Archived - Decision: 95-020 CANADA LABOUR CODE PART II OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Review under section 146 of the Canada Labour Code, Part II,

of a direction issued by a safety officer

Decision No.95-020

Applicant: Bell Canada

483 Bay Street, Floor 4 South Tower

Toronto, Ontario

Represented by: André L. Paiement, Senior Counsel

Respondent: Joel Carr

National Representative

Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada

Mis en cause: Rod J. Noel

Safety Officer #1768

Human Resources Development Canada

Before: Bertrand Southière

Regional Safety Officer

Human Resources Development Canada

A hearing was held in Toronto on September 14, 1995 and on November 22,

1995. In attendance were:

- Joel Carr C.E.P.

- Paul Lochner C.E.P.

- Kevin Marlow

- Larry Watson

- Gary Lloyd C.E.P.

- Al Thompson Mgr Bell

- Dave James C.E.P.

- Paul Danton

- Rod Noel

- Mary Gawrylash Engineering, Bell Canada

- W. G. Valcour Bell

- Ward Saunders Bell

- T. J. Maiden Bell

- J. D. Allan Bell

- M. Parent Bell

- A. Paiement Bell

- P. Wright HRDC

- Jim Locke C.E.P. Local 26

- Steve Cole C.E.P. Local 42

Background

The particular event leading to this direction is described in the LAO

ASSIGNMENT NARRATIVE FORM prepared by safety officer Rod Noel and dated January 30, 1995.

"On July 28, 1994 at approx. 5:15 PM Bell Canada technician Kevin

Marlow entered a confined space, an in ground manhole, at the Ford

Motor Plant, Royal Windsor Drive, Oakville, Ontario for the purpose

of performing work. At approximately 5:30 PM Kevin Marlow was taken

by Co-Worker Larry Watson to Oakville General Hospital where he was

treated for nausea and respiratory problems related to possible

exposure to toxic fumers, suspected to be xylene. He was released

after several hours observation. He was advised his blood had shown

elevated acidic levels. This would be consistent with certain

chemical exposures, including Xylene." (page 3 of Rod Noel's report)

During the previous week, Bell Canada had been trying to solve a

problem with a communication cable, which problem appeared to be

located in the manhole in question (manhole MHA1 which, incidentally,

belongs to Ford). Because the manhole was contaminated, the cable

repair manager, Terry Maiden, did not want anyone to go into the

manhole and he had decided to repair the damage by laying a length of

cable around the manhole and splicing into the cable on each side of

the manhole. On Thursday, July 28, after having explained the work to

the two technicians, Kevin Marlow and Larry Watson, he left at about

1500 hours for the week end. However, the manager was not aware that,

in the conduit where the junction had to be made, there was a power

line. When the employees were informed of the presence of the power

line, they attempted to reach the manager but could not do so.

Eventually, they got in touch with the duty manager, Al Thompson, and

with Dave James who was the duty manager for the night.

According to the two managers, Al Thompson and Dave James, there ensued

a discussion on how to tackle the situation. It was mentioned during

the conversation that Terry Maiden did not want anyone to go into this

particular manhole. Al Thompson then suggested that the manhole be

treated as a designated manhole and that an employee should go down

with a rope tied around his waist with the other standing guard

outside. However, after further discussion, it was decided that there

should be no entry into the manhole at this time; the situation would

be reviewed early the next morning with a manager on site to assess the

situation. Shortly after the call, Kevin Marlow went down in the

manhole using a rope tied to his waist while Larry Watson and another

person stood by outside; after being down 15 minutes or so, Kevin

Marlow informed Larry Watson that he did not feel well. Larry Watson

then told him to get out immediately and shortly afterwards, took him

to the hospital.

I did not hear from the employees (see observation below). However, in

the statement prepared by Larry Watson on October 31, 1994, he says

that Al Thompson told them: "Treat the manhole as a designated manhole,

with one man staying at the top and the other man going down with a

rope on him. It's only going to take 15 or 20 minutes to knock off the

lead sleeve and dry out the splice". Nothing is said about waiting for

a manager to reevaluate the situation early the next day before

proceeding further. Also, at tab 3 of Mr. Noel's report, there is a

"Report - occupational disease or injury", form BC 976, signed by Kevin

Marlow, undated, where no mention is made of an instruction not to go

down in the manhole. In conclusion, although it is not confirmed that

they were told not to go down the manhole, it is not denied either.

It is readily evident that Terry Maiden had no intention either of

going down the manhole or of sending somebody else down: the repair

solution he selected vouches for that. Also, Al Thompson and Dave

James say that, during their conversation with Kevin Marlow and Larry

Watson, the two employees were told not to go in the manhole, but to

wait until the next morning when a manager would go and reassess the

situation. But, Al Thompson admits having at first suggested to go

down with a rope tied to one employee while the other kept watch above.

There was certainly possibility for confusion in the employees' minds

regarding the task at hand. Considering that:

- the manhole had been pumped out;

- it had been power washed and pumped out twice;

- the Passport monitor was not giving an alarm, although there was a

strong odour;

- the manhole had been ventilated;

- it was to be a short job;

- as far as they were aware, there had been no atmospheric problems

in Bell manholes;

- the job had been dragging long enough and it was time to put a

close to it.

I can understand that, in these circumstances, they decided to go ahead

and complete the job immediately.

The next day, July 29, 1994, Dave James went to the worksite with two

technicians, Larry Watson and Gary Skelton. During the day, he went

down very briefly into the manhole in question without following any

safety precautions. Toward the middle of the afternoon that same day,

Wm. Valcour, the General Manager, Access Network Maintenance, visited

the worksite and stopped all work.

The safety officer became involved in the investigation of this

accident when Paul Lochner, a member of the Bell Canada health and

safety committee sent a complaint to Human Resources Development

Canada. The complaint, which was received on August 31, 1994,

identified three concerns: the Passport alarm used by Bell to analyze

the atmosphere; the failure, by Bell, to involve the safety and health

committee in the investigation of the accident; the inaccuracies

contained in the accident report. The safety officer was assigned to

investigate the complaint on September 23, 1994, and started his

investigation on October 11, 1994.

On December 1, 1994, a direction was issued to Bell Ontario as a result

of the safety officer's investigation into the afore-mentioned

incident. On December 22, 1994, a second direction was issued to Bell

Ontario, again as a consequence of this same event. This second

direction (appendix 1) is the subject of this review.

Employer's submission

The employer's argument is based essentially on the fact that the two

employees were told not to go into the manhole. Three witnesses, Terry

Maiden, Al Thompson and Dave James have stated that the employees were

told a number of times not to enter the manhole. It is noted however

that Al Thompson did suggest in the course of his conversation with the

two employees that one of them should go down with a rope tied around

him for safety purposes as it was going to be a short job. As

explained below under "Observations", I did not hear the employees' s

version of the event.

Also, the work done in the pit, next to the manhole, does not appear to

have been an issue at the time, nor was it mentioned at the

investigation on August 10, 1994. Apparently, the employer was not

informed at the time of possible contamination in the excavation; Larry

Watson's report of occupational disease or injury is dated October 6,

1994.

Regarding the issue of whether the employer was aware of possible

contamination at this site, the safety officer has attached to his

report, at tab 15, three documents to demonstrate that the employer was

aware of contamination of manhole MHA1. The first document is a

"Report of service hazard", form BC 212A, dated 89/10/3. This document

says, in Description: "Manhole system owned by Ford - Is full hazard

chemicals that pose a health hazard to employees who work in manholes."

However, in his testimony, Mr. Valcour has stated that this report does

not deal with manhole MHA1. He discussed this report with engineering

and was informed that it applied to other manholes.

Employees' submission

The respondent pointed out that in fact, Al Thompson did suggest during

the conversation with Kevin Marlow and Larry Watson that an employee

should go down with a rope tied around him while the other employee

would monitor the situation from above. Also, on the day following the

incident, Dave James, the manager, went down into this same manhole,

for a very short time it must be said, but without following any of the

usual precautions.

Observations

The alleged infraction for which the direction was issued occurred on

July 28, 1994. A direction was then issued on December 1, 1994, which

direction was not appealed; a second direction was also issued on

December 22, 1994. This second direction is the one being reviewed

here. The hearing had originally been set for June 1995, however, due

to the parties' conflicting schedules, it had to be postponed until

September 14, 1995 and was concluded on November 22, 1995. By that

time, a prosecution had been instigated on this same issue against the

employer. This skewed the hearing and complicated an already difficult

situation. As a result of this prosecution, an agreement was reached

between the employer's and the employees' representatives. A

consequence of this agreement was that, at the hearing, the regional

safety officer heard only the witnesses summoned by the employer;

neither the employees involved in the original incident nor the safety

and health committee representative were heard.

Another observation has to do with the format of the direction. In his

direction, the safety officer has gone to great lengths to detail all

the provisions of the Code and Regulations which, in his opinion, have

been contravened. However, a number of the provisions identified are

conditional on compliance with a previous provision; if the governing

provision was contravened, then it is evident that the secondary

provision was not met and issuing a direction pertaining to the

secondary provision is redundant. For instance, section 3 of the

direction states that the employer failed to assess the hazards of a

confined space in contravention to subsection 11.2(1)(a). Section 5 of

the direction then goes on to say that the employer failed to record,

in a signed and dated report, the findings of a hazard assessment for

the confined space. If, as stated in sections 3 of the direction, the

employer did not assess the hazards of the confined space, it is

evident that there was no signed and dated report of the assessment and

section 5 of the direction is therefore redundant.

Decision

After reviewing the documentation in my possession along with the

testimony from the hearing, I note the following salient points:

- Ford, the owner of the grounds and of the manhole, was aware of

the soil contamination and should have informed Bell Canada of the

situation;

- the pit excavated to reach the cable, next to the manhole, could

have been a confined space, depending on factors such as ease of

egress, depth of excavation and so on; whether it was a confined

space and should have been treated as such or not is a matter of

judgment which I cannot address with the information at my disposal;

- Terry Maiden correctly recognized the manhole as contaminated and

instructed his technicians not to enter it; he failed however to

inform his employer of this finding as he should have;

- Al Thompson did suggest at some point in his conversation with the

two technicians that one should go down with a rope tied around him;

however, the conversation was concluded by advising the technicians

to wait until the following day when a manager would be on site to

reassess the situation;

- Kevin Marlow went down in spite of directions from Terry Maiden

and Al Thompson, although Al Thompson appears to have given

confusing advice; it must also be remembered that the two

technicians had been trained in confined space entry procedures

little more than a month before;

- The entry by Dave James into this same manhole the following day,

without any of the usual precautions, is inexcusable.

I will now examine the detailed explanations given by the safety

officer in his report and discuss the direction section by section.

1. Paragraph 124 of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

The safety officer has included in his report, under tab 15,

information which, in his opinion, shows that the employer was

aware that manhole MHA1 was contaminated. The first document,

form BC 212A, talks about "Manhole system at Ford". Mr. Valcour

has stated that this report was in fact dealing with other

manholes, not MHA1. With no evidence to the contrary, I must

accept his statement. The second document under this tab, dated

1990/04/19, is vague and only mentions that some of the manholes

have a hazardous content: this is insufficient evidence.

Finally, the last document under this tab is a poor copy of a

site plan showing the location of manholes on the Ford property.

On this drawing, three manholes are identified as contaminated:

as far as I can make out, one is MH2, another one is MH3 and the

last one is within the truck plant, but I cannot make out its

identification. MHA1 is not in the truck plant; it is near MH2

and it is not identified on this plan as contaminated.

Therefore, I am not convinced that the employer knew that this

particular manhole was contaminated. However, the manager,

Terry Maiden, was aware of the contamination and he did instruct

the technicians not to go in, although he failed to report it to

the employer. Afterwards, the duty manager, Al Thompson, did

suggest during his conversation with the two technicians, that

one could go down in the manhole with a rope tied around him.

However, it appears that the final instruction to the two

technicians was to wait until the following morning when a

manager would visit the site and reassess the situation. If one

also considers that the two technicians had received, little

more than a month before, training on manhole entry and exit and

manhole testing and ventilation, I think the employer took

reasonable precautions to ensure the safety and health at work

of his employees. As far as the entry into the manhole by Dave

James on the next day, he had not been asked to go down into

manhole: this was his decision. Given his knowledge of the

employer's procedures (as a manager), his awareness of the

incident which had occurred to Kevin Marlow a few hours earlier

in this same manhole, I think this was a poor decision, but I do

not think the employer should be blamed for Mr. James' decision.

Dave James did not consult anyone else before entering the

manhole and, consequently, he is the only one responsible. When

Wm. Valcour visited the site a short while later, he shut it

down. Consequently, I do not think the employer was in

contravention of section 124 of the Code when Dave James went

down in manhole MHA1. Finally, the safety officer has noted that

"the Bell Canada confined space work procedures and assessment

program does not appear to recognize excavations (pits) as

confined spaces" as one of the reasons for issuing this

particular section of his direction. In his submission, the

employer has noted that the direction was issued as a result of

the incident which occurred in the manhole and that the

excavation was never discussed before. As a result, no

representations were made regarding this question.

In conclusion, Terry Maiden failed to report the contaminated

manhole to the employer; Al Thompson, by suggesting to use a

rope tied around the employee as a safety precaution before

going down in the manhole, induced a degree of confusion in the

employees' minds. To this extent, I believe that the actions of

the two managers, acting on behalf of the employer, contravened

section 124 of the Canada Labour Code. Dave James was extremely

imprudent when he went down without taking any safety measures

on Friday, July 29, 1994, but I do not believe he was acting on

behalf of the employer at this time.

2. Paragraph 125(q) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

Paragraph 125(q) reads: "...every employer shall, in respect of

every workplace controlled by the employer,

...

(q) provide, in the prescribed manner, each employee with the

information, instruction, training and supervision necessary to

ensure the safety and health at work of that employee;" I have

underlined "in the prescribed manner", because this is an

essential element of the paragraph referenced by the safety

officer. The regulations contain requirements regarding

information, instruction and training, but no requirements are

prescribed concerning supervision. It is acknowledged that

Terry Maiden failed to recognize that the excavation was

hazardous and should be treated as a confined space; also, he

did not register the manhole as a designated manhole; for his

part, Al Thompson did suggest early in the discussion with the

two employees to go down in the manhole using a rope tied around

the chest. Failing to recognize that the excavation should be

treated as a confined space has nothing to do with supervision:

it is a question of experience. If he failed to recognize this

fact, the same can be also said for the two technicians. He did

not register the manhole as designated because he did not want

anyone going down in it. This did not meet the employer's

procedures, but it was satisfactory from a regulatory viewpoint.

The suggestion made by Al Thompson has already been covered in

section 1 of the direction and there is no need to harp on this

subject again. Finally, Dave James' actions on the following day

were ill-advised, but they were his decision, not the employer's.

3. Paragraphs 125(p) and 125.1(a) of the Canada Labour Code - Part

II; subsection 11.2(1)(a) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer has over 50,000 manholes in Quebec and Ontario. As

allowed by Part 11 of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations, Confined Spaces, the employer has classified these

manholes into classes and an assessment was then carried out for

each of these classes. This assessment is detailed in the

"Report on the assessment of hazards in Bell Canada's confined

spaces" dated July 1994, located under tab 17 in the safety

officer's report. The assessment involved, among other things,

a detailed evaluation of 79 manholes in Ontario and Quebec;

manhole MHA1 located on Ford's property in Oakville was not one

of the selected manholes. An assessment of some designated

confined spaces considered as a class was done as is permitted

by the regulations. It is not required that each confined space

be individually assessed. Incidentally, the incident to Kevin

Marlow is the only intoxication in the records of the employer.

4. Paragraphs 125 (p) and 125.1(a) of the Canada Labour Code - Part

II; subsection 11.2(1)(b) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

I have read the "Report on the assessment of hazards in Bell

Canada's confined spaces" dated July 1994, located under tab 17

in the safety officer's report. The purpose of the report was,

among other things, to validate the existing procedures and to

formulate additional recommendations as needed. The existing

procedures require that, before entry in a confined space, a

verification be made for oxygen concentration, carbon monoxide

concentration, hydrogen sulfide concentration and explosive

vapours concentration. The report recommends that, in the case

of contaminated manholes, the manholes not be entered if they

show visible signs of pollutants or if suspicious odours are

released from them (recommendation #3). I believe the

requirements outlined in subsection 11.2(1)(b) of the

regulations are satisfied along with paragraphs 125(p) and

125.1(a) of the Canada Labour Code.

5. Paragraph 125(c) and (p) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.2(2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations

If, as stated in section 3 of the direction, there was no

assessment of the confined space, then it is irrelevant to issue

a direction to the effect that there was no written report of

the assessment and I would rescind this section of the direction

based on this sole argument. It is agreed that this particular

manhole was not assessed, however, as allowed by the

regulations, an assessment of this class of confined spaces was

made, a written report of this assessment was prepared and the

regulatory requirements are therefore satisfied.

6. Paragraph 125(j) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II; subsection

11.2(3) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations.

I would again use the same argument as in section 5, that is, if

no assessment was made, then there was no written report and

again it is irrelevant to direct the employer to send a copy of

an inexistent report pertaining to an assessment which was not

carried out. However, in Michele Parent's letter to Serge

Cadieux dated March 16, 1995, she states that the assessment

report (tab 17 of the safety officer's report) was transmitted

to the union and to the Corporate Safety and Health Committee in

August 1994. In fact, the report was given shortly after the

incident, but before the direction was issued. There is

therefore no object to this section of the direction.

7. Paragraphs 125(p) and 125.1(a) of the Canada Labour Code - Part

II; subsection 11.4(1)(a) of the Canada Occupational safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer's procedure prior to entry into a manhole calls for

testing with a Passport monitor for oxygen, carbon monoxide,

hydrogen sulfide and explosive vapours. Additionally, employees

are instructed not to enter a manhole if there is a strong odour

from the manhole. In this particular case, a strong odour was

detected and employees were told by Terry Maiden and by Al

Thompson not to enter the manhole until the next day when a

manager would be present.

8. Paragraph 125(p) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.4(1)(b)(iii) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The information submitted to the regional safety officer

indicates that the manhole was pumped out on July 26, 1994; it

was then pressure washed and pumped out twice the day after.

There is no indication in the various testimonies that there was

water in the manhole when Kevin Marlow went down. The

employer's procedures require that any liquid in a manhole be

pumped out before entry and specifically say: "It is illegal to

enter or work in a manhole with liquid in it" (section 243.06 of

the "Accident Prevention Process").

9. Paragraph 125(e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.5(1)(a) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employees were told not to go down in the manhole. The

employer's procedures are predicated on establishing and

maintaining acceptable conditions in a manhole before an

employee goes down. If conditions are not acceptable, the

employees are instructed not to go down. In other words, entry

into manhole is done under the requirements of section 11.4 of

the regulations; no entry is done under section 11.5. Under the

circumstances, the emergency procedures required by section 11.5

are irrelevant.

10. Paragraph 125(e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.5(3) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

Although during the conversation between Al Thompson, Dave

James, Kevin Marlow and Larry Watson, a suggestion was made to

go down with a rope tied around the employee, the conclusion of

that conversation was not to go down, but to wait for a manager

to assess the situation the following day. I agree that the

suggestion might have caused some confusion, but the insistence

of the manager, Terry Maiden, that no one go down into the

manhole and the employees' training into manhole entry and exit

and manhole testing and ventilation, received little more than a

month before, mitigate this suggestion. As mentioned in the

previous section, the employer's procedure for entry into

manholes is based on section 11.4 of the regulations, not

section 11.5; hence, no safety harness or safety line is called

for.

11. Paragraph 125(e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.6(1) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

As mentioned previously, the employer's procedure for entry into

manholes is based on section 11.4 of the regulations; hence, the

requirements of section 11.6 which apply under circumstances

such that paragraph 11.4(1)(a) cannot be complied with find no

application here.

12. Paragraph 125(e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

subsection 11.6(2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

As mentioned in section 11, the employer's procedure for entry

into manholes is based on section 11.4 of the regulations;

hence, the requirements of section 11.6 which apply under

circumstances such that paragraph 11.4(1)(a) cannot be complied

with find no application here.

13. Paragraphs 125(p) and (v) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

and subsection 11.7(2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

Considering the employees were told not to enter the manhole by

their supervisor, Terry Maiden, and by the duty manager, Al

Thompson (although Al Thompson appears to have given confusing

information), I believe that the employer fulfilled his

responsibilities. It must be remembered also that the employees

had been trained, very recently, in safety procedures respecting

manholes.

For all the above reasons, I hereby rescind sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,

8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the direction issued by safety officer R.

Noel to Bell Canada on December 22, 1994; I hereby confirm section 1 of

the direction issued by safety officer R. Noel to Bell Canada on

December 22, 1994.

Decision given on February 9, 1996.

Bertrand Southière

Regional Safety Officer

ANNEX A

IN THE MATTER OF THE CANADA LABOUR CODE - PART II

(OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH)

DIRECTION TO THE EMPLOYER UNDER SUBSECTION 145(1)

On various dates during October and November 1994, including a site

inspection on November 10, 1994, the undersigned Safety Officer

conducted an investigation into a confined space hazardous occurrence

which occurred on July 28, 1994, involving employees of Bell Ontario, a

Division of Bell Canada, 483 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, being an

employer subject to the Canada Labour Code - Part II. The said

confined space workplace is located at the Ford Assembly Plant in

Oakville, Ontario.

The said Safety Officer is of the opinion that the following provisions

of the Canada Labour Code - Part II are being contravened:

1. Paragraph 124 of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

The employer, by failing to ensure coordinated assignment and

monitoring of confined space work, and by failing to ensure a prompt

investigation of hazardous occurrence of suspected exposure of an

employee to a toxic substance, allowed other employees to

subsequently be assigned to work in this location without ensuring

their safety and health was protected.

2. Paragraph 125 (q) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

The employer failed to provide the supervision necessary to ensure

the safety and health of the employees at this workplace.

3. Paragraphs 125 (p) and 125.1 (a) of the Canada Labour Code -

Part II and Subsection 11.2 (1) (a) of the Canada Occupational

Safety and Health Regulations.

The employer failed to assess the hazards of this confined space,

namely Ford - Bell Manhole A.1 (MH A-1)

4. Paragraphs 125 (p) and 125.1 (a) of the Canada Labour Code -

Part II Subsection 11.2 (1)(b) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer failed to specify the tests necessary to determine the

hazards.

5. Paragraphs 125 (c) and (p) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

and Subsection 11.2 (2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer failed to record, in a signed and dated report, the

findings of a hazard assessment for this confined space manhole (MH

A-1).

6. Paragraphs 125 (j) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II Subsection

11.2 (3) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health Regulations.

The employer failed to make a copy of the Hazard Assessment Report

available to the Safety and Health Committee.

7. Paragraphs 125 (p) and 125.1 (a) of the Canada Labour Code - Part

II Subsection 11.4 (1) (a) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer failed to ensure that tests were in place to verify

that airborne hazardous concentrations would not endanger an

employee working in confined space MH A-1.

8. Paragraph 125 (p) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

Subsection 11.4 (1) (b)(iii) of the Canada Occupational Safety and

Health Regulations.

The employer failed to appoint a qualified person to verify that the

entry of contaminated ground - water was prevented, by a secure

means, from entering the confined space MH A-1.

9. Paragraph 125 (e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

Subsection 11.5 (1) (a) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employer failed to establish emergency procedures.

10. Paragraph 125 (e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

Subsection 11.5 (3) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employer failed to ensure that employee wore an appropriate

safety harness. A rope tied around an employee's waist is not

acceptable as a safety harness.

11. Paragraph 125 (e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

Subsection 11.6 (1) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employer failed to specify the procedures to be followed and the

equipment to be used in the event of an emergency in this confined

space.

12. Paragraph 125 (e) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II and

Subsection 11.6 (2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employer failed to explain emergency procedures and maintain a

signed and dated report as was required.

13. Paragraphs 125 (p) and (v) of the Canada Labour Code - Part II

and Subsection 11.7 (2) of the Canada Occupational Safety and Health

Regulations.

The employer failed to ensure that every person entering, exiting or

occupying a confined space followed safe, established procedures and

used the required protection equipment.

Therefore, you are HEREBY DIRECTED, pursuant to subsection 145(1) of

the Canada Labour Code Part II, to terminate the contraventions from

the date the present direction is issued.

Issued at Toronto, Ontario, this 22nd day of December 1994.

Rod J. Noel

Safety Officer

Certificate #1768

To: Bell Ontario

Division of Bell Canada

483 Bay Street

Toronto, Ontario

c. Joint Health and Safety Committee

SUMMARY OF REGIONAL SAFETY OFFICER DECISION

Decision No.: 95-020

Applicant: Bell Canada

483 Bay Street, Floor 4 South Tower

Toronto, Ontario

Represented by: André L. Paiement, Senior Counsel

KEYWORDS:

Manhole; contaminated manhole; intoxication; class of confined spaces.

PROVISIONS:

Code: 124; 125(c); 125(e); 125(j); 125(q); 125(p); 125(v); 125.1(a)

Regulations: 11.2(1)(a); 11.2(1)(b); 11.2(2); 11.2(3); 11.4(1);

11.4(1)(b)(iii); 11.5(1)(a); 11.5(3); 11.6(1); 11.6(2); 11.7(2)

SUMMARY:

During the course of their work on a customer's premises, Bell Canada's

technicians had to access a manhole situated in contaminated soil.

After ventilating the manhole and verifying for atmospheric

contaminants with a Passport monitor, one of the employees went down

into the manhole with a rope tied around his chest as a safety measure

while a co-worker monitored from outside the manhole. After fifteen

minutes or so in the manhole, the employee felt sick and had to come

out of the manhole, at which time his companion took him to the

hospital from which he was released a few hours later. During the

previous days, the employees had also worked in a pit dug nearby in

contaminated soil without following any safety measure other than

ventilating the pit.

The employer's representative claimed that, during prior discussions

with their supervisors, the employees had been told not to enter the

manhole, but to wait until the following day when a manager would visit

the site and reassess the situation. The employees' representative

highlighted that a suggestion had been made to use a rope tied around

the chest as a safety measure while an employee was going down in the

manhole. The direction was rescinded except that a contravention to

section 124 of the Code was confirmed.