Chapter 2 - Schism or spat? The future relationship between Al-Qaeda and ISIL

The history of violence among elements of the jihadist movement suggests that the split between ISIL and Al-Qaeda core is the norm and not the exception. Al-Qaeda was dominant after the attacks of 9/11. It had funding, control of training camps, the charismatic leadership of bin Laden, the prestige of successful attacks, as well as the desire for unity among jihadist forces. These advantages have largely disappeared, and sharp differences have emerged between the two forces. Al-Qaeda rejects ISIL’s immediate focus on a caliphate, its violence and persecution of minorities and its apocalyptic vision. Al‑Qaeda would go after the distant enemy sooner and is open to alliances with groups with compatible aims. At present ISIL is ascendant, but advances by Al-Qaeda affiliates such as Jahbat al-Nusra could restore the competitive balance.

Divisions have always plagued the modern jihadist movement. Rival jihadists probably were behind the 1989 assassination of Abdullah Azzam, the pied piper of the Afghan Arab movement, and other jihadists repeatedly tried to kill Osama bin Laden himself during his time in Sudan. Al-Qaeda emerged as a splinter movement from the broader Arab Afghan cause and it often had difficulty working with, let alone controlling, fellow jihadists. Indeed, given the overall jihadist movement’s bloody track record of internecine violence, the 2014 split between the Al-Qaeda core and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is more norm than exception.

During the late 1990s and immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, Al‑Qaeda managed to bring together many strands of the modern jihadist movement. Several factors explain this relative degree of unity:

  • First, Al-Qaeda often had access to considerable funding, allowing it to incentivise groups to work together and otherwise reward collaborative behaviour;
  • Second, Al-Qaeda controlled access to training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even groups that did not share its vision wanted to improve the proficiency of their members. Control of training camps enabled Al-Qaeda to direct recruits to their preferred clients, enabling a like-minded group within a country to become stronger and to proselytise when they were there, mobilising groups around a shared vision;
  • Third, bin Laden’s philosophy and personality were unusual. He was a charismatic yet humble man. He did not demand adulation but inspired those around him: an ideal combination to unify a movement filled with strong and zealous personalities;
  • Fourth, Al-Qaeda over time gained considerable prestige through its attacks on the United States and other deeds. This stature expanded, enabling the group to attract more and better recruits and funding, thus ensuring even more power in the future;
  • Finally, after the 2001 attacks, US and allied counter-terrorism efforts, which understandably lumped various strands of the jihadist movement together given their many shared goals and training, drove the external apparati together for self-preservation (especially those located in Afghanistan and Pakistan).

Al-Qaeda itself is now on the defensive, and many—but not all—of these factors have diminished. Al-Qaeda probably still has training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but Pakistani military efforts and the drone campaign make these a shadow of what the group had established in the pre-9/11 era. Similarly, its access to funding and recruits are both diminished. Zawahiri lacks bin Laden’s charisma and conciliatory personality, and under his charge the group’s overall prestige has diminished: the core’s operational accomplishments in the last five years are close to nil.

Not everything has changed, however. The whole movement is bound by numerous personal ties, often based on shared fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres of jihad. Many of the individuals involved, particularly outside the Iraq and Syria core, see themselves as brothers-in-arms and are not eager to choose sides. In addition, both Al‑Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are reaching for the same funding sources and recruits, giving them an incentive to pursue similar paths.

Nevertheless, in the author’s judgment the split between the two movements is profound and based on fundamental differences in ideology and strategy:

  • Although both Al-Qaeda and ISIL share a basic long-term vision of a world governed under Islamic law, they differ dramatically on priorities. ISIL leader al‑Baghdadi prioritises building a state, to which most other goals are subordinated. Zawahiri, in contrast, still prioritises the ‘far enemy’ and is leery of establishing a state before conditions are ripe;
  • In areas in which it rules, Al-Qaeda guides its affiliates like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Jabhat al-Nusra to treat minorities well and in general to be a friend of the people: ISIL emphasises religious purity and the use of terror to impose its will;
  • Al-Qaeda and ISIL differ on whether to emphasise the war on the Shia and how much to cooperate with non-jihadist groups;
  • Finally, some in ISIL embrace apocalypticism, which Al-Qaeda views with disdain.

Personal rivalries and violence have exacerbated these differences. Since 2014, the propaganda war has been intense, with senior Al-Qaeda ideologues denouncing ISIL as bloody and foolish, and ISIL blasting Al-Qaeda for its (quite real) relationship with Iran, among other sins. The fighting in Syria between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL has been exacting, with thousands dying. Outside the Levant, commanders embracing ISIL have challenged Al‑Qaeda or its allies in Afghanistan, the Caucasus, North Africa, Yemen and elsewhere.

In the short-term, however, many jihadists—particularly those not attached to established groups that have declared loyalty to one side or another—are likely to work together or go from one group to another depending on which is more prestigious. The Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, for example, primarily involved gunmen linked to Al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), but Amedy Coulibaly—who pledged loyalty to ISIL—carried out simultaneous attacks and was in contact with the core group of shooters. In 2015 in San Bernadino, California, the two perpetrators were radicalised by AQAP ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki and only over time did they shift their loyalty to the ISIL.

In the long term, one group may eclipse the other. Right now ISIL appears ascendant, and continued Al-Qaeda inaction, combined with possible ISIL advances, could foster a cycle that leads to defections and a loss of funding for Al-Qaeda that would eventually cripple it. The death of Zawahiri, who has no obvious successor, would make this even more likely. Al‑Qaeda’s collapse would probably not be absolute, but it would transform it into a minor player in the global jihadist universe. Conversely, a renewal of Al‑Qaeda core advances by prominent affiliates such as AQAP or Jabhat al-Nusra, might restore the balance between the two groups. Although ISIL is currently stronger in general, the focus of Al‑Qaeda on terrorism and the West should make Zawahiri and his followers a continued concern for US, Canadian and European counter-terrorism officials.

In the end, however, the jihadist movement as a whole is likely to remain strong. Although it has had different shapes over the last twenty-five years, it has fed off different wars and other calamities and is now far more influential and powerful than it was when it began.

Page details

Date modified: