Chapter 3 - The enduring footprint of ISIL and Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria and Iraq

Although the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is under more pressure now than at any time since the so-called caliphate was proclaimed in late June 2014, it remains a formidable military force in control of a significant amount of strategically valuable territory. Coalition efforts against the group in Iraq and Syria have borne fruit, but progress is painfully slow and has yet to challenge the group’s key power centres in the cities of Mosul and Raqqa, as well as in Syria’s eastern Deir ez‑Zour. Progress in that respect has been heavily restricted by limitations in local force capabilities and, in Syria, by the chaotic fall-out following Russia’s military intervention.

In Iraq, the December 2015 recapture of Ramadi illustrated what Iraqi security forces were capable of achieving with US support. However, destruction has been vast, with nearly 2,000 buildings destroyed and 3,700 more badly damaged^{Footnote 21}. Two months later, the Iraqi government has yet to declare the city safe for civilian habitation.

With much attention focused on preparing the path towards a battle for Mosul, expectations must necessarily be restrained. The city is three times larger than Ramadi, with a civilian population of at least 750,000^{Footnote 22}. Continuing disagreements over the weighting of local forces, the role of Turkey and Kurds, as well as determining post-conflict delineations of power and influence in the city itself suggest much needs to be done before even preparatory clearing operations can begin. As US Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart declared on 9 February 2016, “securing or taking Mosul is an extensive operation and not something I see [happening] in the next year or so^{Footnote 23}’’.

In Syria, efforts by the US-led coalition against ISIL appear to have slowed following Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the regime of Bashar al-Assad that began on 30 September 2015. All international actors now seem to be reviewing their approach since a cease‑fire was agreed in winter 2016. In large part due to its partnership with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defence Unit (YPG)—the Syrian wing of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK)—the coalition has forced ISIL out of large parts of northeastern Syria, securing key border crossings and paving the way towards the so-called caliphate’s ‘capital’, Raqqa.

However, the YPG has reached the limits of how far into Arab territory its forces can reach. The formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in October 2015 by combining YPG forces with Assyrian, Arab, Armenian and Turkmen militias is a step in the right direction in expanding coalition anti-ISIL capabilities, but as it does in the west, the YPG dominates SDF operations east of the Euphrates. To the west, conflict dynamics have been significantly complicated by Russian-facilitated regime gains north of Aleppo; effective Russian outreach to the SDF; and a subsequent SDF offensive eastwards from the Kurdish stronghold of Efrin towards opposition positions north of the city in mid-February 2016. Under Russian air cover, the SDF advances have appeared increasingly in sync with those led by Hizballah and pro‑Assad forces as little as 5 kilometres south of Aleppo.

Kurdish problems

Although too late to reverse, the US-led coalition might learn from its failure to develop partnerships with a broader set of local Syrian allies on the ground. The spectacular failure of the USD 500 million "Train & Equip" program was the result of a poor understanding of fundamental, conflict-driving dynamics, and it left the coalition partnered overwhelmingly with the controversial YPG. Although the US State Department has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation, it has consistently refused to acknowledge that the YPG, and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) meet the same standard. This despite the fact that the PYD was specifically established by the PKK in 2003^{Footnote 24}, while the YPG was founded by famed PKK commanders like Xebat Derik and Polat Can. Today, the YPG retains a strict adherence to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s teachings, and its fighters are self-identified veterans of other PKK fronts in Turkey, Iran and Iraq^{Footnote 25}.

Despite its demonstrated success in fighting ISIL with US air support, empowering the YPG at the expense of the conventional opposition—rather than coordinating with both, equally—has directly encouraged the Kurdish movement to seek its own territorial objectives. According to a map hung in the office of the PYD’s new diplomatic mission in Moscow, these stretch from opposition-controlled northwestern Idlib to the far northeastern corner of Hasakah. With Russian support for its western fronts, a YPG advance on opposition-controlled towns in northern Aleppo Province has sparked Turkish military intervention, thus opening another conflict front inside Syria. Unfortunately, US policy has empowered two sides of armed groups in Syria that explicitly oppose each other’s very reasons for being, thereby creating potentially intractable conflicts beyond the one involving the Assad regime. Such complexity fuels the very conditions that groups like ISIL thrive in.

Countering ISIL finance

Beyond direct operations, coalition efforts to counter ISIL finance have expanded in recent months to include the targeting of cash and gold reserves, the group’s financial leadership and its oil operations. The impact of the killing of ISIL finance minister Abu Salah in late November 2015^{Footnote 26} appears to have been compounded by further economic losses, as ISIL fighter salaries reportedly were halved in mid January 2016^{Footnote 27}. Whilst this represents important progress, ISIL differs from traditional terrorist adversaries in that it remains almost entirely financially independent. Its greatest source of income does not come from targetable assets like oil, but from taxation and extortion activities practiced within its ‘state’ territory amounting to roughly USD 600 million per year^{Footnote 28}. Therefore, the only truly durable mechanism for countering ISIL finance is taking back its territory, which requires effective and crucially representative local partner forces.

While progress against ISIL in Iraq will clearly take time, efforts appear to be on the right track. Meanwhile, coalition efforts in Iraq should continue to focus on consolidating gains made against ISIL and maintaining the time-consuming and resource-intensive process of building security force capacity, especially Sunni Arab tribal forces around Mosul and the extremely effective Counter-Terrorism Service.

The Syrian chaos

In sharp contrast, Syria appears to have now entered a period of unimaginable complexity during which an effective, comprehensive and unitary strategy against ISIL seems only a distant possibility. De‑escalating broader conflict dynamics is an important priority so as to prevent the consequences of Western inaction from becoming irreversible. Opposition armed factions in Aleppo, long supported by the US and its regional allies, require significant supplementary assistance to prevent the establishment of a comprehensive east-to-west Kurdish zone of control, which would open a full-scale conflict with Turkey and ensure years of future hostilities. Meanwhile, a Russian-led ‘scorched earth’ strategy to enforce a siege of Aleppo looks set to spark refugee flows that could eclipse those seen in 2015. In the first six weeks of 2016, 374 Syrians drowned off the Greek coast, which is 50 per cent of the total for all of 2015^{Footnote 29}. The first 10 days of February 2016 alone saw 100,000 people flee Syria^{Footnote 30}.

The scale and intensity of this proliferating chaos provides ISIL with some temporary space to prepare for future attacks, whether by pro-Assad regime forces or those working with the US-led coalition. Of equal if not more importance, however, is how Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, adapts to operate on this increasingly challenging and complex battlefield. Although it has spent the past three-and-a-half years embedding itself within opposition revolutionary dynamics in Syria through a policy of controlled pragmatism—limiting the extent to which it reveals its true Al-Qaeda colours—Jabhat al-Nusra has emerged as an increasingly self-confident and assertive jihadist actor in recent months. Its lead role in securing major strategic opposition gains in Idlib governorate throughout much of 2015 saw it steadily consolidate its stranglehold over what is now, in effect, Al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Syria.

Amid chaos, potential opportunities

Russia’s intervention posed a challenge to Jabhat al-Nusra, but a far greater one to the conventional opposition, which was present in greater numbers in the regime’s sensitive zones in Homs, Aleppo, Deraa and northern Hama. Although it has faced many airstrikes in Idlib, Jabhat al-Nusra’s territorial domination there has not been confronted by the ground offensives seen elsewhere in Syria. As the opposition struggled against the might of Russian airpower and ground forces composed of the Syrian Army and National Defence Force, as well as Hizballah and dozens of Shia militias, it was also coerced into engaging with an internationally-backed political process, beginning in Geneva in early-February 2016. Jabhat al-Nusra, meanwhile, maintained the consistent position that such a process would end in failure and that involvement in it equated treason^{Footnote 31}.

As the political process struggled to take off and Jabhat al-Nusra’s principal Syrian ally, Ahrar al‑Sham, withdrew from it altogether, Al-Qaeda's affiliate pounced. According to multiple Islamist sources with unique insight on the subject, a series of secret meetings centred principally around Idlib’s Jaish al-Fateh Coalition were called in early January 2016, at which Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership proposed a grand merger. The proposal: any and all groups could unite behind a single Islamic banner under which Jabhat al-Nusra would be willing to cede its name and its leadership. Talks initially stalled when Ahrar al-Sham insisted Jabhat al-Nusra break all ties to Al-Qaeda, but internal deliberation within Jabhat al-Nusra’s Majlis al-Shura in early February 2016 saw that issue tabled as something under consideration^{Footnote 32}. As of mid February, discussions were continuing on the subject.

…Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership proposed a grand merger.

Although still unlikely to be agreed, the fact that Jabhat al-Nusra’s highest levels of leadership are now willing seriously to discuss breaking allegiance to Al-Qaeda in order to take advantage of the opposition’s desperate situation speaks to the scope of its strategic ambitions. As such, Russia’s intervention is both a potential threat and opportunity to Al-Qaeda’s long-term objectives in Syria. In the months prior to Russia’s intervention, Syria’s opposition had begun questioning the true purpose of Jabhat al-Nusra’s presence in Syria, but the threat posed by Russia’s air power has clouded such concerns. The extent to which they still exist may come to define how Jabhat al-Nusra adapts to face the year ahead.

Outlook

ISIL has evolved into a truly international movement since its declaration of a Caliphate in the summer of 2014. This provides it with invaluable strategic depth with which to defend itself in case of existential losses in Iraq and Syria. ISIL’s expansion in Libya, the Sinai and possibly also in Afghanistan point to a future containing multiple, highly-capable ISIL affiliates, or ‘states’. The battle against the group in Iraq looks set to be a slow one, while its core territories in Syria may yet escape a concerted coalition attack for longer than expected. Should pro-Assad forces take on ISIL in Raqqa or Deir ez‑Zour, popular opposition to a regime return may see communities siding with ISIL as the lesser of two evils—akin to dynamics in Iraq in mid-2014.

Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, has strategically adapted to root itself into local conflict and in weak states, thereby exploiting existing rebellious forces in support of its long-term jihadist ambitions. While previous attempts at this slow-game approach failed in Yemen (2011-2012) and in Mali (in 2012), Jabhat al-Nusra appears to have mastered the art of ‘controlled jihadist pragmatism’. Whatever the eventual outcome of the conflict in Syria, there appears to be no scenario in which Jabhat al-Nusra is militarily defeated or disappears from Syria. Even if Syria’s opposition is one day forced from the majority of its territory, Jabhat al-Nusra appears ideally suited to embrace a guerrilla-style war.