Chapter 9 - The prospects for the future of US-Iran relations

I was assigned the task of discussing the prospects for the future of US-Iran relations. This is a very difficult assignment indeed, as pundits in the West have a rather dismal record on this issue. How many times have we heard of the imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic in the past four decades? How many times have we heard that Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is incorrigibly anti-US and irreversibly hell-bent on developing a nuclear bomb? And how many times were we warned that he will never negotiate a nuclear deal with the US? Compounding the problem is that an unforeseen event, like the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in the US or Iran could fundamentally change calculations about bilateral relations. Therefore, some degree of humility in addressing the assignment is essential.

This is why, rather than making predictions, the author will identify some of the key variables that can potentially shape the course of relations between Iran and the United States in the next five to ten years.

While the tortured and poisonous relations between the United States and Iran are unlikely to be normalised any time soon, the nuclear deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed by Iran and the 5+1 group in 2015, seems to have placed the two countries on the right trajectory to improve relations in the coming years. The road ahead, however, is likely to be bumpy, for 37 long years of animosity will not dissipate in a few years only. This is why the two countries can also return to their antagonistic policies towards one another. That said, I am very cautiously optimistic that future relations between the two are unlikely to be as antagonistic as they have been in the past and should improve as the two sides can establish institutional mechanisms to manage their future conflicts. After all, improving relations between Tehran and Washington would be essential for the successful implementation of the nuclear deal that is in both their interests. It would be difficult for the US and Iran to continue their hostile policies towards one another while remaining fully committed to implementing the JCPOA.

The variables to watch

The 2016 presidential election in the US. The Republican Party has adamantly opposed the JCPOA. During the primary season, all GOP candidates expressed their strong opposition to the deal, with most of them promising to "rip to shreds" the nuclear deal with Iran. The GOP presidential nominee, Donald J. Trump, believes the nuclear deal is the "worst deal" ever negotiated by the US and has pledged to "renegotiate" it, presumably to get "real concessions" from Iran. Occasionally, he also has implied that he will reject the deal altogether.

The presidential nominee of the Democratic Party, Hillary R. Clinton, is supportive of the nuclear deal. However, she has promised to "contain Iran", a strategy that would likely generate serious tensions between Iran and the US and could jeopardise the entire nuclear deal. Will Clinton or Trump continue President Obama's strategy of helping Iran to be reintegrated into the world order, or will they design new strategies that could undermine the nuclear deal? 

Domestic opposition in the US against Iran. Regardless of who the next president is, there will be formidable opposition against Iran in the United States. The hostage crisis of 1979, the regrettable and futile chanting of "Death to America" in Iran, Tehran's policy of supporting the Iraqi militias that have killed US troops in Iraq, and a host of other factors have created an anti-Iran constituency in the US. That constituency opposed the nuclear deal, but failed to stop it. Many of its members have now regrouped and seem determined to prevent improving bilateral relations. Their goals appear to be to keep the nuclear deal an exclusively arms-control deal and prevent a détente between Tehran and Washington. While this constituency has a better chance of success under a Republican president, it will remain influential under a Democratic president as well. Consider a recent bipartisan a report from the Center for a New American Security: 

The 2017 presidential election in Iran. Iranian hardliners have strongly opposed the JCPOA. For many of them, Iran has capitulated and made too many concessions to the West. Nor are they enthusiastic about the prospects of improving relations with the US. Can the hardliners nominate in the 2017 presidential election a popular candidate to defeat President Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated the nuclear deal? The chances of their success are not very high, given that all past Iranian presidents, with the notable exception of Mr. Abolhassan Bani Sadr, won re-elections, and there is widespread support among the electorate for the nuclear deal as well as for improving relations with the West. But even if Rouhani loses, it is unlikely the new president will undermine the nuclear deal, for the agreement with the P5+1 was based on a consensus among the most powerful factions within the governing elites, including the Supreme Leader.

A new Supreme Leader. The 77-year old Ayatollah Khamenei has been in power since 1989. He has shrewdly consolidated power and is the ultimate decision-maker. Security and military forces remain under his personal command and have shown no signs of disloyalty to him. As long as he remains in power, the chances of the re-opening of a US embassy in Tehran are slim. He has a deep and lingering mistrust of the United States, which he denounces as imperialistic and arrogant. However, he will not oppose limited and controlled relations with the US to address specific regional issues, such as the bloody civil war in Syria. 

The 2016 elections for the Assembly of Experts, which is constitutionally empowered to choose the Supreme Leader, have resulted in no major realignment of forces within that powerful body as it continues to be dominated by conservatives. Should there be a new Supreme Leader in Iran in the next decade, that individual is likely to be someone who would be acceptable to the major factions within the ruling elite. While any attempt to identify who the next Supreme Leader would be is an exercise in futility, the next Supreme Leader is likely to remain committed to the implementation of the nuclear agreement, if the US and the West remain committed to it as well. The office of the Supreme Leader is so intertwined with the institutions of the Revolutionary Guards and the intelligence agencies, both of which had approved the nuclear deal, that it would be unlikely that the new leader would fundamentally and quickly change the overall direction of Iranian foreign policy.

Regional opposition to improved US-Iran relations. Ironically, the two key allies of the US in the Middle East, namely Israel and Saudi Arabia, opposed the nuclear deal. Of the two allies, it is the Saudis that have taken a much harsher approach towards Iran. They recognise that the deal could become a transformative event in the relationship between Iran and Europe as well as between Iran and the United States. During the negotiations, the Saudis worked indefatigably to prevent a diplomatic solution to the nuclear impasse. Once the historic deal was struck, they emerged as the leader of the so-called anti‑Iran coalition, which portrays Iran as the main culprit for the lingering turmoil in the Middle East. The Saudis’ ultimate strategic goal is to prevent a détente between Iran and the US. They insist that the nuclear deal has not resulted in any discernible change in Iran's "nefarious regional activities". Having given up on President Obama, the Saudis, who also have moved closer to Israel, are hoping that the next US president would re-impose new sets of sanctions on Iran and design a new strategy to contain it. The Saudis will use their impressive financial clout to prevent the US from reaching a détente with Tehran. But if Tehran and Washington decide to improve relations, the Saudis can only complicate the process. They cannot derail it. 

Common regional goals shared by Washington and Tehran. While there is considerable opposition by some US allies to improving relations with Iran, their shared goals in the greater Middle East are likely to steer them towards some form of détente. They both want a stable Afghanistan free of Taliban rule. Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, Tehran and Washington have been supportive of successive governments in Kabul, more so than other Gulf countries. In Iraq, too, Tehran and Washington, despite their major disagreements, particularly in regards to the arming of the Shia militias by Iran, have often supported the same government in Baghdad. They both support the territorial integrity of Iraq as well. 

Iran and the US also share the common goal of defeating violent extremists, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which considers the US and Shia Iran as its most dangerous enemies. Both Tehran and Washington also consider Al-Qaeda as a national security threat and seek to defeat it. 

In Syria, Tehran and Washington are surely on different sides of the devastating civil war, which has resulted in the death of at least three hundred thousand people and has practically partitioned that country. 

There is a growing recognition in Washington that while Iran lacks the power to shape the future of the Middle East, it cannot be marginalised or excluded in any future security arrangement to stabilise Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan. The cost of excluding Iran would be very high. Tehran also recognises that the US is the world's only superpower and that it must negotiate with Washington to address the key challenges in the region. These factors explain why Washington finally invited Iran to the Syrian peace negotiations, and why Iran enthusiastically accepted the invitation. 

It is a cliché to say that countries do not have permanent friends but have permanent interests. The national interests of Iran and the US, more than their profound disagreements, are likely to push the two countries closer in the next decade.