Terms of reference

Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions

Whereas, given concerns expressed surrounding foreign interference with respect to the 43rd and 44th general elections, the Government of Canada and the leaders of all recognized parties in the House of Commons recognize both the cardinal importance of preserving the integrity of Canada’s electoral processes and democratic institutions and the need for transparency in order to enhance Canadians’ trust and confidence in their democracy;

Whereas the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency are undertaking reviews with respect to foreign interference in federal electoral processes in accordance with their respective statutory mandates;

And whereas the leaders of all recognized parties in the House of Commons have supported the establishment of a public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions with respect to the 43rd and 44th general elections;

Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister,

1. directs that a Commission do issue, for the period beginning on the day on which this Order is made and ending on February 11, 2025, under Part I of the Inquiries Act and under the Great Seal of Canada, appointing the Honourable Marie-Josée Hogue, puisne judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, as Commissioner (“the Commissioner”), to conduct an Inquiry under the name of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (“Public Inquiry”), which Commission must
   1. direct that the Commissioner
      1. examine and assess interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections at the national and electoral district levels,
      2. in relation to the issues set out in clause (A), examine and assess the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials, and between the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol panel during the election periods that led up to the 43rd and 44th general elections, and in the weeks following those periods, and actions taken in response,
      3. examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes, notably in relation to
         1. the creation, sharing, assessment and distribution of intelligence and the formulation of advice to senior decision-makers, including elected officials,
         2. the supports and protections in place for members of a diaspora who may be especially vulnerable and may be the first victims of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes, and
         3. the mechanisms that were in place to protect the integrity of the 43rd and 44th general elections from foreign interference as compared to those in place in previous recent federal elections that the Commissioner determines to be relevant,
      4. conduct public hearings at the outset of the Commissioner’s mandate to identify the challenges, limitations and potential adverse impacts associated with the disclosure of classified national security information and intelligence to the public, for the purposes of fostering transparency and enhancing public awareness and understanding, during which hearings the Commissioner should seek to hear from a range of stakeholders, including senior federal public service officials from the legal and national security and intelligence community, academic and legal experts and other stakeholders, as deemed appropriate by the Commissioner,
      5. recommend any means for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference that the Commissioner may consider appropriate, and
      6. in conducting the Public Inquiry and making the Commissioner’s reports,
         1. maximize the degree of public transparency while taking all necessary steps to prevent the disclosure of information whose disclosure could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, in accordance with the procedures set out in clause (iii)(C),
         2. consider the use of alternative measures, such as summaries, in accordance with the procedures set out in clause (iii)‍(C), to describe withheld information and, to the extent possible, explain decisions to withhold information in order to foster understanding of the limitations on and impacts of the disclosure of classified information and intelligence, and
         3. address any relevant classified content in a separate report, if required,
      7. submit to the Governor in Council, in both official languages and in an accessible format, a classified report containing any relevant classified content, if required, and a report suitable for disclosure to the public with findings and recommendations, so as to ensure that the Governor in Council may make available to the leaders of all recognized parties in the House of Commons who have the requisite security clearance, any classified reports as soon as feasible after their receipt, and make the public report available to the public as soon as feasible after its receipt,
         1. in relation to the issues set out in clauses (A) and (B), by no later than February 29, 2024, and
         2. in relation to the issues set out in clauses (C) to (E), by no later than December 31, 2024;
   2. authorize the Commissioner to
      1. adopt any procedures and methods that they may consider expedient for the proper and efficient conduct of the Public Inquiry, accept submissions in the manner they choose, including electronically, and sit at any times, in any manner and in any place in Canada that they may deem appropriate,
      2. receive and review any relevant classified or unclassified documents,
      3. at the Commissioner’s discretion, grant any person who, in the Commissioner’s assessment, would provide appropriate and necessary contributions to, and has a substantial and direct interest in, the subject matter of the Public Inquiry, an opportunity for appropriate participation in the public portions of the Public Inquiry,
      4. recommend to the Clerk of the Privy Council that funding be provided, in accordance with approved guidelines respecting remuneration and expenses and the assessment of accounts, to any person described in clause (C) if the person would not, in the Commissioner’s view, otherwise be able to participate in the Public Inquiry, and
      5. engage the services of the experts and other persons referred to in section 11 of the Inquiries Act, and pay them remuneration and expenses as approved by the Treasury Board;
   3. direct that the Commissioner
      1. perform their duties without expressing any conclusion or recommendation regarding the civil or criminal liability of any person or organization,
      2. perform their duties in such a way as to ensure that the conduct of the Public Inquiry does not jeopardize any ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding, or any other investigation, and provide appropriate notice to the government institution responsible of any potential impact,
      3. in conducting the Public Inquiry, maximize the degree of public transparency while taking all steps necessary to prevent the disclosure to persons or bodies other than the Government of Canada of information whose disclosure could, in the opinion of the Commissioner, be injurious to the critical interest of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, and conduct proceedings in accordance with the following procedures:
         1. on the request of the Attorney General of Canada, the Commissioner must receive information in camera and in the absence of any party and their counsel if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, its disclosure could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security,
         2. the Commissioner may disclose a part or a summary of the information received in camera if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, its disclosure would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, but must, prior to disclosure, provide the Attorney General of Canada with an opportunity to make submissions to the Commissioner regarding the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security,
         3. if the Commissioner concludes that, contrary to the submissions of the Attorney General of Canada referred to in subclause (II), disclosure of a part or a summary of information received in camera would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, the Commissioner must notify the Attorney General of Canada, which will constitute notice under section 38.01 of the Canada Evidence Act,
         4. the Commissioner must provide the Attorney General of Canada with an opportunity to review any report suitable for disclosure to the public referred to in clause (i (G) and to make, prior to their submission to the Governor in Council, submissions to the Commission regarding the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, and
         5. if the Commissioner concludes that, contrary to the submissions of the Attorney General of Canada referred to in subclause (IV), the disclosure of information contained in the report intended for disclosure to the public would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, the Commissioner must notify the Attorney General of Canada, which will constitute notice under section 38.01 of the Canada Evidence Act,
      4. have the Public Inquiry’s primary office in the National Capital Region and use the accommodation provided by the Privy Council Office,
      5. follow established security procedures, including the requirements of the Government of Canada’s security policies, directives, standards and guidelines, with respect to persons whose services are engaged under section 11 of the Inquiries Act and the handling of information at all stages of the Public Inquiry,
      6. use the information technology systems and devices and other electronic systems, including record management systems, and associated support, services and procedures specified by the Privy Council Office, including for records management and the creation and maintenance of websites,
      7. use the automated litigation support system specified by the Attorney General of Canada,
      8. ensure that, with respect to any portion of the Public Inquiry conducted in public, members of the public can, simultaneously in both official languages, communicate with and obtain services from the Public Inquiry,
      9. file the records of the Public Inquiry with the Clerk of the Privy Council as soon as feasible after the conclusion of the Public Inquiry for transmittal to Library and Archives Canada, and
      10. provide the Government of Canada with an opportunity to fully participate in the Public Inquiry; and
   4. provide that nothing in the commission is to be construed as limiting the application of the Canada Evidence Act, the Privacy Act, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act or any other Act of Parliament;
2. authorizes the Honourable Marie-Josée Hogue, puisne judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, to act as Commissioner of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions under section 56 of the Judges Act; and
3. directs that the Commissioner be given access, so that they may carry out their mandate, to those confidential cabinet documents that came into existence on or after November 4, 2015 and that were provided to the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference in relation to the preparation of his First Report, dated May 23, 2023.