The Confidence of Canadians

Accountabilities of the CSIS Director

Long description of infographic: The CSIS Director is accountable to:

Minister of Public Safety
Provides advice on national security policy, adherence to Ministerial Direction and the management of departmental operations, including an annual report.
National Security and Intelligence Advisor
Ensures the NSIA remains informed of security and intelligence matters in the provision of advice to the Prime Minister.
Clerk of the Privy Council
Ensures the Clerk remains informed of overall performance and achievement of corporate priorities.
Treasury Board
Exercises authorities under the Financial Administration Act and any relevant legislation or policies (e.g. controls, internal audit).
Human Resources
Exclusive authority over human resources management and appointment of employees (CSIS Act, s.8).
Labour Relations
Maintains productive labour-management relations per the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act and Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.
Workplace Health & Safety
Responsible for workplace management issues under the Canada Labour Code.

Legal
Ensures that CSIS and its employees act lawfully in the conduct of its affairs and operations.
Review
Ensures that CSIS responds to inquiries from the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in the fulfillment of its statutory review function.
Mandatory reporting
Ensures compliance with government reporting requirements, such as the Main Estimates, the Management Accountability Framework, Access to Information, and the Treasury Board Policy Suite.

Parliament
Core mandate
- Public Accounts
- Government Operations and Estimates
- Standing Senate Committee on National Security & Defence
- Standing Committee on Public Safety & National Security
Officers & Agents of Parliament
Ensures that CSIS responds to Agents and Officers of Parliament, including:
- Auditor General of Canada
- Information Commissioner
- Privacy Commissioner
- Parliamentary Budget Officer
- Commissioner of Official Languages
Ensures that CSIS responds to various government coordination bodies, including:
- Chief Statistician
- Chief Information Officer
- Ombudspersons
- Canadian Human Rights Commission
National Security & Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)
Ensures that CSIS responds to inquiries in the fulfillment of its mandated review function.

Accountability and Retaining the Trust of Canadians

As an intelligence agency it should surprise no one that much of what CSIS does is, and will remain, invisible to Canadians. Successful operations that identify and mitigate threats must be carried out clandestinely in order to be effective. Nevertheless, the way in which CSIS conducts that work is subject to considerable oversight and accountability.

Since CSIS’ inception in 1984, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) has been the independent review agency, reporting to Parliament on the operational activities of CSIS, and hearing public complaints. The Prime Minister of Canada is responsible for SIRC.

In addition, new legislation has led to the creation of the newly formed National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), which offers for the first time, a whole of government examination of the national security function.

Over the years, SIRC and CSIS have developed an open exchange of information to support SIRC investigations; CSIS is currently cultivating the same transparent relationship with NSICOP. CSIS works diligently to ensure SIRC and NSICOP have timely access to documentation required to satisfy their investigations.

CSIS has also established an operational compliance framework, ensuring that compliance is woven into the fabric of our organization’s culture, in an effort to assure the Federal Court, the Government of Canada and Canadians that CSIS holds compliance with the laws of Canada as paramount.

CSIS welcomes any changes that contribute to an increase of public trust, while continuing its efforts to safeguard national security.

Transparency

The confidence of Canadians in the national security efforts of CSIS is fundamental to our legitimacy, operational effectiveness, and institutional credibility. While certain information on our activities and interests must remain protected, CSIS is committed to making information about some of the activities more transparent to Canadians, ensuring there is no risk or compromise to national security. That is why CSIS is committed to providing clear and concise information about our role and mandate. Engaging Canadians on the legal framework under which we conduct national security activities, while balancing the privacy rights of Canadians, is a priority for CSIS. Through public forums, public communications, stakeholder engagement and social media platforms, CSIS endeavours to communicate transparently about our decision-making processes and national security activities. CSIS continues to look for opportunities to engage with Canadians in order to ensure their trust and confidence.

Access to Information and Privacy statistics

ATIP Statistics

Number of Privacy Act requests received during that period

2016-2017: 529
2017-2018: 844

Number of Access to Information Act requests received during that period

2016-2017: 491
2017-2018: 851

Number of Informal requests received during that period

2016-2017: 342
2017-2018: 187

CSIS Foreign Cooperation

The work of intelligence agencies today is transnational, and the increased ‘globalization’ of threats cannot be countered in isolation. Cooperation with foreign agencies provides CSIS access to timely information linked to a number of potential or specific threats, and allows the Service (and, in turn, the Government of Canada) to obtain information which might otherwise not be available.

In response to the evolving international threat environment over the past two decades, CSIS expanded its international presence to address increased domestic and international threats to Canadians and Canada’s national interests.

CSIS has more than 310 foreign relationships in some 150 countries, each authorized by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with s.17(1)(b) of the CSIS Act.

Since its inception in 1984, CSIS has reviewed and assessed its foreign relations based on a number of factors. CSIS reviews various yearly government assessments (e.g. Global Affairs Canada human rights reporting; US State Department Country Reports) and regular reporting from non-governmental entities (e.g. Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; reporting from established media outlets etc.) on all countries with which CSIS has implemented a Ministerially-approved arrangement.

Human Rights Considerations

The human rights reputation of the agencies with which CSIS engages is not something which the Service takes lightly. CSIS opposes in the strongest possible terms the mistreatment of any individual by a foreign agency, and in all situations, it must and does comply with Canada’s laws and legal obligations in sharing information with foreign entities.

The September 2017 Ministerial Direction (MD) on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities requires CSIS to monitor its foreign arrangements on a number of factors, including human rights and the risk of mistreatment, and impose restrictions on information sharing if it is assessed that a foreign entity is engaging in, or contributing to, mistreatment. In March 2018, CSIS implemented an additional mechanism of ‘Restrictions’ which add additional levels of review and approvals on proposals to exchange information in instances where such serious human rights concerns exist.

CSIS must also assess and attempt to mitigate potential risks of mistreatment prior to sharing certain types of information with foreign entities. Mitigation efforts include _ but are not limited to _ obtaining updated assurances from a foreign agency. Such assurances are sought to ensure the foreign agency understands and abides by CSIS expectations (and those of the broader GC) regarding the use of information provided by CSIS vis-à-vis human rights, including the treatment of detainees. Assurances outline to foreign agencies expectations that individuals will not be mistreated in any way as a result of information exchanges with the foreign agency, and will be treated in a manner consistent with domestic and international law, including the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

In accordance with the 2017 MD, the Service is also required to provide, on an annual basis, details to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to the National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians on ‘substantial risk’ cases where this direction was engaged, including the number of high- risk information sharing proposals reviewed by the CSIS Information Sharing Evaluation Committee (ISEC) (or those referred by ISEC to the CSIS Director) for decision. ISEC is a committee of senior officials from CSIS and Global Affairs Canada, advised by the Department of Justice. Such requests are sent to ISEC for review where there is a potential risk that sharing information on a specific case with a foreign entity may result in the mistreatment of an individual, and it is initially assessed at the Branch level that caveats, assurances and/or other factors may not mitigate the potential risk. ISEC then assesses whether or not there is a substantial risk^{Footnote 1} as defined in the MD that the proposed information sharing with the foreign entity may result in the mistreatment of an individual.

During the 2017/18 reporting period, ISEC considered a total of four cases wherein ‘substantial risk’ as defined in the MD[1] was involved. Two of those requests were subsequently referred to the CSIS Director for decision, one of which was approved when it was determined there were sufficient mitigation measures in place to reduce the risk well below the ‘substantial’ threshold. The other case referred to the Director during that period was not approved, as it was assessed that the ‘substantial risk’ threshold could not be lowered enough through mitigation measures.

Academic Outreach

The Academic Outreach program at CSIS affords employee access to leading thinkers who can provide unique insights into a range of issues that have an immediate and long-term impact on Canada’s security environment. It may happen that some of our academic partners hold ideas or promote findings that conflict with our own views and experience, but this is one of the reasons why we initiated the program. We believe there is value in having informed observers challenge our thinking and approaches.

The program helps CSIS focus its intelligence collection efforts and improve its analytical capacity. Reciprocally, a more interactive relationship with the academic community allows CSIS to share some of its own expertise and interests, which in turn can help scholars—political scientists, economists, historians, cyber security experts, psychologists, etc—to identify new avenues of research.

The Academic Outreach program promotes partnerships with other government departments. Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Communications Security Establishment and the Canada Border Services Agency have all provided support to its workshops and programming. The AO program also serves as an important tool to strengthen partnerships with dozens of foreign partners and provides an opportunity for members of the intelligence community across government to exchange on timely and relevant security issues facing our country.

New Legislation: C-59 – What does it mean for CSIS?

CSIS must understand, investigate and respond to a complex and evolving global threat environment.

Terrorists today are increasingly able to communicate securely because of the prevalence of strong encryption. Threats to Canada can also materialize from across the world. This poses enormous operational challenges.

Bill C-59 was tabled in the House of Commons in June 2017. It identifies lawful authority for longstanding collection activities and modern investigative techniques. It proposes a robust and transparent regime in law for dataset collection, retention and its use, as well as establishing in law an authorization regime for otherwise unlawful activities, modeled closely on safeguards in place for Canadian law enforcement. These changes will ensure that CSIS can respond to the evolving threat landscape and continue its vital role in the protection of Canada and Canadians. In order to keep pace with this evolving threat environment and the legal landscape, CSIS will continue to assess whether our current authorities, tools and resources enable us to carry out our mission.

Changes To CSIS Investigatory Powers, Oversight and Review Under an ACT Respecting National Security Matters, 2017 (BILL C-59)

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada at home and abroad, to advise the government of Canada of these threats, and take measures to reduce such threats. An Act Respecting National Security Matters aims to clarify CSIS authorities, and introduce enhanced oversight and review institutions.

Accountability

Oversight

Operations

Footnote 1

Substantial risk” is defined in the Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Mistreatment by Foreign Entities as “a personal, present and foreseeable risk of mistreatment. In order to be ‘substantial’, the risk must be real and must be based on something more than mere theory or speculation. In most cases, the test of a substantial risk of mistreatment will be satisfied when it is more likely than not that there will be mistreatment; however, in some cases, particularly where the risk is of severe harm, the ‘substantial risk’ standard may be satisfied at a lower level of probability.”

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Date modified:: 2019-06-21

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