditions, protecting against misrepresentation of political actors and removing fake accounts and inauthentic content.

The fourth pillar of Canada’s Plan to Protect Democracy is Building a healthy information ecosystem. It combines education and action by increasing transparency, authenticity, and integrity on social media platforms.

The Government of Canada is further working to ensure academia and civil society have resources to increase awareness on how social media platforms operate. These efforts will bring innovative solutions to better understand the information ecosystem, ensuring we continue to adapt to the ever-changing challenges caused by disinformation.

Additionally, our Government is committed to putting in place a transparent and accountable regulatory framework for online safety in Canada that would apply to online communication service providers, including social media platforms. The Minister of Canadian Heritage has been holding consultations advice to seek advice on how to design the legislative and regulatory framework to address harmful content online for social media platforms and how to best incorporate the feedback from Canadians.

34. How is the Government of Canada strengthening communities that may be particularly at risk to disinformation, including remote and rural communities?

Canadians remain our best defense against disinformation. A critically thinking electorate is less likely to fall victim to disinformation in all its forms. Our role is to provide all Canadians, including those from remote and rural communities, with the tools they need to recognize disinformation when they encounter it.

Yet, we can do more when it comes to engaging with communities at-risk of falling victims to disinformation. We look forward to receiving the committee’s advice on this.

Specific incidents

35. Why did [specific alleged incident] not met the threshold for the Panel to make an announcement?

As the honourable members know, it is important to note that threats and interference are not new. The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and Panel were developed with some of the incidents that we saw around the world in mind.

The 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) report on threats to Canada’s democratic process stated that the agency continues to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, clandestine and covert foreign interference activity by state actors, and that interference threats affect all orders of government and all facets of society (media, voters, political parties, etc.).

I am not a party to the Panel’s deliberations including specific incidents. However, I can say that the Panel is mandated to consider the degree to which any particular incident or series of incidents could undermine Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election. This includes the source, whether the activity can be attributed, and whether the situation or threat is self correcting (for instance, traditional media or civil society are debunking the story).

I would reiterate that the threshold for an announcement is high and is meant to be a last resort.

36. Why was [specific person] not informed of an incident?

To be clear, I will not comment on specific allegations reported in the media.

I would just like to point out that section 5.4 of the Cabinet Directive notes that Security and Intelligence Threats to Election (SITE) Task Force will, working within its members’ respective mandates consider all options to effectively address the interference. Barring any national security or public security reasons, the agencies will inform the affected party.

37. Can you elaborate on the baseline threat or ongoing threats?

As has been set out in reports from and appearances at this Committee by CSE and CSIS, the agencies continue to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, clandestine and covert foreign interference activity by state actors. Those interference threats affect all orders of government and all facets of society. But there are ways to protect against these threats without intervening on all of them and bringing disruption into our election.

While there may not be a noticeable uptick of interference activities during an election, foreign interference can serve to undermine Canada’s democratic institutions and the intimidation or coercion of communities in Canada by hostile state actors constitutes a threat to Canada’s social cohesion, sovereignty, and national security.

38. Could there have been individual ridings where foreign interference affected outcomes, even if the global assessment was that 2019 and 2021 elections were free and fair?

The primary consideration for the Panel is the ability of the incidents to affect Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election. As stated by the Panel members themselves before this Committee, they did not observe any activities of foreign interference that met the threshold of affecting Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election.

Foreign states and other actors routinely threaten a broad range of Canadian interests and Canada takes appropriate actions to mitigate risks and respond as required. Threats to these institutions are not new and we can expect to see them continue. When she was before this Committee, CSIS representative Michelle Tessier noted that CSIS does observe activity of foreign interference or attempts of foreign interference, but not enough to have met the threshold of impacting the overall electoral integrity.

Based on the assessments provided by Canada’s experts on the matter, I am confident that the elections were free and fair.

March 6, 2023 announcement

42. On Monday, the Prime Minister announced that an Independent Special Rapporteur will be appointed and asked that NSICOP and NSIRA undertake work related to foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. Can you elaborate on why these avenues were chosen?

The Independent Special Rapporteur will be able to make recommendations for next steps with respect to protecting and enhancing Canadians’ faith in our democracy. Should the Independent Special Rapporteur recommend launching a public inquiry, the Government will abide by such a recommendation.

The National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the Chief of the Communications Security Establishment have each stated in this Committee that they cannot speak to classified information in this setting.

Parliamentarians who are part of NSICOP have the required clearance and setting to probe classified information. Providing such a setting is required so more can be learned about the interference attempts that have taken place in the 2019 and 2021 elections. Further, unclassified reports and recommendations made by NSICOP are made public and provided to Parliament. This provides transparency for Canadians and holds the Government and Canada’s national security agencies accountable.

National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), established in 2019, is an independent and external review body that reports to Parliament. NSIRA has statutory powers to access relevant information and conduct its reviews independently. As such, it is a thorough and independent mechanism for probing intelligence activities related to foreign interference in Canada’s elections in 2019 and 2021. Its findings and recommendations will be reported to Parliament.

43. Why is the Government not launching a public inquiry into foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?

On Monday, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of an Independent Special Rapporteur to oversee further studies into foreign interreference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The Government is committed to holding a public inquiry should the Independent Special Rapporteur so recommend.

The Prime Minister also asked that NSICOP and NSIRA undertake work with respect to foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

Foreign interference threats strike at the core of Canada’s democracy and national security. Due to the nature of information that is being probed, NSICOP and NSIRA provide the appropriate avenues for undertaking this work while ensuring that Canada’s national security remains protected.

44. NSICOP’s reports are made public but prior to release they are redacted to ensure no classified information is released. Who chooses what to redact and how?

Due to the nature of information that can be discussed at NSICOP, reports produced by NSICOP are classified when submitted to the Prime Minister. However, public versions of reports produced by NSICOP are also made available. To ensure no classified information is released, such reports are redacted by Canada’s professional public service who rely on set objective criteria when redacting information for national security reasons.

45. On Monday, the Prime Minister stated that the Government was investing $5.5 million to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation. Can you elaborate on what this means?

The $5.5 million investment announced by the Prime Minister on Monday will fund the Canadian Digital Media Research Network (CDMRN) over three years to undertake activities to help Canadians become more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online.

The CDMRN will produce and support research into the dynamics of Canada’s information ecosystem, as well as further equip academia and civil society with the resources needed to build Canadian information resilience and digital literacy. It will be administered independently by the Media Ecosystem Observatory, a research initiative led by McGill University and the University of Toronto.

4. Background information

a. Protecting Democracy Plan

Measures taken to Protect Canada’s Democracy

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to safeguard Canada’s elections and democratic institutions against interference.

The Plan was initially implemented ahead of the 2019 general election and renewed and updated ahead of the 2021 election, following extensive assessments.

The Plan includes activities under four pillars:

Enhancing citizen preparedness: by improving the critical thinking and digital literacy skills of Canadians and establishing the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol to ensure Canadians are informed of serious attempts to interfere with their ability to have a free and fair election
Improving organizational readiness: by providing classified threat briefings to political parties represented in the House of Commons; offering cybersecurity guidance to political parties; and engaging collaboratively with Elections Canada
Combatting foreign interference: by leveraging the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force
Building a healthy information ecosystem: by renewing and expanding voluntary commitments from digital and social media platforms to improve transparency, authenticity and integrity on their systems through the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online

Budget 2022 announced key investments in the Plan, including renewal of the Rapid Response Mechanism ($13.4 million over five years and $2.8 million ongoing) and $10 million over five years (with $2 million ongoing) in new resources for the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop, and implement government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and protect democracy.

The following specific activities have been initiated under each of the four pillars.

1. Enhancing citizen preparedness

Implementing the Digital Citizen Initiative to support digital news and civic literacy programming and tools to improve Canadians’ resilience against disinformation (Canadian Heritage).

Releasing public reports on threats to Canada’s democratic process, including 2019 and 2021 updates on Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process (Communications Security Establishment) and a 2021 report on Foreign Interference Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process (Canadian Security Intelligence Service).

Implementing the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, a mechanism for communicating with Canadians during the caretaker period in a clear, transparent, and impartial manner about incidents that threaten the integrity of the election (Privy Council Office).

Increasing the reach and focus of Get Cyber Safe, the national public awareness campaign created to educate Canadians about cyber security and the simple steps they can take to protect themselves online, to include greater linkages to cyber threats to Canada’s democratic processes (Communications Security Establishment).

2. Improving organizational readiness

Offering classified threat briefings to key leadership of political parties represented in the House of Commons to promote situational awareness and help them to strengthen internal security practices and behaviours (PCO, Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police).

Offering additional cyber security technical advice and guidance to political parties to enhance security (Communications Security Establishment).

Enhanced government-wide coordination, including deepened engagement with Elections Canada, which has leadership for the operational conduct of elections, to ensure seamless integration with the Government of Canada’s national security apparatus.

3. Combatting foreign interference

Leveraging Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force to improve awareness of foreign threats and support assessment and response, as well as ongoing work by security agencies to prevent covert, clandestine or criminal activities from interfering in the election (Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Global Affairs Canada).

Leveraging the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to strengthen coordination among G7 democracies in responding to threats to democracy, and monitoring malign actors in the social media space (Global Affairs Canada).

4. Building a healthy information ecosystem

Establishing a common understanding with platforms about their responsibilities in the online democratic space through the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online, which was adopted in 2019 and updated in 2021, with new commitments and signatories (Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, TikTok, Twitter, YouTube).

b. Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and the Panel

Critical Election Incident Public Protocol

Overview

The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol) establishes a mechanism for senior public servants, referred to as the Panel, to communicate clearly, transparently, and impartially with Canadians during an election in the event of an incident or series of incidents that threaten the integrity of a federal election.

First implemented in 2019, the Protocol underwent an independent assessment following the 43rd General Election and was renewed and updated for future elections.

The threshold for an announcement by the Panel is very high and limited to exceptional circumstances that could impair Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election, whether due to a single incident or an accumulation of incidents. The incidents in question would pose a significant risk of undermining Canadians’ democratic rights, or have the potential to undermine the credibility of the election.

During the 2019 and 2021 general elections, the Panel received regular security briefings. The Panel did not observe any activities that met the threshold for public announcement.

Post-2019 Protocol Assessment by Jim Judd

The evaluation of the Protocol following the 2019 federal election was conducted by James Judd, a former Canadian public servant and director of CSIS. The classified version of his report was provided to the Prime Minister and the National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians as per the Cabinet Directive. An unclassified version of the evaluation report was also made available to the public in November 2020.

The evaluation of the Protocol found that overall, its implementation was successful and recommended that it be put in place for the next general election.

It was additionally recommended that the institutional composition of the Panel remain the same. This includes the Clerk of the Privy Council; the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister; the Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General; the Deputy Minister of Public Safety; and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It was further recommended that the threshold for an announcement remain unchanged. The high threshold helps to avoid the Panel becoming a frequent intervener in any general election.

Changes to the Protocol in 2021

Cabinet issued an amended Cabinet Directive in May 2021, removing reference to the Protocol’s application during a specific general election. As a result, it will be in place for future general elections until revoked or amended by Cabinet.

Additional key amendments include:

Alignment of the Protocol’s application period with that of the Caretaker Convention.
Explicit provision for the Panel to consult with the Chief Electoral Officer, as appropriate.
Provision for the ability of political parties to alert security agencies of incidents that could threaten a free and fair election.
Recognition of the Panel’s ability to examine domestically-driven interference, as well as to receive information from sources other than security agencies, at its discretion.

Post-2021 Protocol Assessment by Morris Rosenberg

The 2021 assessment of the CEIPP, conducted by Morris Rosenberg, a former Deputy Minister from 1998 to 2013, was made public on February 28, 2023. It found that the CEIPP worked well and should be maintained with some suggested improvements. The Government of Canada will be reviewing the 16 recommendations carefully and responding in due course.

Annex - Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol

1.0 Introduction

The protection and preservation of Canada’s democratic institutions and practices is one of the core responsibilities of the federal government.

National security threat and risk assessments, along with the experience of key international allies, underscore that Canada’s general elections may be vulnerable to interference in a number of areas. Recognizing this, significant work has been undertaken within the federal government to protect and defend electoral systems and processes. As part of this work, the Government of Canada has established the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP) in order to ensure coherence and consistency in Canada’s approach to publicly informing Canadians during the caretaker period about incidents that threaten Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

2.0 Purpose

The Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol sets out the ministers’ expectations with respect to the general directions and the principles to guide the process for informing the public of an incident that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election during the period that the Caretaker Convention is in effect.

The Protocol is an application reflective of the Caretaker Convention. The Caretaker Convention puts into practice the principle that the government is expected to exercise restraint in its activities and “restrict itself” in matters of policy, spending and appointments during the election period, except where action is “urgent” and “in the national interest”. The Caretaker Convention typically begins on the dissolution of Parliament. It ends when a new government is sworn-in or a result returning an incumbent government is clear.

During the caretaker period, announcements that must proceed are to be made in the name of the department to ensure a distinction between official government business and partisan activity.

3.0 Scope of application

The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol will have a limited mandate. It will only be initiated to respond to incidents that occur during the caretaker period, and that do not fall within Elections Canada’s areas of responsibility (i.e., with regard to the administration of the election, as identified in the Canada Elections Act). Incidents that occur outside of the caretaker period will be addressed through regular Government of Canada operations.

4.0 Panel

The protocol will be administered by a group of senior civil servants who will, working with the national security agencies within the agencies’ existing mandates, be responsible for determining whether the threshold for informing Canadians has been met, either through a single incident or an accumulation of separate incidents.

This Panel will be comprised of:

the Clerk of the Privy Council;
the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister;
the Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General;
the Deputy Minister of Public Safety; and
the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

5.0 Process

The protocol lays out a process through which Canadians would be notified of an incident that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, should notification be necessary.

During the caretaker period, the protocol for a public announcement would be:

The national security agencies will provide regular briefings to the Panel on emerging national security developments and potential threats to the integrity of the election. The Panel may also receive information and advice from sources other than the security and intelligence agencies.
Political parties will be instructed on how to report any interference that they may experience during the election.
If the head of a national security agency (i.e., the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or Global Affairs Canada, working within their respective mandates) becomes aware of interference in a general election, they will, in consultation with each other, consider all options to effectively address the interference. As part of this process, they will inform the Panel. Barring any overriding national security/public security reasons, the agencies will inform the affected party (e.g., a candidate; a political party; Elections Canada) of the incident directly.
The Panel will evaluate incidents to determine if the threshold (as set out in Section 6 below) for informing the public has been met. The Panel will operate on a consensus basis and will draw on expertise from across government, including national security agencies working within their existing mandates. The Panel may consult with the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) to ensure mandates are being respected should issues of interference arise that are possibly relevant to both the Panel and the CEO.
If a public announcement is deemed necessary, the Panel will inform the Prime Minister, the other major party leaders (or designated senior party officials who have received their security clearances sponsored by the Privy Council Office) and Elections Canada that a public announcement will be made. These leaders would all receive the same briefing information.
Immediately after having informed the Prime Minister, the other political parties and Elections Canada, the Clerk of the Privy Council, on behalf of the Panel, may either issue a statement or ask the relevant agency head(s) to issue a statement to notify Canadians of the incident(s).

6.0 Threshold for informing the public

A public announcement during the caretaker period would only occur if the Panel determines that an incident or an accumulation of incidents has occurred that threatens Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

Determining whether the threshold has been met will require considerable judgement. There are different considerations that could be included in making this judgement:

the degree to which the incident(s) undermine(s) Canadians’ ability to have a free and fair election;
the potential of the incident(s) to undermine the credibility of the election; and
the degree of confidence officials have in the intelligence or information.

The Panel brings together unique national security, foreign affairs, democratic governance and legal perspectives, including a clear view of the democratic rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

A disruptive event or incidents of interference may emanate from domestic and/or foreign actors. Attribution of interference attempts may be challenging or not possible within the timelines permitted by events, given that attempts to unduly influence the election may involve misdirection and disinformation. Further, it is possible that foreign actors could be working in collaboration with, or through, domestic actors. Ultimately, it is the impact of the incident on Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election that is at issue in the determination of whether the threshold has been met, and if a public announcement is required. For clarity, Canadians – and democracy – are best served by election campaigns that offer a full range of debate and dissent. The Protocol is not intended to, and will not, be used to respond to that democratic discourse.

7.0 Announcement

The announcement would focus on:

notification of the incident;
what is known about the incident (as deemed appropriate); and
steps Canadians should take to protect themselves (e.g., ensure that they are well informed; cyber hygiene), if relevant.

8.0 Existing authorities

Nothing in this Directive in any way alters or expands the mandates of the national security agencies or any other department or agency. Specifically, nothing in this protocol supersedes the RCMP’s independence.

9.0 Assessment

Following each general election, an independent report will be prepared, assessing the implementation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol and its effectiveness in addressing threats to the election. This report will be presented to the Prime Minister and to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. A public version will also be developed. These reports are intended to help inform whether adjustments to the protocol should be made.

c. High-level summary of GC/parliamentary public reports on threats to Canada’s democratic process

High-level summary of public reports on threats to Canada’s democratic process

In 2017, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) produced a public assessment of the cyber threats to Canada’s democratic process. Updates to this report were published in the months leading up to the 2019 and 2021 general elections.

The 2019 update found that foreign cyber interference targeting voters had become the most common type of cyber threat activity against democratic processes worldwide. The update also noted growing recognition that digital platforms are tools that can be used in both the promotion of a democratic marketplace of ideas and the propagation of disinformation.

The 2021 update concluded that although Canada's democratic process was a lower-priority target for state-sponsored cyber actors relative to other countries, Canadian voters were “very likely” to encounter some form of foreign cyber interference (i.e., cyber threat activity by foreign actors or online foreign influence) ahead of, and during, that year’s general election.

Meanwhile, the 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) report on threats to Canada’s democratic process stated that the agency continues to observe steady, and in some cases increasing, clandestine and covert foreign interference activity by state actors, and that interference threats affect all orders of government and all facets of society (media, voters, political parties, etc.). Nevertheless, Canada’s democratic institutions and processes remain strong.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security’s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024 identified five themes to anticipate in the next two years: (1) ransomware is a persistent threat to Canadian organizations, and the most disruptive form of cybercrime facing Canadians; (2) critical infrastructure is increasingly at risk from cyber threat activity; (3) state-sponsored cyber threat activity, especially programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, is impacting Canadians; (4) cyber threat actors are attempting to influence Canadians by degrading trust in online spaces and exploiting social divisions through the use of misinformation, disinformation and malinformation; and, (5) disruptive technologies bring new opportunities and threats.

A Government Response to the December 18, 2020 motion on Foreign Interference was tabled in the House of Commons. The response provided a review of the breadth and scope of foreign interference in Canada. It acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated foreign interference related trends by providing foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to pursue their hostile activities. It also identified measures taken by the Government of Canada to respond to and counter the threat of foreign interference, including investigations and monitoring, measures to protect against economic-based threats to national security, measures to protect our democratic institutions, strategies to reach out to Canadians, and ways the Government of Canada collaborates with like-minded states on this issue.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) produced the 2019 annual report that recommended that the Government of Canada develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resilience, and that the Government of Canada support this comprehensive strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination.

The subsequent NSICOP 2020 annual report concluded that the threat from espionage and foreign interference is significant and continues to grow, and that China and Russia remain the primary culprits. The effects of espionage and foreign interference are the most significant long-term threats to Canada’s sovereignty and prosperity.

Global Affairs Canada’s G7 Rapid Response Mechanism’s annual report for 2021 summarizes steps taken in Canada to safeguard the 2021 general election. The report also notes evolving trends in state-sponsored information manipulation activities, including foreign state actors’ efforts to leverage divisive issues, social cleavages, key influencers, and proxy news sites, and their targeting of non-state bodies and forums at sub-national levels. It also summarizes allies’ efforts to protect their respective institutions and electoral processes from foreign interference.

The Media Ecosystem Observatory’s report on the Canadian 2021 general election found that although there was widespread misinformation during the election, its impact on the election overall was minimal. The report makes four recommendations to address existing vulnerabilities and build resilience against mis- and disinformation in Canada: to develop a community of practice for tackling misinformation; to engage in strategic countering of misinformation; to increase public resilience to misinformation, and to extend initiatives to limit and counter misinformation to non-election periods.

d. Election Modernization Act (re: foreign election interference)

Elections Modernization Act

The Elections Modernization Act, which came into force in June 2019, made changes to the Canada Elections Act intended to address the potential for foreign interference in Canada’s electoral process. These updates included:

New third party spending limits for partisan advertising, partisan activities, and election surveys and a new obligation that such spending come from a dedicated Canadian bank account¹
Blanket prohibition on the use of foreign funds by third parties for advertising at all times and for partisan activities during the pre-election and election periods²
Prohibition on knowingly selling advertisement space to a foreign person or entity to enable undue influence in the election process³
Clarification on what is considered undue influence by foreign persons and entities, including foreign governments, agents, and mandataries of foreign governments⁴
Clarification on the prohibition related to making false statements about the election process⁵
1. In February 2021, the Ontario Superior Court found s. 91(1) to be an unjustifiable limit on s. 2(b) of the Charter and struck the section down with immediate effect⁶
2. The Government of Canada did not appeal the decision, choosing instead to address the Court’s concerns by adding a knowledge element to s. 91(1) in the Budget Implementation Act⁷ in June 2021
Prohibition on the distribution of materials, in any form, with the intent to mislead the public as to the source of the material⁸
Prohibition on the malicious use of a computer including to manipulate public opinion⁹
New requirement that online platforms maintain a publicly available registry of partisan and election advertising for a period of two years following an election¹⁰

e. CEO and CCE recommendations report (re: foreign election interference)

Recommendations from the CEO and CCE addressing threat of foreign interference

Following a general election, the Chief Electoral Officer is required to provide a report that sets out recommendations for legislative amendments that, in his opinion, are desirable for the better administration of the Act. The report also includes recommendations from the Commissioner of Canada Elections related to the enforcement of the Act.

On June 7, 2022, the CEO tabled “Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections”, which proposes 32 recommendations to the Canada Elections Act (CEA). Of the 32 recommendations, six expressly focus on protecting Canada’s electoral process from foreign interference:

Require third parties that wish to use their own funds to provide audited financial statements to EC that show that no more than 10% of their revenue comes from contributions; and require that all other third parties¹¹ incur expenses only from a separate account established for regulated expense purposes, and identify the contributors, who must be individual Canadian citizens or permanent residents (Recommendation 2.3.1)
Prohibit (foreign and domestic) person or entities from knowingly making false statements about the voting process, including about voting and counting procedures, in order to disrupt the conduct of the election or to undermine the legitimacy of the election or its results (Recommendation 4.1.1)
Extend the prohibitions against foreign interference¹² to the pre-election period, and extend the prohibition against misleading publications that falsely claim to be by an election worker, political party, leadership contestant, nomination contestant or candidate to all times¹³ (Recommendation 4.2.1)
Broaden the scope of the unauthorized use of a computer offence¹⁴ to include acting fraudulently with the intention of disrupting the conduct of the election or undermining the legitimacy of the election or its results (Recommendation 4.2.2)
Require that online platforms (redefined by Recommendation 5.1.2) publish their policies on the administration of paid electoral communications and on user accounts during the pre- and election periods, and on addressing (paid or unpaid) content that misleads electors about voting methods, timing and locations or that inaccurately depicts election-related procedures during election periods (Recommendation 5.1.1)
Amend the definition of “online platform” to extend beyond only those that sell advertising space and eliminate the threshold requirement for digital ad registries¹⁵ (Recommendation 5.1.2)

Of the 22 recommendations put forth by the Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE), three relate, to varying degrees, to protecting Canada’s electoral process from foreign interference:

Add a new provision that provides that the powers and duties of the CCE may also be exercised or performed in respect of a conspiracy, attempt, accessory after the fact, and counselling in relation to a violation or offence that is not committed (Recommendation 1.3)
Require that the contact information of the person who authorized the publication of the message also be included in the online ad registry, and require political entities and third parties to take reasonable steps to ensure that the online platform they use to publish advertising is compliant with Canada Elections Act provisions (Recommendations 1.5.1 and 1.5.2)
Clarify and align definitions related to undue influence and foreign corporations or foreign entities (Recommendation 2.2)

f. The Digital Citizen Initiative and the Digital Citizen Contribution Program

The Digital Citizen Initiative (DCI) is a multi-component strategy that aims to support democracy and social inclusion in Canada by building citizen resilience against online disinformation and building partnerships to support a healthy information ecosystem. It was launched as part of the Government of Canada’s four pillar Plan to Protect Democracy in 2019.

DCI supports a community of Canadian researchers through its Digital Citizen Contribution Program (DCCP) which provides financial assistance for research and citizen-focused activities. Funded projects aim to support democracy and social inclusion in Canada by enhancing and/or supporting efforts to counter online disinformation and other online harms and threats.

Since January 2020, the DCCP has provided $15 million in funding to third-party organizations undertaking research and learning activities, such as public awareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians build resiliency and think critically about information they encounter online. These projects have reached over 12 million Canadians online and offline, in minority communities, in both official languages and in Indigenous communities.

Examples of past and current calls

In 2020, the DCCP dedicated around $4.3 million specifically towards organizations supporting citizens to think critically about the health information they find online and to help citizens identify mis- and disinformation and limit the impact of racist and/or misleading social media posts relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. Funded projects reached people nationally and locally, online and offline, in Indigenous and minority communities, in both official languages.

In March 2022, DCCP launched a special targeted call for proposals to fund initiatives that help people identify online mis-and disinformation related to the war in Ukraine and other national threats to social cohesion. As result, 11 projects received a total of more than $2.4 million in funding for activities ranging from educational workshops, documentary podcasts, new educational resources, and efforts to counter Russian disinformation.

The DCCP’s latest open call closed in August 2022 and provided over $1.2M to fund 16 research projects that aim to evaluate online platforms’ efficacy in countering disinformation and other online harms; understand what role non-news and alternative media sources play in the disinformation sphere; and/or identify the behavioral and psychological underpinnings of the spread of disinformation and harmful content.

g. The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace

In November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron launched the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (Paris Call) with a goal of combatting new cyberspace threats that endanger citizens, and critical network infrastructure. The Paris Call calls on states, the private sector, and organizations in civil society to work together to enhance security in cyberspace, fight disinformation, and address new threats that emerge. Ultimately, the Paris Call provides a platform for these groups to exchange information and good practices on several aspects related to foreign electoral interference. This call marks the largest voluntary multi-stakeholder cybersecurity agreement having been endorsed by over 1,100 international entities, nearly 75 Governments, 350 international, civil society and public sector organizations, and more than 600 private sector actors.

The Paris Call outlines nine principles: (1) increase prevention against and resilience to malicious online activity; (2) protect the accessibility and integrity on the Internet; (3) cooperate in order to prevent interference in electoral processes; (4) work together to combat intellectual property violations via the Internet; (5) prevent the proliferation of malicious online programmes and techniques; (6) improve the security of digital products and services; (7) enhance collective cyber hygiene; (8) clamp down on online mercenary activities and offensive action by non-state actors; (9) work together to strengthen the relevant international standards.

Prime Minister Trudeau publicly pledged Canada’s support for the Paris Call in November 2018. In September 2019, Microsoft approached Canada to consider co-leading initiatives outlined by Principle 3, namely the commitment to cooperate to prevent interference in electoral processes, along with the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) who signed on in November 2019. ASD is a non-partisan advocacy group that works to defend and deter foreign state interference. The resulting partnership between Canada, Microsoft, and ASD was announced by Minister LeBlanc alongside Brad Smith, President of Microsoft, and Laura Rosenberger, Director of ASD, in May 2020.

Paris Call Workshops

In March 2020, the Government of Canada, Microsoft and ASD hosted six workshops on preventing foreign interference involving Canadian and international partners.

The workshops focused on (1) effective information sharing, (2) defining foreign interference, (3) countering election interference during a pandemic, (4) countering and responding to disinformation, (5) protecting election infrastructure (6) building resilience. The goals of these workshops were to: (1) learn about best practices around the world, (2) highlight key observations from experts, (3) identify concrete next steps, (4) learn how the Government of Canada can better combat election interference.

PCO-DI convened nearly 34 leaders from various civil society organizations, academic spaces, and government departments to participate in these workshops.

Key takeaways from workshops:

Workshop 1: Improving multi-stakeholder information sharing, focussed on assessing vulnerable parts of the electoral cycle, and emphasized the need to foster intra-governmental coordination.
Workshop 2: Foreign Interference versus Acceptable Nation-State influence, analyzed key terms that should be included in defining foreign interference. This included and considered the scope and framing of definitions that apply to a full range of threat actors and vectors.
Workshop 3: Countering election interference in a pandemic environment, emphasized the need to balance competing priorities to ensure that cybersecurity is not sidelined because of pandemic-related issues.
Workshop 4: Mitigation and Response: focussed on combatting disinformation.
Workshop 5: Countering the Threat of Interference in Election Infrastructure, spoke to the benefits of keeping voting technology up to date.
Workshop 6: Understanding and Building Community Resilience to Counter the Threat of Election Interference; sought to invest resources in supporting and empowering trusted speakers, and ensuring proactivity in the information environment.

Multi-Stakeholder Insights: A Compendium on Countering Election Interference:

Following the completion of the workshops, the three partners released the insights gleaned through these workshops the form of a compendium entitled Multi-Stakeholder Insights: A Compendium on Countering Election Interference. The compendium is a collection of key observations from leading Canadian and international partners in government, industry and civil society aimed at countering election interference.

5. Placemat – 10-year review of efforts to combat foreign interference

Measures to combat foreign interference in elections

6. Quotes – Recent quotes from PROC witnesses

Quotes from PROC March 1 and 2, 2023

Topic	Quote
Elections in 2019 and 2021	“… the last two federal elections were fair and legitimate.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“…These mechanisms [CEIPP and SITE] helped ensure that the 2019 and 2021 federal elections were indeed fair and legitimate despite foreign interference attempts.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“That there was attempts at foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections has been documented and is quite transparent in the reports done by Jim Judd and Morris Rosenberg, and so I acknowledge that foreign interference has been attempted.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“The panel has come to conclusions in 2019 and also for the elections in 2021 that indeed the information did not reach that threshold. Based on my information and my experience for what it is worth, I would say I concur with the conclusion.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
	“…the Panel was briefed on a regular frequency by the CEIPP taskforce [CSIS, CSE, GAC and RCMP] in both electoral campaigns and ultimately did not find there to have been information that would reach the threshold required to advise Canadians.”	Alia Tayeeb, Deputy Chief of SIGINT, Communications Security Establishment
	“…the Panel functions as a mechanism of last resort.”	David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Panel member 2021)
Threat posed by foreign interference	“Although Canada's electoral system is strong, foreign interference can threaten the integrity of our institutions, particularly by sowing doubts and undermining confidence in the process.”	Alia Tayeeb, Deputy Chief of SIGINT, Communications Security Establishment
	“…we are clear eyed in understanding the challenge posed foreign interference.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“…acts of foreign interference attack the fairness of the electoral process and must be addressed to protect our democracy.”	Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer
Impact of foreign interference	“…it is not possible to draw a straight line between foreign influence and the outcome of a particular election.”	Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer
Impact of foreign interference	“…outcome of this work will allow me to determine whether the allegations have merit under our Act [Canada Elections Act]. They will not permit me to draw conclusion or in a particular riding.”	Caroline Simard, Commissioner of Canada Elections
Challenge of foreign interference in a free, open society	“We cannot totally shield ourselves from foreign interference, especially in an open and free society.”	Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer
	“We are an intelligence service that operates in a democracy, where people do have the right to speak freely… there are means that exist already for people to express their discontent.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
	“We don't monitor, any of us, the internal dialogue of Canadians who have the right to express themselves.”	Alia Tayeeb, Deputy Chief of SIGINT, Communications Security Establishment
Intelligence	“Given the very nature of intelligence, individual reports when taken out of context may be incomplete and misrepresentative of the full story.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“…in some cases, publicly disclosing intelligence on foreign state specific attempts to interfere may ultimately play into their hands including by potentially affecting outcomes of electoral processes and creating confusion.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“…I agree with the Prime Minister, CSIS does not determine who should be a candidate and who should not.”	Jody Thomas, NSIA to PM
	“Intelligence is not a question of evidence.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
	“…as an intelligence service we have very vigorous processes to be able to ingest information, challenge that information, validate it, assess it and that's how intelligence is then put together at the end.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
	“Intelligence rarely paints a full or concrete or actionable picture. Intelligence almost always comes heavily caveated or qualified, in ways that caution consumers…”	David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Panel member 2021)
	“…it is extremely rare to come across an intel report that is concrete enough to constitute a smoking gun.”	David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Panel member 2021)
	“Intelligence is not truth.”	David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Panel member 2021)
Responding to foreign interference	“Foreign interference is conducted through a range of tactics and countering those tactics requires an array of measures, both legislative and non-legislative.”	Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer
	“In an open society, there are risks that foreign governments take advantage of that. We don't want measures that would involve actual surveillance of citizens.”	Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer
	“Building resilience to foreign interference is one way to mitigate its course of effects.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
Investigations and law enforcement	“…we have to presume innocence and not compromise investigations.”	Caroline Simard, Commissioner of Canada Elections
	“We investigate these allegations, and we use all of the tools at our disposal to try to better understand, characterize these activities and reduce the threat where possible.”	David Vigneault, Director of CSIS
	“We need to be able to protect our human and technical sources, our employees and so that sometimes poses challenges, as mentioned by the panel yesterday, in terms of converting it into evidence.”	Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director (Operations) CSIS
	“We're not investigating any elements from the 2019 or 2021 elections. We did not receive any actionable intelligence that would warrant us to initiate a criminal investigation.”	Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner - Federal Policing RCMP
	“I am confident that information that was in the hands of our intelligence community that was deemed to be of importance was shared with [the Commissioner of Canada Elections].	Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Footnote 1

Summary, Elections Modernization Act.

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Footnote 2

Section 349.02, Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 3

Section 282.4(5), Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 4

Section 282.4(1), 282.4(2) Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 5

Sections 91-92, Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 6

Canadian Constitution Foundation v. Canada (AG), 2021 ONSC 1224.

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Footnote 7

Section 361, Budget Implementation Act 2021.

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Footnote 8

Section 481(1), Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 9

Section 482(1), Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 10

Section 352.1(2), Canada Elections Act.

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Footnote 11

That are not individuals.

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Footnote 12

Section 282.4 of the CEA.

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Footnote 13

Section 481 of the CEA.

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Footnote 14

Section 482 of the CEA.

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Footnote 15

Section 325.1 of the CEA.

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2024-08-14