CDS/DM Directive for CAF Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R) 2024/2025

References:

  1. Our North Strong and Free (ONSAF): A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence, 8 April 2024
  2. CDS Letters to SACEUR, 6 June 2023 and 27 November 2023
  3. CDS/DM Directive for CAF Reconstitution, 6 October 2022
  4. DND/CAF Operational Sustainment Modernization Strategy, 22 November 2022
  5. CAF Digital Campaign Plan, 10 June 2022
  6. ADM(RS) 1258-3-053 – Evaluation of Ready Joint and Combined Forces, November 2022
  7. ADM(RS) 1258-3-060 – Ready Forces Integrated Strategic Analysis, November 2022
  8. VCDS Directive for CAF Digital Transformation, May 2023
  9. CDS Directive for CAF Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R) 2023-24, 11 August 2023
  10. CDS 2023 Focus Areas, 7 February 2023
  11. TBS 840491 DND Investment Plan 2022 (2022-23 to 2026-27), 19 May 2022
  12. Briefing Note to CDS - FP&R Campaign Plan: Endorsement of CAF Strategic Readiness Priorities, 13 November 2023
  13. Department of National Defence Investment Plan 2022 (2022-23 to 2026-27), 04 May 2022
  14. Enabling Full-Time Capability Through Part-Time Service: A New Vision for the Reserve Force, 29 November 2023
  15. Prosci Change Management Practitioner Program
  16. Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept, October 2023
  17. Ready, Resilient, Relevant: A Strategy for Defence, June 2024 (draft)

Situation

1. (U) General. Readiness – that is the ability to carry out the missions for which Defence is mandated by the Government of Canada (GC) – is the core business of Defence and one of the most important responsibilities of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS then provides advice to the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the GC regarding the ability to employ the CAF to protect and defend Canada, Canadians, and Canadian interests, at home and abroad. Readiness is also as equally important to the Deputy Minister (DM), ensuring that each Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) also prioritizes and synchronizes their support towards ready forces.

2. (U) Accordingly, the Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R) Framework, as the primary instrument to direct, measure, and analyze CAF readiness, intends to achieve the following objectives:

  1. (U) Directing the Force Generation (FG) of the required Force Elements (FElms) that are the building blocks to deliver on the mission sets and concurrent operations guidance as directed by the GC in ONSAF (Reference A) and SSE (Ref R, p. 81);
  2. (U) Supporting resource allocation to L1s for readiness via extended planning and integration in Defence governance fora;
  3. (U) Directing the preparation and readiness of these FElms for Force Employment (FE) including Notice to Move (NTM) / Response Posture (RP) requirements;
  4. (U) Providing the CDS with an accurate and reliable picture of readiness, verified within no more than 30 days, at all times;
  5. (U) Providing the basis for the formulation of CDS advice to government on options to employ the CAF in pursuit of Canadian interests;
  6. (U) Informing senior leadership and governance fora in deliberations and decision- making related to CAF readiness with evidence-based and data- driven analysis and advice;
  7. (U) Supporting planners and decision makers at all levels with readiness analysis, tools, and data to enable operational planning, business planning, and other internal processes related to readiness; and
  8. (U) Enabling the measurement of readiness from a financial and resource perspective to quantify the true cost of the Defence mission.

3. (U) Context. Ensuring ready forces to detect, deter, and defend against threats to Canada and its interests is the core business of defence and requires a continuous focus to successfully deliver the Defence mandate. The CAF is likely to deploy more personnel worldwide to deter competing forces, all of that during historic domestic response peaks that are likely to perpetuate. Such pressures counter any positive effects the start of CAF Reconstitution might have had and justify the ever-growing urgency for modernization across its business. Given this, the FP&R Framework must not only assist by better guiding the generation of ready forces, but also support strategic campaigning in line with the Defence mandate to align with the GC Priorities (Reference C, Theme 8).

4. (U) Ready, Resilient, Relevant: A Strategy for Defence. Readiness is emerging as an overall focus and key line of effort within Ready, Resilient, Relevant: A Strategy for Defence, which seeks to better direct, prioritize, and cohere departmental efforts on signature initiatives aimed at ensuring Defence remains fit for purpose and ready to respond to the challenges of an increasingly complex and volatile security environment. This directive and the FP&R campaign plan will both enable the realization of the Strategy for Defence's objectives (evidence-based, data-driven decision making informed by more sophisticated analytical tools) and provide important vehicles to implement the direction contained in the strategy. As the strategy progresses, the FP&R enterprise will adapt to its direction IOT enable the strategy, particularly in relation to better integrating and cohering the management of readiness and related decisions across Defence and its governance.

5. (U) FP&R Campaign Plan. While the situation has started to improve since publishing Reference I and its associated campaign plan, major work still lays ahead. While some campaign plan milestones will require updating, the lines of efforts (LoE) and their objectives remain valid and still resonate within the readiness community. Current progress can be read in Annex C, page 3. In terms of major highlights, improved access to the data enabled the addition of new readiness inputs into key governance processes – CDS Weekly Operations Brief, Departmental Results Framework, National Procurement, etc. Finally, FP&R has met compliance to the ADM(RS) Management Action Plans laid in Reference F and G, completing 2 of 6 items in the last year.

6. (U) Change Management. As asserted in the main effort for Reference I and supported by Reference O, change management has started to be applied. Formal change management assessments have started and bring key findings:

  1. (U) A higher change management performance for FP&R (improvement of 21%, from 48% to 69%) between the 2018 FP&R Directive and the current renewal efforts;
  2. (U) The most common barrier among current readiness L1 staffs is the desire to embrace the change, while staffs from non-FG L1s have a stronger desire to support the FP&R renewal but lack the knowledge on how to assist. SJS FP&R will maintain an iterative approach to better service these parts of the community;
  3. (U) Subordinate staffs surveyed down at L2-L4 levels report still lacking awareness on FP&R renewal and the effect it should have on their work – now or in the future; and
  4. (U) A change management risk assessment highlights several high-risk areas, such as: extremely wide scope of the overall change initiative, existing change fatigue, very decentralized leadership and governance, an eclectic impacted community, and limited sponsor reach.

Mission

7. (U) The CAF will FG FElms IAW the renewed FP&R Framework, factoring in reconstitution considerations and capabilities modernization where required, IOT meet and respond effectively to the prioritized defence and security requirements of the GC.

Execution

8. (U) Intent. We must continue to re- assert readiness as the central business process and core business of Defence. Strategic Readiness Priorities provide the details of where we must place emphasis on our most relevant and pressing operational activities (Annex A, Appendix 1). These priorities need to match our output planning and steer our resource allocation process from the beginning rather than being an after- thought. Reinvigorating the FP&R process must carry on as a cement solidifying our stated focus areas (Reference J), in line with, and in support of the Reference E and DEFENCE˟ (Reference M). All current and future data sources are critical to analysis that should inform reconstitution, modernization and align ready forces for FE. It will underpin our ability to provide real-time, evidence- based, data-driven recommendations to the MND and the GC on the best use of resources to deliver on GC direction and respond to emerging events. This will deliberately assist in rebuilding the force, re-establish its readiness, and in so doing provide the GC with sustainable FE options and ensure the long-term viability of the institution.

9. (U) FP&R will continue its business transformation while ensuring that change management precepts are properly followed to guarantee community buy-in and empower the entire organization, not just the small – yet essential – readiness reporting community. Once again, FP&R reporting is not a report card or an assessment of how force generators are managing FG. Its value is derived from its description of what is ready, and more importantly, in its identification of key trends and challenges impeding the readiness of the CAF requiring resolution.

10. (U) Concept of Operations. Reinvigorating the FP&R Framework remains an iterative process, capitalizing on sustained success to bolster itself as a change initiative. Efforts are still to be coordinated through the campaign plan (Annex C), updated by this directive, managed by the SJS FP&R section, and adjusted as needed through yearly CDS/DM FP&R directives.

11. (U) As depicted in Annex C, the FP&R Campaign Plan will stay focused along the following Lines of Effort (LoE) and corresponding objectives:

  1. (U) LoE 1 – Guide the framework, with the objective that FP&R provides agile and tailored strategic readiness direction based on pertinent information through modern processes;
  2. (U) LoE 2 – Fix the data model, with the objective that data is reliable, available, visible, usable and properly federated; and
  3. (U) LoE 3 – Integrate FP&R into CAF processes, with the objective that all users and contributors are integrated in an optimal FP&R business flow.

12. (U) Main Effort. Reinvigorate FP&R as a key business process that delivers readiness through deliberate change management, supported by a business- driven philosophy on FElms and better functioning tools.

13. (U) End State. CAF Readiness is sustainable and sufficient to meet Government of Canada policy objectives. FP&R is operationalized as a business process and an enduring framework that informs systematic decision intelligence (understand, decide, act) based on high-quality, real- time, reliable data; guided by and integrated with Defence governance; supported with digital-age analysis tools that serve users at all levels; and with the requisite support and buy-in from all involved in readiness.

14. (U) Progress towards this end state will be measured through the following measures of effectiveness (MoEs) as per the campaign plan (Annex C):

  1. FP&R business and governance buy-in (MoE 1);
  2. quality of reporting (MoE 2);
  3. constant and reliable readiness assessments (MoE 3);
  4. successful implementation of self-serve analytics and modelling (MoE 4);
  5. decision-making/governance is systematically informed by FP&R (MoE 5); and
  6. change has been effectively managed (MoE 6).

15. (U) Governance. Annex A will remain the initial backbone, as the work for an enduring DAOD on Strategic Readiness will require more time to be well integrated in change management. The current L0.5 governance cycle stood up with Reference I will continue to inform the preparation of the CAF FP&R Directive for FY 25/26 as it has done for this iteration.

16. (U) Technology. Full digital transformation of the FP&R Framework remains critical to ensuring its success in a digital/information age. The current Strategic Management and Readiness Tool (SMaRT) fielded in 2022 represents an advancement in data governance while still relying on manual inputs, and it is now integrated with PowerBI. Simultaneously, the stand-up of ADM(DSG) has provided a growing level of alignment with future digital transformation strategic initiatives. Early advancements bolstered by this partnership will provide key stimulators for the overall change management requirements for FP&R, culminating with DEFENCE˟ integration. Nevertheless, any advancements possible with SMaRT will carry on ensuring that FP&R remains responsive to user needs until replacement by DEFENCEx.

Tasks

Note 1: all tasks in this directive relate to FY 24/25, but milestones from the FP&R Campaign Plan should be considered as implied future tasks.

Note 2: previous tasks stated in Reference I that do not appear in this iteration have either been completed, shifted to later as per Annex C, or are otherwise rescinded. SJS refined internal tasks have been moved to an internal directive.

17. (U) Common to all. Support the CDS and DM intent to improve the FP&R Framework, notably in augmenting the accuracy and timeliness of reporting, enhancing FP&R analysis, and onboarding new digitalized tools when available.

18. (U) Common to all Force Employers / Force Generators:

  1. (U) FG and maintain FElms IAW SMaRT, including new requirements stemming from NATO planning and effects data requirements;
  2. (U) BPT respond to changes in NATO FElm requirements, as they are agreed to in-year;
  3. (U) Input, update, and/or verify readiness assessments for each assigned FElm using SMaRT at least monthly IAW Annex A;
  4. (U) Provide appropriate representation to the FP&R governance process;
  5. (U) BPT support SJS FP&R and ADM(DSG) in Operational Readiness Planning Enhancement efforts, when requested;
  6. (U) Report the status of Battle Decisive Munitions (BDM) to DGS/Strat J4 Ammo at the end of each FY quarter or as requested;
  7. (U) Identify baseline training ammunition requirements to reach directed readiness states, provide impact statements for insufficient allocations and report through the Ammunition & Explosives Oversight Committee (AEROC);
  8. (U) Support SJS DGS in the continued implementation of LOGFAS;
    • NOTE: This is to ensure that DND/CAF can meet mandated NATO logistics reporting and interoperability requirements, and that the CAF sustainment plans are not made in isolation;
  9. (U) Support SJS FP&R in validating the status of high demand/low density FElms through FP&R governance;
  10. (U) Support SJS DGS/DSSR and CJOC in the development of joint FElms and capabilities, such as JTFSCs, IAW Reference D;
  11. (U) Support CFD/FMSD efforts to adapt CAF organizational structures and proposed FG outputs IAW Reference C; and
  12. Support the VCDS/Chief of Reserves IAW Reference N in the development of new Reserve Force (Res F) capabilities, and in the maintenance and revitalization of existing ones.

19. (U) VCDS:

  1. (U) In collaboration with SJS FP&R, amend measurement methodologies and metrics to enable an effective combining of corporate, financial, and readiness goals;
  2. (U) Incorporate readiness and strategic effects data into the Operations Data Domain development, noting that ADM(DSG) will support CCSI in this area to ensure coherency, alignment, and nesting within the broader ADM(DSG)-led Data Governance Framework;
  3. IAW Reference N, work with L1 FGs to further capabilities within the Reserve Force that have been identified as needed to address FP&R or potential larger- scale mobilization needs for the CAF; and
  4. IAW Reference N, work with CMP to evaluate the purpose and role for the supplementary reserve. Look at future design options to support both early and late-stage mobilization needs and how personnel held in the supplementary reserve may contribute to this.

20. (U) SJS:

  1. (U) Implement multi-year readiness output planning on a minimum horizon of 3 years;
  2. (U) NLT 1 Dec 2024: Conduct L1 Review of DAOD on Strategic Readiness;
  3. (U) Coordinate the monthly reporting of FP&R data from supporting FG L1s and upwards to required superior levels (DOS at SJS Weekly, VCDS through VCDS L0 Dashboard, CDS at CDS Ops and NATO via its Readiness Reporting Tool (RRT));
  4. (U) Fulfill Management Action Plans requirements in relation to ADM(RS) Evaluations on Ready Forces;
  5. (U) Support the development of joint FElms and capabilities in collaboration with SJS DSSR, CJOC and applicable L1s IAW Reference D;.
  6. (U) Through the integration with ADM(DSG), CFO and VCDS (CFD, CCSI and C Prog), develop data requirements and relationships to quantify the financial costs of readiness;
  7. (U) Support CFD efforts for FMSD and DTSD;
  8. (U) Collaborate with ADM(Pol) and force employers to ensure the strategic alignment of operations with GC direction and priorities, and the prioritization of defence activities and relationships as guided by the Global Engagement Strategy (GES);
  9. (U) On an annual basis, work with ADM(Pol) and FG L1s to negotiate CAF contributions to NATO, UN, or other multilateral and coalition constructs and provide recommendations to the DM and CDS;
  10. (U) NLT 1 April 2025: Support CJOC in the finalization of the FG model for the Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC); and
  11. (U) NLT 1 May 2025: Develop CAF Sustainment Readiness directive as part of the CAF Operational Sustainment Campaign Plan, containing policy and procedural guidance for the calculation of operational stocks and sustainment services required to support readiness commitments IAW Reference D.

21. (U) CJOC:

  1. (U) Provide operational-level recommendations to FP&R on adjustments to force posture resulting from the evaluation of all operations and CONPLANs IAW Reference C;
  2. (U) Provide input to FP&R FElm readiness requirements, in consultation with SJS and ADM(Pol), related to any changes in force posture resulting from NORAD modernization and Continental Defence efforts;
  3. (U) NLT 1 April 2025: Finalize the FG model for the Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC) in coordination with other FG L1s;
  4. (U) Continue to serve as the CAF Joint Readiness Authority (JRA) (all L1s supporting):
    1. (U) Coordinate and leverage national level joint readiness opportunities inclusive of joint experimentation, training and exercises with NATO, Five Eyes (FVEY) partners, NORAD-NORTHCOM, and other key allies and partners, and with other members of the Canadian Defence & Security community;
    2. (U) Maintain and refine a rolling three-year Joint Managed Readiness Programme (JMRP) that supports the FG of required FElms;
    3. (U) Further develop, refine, and optimize Joint Readiness mechanisms in collaboration with SJS;
    4. Generate a joint training evaluation plan in support of the JMRP; and
    5. (U) Maintain and refine the Joint Task List (JTL).

22. (U) CMP/MPC and ADM(HR-Civ). In line with ADM(DSG)'s effort for data domain development, ensure stewardship of DND/CAF workforce data and provide workforce analytics support as required to enable emerging readiness functionalities bolstered by SJS and ADM(DSG).

23. (U) Corp Sec:

  1. (U) In collaboration with SJS and VCDS, identify suitable governance for strategic readiness as part of the broader governance modernization; and
  2. (U) Provide support in amending DAOD 1000-10 for strategic readiness authorities and the development of the DAOD on Strategic Readiness.

24. (U) ADM(DSG):

  1. (U) Support SJS FP&R in incorporating the FP&R Framework and data sets into DEFENCE˟'s Defence Planning and Operations business functional area and the Enterprise Structure;
  2. (U) Lead readiness enhancement efforts within current Enterprise Resources Planning systems to deliver early digital transformation gains for Strategic Readiness;
  3. (U) Plan for transfer of in- service support of SMaRT from SJS JIIFC to the appropriate sections in ADM(DSG) for application, web service, network access, and hardware support;
  4. (U) Assist SJS JIIFC with planning for redundancy and survivability of the production instance of SMaRT on CSNI;
  5. (U) Assist SJS JIIFC with mitigation of potential points of failure related to existing SMaRT implementation; and
  6. (U) As the Functional Authority for the Cyber Mission Assurance (CMA) Program, establish the requirement and set the conditions for the integration of cyber-resilience into L1 FP&R reporting as a collaborative effort between SJS, CJOC, and C Cyber.

25. (U) ADM(Mat). Integrate readiness considerations in National Procurement (NP) planning in collaboration with the Chief of Programme (CProg), FG L1s, and the SJS.

26. (U) ADM(IE):

  1. Integrate readiness considerations in National Real Property Portfolio Plan (NRPPP) in collaboration with the Chief of Programme (CProg), FG L1s, and the SJS; and
  2. Align changes to infrastructure investment priorities and divestment decisions IAW Strategic Readiness Priorities detailed in Annex A, Appendix 1 and Reference L.

27. (U) ADM(Pol):

  1. (U) Provide guidance on force posture through the GES and in the on-going analysis and interpretation of world events, including consultation with allies and partners, and the GC's defence priorities at home and abroad;
  2. (U) Work with SJS and FEs to refine the strategic-level mission review process and to inform options for the renewal, evolution, or cessation of missions in alignment with GC and reconstitution priorities and objectives IAW Reference C; and
  3. (U) In light of the changes in the strategic environment, advise the FP&R Framework of any intended changes to the desired operational outputs required to support the applicable Defence Policies (ONSF, SSE and NORAD Mod) and which would amend the FElms list (Annex B).

28. (U) ADM(PA). Assist SJS FP&R with the establishment of an internal communication plan and the provision of technical PA support in line with change management requirements for the duration of the Campaign Plan.

Coordinating Instructions

29. (U) Readiness priorities. Refer to Annex A, Appendix 1 for definitions and details.

30. (U) Efficiencies for RFI Process. The FP&R Framework is an expanding source of data, modelling and analytics capabilities that will be leveraged across the SJS, and external organizations as appropriate. The data collected and analyzed through this directive is the source of record of CAF readiness and will be used as such in responding to requests for information related to CAF readiness. SJS will maximize the use this source data to streamline time- consuming staff processes and reduce the burden on other organizations to the extent possible.

31. (U) FP&R Reporting. NLT the 25th day of each month for all assigned FElms using SMaRT: FGs will complete monthly readiness reporting IAW the specific instructions at Annex A.

32. (U) Consumption of readiness. FElms assigned to high readiness tasks will always be ready IAW directed NTM/RP requirements in Annex B. Where possible, FElms committed to high-readiness (HR) tasks should not be employed on other operations or missions, unless no other option exists. If deployed, it should be indicated as such in SMaRT.

33. (U) NTM. All FElms will be at 90- days' NTM, unless assigned a designated readiness level IAW Annex B. For further considerations on NTM and RP, refer to Annex A.

34. (U) Performance Measurement. FP&R performance measurement will carry on as initiated and be reported to the Strategic Readiness governance, with detailed reporting to enable steering of measurement validity throughout the campaign plan duration.

35. (U) Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA+). GBA+ will be applied throughout FP&R planning processes and FG activities:

  1. (U) All members assigned to a FP&R FElm should complete the basic GBA+ training, including the new supervisor- level course. Personnel assigned to a NATO FElm should also meet NATO standards; and
  2. (U) Given the massive extent of personnel assigned to FP&R FElms across Defence, it cannot be expected that gender parity ratios can be applied in the staffing of those FElms, even when activated and assigned to CJOC. Any attempt to do so, especially for new sustained operations, would deplete the ranks of any GBA+ minority groups for follow-on rotations and induce new vectors of social in-balance in the GBA+ spectrum. Troop composition remains a command prerogative, but as a guideline FP&R FElms should include an equal proportion of GBA+ minorities equivalent to that of the entity generating that FElm.

36. (U) Culture. Planning processes and FG activities will align with, embrace, and support culture change initiatives.

37. (U) Public Affairs Posture. Passive externally, active internally.

Concept of Support

38. (U) Until FP&R starts better influencing resource allocation at the onset, it is still incumbent upon L1 to business plan and prioritize activities ISO of their FP&R remits. Where L0 has not provided financial resources requested, it should be annotated in SMaRT. In terms of new capability development, L1s should use the existing project governance frameworks to advocate for resources. SJS FP&R is able to assist with fact finding and data modelling ISO L1 efforts, as requested.

Command

37. (U) Authorities. Functional authority is assigned SJS to develop and issue DAODs and other policy instruments in the functional area of Strategic Readiness. The corporate administration management table laid out in DAOD 1000-10 (Framework for Corporate Administration and Management) is to be amended to reflect this change NLT 1 December 2024.

38. (U) Supported L1. SJS.

39. (U) Supporting L1s. VCDS, RCN, CA, RCAF, CJOC, CFINTCOM, CANSOFCOM, CMP/MPC, CFMP GP, NORAD, ADM(DGS), ADM(Mat), ADM(IE), ADM(Pol), ADM(PA).

40. (U) SJS Points of Contact

  1. (U) Director General Strategies Effects and Readiness, BGen Nicolas Pilon, 613-904-5812;
  2. (U) Director Domain Integration and Readiness, Mr. Brodie Ross, 613-904-5844;
  3. (U) FP&R Section Head, LCol Brian J. Gendron-Houle, 613-904-6128;
  4. (U) DI/Readiness Governance Section Head, Cdr Kyle Redshaw, 613-904-6128;
  5. (U) FP&R Manager, Mr. George Siket, 613-904-6102; and
  6. (U) TREX SSO, LCol Shane Voisard, 613-904-6136.

Annex A to CDS/DM Directive for FP&R

Governance and reporting

Context

1. (U) This Annex provides direction and guidance to force generators and their staffs regarding FP&R governance and reporting requirements. In time, the FP&R framework aims to support readiness requirements at all levels through the development of additional analysis and self- serve functionality based on FP&R reporting and the establishment of FP&R governance that will be aligned to and integrated with departmental decision- making and business processes.

2. (U) The intent of FP&R remains to understand current readiness. However, it must evolve from simple reporting to deeper analysis and insights that can drive decision making, supported by digitally transformed tools that allow for self-service modelling, analytics and alerts. Equally important is understanding and mitigating the impediments that affect readiness outputs and projections.

3. (U) IOT provide detailed analysis regarding the status of CAF readiness, reporting will include an overall readiness assessment, as well as a breakdown of readiness status along the four readiness pillars (Personnel, Equipment, Training, and Sustainment (PETS)) for each individual FElm. This information and analysis is vital for the further development of analysis tools, operational planning, for the CDS to provide options and advice to the Government of Canada (GC) in the service of Canadian interests, to inform deliberations and decisions related to readiness, and to direct changes to FP&R IOT avoid or mitigate potential readiness issues. For this reason, the accuracy and timeliness of reporting is vital – so too is its digital transformation.

4. (U) By end of FY 24-25, the content of this document and parts of the main directive will migrate to an enduring DAOD on Strategic Readiness as part of the development of FP&R governance. The Force Elements currently identified in Annex B will also transition as a part of digital transformation to the web-based Strategic Management and Readiness Tool (SMaRT).

Concepts

5. (U) Force Posture. "Force Posture" is the characterization of the essential tasks of the CAF, broken down by the FElms to deliver specific and necessary capabilities. A FElm is an organizational entity consisting of personnel, equipment, requiring unique training and sustainment. Force generators are responsible for the FG of specific FElms for FE on operations (refer to Annex D for full details).

6. (U) Annex B lists the FElms required to ensure the CAF is postured for concurrent operations. These FElms represent the various capabilities available to fulfil the roles and missions defined within Ref A. To have an accurate picture of the readiness of the CAF and the critical context for operational-level resource prioritization and decision-making, force generators will report on the readiness of all FElms assigned to them.

7. (U) Readiness. "Readiness" defines the preparedness of FElms to respond to government direction, expressed in terms of the ability to execute a military task and the time available to deploy that FElm to perform a specified tactical or operational task (Annex D).

8. (U) NTM. While guidance for NTM is issued in the Annex B to this directive, it is important to note that several FElms are called upon to support multiple Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) for which NTMs may differ. Accordingly, the FP&R Framework requires that FElms meet the most stringent NTM listed within its assigned CONPLANs.

Governance

9. (U) The FP&R framework is influenced on a continuous basis by other CAF/DND processes. For this reason, where possible, FP&R governance must seek to provide direction and integrate with other governance and business processes IOT study and steer all aspects that compose it. SJS will ensure to integrate readiness into higher governance review efforts and identify how and which higher governance body will be leveraged. The following subjects (but not limited to) will be looked at in Strategic Readiness governance:

  1. (U) Manage implementation of the FP&R Campaign Plan and Directive tasks through regular review and reporting of progress and milestones, and adjusting as required;
  2. (U) FElms, be they official, aspirational or simply analytical, and how they are serviced or used for force employment;
  3. (U) Reconsiderations of required FElms to support changing operational outputs required to answer Defence Policy re- orientation, as indicated by ADM(Pol);
  4. (U) Multi-year planning of readiness outputs per FG L1s enabling the alignment of strategic planning across CAF/DND;
  5. (U) Data handling within approved data domain and federating from other data domains, to include the system of record (currently SMaRT);
  6. (U) System and framework development and evolution, to include onboarding of new capabilities or processes;
  7. (U) Relationship to DND performance measurement, including Strategic Effects and Defence Results Frameworks;
  8. (U) Contributions to NATO, allies, partners and OGD readiness reporting; and
  9. (U) Integration with broader Defence governance processes and reporting requirements.

10. (U) The development of FP&R governance will be supported by the following series of engagements:

  1. (U) Strategic Readiness Management Board (SRMB) meetings will take place cyclically throughout a normal fiscal year, aiming to inform the readiness community and preparing remits for higher governance fora.
  2. (U) FElm Sub-Working Groups held in August, December, and March to synchronize and review FElms (SO level, chaired by SJS FP&R); and
  3. (U) Publication of an annual Defence FP&R Directive by the CDS/DM, providing key elements of upcoming readiness development, state of the readiness business process and adjustment to the FP&R Campaign Plan (until completed in 2027 or follow-on plan developed).

11. (U) SJS FP&R will coordinate all ToRs, communications and visual products throughout the year.

FP&R Reporting

12. (U) Accurate L1 reporting ensures risks are identified early, where readiness demands may exceed available resources. Factual feedback drives discussion regarding resource prioritization and risk management IOT meet GC ambition levels. New reporting requirements from NATO on NFM planning and effects will force the CAF to grow the number of FElms and also transition more quickly to SMaRT FElm matching more closely real units in several cases. Even more so, timely L1 reporting, at the FElm level, is essential for identifying limitations and providing data-driven, evidence-based CDS advice to the GC with respect to military response options. In addition, the FP&R framework will inform CProg and CFD on present and future issues that may affect readiness. So too it will drive readiness governance and associated decision-making once established.

13. (U) In certain cases, FElms may contain personnel/equipment that are not integral to a unit and therefore its availability status may not be obvious. Agreements shall be reached for either: a Lead L1 to report on said FElm and aggregate data from the contributing L1s; or assignment of smaller properly weighted and palatable FElms to a specific L1s. In such latter case, readiness of the originally intended FElm, for example a Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC), can be obtained through Force Package modelling.

14. (U) Force generators are to input, update, or declare (as applicable) FElm readiness assessments each month using SMaRT and IAW the colour coding defined below (percentage threshold based on NATO measurements). Readiness levels will be based on the four pillars of readiness PETS. The combination of these four pillars will drive the overall assessment of FElm readiness. While the four pillars will provide a frame of reference, the overall assessment of FElm readiness is retained by the FG who retain a "Commander Override" capability over the system generated readiness level established by SMaRT. This respects a Commander's enhanced knowledge of the readiness of applicable FElms and allows for more accurate analysis in certain circumstances.

  1. (U) Ready:
    1. (U) Green (90% or above). Satisfactory: no concern, credible force pool available with few limitations – fully operational; and
    2. (U) Yellow (75-90%). Minor concern: shortfalls need to be met; minor deficiencies or discrepancies do not significantly affect the accomplishment of a mission or task – substantially operational.
  2. (U) Not Ready:
    1. (U) Orange (60-75%). Combat Ineffective: key shortfalls that may impact operation, deficiencies/discrepancies adversely affect the accomplishment of a mission or task – marginally operational; and
    2. (U) Red (Below 60%). Unsatisfactory: mission critical shortfalls exist, the number or the magnitude of deficiencies prevents from accomplishment of a mission or task – not operational.
  3. (U) Partially deployed (Light Blue) – FElm exists and is ready, but, part of it (sub-element) is deployed and therefore the FElm is only partially available;
  4. (U) Deployed (Dark Blue) – FElm is green but currently deployed and therefore is not available;
  5. (U) High Alert/Immediate Reachback (Dark Green) – FElms which are operational in their current location but are providing an ongoing or immediate ability to complete its task, NTM being counted in minutes usually. This applies for example to NORAD interception fighter aircrafts ready on tarmac, 24/7 targeting or SAR aircrafts, coordination or operation centres. This could also apply to FElms who's NTM is reduced while conducting active deployment battle procedure. Such FElm usually have pre-approved authorities to activate and deploy, or are likely subject to ongoing discussions between GC and DND for activation; and
  6. (U) In development (Grey) – FElm is new and is not currently at Initial Operating Capability but will become ready within Horizon One. It might be considered as aspirational due to lack of definition, or it might have become an official FElm now owned by a L1 through a sponsored project but not be ready for fielding and implementation.

15. (U) Additionally, in order to provide more quantitative data, FGs will input the following:

  1. (U) For FElms declared "READY – YELLOW", force generators will indicate which of the four pillars (Personnel, Equipment, Training, or Sustainability) is low, and will explain in the comments section what is driving the assessment, the risk, and when it is expected to be rectified;
  2. (U) For FElms declared "NOT READY – ORANGE or RED", force generators will provide information on: a) the reason the FElm is not ready; b) the mitigation plan in place to ensure readiness of the FElm; and c) a projected timeline for when the FElm will meet its readiness requirements; and
  3. (U) Further to Para 13, FGs must be clear when assessing the status of sub-elements within a FElm, especially if they do not directly manage a sub-element, are centrally managed and could be tasked against a different FElm, or could have a significant detrimental effect on non-deployed operations should they be used with the FElm being assessed. Issues must be closely monitored in an attempt to mitigate, and if necessary, report on any such potential conflict.

Force posture and felm management

16. (U) Managing Force Posture. (A requirement for a change in force posture will normally be driven by new GC direction/policy; evolving geopolitical affairs; and changes in threats or Defence resource levels. FP&R will serve as one of the main means to understand change by facilitating the identification of options for decision making, not only through analytics but also through governance integration. Horizon One (1-5 yrs) options relating to Force Posture may include, but are not limited to:

  1. (U) Adjustments to training (e.g. training focus and prioritization, resource allocation, JETA funding ranking);
  2. (U) Equipment support prioritization (including early divestment and National Procurement (NP));
  3. (U) Organizational restructuring and personnel staffing prioritization;
  4. (U) Recommendations on positioning decisions, including basing, forward positioning, forward deployments;
  5. (U) Adjustments to the CAF global engagement strategy and national priorities; and
  6. (U) Adjustments to Command and Control (C2) architecture and CONPLAN design.

17. (U) Any proposals for changes to FP&R FElms will be considered by FP&R governance once established and will be staffable to the FP&R Section secretarially for the time being, and through the new SMaRT change and approval mechanism tool when fielded in the next year.

18. (U) Looking at Force Development, there might still be aspirations to grow the CAF with new organizations, fleets, and consequentially with more FElms. The system of record for FElms (SMaRT at this time) will be able to account for this, either with 'official' FElms that L1s FG for, or with 'aspirational' FElms that could assist in eliminating concurrency limitations. Only through proper collaborative governance should FElms move from aspirational to official status, to the same extent that official FElms can later be retired for any given set of reasons.

Annex A, Appendix 1 to CDS/DM Directive for FP&R

Strategic readiness priorities

References

Context

1. (U) As part of the FP&R Campaign Plan, strategic readiness priorities have been developed to prioritize joint force generation as well as inform strategic alignment and resource allocation amongst various internal processes.

2. (U) SJS in conjunction with the force generation (FG) community, has developed strategic readiness priorities that will help guide force generator's efforts towards the most important capabilities, and inform readiness- related decision-making and departmental governance.

Concept

3. (U) The first Strategic Readiness Management Board (SRMB), at reference A agreed that the first iteration of strategic readiness priorities would be formally proposed for endorsement by the CDS secretarially, Reference B, while future iterations would be vetted through the in- development readiness governance.

4. These priorities have been written to be relatively enduring in the short to medium term. To ensure their continued relevance, they will be reviewed on a regular basis (initial discussions suggest a 3-year cycle is likely ideal). Given the current state of the CAF, reconstitution was given highest priority. Readiness for named operations follows and Joint Force Integration and Pan-domain priorities round out the list. Within each of these priority groupings are sub- priorities which are meant to provide further discrimination and guidance on the most desirable activities.

5. (U) The following is the current set of Strategic Readiness Priorities as defined by the SRMB and endorsed by the CDS:

  1. (U) Pri 1 - Readiness decisions enabling reconstitution
    1. (U) Pri 1.1 – Resource allocation to procure for and sustain existing Force Elements (FElms) (ie. restocking of spare parts, platform life extension, shifting recruits to trade in need, etc.);
    2. (U) Pri 1.2 – Start FG of new FElms (ie. ground-based air defence, joint support ships, etc.);
    3. (U) Pri 1.3 – Rationalization effort of FElms FG (ie. regrouping units to produce viable FElms, RCAF's OP SALUS, extending assignment of FElm for given units vs training new units, etc.); and
    4. (U) Pri 1.4 – Institutional resources allocation or transfer supporting readiness (ie. infrastructure money towards training centers, CA's OP PARADIGM, range infrastructures enabling more complex training, etc.).
  2. (U) Pri 2 – Readiness for named operations
    1. (U) Pri 2.1 – Readiness for Joint Force projection and Sustainment (strategic airlift manning and maintenance, medical Role 1 and 2, EX READY POSTURE, etc.);
    2. (U) Pri 2.2 – Readiness for hasty or confirmed force employment (TMST, collective pre-deployment training, pre- deployment validation, etc.);
    3. U) Pri 2.3 – Readiness for domestic/continental mandates (ie. immediate response unit training, OP NANOOK, EX ARCTIC EDGE, NORAD, task-specific pre-deployment training, etc.); and
    4. (U) Pri 2.4 – Readiness for active deterrence tasks/EXs (ie. EX MAPLE RESOLVE, EX RIMPAC, EX TRIDENT JUNCTURE, etc.).
  3. (U) Pri 3 – Joint Force Integration (JFI) & Pan-domain readiness priorities
    1. (U) Pri 3.1 – Space and Cyber Readiness (ie. EX SCHRIEVER WARGAME, EX CYBER FLAG, cyber network assessments on exercises, etc.);
    2. (U) Pri 3.2 – Readiness for targeting (ie. exercises integrating new precision ammunition, JTACs and TACPs, simulation exercises testing targeting decision- making and joint sensor-to- shooter linkages, etc.);
    3. U) Pri 3.3 – Readiness for Contested/degraded operations (EX ARDENT DEFENDER, EX VIGILANT SHIELD, etc.); and
    4. (U) Pri 3.4 – Readiness initiatives supporting JFI & pan-domain effects (NATO STEADFAST exercise series, the CAF OLYMPUS initiative, etc.)

Outcomes

6. (U) The strategic force generation priorities are meant to serve several purposes. First, they provide governance-developed and senior- leadership endorsed priorities to guide CAF joint force generation. Second, they will help inform decision-making, governance, and resource allocation. This is critical to achieving one of the core tenets of the FP&R campaign plan - moving beyond simple measurement of readiness, to influencing governance and decision-making based on clear priorities. To capture an immediate opportunity to advance this integration, the JFI and pan-domain readiness priorities are being incorporated into the model that prioritizes Joint Exercise and Training Account (JETA) funding for joint force generation exercises.

7. (U) Lastly, these priorities will help deliver on addressing recommendations of the ADM(RS) evaluations and the advancement of the FP&R Campaign Plan.

FP&R Campaign Plan – Overview

Intent. DND must carry on establishing readiness as a key business process and core purpose of Defence. Our Strategic Readiness Priorities must inform on operational pressures, prioritize in time of cuts but even more educate our planning and issuance of resources at the start of business planning. This reinvigoration of FP&R process is essential to reconstitution and modernization. It underpins my ability to provide evidence-based, data-driven recommendations to the MND and the GC on the best use of resources to deliver on GC direction and respond to emerging events. Change management remains essential to ensure community buy-in and empower the entire organization.

Main Effort

Reinvigorate FP&R as a key business process and that delivers readiness through deliberate change management

End State

CAF Readiness is sustainable and sufficient to meet GC policy requirements. FP&R is operationalized as business process and enduring framework informing systematic real time decision intelligence (understand, decide, act) guided by Defence governance, supported with digital-age analysis tools that serve users at all levels

Campaign Plan - Milestones

LoE 1 – Guide the Framework

  1. 1 Engage L1s to socialize new F Elm philosophy
  2. 2 Rapidly issue a renewed FP&R Directive
  3. 3.1 Hold first Strategic Readiness WG
  4. 3.2 Governance perpetually feeds yearly FP&R Directive updates
  5. 3.3 Leverage more binding yearly VCDS Business Plan
  6. 4 Integrate readiness into VCDS 2024-29 Strategic Planning Cycle
  7. 5 Inform CDS on complete ONSF readiness
  8. 6 Define options for data governance supporting FP&R with ADM(DTO) and CCSI
  9. 7 Develop Sustainment readiness concepts into actionable directives
  10. 8 Formalize FP&R governance into a more enduring DAOD on Strategic Readiness
  11. 9 Officialise a data domain supporting readiness needs with DGWG
  12. 10 Delineate changes to governance ARAs for Strategic Readiness and Data Domain with arrival of DEFENCEx governance
  13. 11 Support DEFENCEx communication plan for implementation regarding readiness

LoE 2 – Fix the data model

  1. 1 Remain aligned with NATO and Allies (PETS, F Elms, F Packages)
  2. 2 Transition SJS FP&R data to IT domain-driven business models (Web-SMaRT)
  3. 3 CAF F Elms must match generated L1 F Elms
  4. 4 F Elms solely inspired from FMSD must be reconsidered
  5. 5.1 Integrate F Package datasets to reflect on ONSF goals and aspirations
  6. 5.2 Enable data modelling
  7. 5.3 Transition FElm data build to support output planning and additional NATO planning and effects requirements
  8. 6.1 Enable maximum delegation of data entry at source
  9. 6.2 Integrate to DTO's Data Analytics Service team for in-service support
  10. 6.3 Enable self-serve access to Web-SMaRT data layer
  11. 6.4 Exploit PowerBI for dashboards production
  12. 7.1 Join DTO's Operational Analytics Enhancement efforts
  13. 7.2 Coalesce SMaRT and CFTPO
  14. 7.3 Coalesce SMaRT and DRMIS
  15. 7.4 Coalesce SMaRT and Exonaut
  16. 8 Expand the existing Web-SMaRT data layer to service other data users related to readiness (LOGFAS, SEFs, etc.)
  17. 9 Integrate readiness dataset needs into DTO's DEFENCEx data layer

LoE 3 – Integrate FP&R into CAF processes

  1. 1 Formalize readiness as a Business Process in DTO's DEFENCEx development
  2. 2 Initiate ADM(RS) MAPs for Readiness and Joint Programs
  3. 3.1 Provide insight on pressures between readiness and reconstitution
  4. 3.2 FP&R metrics and systems start supporting FE
  5. 3.3 Resolve JTFSC F Elms generation and reporting
  6. 3.4 Revitalize sustainment readiness concepts
  7. 4 Support digital decision intelligence with modelling (concurrency, risks, projection in time)
  8. 5.1 C Prog full review of MoPs and MoEs affecting readiness
  9. 5.2 Link FP&R as MoPs for SEFs
  10. 6 Fulfill ADM(RS) MAPs for Readiness and Joint Programs
  11. 7 Start publishing 3-year outscope readiness plans
  12. 8 FP&R must support better advocacy for joint FD and FG, not only FG/FE
  13. 9 Train readiness staff across CAF on DEFENCEx roles
  14. 10 Field fully digitalized readiness solution within DEFENCEx

End State

CAF Readiness is sustainable and sufficient to meet GC policy requirements. FP&R is operationalized as business process and enduring framework informing systematic real time decision intelligence (understand, decide, act) guided by Defence governance, supported with digital-age analysis tools that serve users at all levels

Measures of Effectiveness

MoEs inform evaluation and assessment of ongoing iterative change:

Objectives

FP&R provides agile and tailored strategic readiness direction based on pertinent information through modern processes

Data is reliable, available, visible, usable and properly federated

All users and contributors are integrated in an optimal FP&R business flow

End State

CAF Readiness is sustainable and sufficient to meet GC policy requirements. FP&R is operationalized as business process and enduring framework informing systematic real time decision intelligence (understand, decide, act) guided by Defence governance, supported with digital-age analysis tools that serve users at all levels

Annex D - To CDS Directive for FP&R

Glossary

Alert
  1. Readiness for action, defence or protection.
  2. To forewarn; to prepare for action.
  3. The period of time during which troops stand by in response to an alarm.

Alert State:

  1. A level of preparedness characterized by the measures taken for protection, deterrence, defence and confidence.
  2. The maximum time in minutes required to bring an aircraft or weapons system, or part of it, to immediate availability. (see Notice to Effect and Notice to Move)
    High Alert: state in which a resource is maintained ready with no time or significantly less time than usually afforded for additional preparation to intervene to protect, deter or defend. Such state usually renders the entity unable to conduct any other activity than being on station or completing preparation for its perceived task.
Battle Decisive Munitions (BDM)

Battle Decisive Munitions are those munitions that are: capable of destroying major weaponized platforms, weapon systems, capabilities, and infrastructure; of such strategic interest that they must be tracked and reported upon in the Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS). Once munitions are identified as BDMs, and have been apportioned to nations through the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP), their acquisition, stockpiling, and shelf life must be managed to mitigate potential availability issues.

Capability

A description of the military operational output or outcome that a unit, force, or organization is able (and usually constituted or organized) to deliver an effect.

NATO: The ability to create an effect through employment of an integrated set of aspects categorized as doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership development, personnel, facilities, and interoperability.

Capacity

The maximum number of FElms of a specific type expected to be employed concurrently.

NATO: A capability expressed in quantitative terms.

Cyber Mission Assurance
A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, critical to the execution of mission-essential functions against cyber threats or actions in any operating environment or condition.
Commander's Note
An L1 comment that explains an issue, impact, or mitigation of a particular readiness rating.
Component

In joint operations, an organization subordinate to the joint task force and responsible for the planning, integration and conduct of operations for a domain or function.

Typical components are maritime, land, air, special operations and support.

Dedicated
The Force Element (FElm) is set aside or reserved for a specific FG task. Although not yet employed operationally, the FElm cannot be re-tasked.
Endurance
Requirement to generate operational FElms that can be either surged for a single event/rotation or that can be sustained for an extended period.
Force Element (FElm)

An organizational entity consisting of personnel, equipment, training of individuals and groups, and sustainment components which can be force generated and assigned to operational tasks (e.g. Frigate, CC- 177, Field Artillery Battery).

Note: Some softwares and enterprise systems have technical objects referred to as force structures or force elements interchangeably. The FP&R Framework will provide clarification, as required.

Force Employment (FE)

Strategic: Application of military means in support of strategic objectives.

Operational: The command, control, and sustainment of generated forces on operations.

Force Generation (FG)
Force generation is the process of organizing, equipping, and training forces for employment or being ready to respond to contingencies. Adding sustainability considerations creates readiness.
Force Generation Task
Task which requires L1s to generate FElm(s).
Force Generator – Lead and Supporting

Lead Force Generator provides the preponderance of forces or capabilities and therefore bears the responsibility to ensure that their FElms are generated and others are coordinated.

Supporting Force Generators will prepare FElms, as required, to accomplish its assigned tasks.

Force Mixed Structure Design (FMSD)
A section from CFD that uses dynamic modelling to produce conclusions regarding force generation and employment conclusions regarding risk thresholds, size of force, etc.
Force Package
A grouping formed by the combination of FElms.
Force Posture
Sum of the various FElms that characterizes a military force in relation to a given mission. In the FP&R context, it is the characterization of the essential tasks of the CAF, broken down to the FElm level to deliver specific and necessary CAF capabilities. A FElm is an organizational entity consisting of personnel, equipment, which require unique training and sustainment. Force generators are responsible for the FG of specific FElms for FE on operations.
Force Structure

The organization of military personnel and materiel for operations, missions and tasks.

Note 1: A force structure can be treated as a force element if suitably built to fulfil perceived tasks and leaving no technical dependencies behind (e.g. rear party, garrison stores, etc.).

Note 2: Some softwares and enterprise systems have technical objects referred to as force structures or force elements interchangeably. The FP&R Framework will provide clarification, as required.

High Alert / Immediate Reachback
FElms which are operational in their current location but are providing an ongoing or immediate ability to complete its task, NTM being counted in minutes usually. This applies for example to NORAD interception fighter aircrafts ready on tarmac, 24/7 targeting or SAR aircrafts, coordination or operation centres. This could also apply to FElms who's NTM is reduced while conducting active deployment battle procedure. Such FElm usually have pre-approved authorities to activate and deploy, or are likely subject to ongoing discussions between GC and DND for activation.
Joint
Activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two components participate.
Notice to Effect (NTE)

An advance warning that specifies the time it will take to move from a decision to deploy until achievement of full operating capability in the theatre of operations.

NTE has three distinct components: the NTM, the deployment time, and the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOM-I) process. Note that RSOM-I may not always apply to the air and maritime domains.

Notice to Move (NTM)
Specifies the time given to a FElm/Force Package within which it must be ready to deploy, from the receipt of a warning order to movement. Expressed in hours or days.
Operational Reachback
FElm that provide 24/7 critical non-deployed support to operations which must be tracked as FElm.
Reachback
  1. A process by which commanders, their staffs and deployed forces may be provided with timely, coordinated and authoritative advice drawing upon remote expert sources of information.
  2. The process to provide deployed forces with services and capabilities from experts that are external to the theatre of operations.

Immediate Reachback – Status of a group that must be able to provide remote services to deployed forces around the clock.

Readiness

The preparedness of FElms to respond to government direction, expressed in terms of the capability to execute a military task and the time available to deploy that FElm to perform a specified tactical or operational task.

Note: Readiness is also expressed as "The state of being appropriately prepared to meet specified personal, professional and operational demands."

Readiness Level

Readiness levels designate the target response time for a FElm/Force Package to be ready for deployment, from the receipt of a warning order to movement, for a specific mission/task.

Immediate (I) - Ready to deploy within hours IAW its assigned CONPLAN. FElms assigned an Immediate readiness level are considered to be dedicated and cannot be reassigned. The sum of the FElms assigned an Immediate readiness level are considered to be CAF's Immediate Response Forces.

High (H) - Ready to deploy within days or months as per assigned FP&R tasks. The sum of the FElms assigned a High readiness level are considered to be CAF's High Readiness Forces.

Normal (N) - Ready, at no specific NTM. Upon notice, FElms at Normal readiness levels are prepared to increase readiness to High or Immediate readiness levels. The sum of the FElms assigned a Normal readiness level are considered to be CAF's Normal Readiness Forces.

Readiness Rating

Readiness rating for a FElm is represented as:

Ready - Green (90% or above). Satisfactory: no concern, credible force pool available with few limitations – fully operational

Ready - Yellow (75-90%). Minor concern: shortfalls need to be met; minor deficiencies or discrepancies do not significantly affect the accomplishment of a mission or task – substantially operational.

Not Ready - Orange (60-75%). Major concern: key shortfalls that may impact operation, deficiencies/discrepancies adversely affect the accomplishment of a mission or task – marginally operational;

Not Ready - Red (Below 60%). Unsatisfactory: mission critical shortfalls exist, the number or the magnitude of deficiencies prevents from accomplishment of a mission or task – not operational.

Partially deployed (Purple) – FElm exists and is ready, but, part of it (sub-element) is deployed and therefore the FElm is only partially available.

Deployed. (Blue) – FElm is currently deployed and is therefore not available.

In development (Grey) – The FElm is not currently at Initial Operating Capability (IOC), but, will become ready within Horizon One.

Sustained
Force generators are expected to generate FElms indefinitely or through multiple rotations.
Time-Limited
A temporary increase in operational tempo and/or force levels. Force generators are expected to generate FElms with a view of a single rotation mission, generally not more than nine months.

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