Sentinel shield: Wide-area detection for early warning against uncrewed aerial systems

The challenge

Background and context

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), in partnership with its defence and security partners, are seeking innovative solutions capable of persistent and timely wide-area detection, recognition, identification, and tracking of Class I and II Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS), including emerging designs which do not rely on traditional navigation techniques such as Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) and Radio-Frequency (RF).

This challenge is being supported by the Bureau of Research, Engineering and Advanced Leadership in Innovation and Science (BOREALIS).

Procurement and Operationalization of Innovation and New Technology (POINT):

Procurement and Operationalization of Innovation and New Technology (POINT) is a Research and Development (R&D) and an optional follow-on acquisition pilot being trialled for this challenge. It is designed to facilitate the acquisition of innovations once they complete the R&D phase. Contractors who successfully complete the R&D phase, may, at Canada’s discretion, be awarded a contract for the Phase 2 - Acquisition of their solution at a larger scale. Future POINT challenges will be informed by lessons learned from this pilot initiative.

Below are the planned requirements associated with a potential follow-on Phase 2 - Acquisition contract:

• Value of follow-on acquisition: Up to $20M (tax excluded), inclusive of:
• The number of units procured.
• The costs to install the units at the operational locations.
• The In-Service Support (ISS), for a period of approximately 2 years. ISS is to include training, maintenance, and repair of the systems during that period.
• Number of units required: Sufficient number of systems to provide coverage for up to 27 sites located across Canada or in a deployed location specified by the CAF, of at least 10 km radius circle per site.
• Timeframe for Phase 1 - Build & Test contract award:
• Step 1 “Build” (if required): Fiscal Year (FY) 26/27
• Step 2 “Test” to be conducted: May 2027
• Timeframe for Phase 2 - Acquisition contract award: FY 27/28
• Estimated delivery of solution under the Phase 2 - Acquisition contract: FY 27/28

Note that solutions must have successfully completed Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5 and be ready to advance to TRL 6 or higher in order to qualify for a Build & Test contract. Completing the Build & Test contract does not guarantee that your solution will be selected for an optional Phase 2 - Acquisition contract award under the POINT framework.

Background and context

This challenge is part of Canada’s broader initiative to modernize continental defence and enhance domain awareness across its vast northern, coastal, and border regions, and aligns with priorities outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) and Our North Strong and Free (ONSAF) as well as the NORAD Modernization Science and Technology initiative. A key focus of this effort is the development of next-generation Counter-UAS (CUAS) systems that incorporate early detection capabilities to address the evolving threat posed by Class I and II UAS (see Definitions Section below for NATO UAS Class table).

Lessons learned from recent high-intensity conflict zones have underscored the disruptive potential of UAS. These systems, often deployed in coordinated swarms and/or operated with RF silent navigation techniques, can penetrate critical airspace undetected, target critical infrastructure, and undermine operational tempo. Adversaries are leveraging commercial and military technologies to develop UAS platforms that are smaller, faster, more autonomous, and increasingly resistant to detection through RF signature suppression, with stealthier airframes, and novel flight profiles.

Their ability to evade conventional detection methods such as air traffic radar, electronic surveillance measures and optical sensors due to their size, speed, low radar cross section (RCS) and ability to fly at varying altitudes with little or no RF output exposes a growing vulnerability within current defence architectures. There is a need for the development of novel or innovative ways for detecting, recognizing, identifying, and tracking UAS that are not based on these conventional or traditional approaches. There is also a need for the ability to monitor and protect a wide area (10 km radius circle) to provide the early warning of potential intrusion.

The focus of this challenge is wide-area detection of UAS around installations such as military bases, radar stations, and other critical military infrastructures. In this situation, there is a need for continuous and persistent monitoring of the space within 10 km of the centre of the locations and ideally further, enabling accurate and timely detection, recognition, identification, and tracking of low-RCS Class I and II UAS threats. These threats may be flying at altitudes from surface to 10,000 feet (3048 m) above ground level (AGL), flying at varying speeds and flight patterns, and/or in swarms, which increases the complexity of detection, recognition, identification, and tracking.

The CAF currently fields CUAS‑relevant sensors that address some of these requirements but is interested in additional and complementary systems to create layered defences.

The CAF is seeking to enhance its overall CUAS effectiveness by seeking additional low-cost, scalable solutions with significant improvements to the below areas:

• Earlier and wider‑area warning:
• Extend initial detection range and angular coverage for low‑RCS and RF‑silent micro/mini UAS (Class I).
• Reduce operator burden:
• Provide reliable UAS vs non‑UAS discrimination and broad class/type classification to support confident operator action and automated cueing of sensors / effectors.
• Be employed in conjunction with other CUAS systems as part of a layered defence approach. Interoperability with existing CAF Command and Control (C2) networks/targeting systems using standard protocols (i.e., Android Tactical Awareness Kit (ATAK), Joint Range Extension Application Protocol-C (JREAP-C), Cursor on Target (CoT) Message, Sensing for Asset Protection with Integrated Electronic Networked Technology (SAPIENT), etc.)
• Through‑life affordability & deployability
• Reduce acquisition, installation, and in‑service support burden (costs, power, footprint, mast/tower, shelters).
• Cybersecurity measures to protect data and communication channels are preferred to enable the solution to maintain operational continuity and effectiveness.

Operational scenario

While any CUAS system can be used in a variety of situations, for the purposes of proposing solutions to this challenge, the Essential and Desired outcomes will be considered against the scenario of detecting UAS threats in and around a military Base Operation Centre with the following characteristics:

• The perimeter of the base will be a circle with a radius of 2.5 km from the centre point of the base with a security perimeter fence encircling the base at that distance.
• The area to be covered by the CUAS system starts at the centre and extends beyond the 2.5 km perimeter, to become a cylinder with a 10 km radius and at altitudes from 10,000 feet (3048 m) AGL down to the visible horizon line across that distance.
• The target UAS to be detected is a NATO Class I Micro UAS of similar characteristics to a DJI Phantom 4, with an RCS on the order of 0.01 m² at 35 GHZ and 94 GHz, as measured through internal Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) evaluations, moving at 50 km/h.
• Proposed systems can be located anywhere within the 2.5 km security perimeter with ready access to small buildings, electricity, heat, and light and no additional security concerns.
• If the CUAS system has any components installed outside of that 2.5 km perimeter (such as a mesh of sensors for example), that external area is to be considered unsecured and rural without the following services, meaning that any such proposal will need to include how these would be provided if required:
• Power, heat, or other utilities
• Communications access (internet, networks, etc.)
• Road access
• Security
• Weather protection
• Operation of the solution will be inserted into the existing 24/7 “Base Operations Centre.”

Essential outcomes

Proposed solutions must demonstrate how they will concurrently meet the following essential outcomes within the operational scenario above.

• Provide coverage across the full area of a cylinder with a 10 km radius. This coverage includes not just when a target penetrates the boundary, but also as it moves within the cylinder.
• Concurrent detection, recognition, and tracking of at least three of the scenario targets (NATO Class I Micro UAS of similar characteristics to a DJI Phantom 4) at speeds up to 50 km/h. Note that:
• Detection means that the solution can distinguish an object from the background clutter.
• Recognition means that the solution can recognize the broad class of an object’s type (is it a Class I UAS, or a Class II UAS, or a larger UAS, or an aircraft, etc.?), and by consequence reduce the likelihood of nuisance alarms.
• C2 Interoperability with at least one of the following: ATAK, JREAP-C, Link 16, CoT messages, or SAPIENT to enable real time decision cycles.
• Be capable of continuous 24/7 day and night monitoring of the area and detection within it.
• Near-real-time latency of less than 2 minutes for the detection, recognition, and tracking of targets.
• Ability to withstand and operate in all Canadian weather conditions, including extreme heat (+40°C) and cold (-40°C), rain, snow, fog, and smoke.
• It is accepted that some limited and reasonable performance degradation may occur during periods of rain, snow, fog, and smoke, but when such environmental effects end, full performance resumes without requiring operator or maintenance actions.
• For example, it is reasonable that during light snow there may be some minimal degradation in detection range, but in a heavy whiteout blizzard there may be almost no detection possible.  When the snowfall ends, full detection ranges resume.
• Incorporation of design and production characteristics and durable configuration intended for final testing and continual use, such as but not limited to: components installed within protective boxes, outdoor devices are weatherproofed, external cabling is robust with proper connectors, controls and switches can withstand thousands of cycles. etc.

Desired outcomes

Proposed solutions should include the following capabilities and considerations within the operational scenario described above. The relative importance of these characteristics is included as a percentage “Weight Factor” (WF), which will be used during the evaluation and selection processes. The sum of all Weight Factors is 100%:

Operational Performance (WF 75%)

• (WF 20%) Detection coverage over a cylinder with radius greater than 10 km, and up to 30 km.
• (WF 10%) Detection altitude over a cylinder with an altitude from the visible horizon line at the maximum range of detection of the solution up to 10,000 feet (3,048 m) AGL.
• (WF 10%) Ability to operate in all Canadian weather conditions with no performance degradation during periods of rain, snow, fog, and smoke.
• (WF 10%) Be concurrently effective against more than three of the scenario targets (NATO Class I Micro UAS of similar characteristics to a DJI Phantom 4), including swarms of up to 100 concurrent targets.
• (WF 5%) Be able to identify targets (in addition to detecting and recognizing them – see the definitions at the end of the document), meaning that the solution can specifically determine details about the object detected, and differentiate between types of mini / micro UAS.
• (WF 5%) Be effective against targets moving at speeds over 50 km/h and up to 300 km/h.
• (WF 5%) Be effective against RF silent targets, such as tethered UAS with onboard navigation and control.
• (WF 5%) Near-real-time latency as short as possible (under five seconds) for the detection, recognition, and tracking of targets.
• (WF 5%) Be effective against the other all categories of Class I and II UAS (see table below) within the operational scenario.

Other Characteristics (WF 25%)

• (WF 5%) The coverage is achieved with all components of the solution located inside the perimeter fence of the military base described in the operational scenario (with the fence being at the 2.5 km radius from the centre of the base).
• (WF 5%) Minimize the human resources CAF will have to allocate to operate the solution covering a single base as per the operational scenario, and assuming the operation of the solution will be inserted into an existing and already staffed Base Operations Centre. This will be evaluated as follows:
• The solution is fully automated and does not require any additional dedicated operators. Its operation can reasonably be conducted with the normal existing staffing of the Centre. (Full evaluation points for this outcome)
• The solution has some basic automation, but an operator will have to be actively monitoring or controlling the solution approximately 50% of the time. (50% evaluation points for this outcome)
• The solution has no automation and requires one or more dedicated operators more than 50% of the time to maintain continuous coverage. (No evaluation points for this outcome)
• (WF 5%) C2 Interoperability with more than one of the following: ATAK, JREAP-C, Link 16, CoT messages, and SAPIENT to enable real time decision cycles.
• (WF 5%) Use an open architecture (non-proprietary) that seamlessly integrates with existing DND/CAF command, control and communications (C3) framework (via open standards), allowing DND/CAF to modify, upgrade or integrate components over time without proprietary restrictions.
• (WF 5%) System includes functionality to prevent and/or resist cyber attack.

Concept for the testing

The testing of solutions to evaluate how well they meet the challenge described above can only become fully planned and agreed after the technologies to be tested are selected and their specific test requirements are defined and understood.  In advance of that, the notional testing intent, subject to modification at Canada’s sole discretion, is as follows:

• The intent is to conduct contractor-owned testing with DND and CAF present.
• The objective of the testing is to evaluate how well the selected technologies perform against the operational scenario and each of the essential and desired outcomes above.
• The testing is not intended as an exhaustive full “Operational Test and Evaluation” program of each solution, as may be required during the implementation into operational service for a solution that is procured for operational implementation.
• The test parameters to be examined during the testing will be:
• For all solutions, be the essential and desired outcomes described above, provided it is an item that can be tested in the environment DND obtains for the testing. Some outcomes may not be easily tested in the selected environment and will remain as a paper-based evaluation of the solution’s configuration at the time of testing.
• Solutions that do not claim to meet a particular desired outcome, will not be tested against that outcome, and the outcome will be reported as “not met”.
• If a solution claims it can do something not described in the outcomes, but it is a functionality of interest and relevance to CAF and it can reasonably be tested in the environment and timeframe, it may be added to their test plan.
• The technologies from all selected companies would be concurrently tested at a suitable location, simulating the scenarios described above.
• The Contractor will retain ownership of the solution during the testing.
• Canada would provide all the supporting infrastructure and logistical support for the testing, including the location, utilities, red team, and target UAS. The Contractor would provide their technology, operators, and technical support.
• The red team will conduct assorted flight patterns to approach, penetrate, and fly within the 10 km cylinder of the scenario.
• Parameters for these flight patterns will be finalized to test the maximum performance limits and potential weaknesses of the selected technologies. Subject to those clarifications, this testing could include ranges up to 30 km, altitudes up to 10,000 feet (3048 m) AGL, speeds up to 300 km/h, assorted angles of approach, and in swarms.  Where reasonable, these will be adjusted to test the performance limits of the technologies being tested.
• The testing is expected to take place in May 2027 (subject to change) with a duration of approximately two weeks.

Schedule

The notional schedule is:

Definitions

Classes of UAS

The following NATO UAS Class definitions are used for this challenge. Source: UAS CONEMP (Table 1 - NATO UAS Classification Guide. September 2009 JCGUAV meeting (page 6)):

Sensor details detected. In discussing how much detail a CUAS sensor system can determine, the following scale of definitions is used:

• Detection means that the solution can distinguish an object from the background clutter.
• Recognition means that the solution can recognize the broad class of an object’s type (is it a mini / micro UAS, or a larger UAS, or an aircraft, etc.?), and by consequence reduce the likelihood of nuisance alarms.
• Identify means that the solution can specifically determine details about the object detected and differentiate between types of mini / micro UAS.