Leader’s debates commission main estimates - May 16, 2023

Opening remarks

Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities
Leaders’ Debates Commission Main Estimates
Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
May 16, 2023

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Introduction

Thank you, Madame Chair.

Members and Colleagues, I am pleased to appear before this Committee today to discuss the Main Estimates for the Leaders’ Debates Commission.

I am joined today by Al Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions, at the Privy Council Office.

As you know, the Prime Minister has entrusted me with the important responsibility of supporting our democratic institutions. I take these responsibilities very seriously.

Canadians have many reasons to be proud of our democracy, but as you are all aware, democracy is always a work in progress and requires our ongoing attention.

I thank the members of this Committee for the time, care, and commitment that you invest every day in our democracy and our democratic institutions.

Leaders’ Debates Commission

Leaders’ debates play an essential role in federal elections, and are a cornerstone of Canada’s healthy, vibrant, and diverse democracy.

Since its creation in 2018, the independent Leaders’ Debates Commission (LDC) has engaged Canadians during two federal elections (2019 and 2021), providing a platform for citizens to compare and learn more about prospective prime ministers and their ideas and vision for the country.

While the LDC receives limited administrative support from the Privy Council Office, it conducts its mandate with complete independence and in the public interest.

As you heard earlier this morning from the Commission’s Chief Financial Officer, the LDC’s mandate is to organize two leaders’ debates (one in each official language) for each federal election, under the leadership of an independent Commissioner and supported by a seven-member advisory board.

The Commission conducted a lessons-learned exercise based on its experience with the debates during the 2021 election. I tabled the resulting recommendations report in the House of Commons on May 10, 2022.

As Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities, I have been mandated by the Prime Minister to consider this report on how to improve leaders’ debates and take steps to ensure that they continue to serve the public interest.

To date, this has included discussions with the Commission about addressing the report recommendations within the Commission’s current Terms of Reference.

As you know, the Right Honourable David Johnston stepped down as the Debates Commissioner in March 2023 to take up his appointment as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference.

Let me express my gratitude, on behalf of all Canadians, for the leadership, knowledge, and experience he brought to the Commission as it continues to establish itself as part of our democratic infrastructure.

The Government intends to appoint a new Commissioner. I will have more to say about the timing and process for this appointment in the future.

In the meantime, the Commission continues its work to prepare for the next set of debates.

Main Estimates

Turning now to the subject of this appearance, the Main Estimates for 2023-24 include an amount of $3,453,736 for the LDC.

The LDC will have access to $596,814 in 2023-24. This is to fund its ongoing operations, including salaries.

The remaining $2,856,922 is a frozen allotment that the LDC can only access in the event of an election, in order to fund production of the actual debates.

You may recall that Budget 2021 revised the existing two-year (pre-election and election year) funding profile of the LDC to allocate existing funding over a four-year period.

This was done to ensure the continuity of the LDC, particularly in a minority government context, so that they are ready to deliver the debates regardless of when an election is held.

The total funding amount included in the Main Estimates helps to ensure leaders’ debates continue to play an essential role in Canada’s federal elections.

Conclusion

Once again, thank you members for the opportunity to appear today.

I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Thank you, Madame Chair.

Leaders’ Debates Commission

Key messages

Role and value of leaders’ debates

Leaders’ debates play an essential role in Canada’s federal elections.

The debates engage Canadians in electoral campaigns and help inform voters by providing important information on different political parties and their platforms.

Resignation of Commissioner Johnston

The Right Honourable David Johnston served as Leaders’ Debates Commissioner for the debates that took place in 2019 and 2021.

Mr. Johnston stepped down as Commissioner in March 2023 to take up his appointment as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference.

I would like to thank Mr. Johnston for his many years of service as Commissioner, and for the leadership, knowledge, and experience he brought to the Commission as it continues to establish itself as part of our democratic infrastructure.

The Commission’s report on the 2021 federal election

The Government has carefully reviewed the report’s findings and recommendations and is working to ensure that leaders’ debates continue to serve the public interest.

To date, this has included discussions with the Commission about addressing the report recommendations within the current Terms of Reference.

2023-2024 main estimates

This year, total funding for the LDC is $3,453,736, which is included in the 2023-2024 Main Estimates.

The LDC will have access to $596,814 to in 2023-24. This is for salaries (including Employee Benefit Plans) and operations.

The remaining $2,856,922 is a frozen allotment that the LDC can only access in the event of an election, in order to fund the production of the debates.

The total funding included in the 2023-2024 Main Estimates is to ensure the continuity of the LDC so they are ready to deliver the debates, regardless of when an election is held.

As an independent body, the LDC is best placed to explain how it intends to use the available funding.

If pressed on funding:

• The LDC provides a service to Canadians and the democratic process by delivering more open and transparent debates.
• Budget 2021 approved funding for the LDC to address its immediate needs to organize debates for the 44th general election. It also included provisions for a more sustainable infrastructure to organize debates in minority government situations.
• Prior to Budget 2021, the LDC’s total funding was allocated over a two-year period – a pre-election year and an election year. Budget 2021 provided the same funds over a four-year period.
• More specifically, Budget 2021 revised the funding profile of the LDC to allocate $0.5M for the first year of an election cycle, $0.7M for the second, $0.7M for the pre-election year, and $3.6M for the election year to ensure that the LDC has sufficient funds to prepare for the next general election.
• The Budget 2021 changes enable the LDC to deliver the debates, regardless of when an election is held.

Anticipated questions and answers

Main estimates 2023-24

The 2023-24 Main Estimates include $3,453,736 in funding for the LDC. What is this amount for?

The funding included in the 2023-2024 Main Estimates is to ensure the continuity of the LDC so they are ready to deliver the debates, regardless of when an election is held.

In 2023-24, the LDC will have access to $596,814, which is for salary (including Employee Benefit Plan) and operations.

The total amount includes a frozen allotment of $2,856,922 that the LDC can only access when an election is called. This amount is reserved to produce the actual debates.

As an independent body, the LDC is best placed to explain how it intends to use the available funding.

Why did the reporting for the LDC’s funding change from the previous year? Is the funding the same?

The amount for 2023-24 includes the election year funding and 2022-23 did not. In both cases, the LDC can access the frozen allotment only when an election is called.

Budget 2021 revised the Commission’s existing two-year (pre-election and election year) funding profile to allocate existing funding over a four-year period.

Currently, the Commission is in year two of a four-year electoral cycle and as such it will have access to $0.60M. This funding will be spent on salaries (including EPB) and operations.

As an independent body, the LDC is best placed to explain how it intends to use the available funding.

Is the government providing funding for the Commission in the current fiscal year because it anticipates an election before the end of March 2024?

No. This is to ensure there are no gaps in operations and that the Commission can respond quickly and effectively whenever an election may be called. The timing of the next General Election remains unknown.

How much has the LDC spent to date? 

To date the LDC has spent $8.1M consisting of $0.1M in 2018-19, $3.7M in 2019-20, $0.3M in 2020-21, $3.2M in 2021-22, and $0.7M in 2022-23.

The amount spent to date reflects the funding that was approved for the last two elections, plus the LDC’s ongoing operations for 2022-23.

Will the LDC receive corporate services from the PCO? How much will this cost?

It is anticipated that the Privy Council Office (PCO) will provide corporate support to the LDC for 2023-24 for services such as financial management, human resource management and information technology.

To date the amount charged to LDC for PCO corporate services was $0.3M in 2019-20, $0.5M in 2021-22, and $0.1M in 2022-23. The amount for 2023-24 will depend on the level of service required by LDC.

The amount charged to LDC per fiscal year fluctuates depending on whether it is an election year or a non-election year.

Resignation of Commissioner Johnston

When exactly did the Commissioner step down?

The Right Honourable David Johnson stepped down as Commissioner on March 16, 2023. The Government announced its intent to appoint Mr. Johnson as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference on March 15, 2023.

When will the Government appoint a new Commissioner?

Canada’s next fixed election date is October 20, 2025. The Government is committed to having the next Commissioner in place in advance of the next general election.

What will the appointments process for the next Commissioner look like?

The appointment process for the next Commissioner has not yet been determined.

Is the Commission still able to carry out its work without a permanent Commissioner?

The Commission continues its work within its mandate to prepare for the next set of Leaders’ Debates and will be ready to support the next Commissioner once they are appointed.

Will the Commission be able to fulfill its mandate to organize Leaders’ Debates in the event of an early election?

Budget 2021 revised the existing two-year (pre-election and election year) funding profile of the Commission to allocate existing funding over a four-year period, to ensure the Commission has sufficient funds to prepare for general elections in minority government situations.

Canada’s next fixed election date is October 20, 2025. The Government is committed to having the next Commissioner in place in advance of the next general election.

Role and Purpose of the Leaders’ Debates Commission

Why is the Leaders’ Debates Commission necessary? 

The LDC was established to ensure that leaders’ debates, in both official languages, remain a predictable, reliable, and stable component of election campaigns.

The work they do is important because an informed electorate is necessary for a healthy democracy. Leaders’ debates provide important opportunities for political parties to communicate directly to Canadians while enabling Canadians to make informed choices come voting day.

Leaders’ debates foster transparency, encourage civic engagement and provide an opportunity for the electorate to get to know party leaders and their policy priorities first hand. All of these elements help build trust in our public institutions.

The LDC is also tasked with organizing debates in a way that reaches new audiences as well as a wider audience than ever before. This includes providing broadcasts in Indigenous languages, as well as other languages spoken across the country, and ensuring that debates are as accessible as they can be to all Canadians, including those living in remote areas and/or those living with disabilities.

Is the LDC serving its purpose?

Leaders’ debates play an essential role in Canada’s federal elections. These debates engage Canadians in the electoral campaign. They help inform how Canadians vote by providing a forum to compare prospective prime ministers, while providing information on different political parties and their policy platforms. The LDC continues to fulfill its purpose and make debates a more predictable, reliable and stable element of federal election campaigns.

Over 10 million Canadians tuned in to the 44th general election English-language debate and over four million watched the French-language debate. The English-language and French-language debates were distributed on 36 television networks, four national radio networks, and 115 digital streams. The debates were provided in 16 languages, including six Indigenous languages, American Sign Language (ASL) and Langue des signes Québécoise (LSQ). They were also available in closed captioning and described video.

The Commission’s Report on the 2021 Federal Election

How will the Government respond to the Commissioner’s recommendations report?

The Government has carefully reviewed the report’s findings and recommendations and is working to ensure that leaders’ debates continue to serve the public interest.

To date, this has included discussions with the Commission about addressing the report recommendations within the current Terms of Reference.

I would like to thank Commissioner Johnston for his leadership on this important issue.

What are the key recommendations in this report?

The principal recommendation is to establish the LDC as a permanent, publicly funded entity.

The report makes a number of key recommendations intended to continue to serve the public interest and ensure future debates are predictable, reliable, and stable.

For example, the LDC report recommends greater control in developing, as well as approving, the format of the debates. The new recommendation would require the LDC to select a producer for the debates earlier in the process, and on the basis of their experience in producing debates.

Additionally, the LDC recommends having the authority to select the debate moderator(s) based on expert consultations. Stakeholder and public feedback from the 44th election overwhelmingly indicated that the moderator should be largely invisible, giving way to substantive discussion among the political leaders at the centre of the debate.

The report also recommends that the LDC have the authority to hold more than two debates.

Does the public have access to this report?

Yes. The report was tabled in Parliament on May 10, 2022, and is available on the LDC website.

It should be noted that the Commission is an independent body, and as such, the Government has no role in contributing to or approving the contents of the report.

What was the methodology behind the report?

The report provides a frank assessment of the leaders’ debates in terms of what worked and what needs to be improved for the LDC to continue to serve the public interest. The recommendations reflect the consideration given to how the LDC could achieve this goal.

For greater details on the report and methodology, please contact the LDC.

Role of PCO

How does the Privy Council Office support the Leaders’ Debates Commission?

The Privy Council Office provides administrative support to the Commission. This support is no different from other support that the Privy Council Office has provided to independent entities such as a Commission of Inquiry. However, the relationship ends there. As indicated in the Order in Council setting its mandate, the “commission is to be guided by the pursuit of the public interest and by the principles of independence, impartiality, credibility, democratic citizenship, civic education, inclusion and cost-effectiveness”.

Has the Privy Council Office provided directives or advice to the Leaders’ Debates Commission since its creation?

The Privy Council Office provides limited administrative support to the LDC. This support is no different from other support that the Privy Council Office has provided to independent entities such as a Commission of Inquiry. However, the relationship ends there. As indicated in the Order in Council setting its mandate, the “commission is to be guided by the pursuit of the public interest and by the principles of independence, impartiality, credibility, democratic citizenship, civic education, inclusion and cost-effectiveness”.

Protecting democracy

Key messages

General – Foreign Interference

• Baseline of Foreign Interference: Foreign interference is a global problem also faced by Canada’s allies. Canada actively works together with its partners, including Five Eyes partners, to combat this threat.
• Foreign interference is not new, and this has been communicated to Canadians: Over the last few years, Canada’s national security agencies have issued public reports to raise awareness about the nature of the foreign interference threat in Canada. Such reports have been made publicly available since 2017.
• No incidents compromised the integrity of the 2019 and 2021 elections: Ministers are not members of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel and cannot speak to the briefings provided to the Panel members by the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Taskforce during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. However, in both 2019 and 2021, members of the Panel did not observe any activities that met the threshold for public announcement or affected Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.
• The Government is continuously working to update its response to the evolving threat of foreign interference: The Government is committed to continuously assessing and adapting the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy to ensure it is standing up to the challenges brought on by rapidly evolving threats to Canada’s democracy, including foreign interference. The Government has also committed to take action on the key areas highlighted in the April 6, 2023 report, presented to the Prime Minister, and entitled “Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions.”

Protecting Democracy Plan

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy (the Plan) is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to safeguard Canada’s elections and democratic institutions against interference.

The Plan was initially implemented ahead of the 2019 general election and renewed and updated ahead of the 2021 election, following independent assessment.

The Plan includes activities under four pillars:

• Enhancing citizen preparedness: by improving the critical thinking and digital literacy skills of Canadians and establishing the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol to provide a mechanism to communicate clearly, transparently and impartially with Canadians of serious attempts to interfere with their ability to have a free and fair election.
• Improving organizational readiness: by providing classified threat briefings to political parties represented in the House of Commons; offering cybersecurity guidance to political parties; and engaging collaboratively with Elections Canada.
• Combatting foreign interference: by leveraging the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
• Building a healthy information ecosystem: by renewing and expanding voluntary commitments from digital and social media platforms to improve transparency, authenticity and integrity on their systems through the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online.

The Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol requires that an independent report assessing the implementation and effectiveness of the Protocol in addressing threats to the election be completed following each general election. The most recent report, following the 2021 general election, was completed by Mr. Morris Rosenberg, a former senior public servant. The public version of the report was released in February 2023. The report found that several elements of the Protocol worked well and that it should remain in place with improvements based on his 16 recommendations. Work is underway to implement the recommendations.

Through Budget 2019, the Plan received $48M over three years, on top of measures taken in previous years to prepare for and respond to threats.

Budget 2022 announced further key investments in the Plan, including renewal of the Rapid Response Mechanism ($13.4 million over five years and $2.8 million ongoing) and $10 million over five years (with $2 million ongoing) in new resources for the creation of the Protecting Democracy Unit within PCO to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures to counter disinformation.

Budget 2023 proposes additional measures related to protecting Canada’s democracy. This includes providing $48.9 million over three years starting in 2023-24 to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted, as well as $13.5 million over five years, starting in 2023-24, and $3.1 million ongoing to Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office.

Canada Elections Act – Amendments to address the potential for foreign interference

In 2018, Parliament passed legislation that made changes to the Canada Elections Act to address the potential for foreign interference in Canada’s electoral processes. The Act prohibits a foreign person or entity from unduly influencing an elector to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or registered party. It also prohibits third parties from using foreign funds for partisan advertising and activities, and prohibits foreign entities from spending on partisan advertising and activities during both the pre-election and election periods.

30-Day Report: “Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions”

Presented to the Prime Minister on April 5, 2023, and published on April 6, 2023, the report includes further actions to respond to recommendations from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and independent assessments of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.

These recommendations call upon the Government to enhance communications with Canadians about foreign interference and protecting democracy; strengthen institutions and supporting legislation to combat foreign interference; respond to newly emerging risks, vulnerabilities, and security issues; and deepen engagement with partners to enhance awareness and improve resiliency to foreign interference.

The Government is committed to taking action on key areas identified in the 30-Day report to strengthen its response to the threat of foreign interference.

The 30-Day report was one of the series of new measures to combat foreign interference announced by the Prime Minister on March 6, 2023, which also included:

• Launching public consultations to guide the creation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry to ensure transparency and accountability from people who advocate on behalf of a foreign government and ensure communities who are often targeted by attempts at foreign interference are protected;
• Requesting the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to undertake reviews to assess the state of foreign interference in federal electoral processes and the flow of information to decision-makers;
• Establishing a new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator to align efforts across Canada’s government;
• Investing $5.5 million to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation; and,
• Creating the position of an Independent Special Rapporteur, the Right Honourable David Johnston, to assess the extent and impact of foreign interference in Canada’s electoral processes and make expert recommendations on protecting and enhancing Canadians’ faith in our democracy.

Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

On March 15, 2023, the Government announced its intent to appoint the Right Honourable David Johnston as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, as part of a suite of measures to help combat foreign interference and strengthen confidence in our federal electoral process and democratic institutions.

Mr. Johnston is an accomplished Canadian public servant and law professor. He served as the 28th Governor General of Canada from 2010 to 2017, an important role in Canada’s democracy.

In this current role, Mr. Johnston has a wide mandate to look into foreign interference in the last two federal general elections and the government’s efforts to defend Canada against it, as well as make expert recommendations on how to further protect our democracy and uphold Canadians’ confidence in it.

Mr. Johnston will complete his work by the end of October 2023. In addition, he has been requested to provide interim recommendations on the advisability of additional mechanisms or transparent processes he believes may be necessary to answer any issues in connection with this mandate are requested no later than May 23, 2023. This could include a recommendation to initiate a formal public inquiry.

Disinformation

Democracies face a growing threat from those seeking to weaken and undermine citizens’ trust in their government. That is why the Government continues to take coordinated action to help Canadians build resilience against disinformation.

The Government established the Digital Citizen Initiative in 2019 to contribute to these efforts. This initiative provides funding to civil society organizations undertaking research or citizen-focused activities, such as public awareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians become more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online. 

We are also working with prominent members of the academic community to have a better understanding of the state of disinformation in Canada. One objective is to develop policies and tools to ensure the public service is better equipped to mitigate the impact of disinformation.

In addition, on March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced $5.5 million to strengthen the capacity of civil society actors to counter disinformation.

Anticipated questions and answers

Protecting Democracy Plan

Why does Canada need a plan to protect democracy?

The Government of Canada is committed to protecting our democratic institutions. Malicious foreign actors have demonstrated their intent to undermine democratic societies, electoral processes and security by targeting Canada or some of Canada’s partners and allies.

It is important that Canadians be aware of the threats facing the country. That is why security agencies have released reports to explain the threat. This includes the report by the Communications Security Establishment in 2017 and updated in 2019 and 2021, as well as the report released by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in advance of the 2021 general election, entitled “Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process”.

As noted in these reports, “democratic processes remain a popular target” and “the vast majority of cyber threat activity affecting the democratic processes can be attributed to state-sponsored cyber threat actors”.

A healthy democracy is built on fair and free elections. Protecting our democracy matters to everyone: Canadians, political parties, governments and the private sector. We recognize that, in any election, Canada may face threats of foreign interference and we must be prepared.

How was the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy developed?

Attempts by foreign actors to interfere in elections around the world have become commonplace. As a result, leading up to the October 2019 general election, the Government announced the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy (the Plan) to safeguard Canadian democratic institutions and processes.

Since 2019, elements of the Plan have undergone internal and independent assessments, which have confirmed their utility but also underscored the need to continuous evolve to changing threats. We have built upon and improved these measures, continuing to ensure a government-wide approach to protecting our democratic institutions and processes.

Does the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy cover domestic threats and interference activities? Or foreign actors that use Canadians as proxies?

One of the hallmarks of democratic societies is freedom of expression, and open debate and dialogue, particularly during election campaigns. Such dialogue and engagement are cornerstones of a healthy democracy.

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy encompasses efforts to protect this dialogue and engagement, but also to protect our democratic processes and institutions from threats, be they foreign, homegrown, or a combination of the two.

How will the Government implement the recommendations contained in the recent independent evaluation of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol by Morris Rosenberg?

Mr. Morris Rosenberg’s independent evaluation of the Protocol in place for the 2021 election was released publicly in February 2023. The report found that several elements of the Protocol worked well and that it should remain in place with improvements based on his 16 recommendations, related to the themes of communications, considerations by the Panel, changes to the Protocol, political actors and security issues.

The 30-Day Report, entitled “Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions”, publicly released on April 6, 2023, highlighted the work completed to date and further actions to respond to outstanding recommendations, including those by Mr. Rosenberg.

A plan to implement the recommendations by Mr. Rosenberg is under development.

What further changes could be made to the Canada Elections Act and when?

Work is ongoing to consider recommendations put forth by the Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Canada Elections following the 43rd and 44th general elections.

Several of these recommendations relate to the mandate the Prime Minister gave me to lead an integrated government response to protect Canada’s democratic institutions against foreign interference and disinformation.

In addition, I look forward to receiving any further recommendations this Committee may have as it carries out its study on foreign interference.

30-Day Report: “Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions”

What was the purpose of the 30-day report?

On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced a series of new measures to take immediate action to combat the threat of foreign interference.

This included developing a plan to address outstanding recommendations from the NSICOP, the independent assessments of the Protocol (Judd Report and Rosenberg Report), and other reviews on these matters, within the next 30 days.

What was in the 30-day report?

The 30-Day report highlights the work completed to date as well as further actions to respond to outstanding recommendations to enhance communications with Canadians about foreign interference and protecting democracy; strengthen institutions and supporting legislation to combat foreign interference; respond to newly emerging risks, vulnerabilities, and security issues; and deepen engagement with partners to enhance awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference.

More specifically, the report outlines that, along with ministers and national security agencies, the new National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator will work to bolster public communications on foreign interference. New briefings will be offered to Members of Parliament, Senators and their staff, and the Coordinator will work on expanding briefing mechanisms outside the federal government.

The plan also includes reviews of existing legislation, such as the CSIS Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act, and the Canada Elections Act.

Improvements will be made to briefings for political parties during the next General Election and the government will be exploring further changes to the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, as well as enhancements to the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.

Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference

Why did the Government appoint an Independent Special Rapporteur?

The Government announced the creation of the Independent Special Rapporteur on March 6, 2023, as part of a series of new measures to combat the threat of foreign interference.

The Independent Special Rapporteur will have a wide mandate to look into foreign interference in the last two federal general elections and make expert recommendations on how to further protect our democracy and uphold Canadians’ confidence in it.

Should the Independent Special Rapporteur recommend launching a public inquiry, the Government will abide by such a recommendation.

On March 15, 2023, the government announced its intent to appoint the Right Honourable David Johnston as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference.

Mr. Johnston is an accomplished Canadian public servant and law professor. I am very pleased that he agreed to take on this important appointment and I look forward to his recommendations.

Why is the Government not simply launching a public inquiry into foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?

On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of an Independent Special Rapporteur to oversee further studies into foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The Government is committed to holding a public inquiry should the Independent Special Rapporteur so recommend.

The Prime Minister also asked that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) undertake work with respect to foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections

Foreign interference threats strike at the core of Canada’s democracy and national security. Due to the nature of information that is being probed, NSICOP and NSIRA provide the appropriate avenues for undertaking this work while ensuring that Canada’s national security remains protected.

Disinformation

What is the Government of Canada doing to combat disinformation?

Democracies face a growing threat from those seeking to weaken and undermine citizens’ trust in their government. That is why the Government continues to take coordinated action to help Canadians build resilience against disinformation.

The Government established the Digital Citizen Initiative in 2019 to contribute to these efforts. This initiative provides funding to civil society organizations undertaking research or citizen-focused activities, such as public awareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians become more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online. 

We are also working with prominent members of the academic community to have a better understanding of the state of disinformation in Canada. One objective is to develop policies and tools to ensure the public service is better equipped to mitigate the impact of disinformation.

In addition, on March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced a $5.5 million dollar investment into strengthen the capacity of civil society actors to counter disinformation.

How is the Government of Canada working with social media companies to combat disinformation?

Social media companies have a vital role to play in safeguarding our democratic institutions by enforcing their terms and conditions, protecting against misrepresentation of political actors and removing fake accounts and inauthentic content.

The fourth pillar of Canada’s Plan to Protect Democracy is building a healthy information ecosystem. It combines education and action by increasing transparency, authenticity, and integrity on social media platforms.

The Government of Canada is further working to ensure academia and civil society have resources to increase awareness on how social media platforms operate. These efforts will bring innovative solutions to better understand the information ecosystem, ensuring we continue to adapt to the ever-changing challenges caused by disinformation.

Additionally, the Government is committed to putting in place a transparent and accountable regulatory framework for online safety in Canada that would apply to online communication service providers, including social media platforms. The Minister of Canadian Heritage has been holding consultations to seek advice on how to design the legislative and regulatory framework to address harmful content online for social media platforms and how to best incorporate the feedback from Canadians.

How is the Government of Canada strengthening communities that may be particularly at risk to disinformation, including remote and rural communities?

Canadians remain our best defense against disinformation. A critically thinking electorate is less likely to fall victim to disinformation in all its forms. Our role is to provide all Canadians, including those from remote and rural communities, with the tools they need to recognize disinformation when they encounter it.

The Government established the Digital Citizen Initiative in 2019 to contribute to these efforts. This initiative provides funding to civil society organizations undertaking research or citizen-focused activities, such as public awareness tools and online workshops, to help Canadians become more resilient and think critically about the information they consume online. 

We are also working with prominent members of the academic community to have a better understanding of the state of disinformation in Canada. One objective is to develop policies and tools to ensure the public service is better equipped to mitigate the impact of disinformation.

Measures to combat foreign interference in elections

Key findings and all recommendations from the Rosenberg (2023) and Judd reports (2020)

Section 9 of the Cabinet Directive establishing the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (“the Protocol”) requires that an independent evaluation of the Protocol be completed following a general election. A public report is produced alongside a classified version which is submitted to the Prime Minister and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Rosenberg report

Mr. Morris Rosenberg, former senior public servant, evaluated the Protocol following the 2021 general election. The public version of his report (“Rosenberg Report”) is expected to be released shortly.

Rosenberg key findings

• The Protocol is effective in enabling the Panel to have input from outside the national security agencies, as required. The language is broad enough to encompass advice from both within and outside of the government.
• Rather than having the Chief Electoral Officer serve as a Panel member, having the ability to consult with him as per the wording of the Protocol is more appropriate given the differing mandates.
• A panel composed of senior deputy ministers has several advantages. The composition of the Panel is based on their knowledge, experience and judgment and the working relationship among them. They are skilled at drawing out the expertise of the security agencies. They are also adept at assessing the information they receive and in challenging it, where necessary.
• Panel members were generally positive on the briefings they received from the Privy Council Office and SITE during the election campaign. They were also generally satisfied with the content of the pre-election briefing, however there was agreement that earlier preparation would be beneficial in the future.
• Overall, several elements worked well, and the Protocol should remain in place with improvements around communication, preparation, announcement considerations, and clarification of some of the language in the Protocol.

Rosenberg recommendations

Communications

• Public communication about the Protocol should provide a clear explanation for the inclusion of domestic actors and of the types of activities that are of concern. (1)
• There should be an announcement, within a year of the previous election, about the government’s plan to safeguard the integrity of Canada’s elections, including an explanation of the reason for the Protocol. (4)
• The government’s plan and public communications should acknowledge that the problem of interference occurs both before the election is called and during the caretaker period. It should be clearer on how and by whom pre-election interference will be addressed, beyond saying that it will be handled through normal ministerial channels. (5)
• Public communications on the Protocol should emphasize the full range of activities that occur during the caretaker period, rather than being focused on the announcement by the Panel. (16)

Panel considerations

• It is recommended that the government consider options to ensure that the Panel is well-prepared in advance, and as much as possible, continuity of members is maintained between elections. (6)
• Briefings of the Panel should begin much earlier in the mandate and include non-government actors with expertise on interference and disinformation. (7)

Protocol changes

• The government should consider amending section 6.0 to provide that, barring any national security or public interest reasons, an announcement would be made if the threshold is met. (9)
• The government should consider removing the fourth sentence in the final paragraph of section 6.0 and clarifying that actual or potential impact is one of several considerations that the panel takes into account in exercising its judgment as to whether the threshold has been met. (10)
• There should be further study of the issue of whether the Protocol should be amended to provide for the possibility of announcements below the threshold set out in section 6.0. (11)
• The Protocol should be maintained with the modifications noted in this report. (15)

Political actors

• There should be an effort made to provide briefings to political party representatives at downtown Ottawa secure locations. (12)
• Briefing times should be fixed in advance, with flexibility to address urgent situations. (13)
• The national security agencies should develop a program of unclassified briefings to increase the awareness of Members of Parliament and Senators on foreign interference and on election interference and on measures they can take to safeguard themselves and their online information. (14)

Security issues

• Preparations for the next election should include an assessment of whether ministerial security, Royal Canadian Mounted Police protective policing, and local policing capabilities are adequate for the level and persistence of threats and whether there is effective coordination among these bodies. There should also be a review of the coordination between political parties and the government with respect to campaign and security operations. (2)
• There should be an assessment as to whether any adjustments should be made to the role of the SITE membership in light of the growing problem of domestic interference. (3)
• There should be an opportunity for a review body to assess the decisions of ministers with respect to the use of threat reduction measures during the caretaker period. (8)

Judd report

Mr. Jim Judd, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, evaluated the Protocol following the 2019 general election. The public version of Judd’s report (“Judd Report”) was released in May 2020.

Judd key findings

• Overall, the implementation of the Protocol was successful. While no threats met the threshold, the Protocol ensured the Government of Canada was prepared to report to Canadians as needed and that decision-making about potential interventions did take place as appropriate.
• The Panel was well supported and received timely, varied and considered intelligence and other reporting.
• Panel members developed a rapport and came to a common understanding of their roles and the challenges of meeting their responsibilities. Collegial relationships were also developed with partners (Elections Canada and security agencies).
• Challenges include: the range of possible threats; no other similar model to draw from; the short time for decision-making, possibly with incomplete information; threshold not lending itself to quantifiable decision-making; and finally, distinguishing between domestic and foreign threats on social media.
• Overall, public and media reactions to the Protocol were neutral to positive. Some foreign media contrasted the Canadian actions very favourable relative to the efforts of other Western countries. That said, the report notes two areas of criticism. The first questioned the utility of the Protocol as any intervention would do more harm than good. The second was about the composition of the Panel. One observation was that was it should not be comprised of public servants, but rather eminent Canadians such as former jurists or political leaders. Another critique of the Panel’s composition was that the Panel did not have representation from Elections Canada.

Judd recommendations

1. Implement the Protocol for the next election using the same model and Panel membership. Prepare Panel members early, starting with new members. The high threshold and decision by consensus should be maintained, as well as the support and participation from the same departments and agencies. The rationale is that this model has already been accepted by the parties and there is the ability to maintain some consistency in membership. An accompanying media strategy should also be developed.
2. The Protocol should also cover the pre-writ period, recognizing this may not be possible in the event of an election triggered by a non-confidence vote.
3. Privy Council Office support teams (Democratic Institutions and Security and Intelligence) should monitor any international developments, with particular attention paid to any evolution in tactics by malign actors and any developments in defensive counter-measures taken by target countries (legal, regulatory and operational). This can also include academic and think-tank research.
4. Immediately establish the same relationships with the political parties, particularly with respect to guidance and support around cyber issues as the parties are likely targets beyond simply the election period.
5. Conduct an evaluation on the extent to which the social media platforms lived up to the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online. Once complete, hold discussions with the platforms on the Government’s expectations for the next election. Participation in the Paris Call could possibly inform any new agreements.

30-day report – backgrounder

Countering an evolving threat: Update on recommendations to counter foreign interference in Canada’s democratic institutions

From: Democratic Institutions

Backgrounder

On March 6, 2023, the Government of Canada announced several measures to combat foreign interference and uphold confidence in our democratic institutions. Those measures included a request to develop a plan, within 30 days, to address outstanding recommendations from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and assessments of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol). Specifically, the reports include:

• National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019
• Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018
• Report on the Assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (Rosenberg Report)
• Report on the Assessment of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol – May 2020 (Judd Report)

Between 2018 and 2023, a total of 26 recommendations were made, including 16 delivered in February 2023 as part of the Rosenberg Report. The recommendations have been grouped by the following themes:

• Communicating with Canadians about Foreign Interference and Protecting Canada’s Democracy
• Effective Governance and Strong Legal Frameworks
• Risks, Vulnerabilities, and Security Measures
• Engagement with Partners to Enhance Awareness and Improve Resilience to Foreign Interference

There has been significant work done to implement many of the recommendations from the reports, and the government is continuing to work towards implementing others.

• The five recommendations from the two NSICOP reports (2018 and 2019) have been partially addressed. Some action has been taken with respect to every recommendation, and additional options for consideration have been identified
• Four of the five recommendations of the Judd Report have been implemented in whole or in part. One of the recommendations proposed that the Protocol be expanded to apply even when there is no election being held. This had not been implemented because Ministers already have the responsibility and the necessary powers to address any concerns about foreign interference that could arise between elections. Ministerial responsibility is a fundamental tenet of Canada’s parliamentary democracy. The Rosenberg report, received in February 2023, outlined 16 recommendations which are in the process of being considered for early implementation

NSICOP and Protocol Assessment Reports

In 2017, the Government of Canada introduced legislation to create the NSICOP, made up of Members of Parliament from each party and Senators with top-secret security clearance to review national security and intelligence activities across the government. It was modelled on similar approaches taken by international partners and has since reviewed and provided recommendations on issues concerning national security. In 2019, the NSICOP completed a review of foreign interference in Canada and published their unclassified findings and recommendations in their 2019 annual report. NSICOP also published recommendations relating to foreign interference in their Special Report in February 2018.

As part of the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, starting with the 2019 election, the Government of Canada established the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which is administered by a panel of the most senior federal public servants (the Panel) who, working with national security agencies, are responsible for communication with Canadians in the event of an incident or series of incidents that threaten Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election.

James Judd, a former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, undertook an assessment of the Protocol covering the 2019 federal election. Morris Rosenberg, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Attorney General of Canada, conducted his assessment of the Protocol covering the 2021 federal election. During the 2019 and 2021 general election, the Panel did not detect foreign interference that threatened the integrity of either election.

30-day report – full report

Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions

In this section

• Introduction
• Recommendations from the four reports reviewed – Implementation status, potential gaps and next steps
• Annex A – Table of recommendations and associated actions

Introduction

On March 6, 2023, the Government of Canada announced several measures to combat foreign interference in Canadian democratic processes. Included in these measures was a request to develop a plan to address outstanding recommendations from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) in 2018 and 2019¹, the Judd Report², and the Rosenberg Report³. The plan, set out below, outlines these recommendations, summarizes the actions that have been taken so far to address them, and proposes further action.

Between the years 2018 to 2023, 26 recommendations were made with 16 of those received in early 2023, as part of the Rosenberg Report. Since the recommendations from each of the reports touch on similar issues, they have been grouped under the following themes:

• Communicating with Canadians about Foreign Interference and Protecting Canada’s Democracy
• Effective Governance and Strong Legal Frameworks
• Risks, Vulnerabilities, and Security Measures
• Engagement with Partners to Enhance Awareness and Improve Resilience to Foreign Interference 

A table with the status of each recommendation can be found at Annex A.

This plan outlines the recommendations made in the reports to protect Canadian democratic institutions and processes; summarizes the actions that have been taken or are in progress to address the recommendations; and proposes further steps for consideration to bolster Canada’s response to foreign interference threats. In order to implement these further steps, additional work will be required, including, the policy approach, undertaking consultations, possible legislation for Parliamentary review, and implementation.

Recommendations from the four reports reviewed – Implementation status, potential gaps and next steps

There has been significant work done to implement many of the recommendations from the reports, and the Government is continuing to work toward implementing others.

The five recommendations from the two NSICOP reports (2018 and 2019) have been partially addressed. Some action has been taken with respect to every recommendation, and additional options for consideration have been identified. 

Four of five recommendations of the Judd Report have been implemented in whole or in part. One of the recommendations (#2) proposes that the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol be expanded to apply even when there is no election being held. This had not been implemented because Ministers already have the responsibility and the necessary powers to address any concerns about foreign interference that could arise between elections. Ministerial responsibility is a fundamental tenet of Canada’s parliamentary democracy. 

The Rosenberg Report, received in February 2023, outlined 16 recommendations which are in the process of being considered for early implementation.

The four reports point out that equipping citizens with knowledge is the best defence against those who try to meddle in Canada’s democratic processes. In its 2019 report, NSICOP outlined that, with regards to foreign interference, it is critical to “strengthen public awareness of threats to Canada.” Mr. Rosenberg, in his recent report, emphasized the importance of establishing “a clear articulation of the problem and the approach to addressing it.” 

Current status

The Government of Canada has taken steps to increase public awareness around foreign interference and to encourage a whole-of-society approach to addressing this threat. Since 2018, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has highlighted the threat of foreign interference in every Annual Report. Before the 2021 federal election, CSIS released a public report focusing on foreign interference and threats to Canada’s democratic process. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) also began publishing reports on foreign cyberinterference in the context of elections in 2017. The Government of Canada has also undertaken specific outreach activities to engage Canadians and communities, including CSIS stakeholder engagement (industry, universities, Canadian communities, civil society), CSE and Cyber Centre outreach (industry, small business, privately-owned critical infrastructure), and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) community outreach efforts. 

In advance of the 2019 election, Canada put in place the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy. The Plan was the first of its kind internationally and recognized the importance of an informed citizenry in defending against foreign interference through the establishment of the Digital Citizen Initiative. This initiative supports democracy and social inclusion in Canada by building citizen resilience against online disinformation and building partnerships to support a healthy information ecosystem. The Plan also recognized the importance of collaboration with allies and like-minded partners by expanding Canada’s leadership role in the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, which was launched at the G7 meeting hosted by Canada in 2018. This mechanism helps G7 and other allied countries to cooperate by sharing information about foreign interference on social media. Since 2018, the Government of Canada has invested close to $20 million in the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, including $13.4 million over five years in May 2022, to deepen the coordination between countries in identifying, and responding to, foreign threats to democracy, including state-sponsored disinformation.

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy also signaled that government institutions need to continue to work together to prepare and respond to threats of foreign interference. The Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol) is part of this effort. The Protocol establishes a non-partisan panel of deputy ministers (the Panel) tasked with communicating to Canadians about incidents during the writ period that threatened the integrity of a federal election. 

The Panel’s deliberations are informed by another innovation, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, which is made up of officials from the RCMP, CSE, CSIS and Global Affairs Canada, to report on covert, clandestine, or criminal activities by foreign actors.

The Plan recognized that foreign state interference and disinformation challenges are complex and inter-related – the latter being a tactic of the former. As such, the Plan outlined a whole-of-society approach to tackling them. The Government of Canada is working to further equip academia, civil society, and provinces and territories with the resources needed to increase awareness of these threats. Working with these partners is essential to ensuring Canada continues to adapt to ever-changing challenges. 

The Government’s approach continues to evolve. The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy has been revised and improved since the 2019 federal election by bringing to bear four strategic areas of improvement:

• Strengthening a “full election cycle” view of threats;
• Broadening the Government’s view on threat awareness;
• Developing central leadership on disinformation; and
• Continuously reinforcing the resilience of institutions and citizens. 

The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy has also been improved by addressing Mr. Judd’s recommendations for the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol. These changes included: 

• Alignment of the Protocol’s application period with that of the Caretaker Convention;
• An explicit provision for the Panel to consult with the Chief Electoral Officer, as appropriate;
• A provision for the ability of political parties to alert security agencies of incidents that could threaten a free and fair election; and
• A recognition of the Panel’s ability to examine domestically-driven interference, as well as to receive information from sources other than security agencies.

The Canada Declaration on Election Integrity Online was strengthened by expanding signatories beyond the original four – Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter. In 2021, TikTok, LinkedIn and YouTube joined the Declaration. First established in 2019, the Declaration is a voluntary agreement with social media platforms to increase the transparency, authenticity and integrity of their systems to help safeguard Canada’s federal elections. The Declaration recognizes that social media and other online platforms, as well as the Government of Canada, have respective responsibilities to help safeguard Canada’s electoral processes. This directly responded to Mr. Judd’s recommendation #5 and helped to reduce disinformation. 

The renewed Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy also recognized the importance of departments and agencies working together to address quickly emerging challenges. It additionally strengthened interdepartmental cooperation in countering disinformation.

Drawing upon insights developed by the United Kingdom’s RESIST model, this work is founded on the need to recognize disinformation and to understand how it works. While still in its early stages, these efforts also seek to enhance the availability of reliable information on government programs and services, implement a counter disinformation toolkit, and offer training for Parliamentarians and public servants on foreign interference and disinformation.

Most recently, the Government of Canada established the Protecting Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office and tasked it with coordinating, developing, and implementing government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and to protect Canada’s democratic institutions. Together, these efforts contribute to the overarching objective of one of NSICOP’s 2019 recommendations to “build institutional and public resiliency” through “sustained central leadership and coordination.” 

Potential gaps and next steps

Informed by earlier reviews and by evidence from the 2019 and 2021 federal elections in which the above measures were in place, Mr. Rosenberg finds that “the government’s plan and public communications should acknowledge that the problem of interference occurs both before the election is called and during the caretaker period” – it is not just during the election period, but all the time. 

Mr. Rosenberg also finds that the Government should be clear that “the Protocol is only one element in a much larger set of measures aimed at addressing election interference”. Mr. Rosenberg recommends “an early, fulsome communications approach” that explains the “full range of activities that occur during the caretaker period.” These findings align closely with earlier findings from NSICOP that recommend that the Government “engage Canadian institutions more thoroughly on the significant threats they face” with regards to foreign interference. It can, however, be challenging to speak openly about foreign interference, given the risk of revealing intelligence, the need to protect sources, and to ensure critical relationships are maintained with Canada’s intelligence partners. NSICOP acknowledged this reality in its 2019 report when it emphasized the “challenges in communicating information” related to foreign interference “due to the sensitive nature of the information.”

Nevertheless, it is clear that a central finding in the four reports studied relates to a requirement for increased transparency with Canadians about the extent and nature of foreign interference in democratic processes. There is more work to be done to ensure broader awareness of both the threats facing Canada and the measures put in place to address them. As per Mr. Rosenberg’s recommendations to undertake more robust and frequent communications with Canadians on foreign interference and Canada’s efforts to protect Canadian democracy, the Government, including responsible ministers as well as national security and intelligence officials, will find further opportunities to keep Canadians informed of the extent of foreign interference affecting all aspects of society, including in their democracy. An engaged, informed, and resilient citizenry is one of our best defenses against attempts to undermine our democracy and its institutions. Keeping Canadians informed of the activities being undertaken on their behalf, and adopting emerging communications best practices that draw from Canada and NATO’s recent efforts to identify and counter Russian state sponsored disinformation in the invasion of Ukraine, will help ensure Canadians’ democracy remains strong and secure.

Specifically, the Government will use the new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator and CSIS’s upcoming Annual Report to bolster communications with Canadians.

Additionally, new briefings to be offered to Members of Parliament and Senators will increase awareness of the threat foreign interference poses. The new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator will work on expanding briefing mechanisms with provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous officials. 

Recently announced funding to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation, including from foreign sources, will also help to increase resilience. The Government is also accelerating efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Canada, and partners, to combat disinformation, including state-sponsored disinformation, through strategic communications, based on the RESIST model.

These measures are consistent with the commitments outlined in Minister LeBlanc’s mandate letter– in which he is charged to “lead an integrated government response to protect Canada’s democratic institutions, including the federal electoral process, against foreign interference and disinformation”. This work will need to be done in close collaboration with others, including the Minister of Public Safety, who has the overall responsibility to lead the government-wide efforts to counter foreign interference. Efforts will also be informed by key partners such as the Chief Electoral Officer, whose post-election recommendations reports provide important insights on developments affecting Canada’s electoral system. 

Using the findings and recommendations from the Independent Special Rapporteur’s review on foreign interference, as well as the ongoing reviews from NSICOP and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), the Government will take additional action. 

The reports studied highlighted the importance of having a modern and robust legal and governance framework to counter foreign interference, which balances national security considerations with privacy and other Charter protections.

Current status

In 2017, Parliament created NSICOP, which provides a forum for Members of Parliament of all recognized political parties and Senators with top-secret clearance to review classified information. In line with the NSICOP 2019 recommendation #1d, which calls for a whole-of-government mechanism to identify and respond to foreign interference, the Government has recently taken several steps to respond to foreign interference through operational and policy mechanisms. Firstly, the Prime Minister announced the creation of the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator within Public Safety Canada, a new role with the express purpose of coordinating efforts to combat foreign interference. Budget 2023 announced an investment of $13.5 million over five years and $3.1 million ongoing to fund the Coordinator’s office and its activities. Secondly, the Government launched public consultations regarding the implementation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry to expand Canada’s toolkit to confront this evolving threat. These consultations are due to conclude in spring 2023.

In addition, the 2018 NSICOP special report highlighted the key role played by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) to the Prime Minister in providing advice as coordinator of the security and intelligence community and as advisor to the Prime Minister. Since then, steps were taken to further strengthen the national security governance framework to ensure that the NSIA maintains active awareness of ongoing threats and mitigation measures, including those related to foreign interference. 

The NSICOP report from 2019 recommended (#1c) that the Government assess existing legislation that pertains to foreign interference, specifically the Security of Information Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act), and make legislative changes as required. Departments and agencies have conducted extensive policy and legal analysis with respect to these laws, have identified gaps, and continue to develop options to address them with a view to strengthening Canada’s legal framework.  

The Elections Modernization Act, which Parliament passed in 2018, prohibits the use of funds from foreign entities and includes heightened transparency measures. The Government has also introduced other pieces of legislation, including Bill C-26, An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, to bolster cyber security. 

In 2019, the Government created NSIRA, which conducts independent expert review of national security and intelligence activities across all federal departments and agencies and informs Parliament and Canadians as to their lawfulness.

Additionally, Budget 2023 provides $53 million over two years to support departments and national security and intelligence agencies to support them in fulfilling their obligations to comply with legislated review requirements in a timely and efficient manner as well as implement recommendations. 

Potential gaps and next steps

In order to modernize Canada’s legal toolkit to address foreign interference threats and fully implement the NSICOP recommendation on strengthening the legal framework, the Minister of Public Safety, informed by the ongoing work of the Independent Special Rapporteur and the reviews of NSICOP and NSIRA, will: 

• Work on changes to modernize the CSIS Act which was written before the internet was widely available. Changes could be advanced to allow CSIS to better operate in a digital world by effectively collecting and using digital data; enable CSIS to share intelligence with non-government partners to help them counter threats; and collect intelligence and conduct activities to counter foreign threats that were not envisioned when the CSIS Act received Royal Assent in 1984. This work should also be informed by the recommendations in the Public Order Emergency Commission’s final report that pertain to the CSIS Act. Given the need for Canadians, particularly members of diaspora communities, to have confidence that their national security agencies are working to protect their interests and respect their Charter rights, robust dialogue and consultation on any proposals will be required; and
• Working with enforcement partners and national security agencies, explore if further amendments to existing provisions are needed and whether to create new offences under the Security of Information Act and the Criminal Code to facilitate prosecution of foreign interference activities.

In referring to the 2018 Election Modernization Act, Mr. Rosenberg notes that “Canada’s election laws have been modified to more effectively counter foreign interference.” The Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities is currently working on amendments to the Canada Elections Act. As part of this process, the Minister is examining potential amendments to also counter foreign interference. 

The reports reviewed provided several recommendations related to the requirement for the Government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the Government’s toolkit to the evolving threat.

Current Status 

The NSICOP 2019 report highlighted the need to identify risks and harms to institutions posed by the foreign interference threats (#1a), as well as requirements to undertake a full examination of resulting vulnerabilities (#1b). In response, departments and agencies have developed assessments of threats and risks posed by foreign interference, and measures to counter these threats. Departmental Chief Security Officers (CSO) and Chief Information Officers (CIO) have, under the leadership of the Privy Council Office, undertaken training to better inform the CSO and CIO community of threats and possible mitigation strategies (e.g., technical safeguards and cyber hygiene tips). In addition, as part of the assessments of threats and risks, departments and agencies have been engaging with stakeholders from sectors of strategic interest – such as critical infrastructure operators – to help identify risks and address vulnerabilities relevant to their specific areas of operation.

In order to address foreign state efforts to interfere in Canada’s democracy by intimidating diaspora communities in Canada, Budget 2023 provides $48.9 million over three years to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted.

Potential gaps and next steps

Foreign interference can be subtle and the potential effects difficult to identify, quantify and articulate. As such, departments and agencies continue to engage with stakeholders in academia and through other outreach programs to assess short- and long-term impacts of foreign interference in Canada, while continuing to make updates to assessments as the threat evolves.

Mr. Rosenberg made the recommendation (#2) that “preparations for the next election should include an assessment of whether ministerial security, [RCMP] protective policing, and local policing capabilities are adequate for the level and persistence of threats and whether there is effective coordination among these bodies. There should also be a review of the coordination between political parties and the government with respect to campaign and security operations.” The Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of security threats and protective measures available to Ministers, other Parliamentarians and senior officials, including foreign interference threats. The Ministers are evaluating tools to align with the threat environment and alleviate risks and vulnerabilities.

Mr. Rosenberg also recommended (#3) that “[t]here should be an assessment as to whether any adjustments should be made to the role of the SITE membership in light of the growing problem of domestic interference”. This will be considered through further enhancements to the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, building on the guidance laid out in Minister LeBlanc’s mandate letter, and will include an examination of making SITE a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Foreign interference is both a local and a global threat. It affects individuals, organizations, companies, as well as democratic processes at every level. It cannot be effectively addressed by any entity or order of government acting in isolation. It evolves quickly, making the sharing of information one of the most effective tools to stay abreast of the risks. The Government of Canada must work with partners both domestically and internationally to ensure the strongest defenses possible are in place. Each of the four reports provided recommendations that point to the need for a whole-of-society approach in countering foreign interference. These include recommendations to enhance engagement domestically and internationally, as well as to ensure partners and stakeholders are informed and able to contribute to collective efforts.

Current status

In response to recommendations made by NSICOP in 2018 and 2019, the Government has advanced several efforts. The Prime Minister announced the creation of the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator within Public Safety Canada, which directly responds to the NSICOP 2019 recommendation #2. The Government has also made progress in response to two other NSICOP 2019 recommendations. For example, security and intelligence agencies, including the RCMP, CSIS, Public Safety Canada, and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, have expanded engagement with provincial, territorial and municipal representatives, as well as with Indigenous leaders and communities, and critical infrastructure owners and operators to increase awareness of threats and build resilience (#1e). The RCMP also works with police of jurisdiction (POJ) to counter foreign interference, including for the countering of state backed harassment and intimidation, as POJs are often the first to be made aware of foreign interference-related activities. Further, the security and intelligences agencies and others continue to engage regularly with international partners on collaborative efforts to address foreign interference, including through intelligence sharing. Cooperation with Canada’s allies is also undertaken by the Minister of Public Safety as Canada’s representative at the annual Five Country Ministerial, where Five Eyes security ministers meet to collaborate on various national security issues, including foreign interference; discuss respective approaches to shared issues; and coordinate a cohesive Five Eyes response (#1g).

In its 2018 special report, the NSICOP recommended (#1) that, “in the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and the Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.” It further recommended that Ministers “should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government… [and that] … consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.” Measures exist that address this recommendation. First, expectations and obligations for Ministers and their actions have been made public as part of their individual mandate letters. Second, the Parliamentary Protective Service provides security briefings to incoming Parliamentarians which address various threats, including foreign interference. SITE has also offered briefings to political party representatives during the writ period, while the Privy Council Office briefs all incoming Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries upon appointment on the range of security threats, including foreign interference. 

Mr. Judd recommended that Canada “should monitor any international developments, with particular attention paid to any evolution in tactics by malign actors and any developments in defensive counter-measures taken by target countries (legal, regulatory and operational).” The Government has pursued international collaboration in many fora, including through the Rapid Response Mechanism, bringing together G7 countries to identify and respond to foreign threats. The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (Paris Call) was launched in November 2018 and calls on states, the private sector, and civil society organizations to work together to enhance security in cyberspace, fight disinformation and address new threats that emerge. Through the Paris Call, Canada and other groups exchange information and good practices on several aspects related to foreign electoral interference. Workshops were organized resulting in the publication of Multi-Stakeholder insights: A compendium on countering election interference in 2021.

In response to Mr. Judd’s recommendation #4, the Government offered briefings for political parties in the lead up to the 2021 federal election, including providing information about issues the parties may face during the campaign. Mr. Rosenberg highlighted “the need to work with external partners in Canada and globally, from academia, industry, and civil society, to support information integrity during elections. These external partners play several important roles. They have perspectives on the evolving threat environment that may differ from those of the national security agencies. They have a public education role. They can also alert the public to attempts at interference both before and during the campaign.” To this end, the Government of Canada has worked to empower Canadians, particularly youth, with the right skills to navigate online information. Since January 2020, the Digital Citizen Initiative has invested over $15 million in 96 projects by civil society and academic organizations to build citizen resilience against disinformation. The Government’s commitment to the Digital Citizen Initiative was further expanded in the 2022 Fall Economic Statement with an investment of $31 million over four years, more than doubling the program’s yearly funding. On March 6, 2023, the Government of Canada announced an investment $5.5 million to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to provide important insight into the dynamics of Canada’s information ecosystem, strengthening the resilience and digital literacy of government, industry, civil society and citizens. 

Potential gaps and next steps

NSICOP’s 2019 report recommended (#1f) that Canada’s strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resilience should “include an approach for ministers and senior officials to engage with fundamental institutions and the public.” As the Government reviews the Protocol following the release of Mr. Rosenberg’s report, the Government will look at establishing a process by which Ministers and senior officials, including members of the Panel as part of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, engage with stakeholders and communities. This engagement would seek views on best practices to mitigate the impact of foreign interference and disinformation on Canada’s institutions.

The Government will also continue working with Canadian partners to further the work accomplished through the Paris Call to ensure that everyone has access to the most current expertise to protect Canada’s electoral processes.

The report by Mr. Rosenberg also included recommendations to brief political party representatives in a secure location in Ottawa (#12) and to fix briefing schedules during the election period in advance while being flexible to urgent situations (#13). These recommendations will be implemented. The report further suggested providing a program for unclassified briefings for Parliamentarians and their staff on foreign interference and ways they can protect themselves (#14). Briefings will be offered to Parliamentarians and their staff following their swearing-in and on a regular basis in the future. 

Conclusion and next steps

The Government of Canada has implemented a number of measures in recent years to counter foreign interference in all aspects of society, including those related to democratic processes. These measures respond to several recommendations made by NSICOP, Mr. Judd and Mr. Rosenberg, either in whole or in part. This plan outlines further actions to respond to the outstanding recommendations and close any remaining gaps.

This work includes further increasing transparency and communications with Canadians about the threat of foreign interference and the specific Government actions being undertaken to mitigate it. This includes reviewing existing legislation, such as the CSIS Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act, and the Canada Elections Act. It also includes enhancing the security of senior public officials and exploring possible improvements to SITE and the Cabinet Directive.

Any steps taken will be undertaken with close consideration for ongoing work done by NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and the Independent Special Rapporteur, the Right Honourable David Johnston, to ensure Canadians continue to have confidence in their democratic institutions and electoral processes.

Annex A – Table of recommendations and associated actions

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Annual Report 2019

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Special Report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018

Report on the assessment of the 2019 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (Judd Report)

Report on the assessment of the 2021 Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (Rosenberg Report)

Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act (EBRA)

Key messages

• The draft reports by all of the independent electoral boundary commissions have now been tabled in the House of Commons.
• This Committee is in the process of studying any objections filed by Members of Parliament. I thank you for your ongoing work on this matter.
• Once the Committee has completed their studies, their reports and copies of the objections will  be provided to the commissions for consideration.
• As independent bodies, the commission will make all final decisions as to where these boundaries will lie.
• The procedures for carrying out the redistribution of federal electoral districts are set out in the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act.

Background

Canada’s Constitution requires that federal electoral districts be reviewed after each decennial census and adjusted (or redistributed) to reflect changes and movements in Canada’s population. The current federal redistribution process began in October 2021 and involves two steps: 1) a constitutionally-prescribed process for allocating seats between the provinces and territories (complete); and 2) a legislatively-prescribed process for the independent drawing electoral district boundaries within every province (ongoing).

Each electoral boundary commission published a proposal in Spring/Summer 2022 that detailed potential names and boundaries of the electoral districts (EDs) in their respective provinces and then held at lease one public hearing to gather feedback.

All ten commissions have now tabled their draft reports, which have been referred to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC).

From the date of referral to PROC, Members of Parliament (MPs) have 30 calendar days to file written objections to the reports with the Clerk of PROC, signed by at least ten other MPs. PROC has 30 sitting days – or longer if the House grants an extension – to review these objections and invite MPs to attend as witnesses.

At the conclusion of its consideration of the reports and the objections, PROC will return the reports to the Speaker of the House along with a copy of the objections.

Each PROC report is sent to the Chief Electoral Office (CEO) for distribution to the responsible commission. The commissions have 30 calendar days to consider any objections to their draft report before preparing the final report. However, as independent bodies, the commissions make the final determinations over the boundaries and names of EDs.

Upon receiving the final reports from the commissions, the CEO forwards them to the Speaker of the House of Commons for tabling. The CEO will also prepare two Representation Orders this decennial that will be issued together (one for Quebec and one for all other provinces, consistent with Bill C-14) that set out the boundaries and names of all the new EDs across the country. The CEO will transmit the Representation Orders to the Minister responsible for the EBRA (expected in September 2023). The Representation Orders must be proclaimed by the Governor in Council five days thereafter.

The new electoral boundaries and names become effective upon the first dissolution of Parliament that occurs at least seven months after the date of proclamation (April 2024 at the earliest). This period gives Elections Canada, political parties, candidates, and sitting MPs the time to prepare for the next general election (e.g., hire or reappoint returning officers, adjust the National Register of Electors, or reorganize ED associations).

Anticipated questions and answers

Has the public had a chance to provide input into the proposed new riding boundaries?

The views of Canadians are essential to each of the 10 non-partisan and independent commissions, one for each province, responsible for redrawing Canada’s ridings.

The Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act requires the independent commissions to hold at least one public hearing in each province and engage Canadians and Members of Parliament.

Since they began their work last year, the commissions have held more than 140 public hearings across the country—many more than required under the Act—and have received over 4,000 written submissions.

This informed their plans for the names and boundaries of future ridings, as tabled in the House of Commons, and referred to this Committee.

Members of Parliament had another opportunity to share their views through the work of this Committee to study the commissions’ draft reports.

We are grateful for the work done by the independent commissions, who have or will make their final decision later this year after considering input from the public, Members of Parliament, and this Committee.

What about the concern raised in Nova Scotia about a perceived lack of procedural fairness, the duty to consult Indigenous Peoples, and UNDRIP?

I understand this was an issue PROC discussed at length.

The Government takes its duty to consult and the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act seriously.

As the Minister responsible for the EBRA, I have taken note of the discussions and will consider this matter carefully.

Timelines for redistribution of electoral boundaries (2021-2024)

Province-by-Province Timeline for the Redistribution of Electoral Boundaries

Main Estimates

Leaders' Debates Commission (LDC) - Financial table

Main estimates summary - Leaders’ Debates Commission

Raison d’être

The Government provided a mandate to the Leaders’ Debates Commission to:

• Exercise its function in a manner that is impartial, independent and cost effective;
• Organize two leaders’ debates for the federal election – one in each official language; and
• Report to Parliament (findings, lessons learned, and recommendations) to inform the potential creation in statute of a “built to last” Leaders’ Debates Commission.

Organizational Estimates

2023–24 Main Estimates by purpose

Listing of Statutory Authorities

2023–24 Estimates

Annex - Items for inclusion in the Proposed Schedules to the Appropriation Bill

Items for inclusion in the Proposed Schedule 1 to the Appropriation Bill
(for the financial year ending March 31, 2024)

Unless specifically identified under the Changes in 2023–24 Main Estimates section, all vote wordings have been provided in earlier appropriation acts.

Budgetary Expenditures by Standard Object

This table shows the forecast of total expenditures by Standard Object, which includes the types of goods or services to be acquired, or the transfer payments to be made and the revenues to be credited to the vote.

Definitions of standard objects available at: Chart of accounts for 2023 to 2024 - Object codes for 2023 to 2024.

Interest payments relating to capital leases are included under "Public debt charges". These payments are voted expenditures and are not included under the "Public Debt" heading on the Composition of Estimates and Expenditures table.

Statutory forecasts

Expenditures by purpose

Interim Supply Requirements - Leaders’ Debates Commission

Committee membership