Chapter 8 - Iran-Russia relations: Current state and potential evolution

Iran and Russia currently share several interests. These include their leaders’ shared antipathy towards the West, fear of the rise of a democratic opposition against them, fear of Sunni jihadism, and support for the Assad regime in Syria. Moreover, Tehran not only buys weapons from Moscow, but Russia has finished one nuclear reactor for Iran and there are plans for it to build others.

There have, however, also been—and continue to be—several important differences and disagreements between Tehran and Moscow. These include: continuing Iranian resentment over the loss of Iranian territory to the Tsarist empire in the 19th century; Tsarist and Soviet interventions in Iran during the 20th century; Soviet support for secessionism in Iran’s northwest just after World War I and World War II; as well as Soviet support for Saddam Hussein during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.

Since the break-up of the USSR in 1991, Iran and Russia (as well as other littoral states) have been unable to agree upon a formula for delimiting their maritime borders in the Caspian Sea as well as dividing the mineral resources beneath it. The old Soviet-Iranian maritime border gave Iran only an 11  per cent share of the Caspian. After the fall of the USSR and the emergence of three more Caspian littoral states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), in addition to Russia and Iran, Moscow proposed dividing the Caspian along a “modified median line” giving each littoral state roughly the same  percentage of the Caspian as its share of the coastline. This formula would result in Iran having a 13  per cent share of the Caspian. Tehran, though, has insisted that the Caspian be divided equally, and that each littoral state receive a 20  per cent share. Iran engaged in gunboat diplomacy over this issue in 2001 while Moscow did so in 2002. Negotiations over this issue have occurred since then, but an agreement has not yet been reached.

Tehran is also unhappy that despite Moscow’s profession of friendship towards Iran, Russia is also seeking improved ties with Iranian adversaries: the Arab Gulf states and Israel. Even areas of joint cooperation have proved contentious: Moscow has delayed or cancelled arms sales to Iran at the West’s behest, took an inordinate amount of time to complete the nuclear reactor at Bushehr and appears to have different priorities than Tehran regarding the ongoing negotiations for a peace settlement in Syria. Most recently, while Moscow has joined Riyadh in calling for an oil production freeze, Tehran has pointedly refused and insists that Iran will increase production (which contributes to lower prices) instead.

Thus, while there is an important degree of cooperation between Iran and Russia, there are also important differences between them that serve to limit just how much the two sides cooperate. Further, their common interests have not been strong enough to enable them to overcome their differences. Neither has proved willing to give up much of anything for the sake of improved ties to the other. On the other hand, their differences have not been great enough to prevent them from cooperating on issues of common concern either. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Iran-Russia relationship requires an understanding of how each side views the other.

How Iran views Russia

Iranian and Russian leaders share a deep-seated antipathy towards the West in general and the US in particular. But the Iranian leadership, as well as public opinion, has a generally negative view of Russia due both to Iran’s many negative experiences with Russia in the past and low expectations about Moscow’s reliability in fulfilling agreements it has reached with Tehran now. Yet while the top Iranian leadership shares this negative image of Russia, it nevertheless has found cooperation with Russia useful in several respects. Although they would have preferred that Russia had vetoed them outright, Iranian leaders value Russia for acting to delay and water down economic sanctions that the West had urged the UN Security Council to impose on Iran over the nuclear issue. Although Tehran has been frustrated over Russian unreliability as an arms supplier and the delays in completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iranian leaders value Moscow for delivering these goods at all when the West would not. Iranian leaders also see the Putin regime in particular as an ally against what they both see as Western attempts to promote democratisation. Further, Iranian leaders value Moscow for both its strong support to, as well as intervention in support of, the Assad regime without which Tehran may not have been able to prevent its replacement by a Sunni Arab regime hostile to Iran.

Despite this, Iranian leaders are well aware of the limits to partnering with Russia. There is a strong sense in Iran that what Moscow really wants is to achieve some sort of modus vivendi with the United States and the West, and that Moscow always stands ready to stop supporting Iran if it can get the right price for doing so from Washington in particular. Even if Russia-US differences prevent what Tehran regards as this worst-case scenario, Iranian leaders are well aware that Moscow and Tehran are competitors in the oil and gas markets. Further, Russia (especially as a result of Western sanctions and low oil prices) simply does not have anywhere near the same ability to invest in Iran that the West, China or other dynamic Asian states do. An economically declining Russia only provides limited opportunities for Iranian exports, and besides arms and nuclear reactors, there is not all that much that Tehran wants to buy from Russia. While Tehran may be confident that Moscow will not dump Iran in exchange for improved relations with the Arab Gulf states or Israel, Moscow’s cooperation with the former is annoying and with the latter is embarrassing to Tehran.

How Russia views Iran

Moscow has greatly valued Tehran’s steadfast opposition to US foreign policy. Since Moscow has sometimes cooperated with Washington while Tehran has generally not, this has actually allowed Moscow to be viewed as a partner by Washington in dealing with Iran. Further, direct US economic sanctions on Iran, along with Washington pressuring its Western allies to limit the extent of their trade with Tehran, have benefited Moscow substantially. Not only has US blockage of Western investment in the Iranian petroleum sector limited Iranian output (thus benefiting other petroleum exporters such as Russia), it has also prevented Western investment in pipelines that could transport Caspian Basin oil and gas through Iran to the world market, thus artificially increasing the reliance of these countries on export routes via Russia.

Indeed, Moscow’s main worry about Iran is that the enmity between Tehran and Washington will end, and Tehran will then have little need for Russia. Although this has seemed like a low probability event ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Moscow feared that the Obama administration’s efforts to reach a nuclear accord with Tehran would lead to a closer rapprochement between Iran and the United States. Russian leaders understood that, if Moscow had attempted to block an agreement that Washington and Tehran wanted to make, the latter would have proceeded without Moscow. Fortunately for Moscow, though, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s opposition to a broader rapprochement with the US as well as Tehran’s continued strong support for the Assad regime and hostility towards both Israel and the Arab Gulf states have made the prospects of further improvement in Washington-Tehran ties highly unlikely at present.

Yet even in the absence of improved Iran-US ties, there is much about Iranian policy that frustrates Moscow. Hostile relations between Washington and Tehran should have, in Moscow’s view, resulted in Iran becoming both dependent on and deferential to Russia. Tehran, though, has not only not shown gratitude to Moscow for what it has done for it, but has complained about how Moscow has not done more instead. Russian leaders are also frustrated about how Iran persists in refusing Moscow’s proposals for resolving the Caspian Sea issue. Currently, Moscow sees Tehran as out of alignment with it on several issues: at a time when the Russian economy is becoming more isolated from the West’s (due both to Western sanctions and Moscow’s response to them), Iran is improving its economic ties to the West.

Moreover, instead of joining Moscow’s efforts to isolate Turkey after the November 2015 shootdown of a Russian military aircraft by Turkish forces, Tehran has worked to improve relations with Ankara instead. Although Russia moved to severely cut back trade ties with Turkey after this incident, Iran and Turkey announced plans to increase theirs. In addition, Tehran, like Ankara, has taken a dim view of Russian support for Kurdish forces in Syria (Iran, like Turkey, has a substantial Kurdish population inside its borders which it does not want to secede).

Future prospects

Despite their ongoing difficulties, Iran-Russia ties may now be stronger than if there is either a dramatic improvement or deterioration in Iran-US relations. If, somehow, Iran’s ties to the West improve, Tehran will simply have less need for Russia. While Iran may not join the US in opposing Russia, it will certainly not join Russia in opposing the US. Further, just as Russian petroleum exports have benefited from Iran-US hostility, Iranian petroleum exports could benefit from Russian-Western hostility if this grows worse.

On the other hand, if Iran-US hostility returns to the point where open conflict between them is possible, it is doubtful that Moscow will come to Iran’s defence. Russian President Vladimir Putin may take advantage of Iran-US hostility to pursue expansionist aims in the former Soviet space, but with Russian forces already involved in eastern Ukraine, Syria and the North Caucasus, he may not wish to risk becoming overextended through involvement in yet another conflict. Just as in the past, Iranian-Western hostility may not result in increased Iranian trade with Russia, but with China instead.

Similarly, Iran-Russia ties may deteriorate as a result of either positive or negative political change inside Iran. The rise of democratic forces inside Iran would lead to greater cooperation between Iran and the West. The rise of more strongly Shia Islamist forces in Iran, though, may reaffirm Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s view of seeing both East and West as “satans”.  One possible source of tension might be Syria, with Russia more willing to reach a compromise with Sunni Arabs and Kurds there, while Iran insists on supporting the Shia-affiliated Alawites who form the basis of the Assad regime. Further, a more Shia Islamist Iran will be far less tolerant of Moscow’s close ties to Israel and the Gulf Arabs than Tehran is now.

In addition, the rise of China and India, as well as the growing rivalry between them, may have a greater impact on the international relations of Iran and other states in the region than anything Russia does. Indeed, if China and India decide to compete with each other through providing assistance to, as well as buying petroleum from Iran, Russian influence in Tehran may become decidedly peripheral.

Finally, just as internal collapse or preoccupation with conflict elsewhere has led to Russian/Soviet withdrawal from, or inattention to, the Middle East in the past, a similar occurrence could lead to a similar result in the future. This could give Tehran not just the opportunity, but strong incentive to expand Iranian influence into the Caucasus and at least part of Central Asia, even if just to prevent other countries or Sunni Islamist forces from doing so.

None of these scenarios, though, seems as likely at present as a continuation of the present situation in which pro-Western reformist forces lead the government but anti-Western conservative clerics remain in ultimate control. Such an Iran is likely to continue cooperating with Moscow when Iran-Russia interests are similar, but not hesitate to pursue policies different from Moscow’s when they are not. While there is deep division inside Iran between those who are pro-Western and those who are anti-Western, there is not a strong constituency there for being pro-Russian.