Chapter 4 - The evolving fight against jihadism in North Africa and the Sahel

The level of terrorist activity in regional states is in part determined by structural factors. Countries in North and West Africa are vulnerable to terrorist groups because of ineffective government, the exclusion of important groups from political power, the presence of a radical Islamic tradition and the long history of regional terrorism. Daesh and Al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) strategies fully exploit local vulnerabilities. Terrorist activity interferes with national development strategies and stimulates terrorism infrastructure, such as the small arms market. For national actors and external supporters, the impacts of economic strategies are long-term, not immediate.

Over the course of 2014 and 2015, the main story in the region was the inroads made by Daesh^{Footnote 19}. According to Janes IHS data, the group was responsible for 298 attacks in the region^{Footnote 20} between September 2015 and August 2016, while Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) and Ansar al-Sharia were responsible for only four each. Similarly, Daesh was responsible for over 1,100 deaths with Ansar al-Sharia responsible for only 55 and AQIM seven. 

These figures demonstrate the significant impact Daesh has had on the states along the southern Mediterranean over the course of the last year. The vast majority of the Daesh attacks were in Egypt or Libya, with the notable exceptions of the 2015 and 2016 cross-border attacks into Tunisia. The AQIM attacks took place in Libya and Algeria. 

The inroads by Daesh have come at the expense of other groups—including AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia. Nevertheless, these groups have not gone away. AQIM, which could have collapsed completely under the strain of French intervention in Mali, continued pressure from Algerian counter-terrorism operations, and the advent of Daesh, has nevertheless continued to have a clear presence and attract adherents. This may be due to the skill, experience and networks of its leaders.

AQIM has continued to have a clear presence and attract adherents.

Daesh’s most significant inroads have been into Libya, with US intelligence officials estimating publicly that over 5,000 were present in February 2016. Many of these were presumed at the time to be located in the town of Sirte, along the central Libyan coast. Others formed in cells around the country, including Derna, Benghazi, Ajdabiyah, Tripoli and Sabratha.

Over the summer of 2016, however, Misratan militias, backed by small numbers of Western special forces and US airpower, managed to push Daesh out of Sirte. This came as a surprise to many observers who doubted that Misratan forces would have the capacity or will to conduct such an operation.

The Daesh fighters in Sirte, many of whom were formerly members of Ansar al-Sharia, are now likely more widely dispersed around the country. Many appear to have fled to Libya’s southern provinces. While the destruction of Daesh’s safe haven in Sirte is an important step forward, major counter-terrorism challenges remain for the country as well as for the region.

The spread of Daesh and similar groups is clearly a significant threat to the region. As long as these groups are active, they will continue to pose a threat to the local population while impeding progress on state-building, economic development and other key objectives. Although Europe has yet to experience a terrorist attack originating from North Africa, the possibility is not remote if regional trends continue along their current trajectory. The presence of Daesh in Libya in particular has facilitated migrant flows through the central European route, significantly exacerbating this security challenge for Europe in an already troubled time.

The nature of the problem

A basic question in social science research is whether structure or agency is more important in shaping social phenomena. For those scholars who focus on structural factors, social conditions, power relations, institutional design and other structural features of the systems are the key to understanding social outcomes, such as the trajectory of terrorist groups. For other scholars, however, structural factors are less important than agents in shaping phenomena. For these scholars, individual states, social groups, or even single human beings are what matter most.

To understand the nature of violent extremism in North Africa, we need to draw on both traditions. Clearly, structural factors play an important role in creating a context in North Africa where violent extremist groups have proliferated in recent years.

• Structural conditions for violent extremism are strong where lower levels of economic development, limited opportunities for employment and social advancement, political exclusion and conservative Islamic traditions combine.
• Such conditions exist in the Sinai, parts of Libya, such as Derna and Sirte, towns in inland Tunisia, such as in the Kasserine Governorate, as well as parts of Algeria, Morocco, Mali, and Niger.
• These conditions are exacerbated by political exclusion or in the case of Libya, Northern Mali, and arguably parts of Tunisia and the Sinai by the limited presence or quasi absence of the state.

At the same time, however, agency and conjuncture have also played a role. Violent extremist organisations have existed in this region for a quarter century.

• In the 1990s, mujahedeen returning from Afghanistan played a key role in the genesis of the extremist movement in Algeria, later going on to form the Salafist Group for Preaching and Jihad (GSPC^{Footnote 21}) and, in 2006, AQIM.
• Similarly, the eastern Libyan town of Derna, which was overrun temporarily by Daesh affiliates in 2014, was once the single largest contributor of foreign fighters to Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 2006 insurgency.

Nevertheless, the growth of violent extremist groups in North Africa has been accelerated—and the threat from those groups much intensified—due to conscious efforts by Daesh and other extremist organisations, who have sought to take advantage of the ripe context for extremism to build their ranks.

The recent experience of Libya is an excellent example of these dynamics. Political, economic and social conditions in that country were conducive to violent extremism well before the Arab uprisings. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was active from the 1990s in eastern Libya until its violent suppression by Muammar Qaddafi. However, in the wake of Libya’s 2011 collapse, extremist groups have actively targeted Libya with the intent of benefiting from those structural conditions.

• For example, in Benghazi, especially in the months following the September 2012 attacks on the US diplomatic facility there, groups from outside Libya likely took advantage of the absence of state control to make inroads. These external groups likely worked and overlapped with groups of domestic origin such as Ansar al-Sharia.
• An even more poignant case, however, is that of Daesh’s 2014-2015 expansion into Libya. When the so-called Battar Battalion pledged allegiance to Daesh in October of 2014 in Derna, Daesh’s leadership in Raqqa quickly sought to take advantage of this development by sending emissaries to provide leadership and organisational skills, and potentially also offering financial support.
• Yet another example of the role of agency in spreading violent extremist views can be found in Tunisia in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. In the initial period following the 2011 revolt, the loss of state control—positive in so many ways—also meant the proliferation of unofficial places of worship. These gatherings made easy targets for extremist preachers from outside Tunisia to spread violent extremist doctrines.

Finally, in addition to structure and agency, there is an element of path dependency that has worsened the problem of violent extremism in North Africa. In other words, the growth of extremism, to date, has had compounding effects. There are several reasons for this.

• For one, there is the demonstration effect, which is witnessed around the world, and exists in North Africa as well. In the context of radicalisation, the demonstration effect simply means that examples of terrorist acts and radical groups erode existing social norms and other social barriers to what would normally be considered transgressive behaviour. In other words, examples of radical groups help to legitimise radicalisation. They offer hope to the would-be radical while also offering concrete examples of the benefits in terms of power and status that membership in a radical group promises.
• Path dependency also plays a role in shaping the broader environment. Radical groups clearly contribute to economic hardship and overall statelessness in countries like Libya, where they are active belligerents in the ongoing civil war, thus perpetuating conditions conducive to radicalisation. They also contribute to the development of a market for the tools of violent extremism, such as small and light arms, and expertise in munitions, especially improvised explosive devices.
• Not least of all, path dependency is strengthened when a sub-region or whole country becomes a ‘hotspot’ for violent extremists, as was the case in Libya in later 2015 and early 2016, when thousands of foreign fighters from Tunisia, Nigeria, Egypt, the Gulf and beyond flocked to Sirte to join what appeared to be the next front in Daesh’s drive to establish a far-reaching caliphate. Indeed, certain parts of Libya have become a veritable ‘terrorists bazaar’.

Outlook

In dealing with such a complex and deep-rooted problem, policy tools are limited. The ability of the United States, Canada and Europe to provide solutions to the structural factors that contribute to extremism is limited in the near to medium term. For example, one of the most important structural factors contributing to violent extremist movements, as has been widely recognised, is economic exclusion. Even if it is not the only factor—and there are cases of radicalisation in which economic exclusion did not play a significant role—it seems clear that inclusive economic development in many of the vulnerable towns and regions in North Africa would do a great deal to reduce the phenomenon of radicalisation. Inclusive economic development, however, is a process measured in decades or even generations. This does not mean that it should not be an objective, much less that development efforts of Canada and its major allies are unworthy. But it does mean that such efforts are unlikely to have a big impact on radicalisation in North Africa at least in the short to medium term.

Other tools, however, can be more effective. State-building, for example, in Libya or in parts of Tunisia, is possible. The idea of nation-building is out of vogue—if it ever was in vogue. Despite the negative connotation of the term, however, it is possible to strengthen states that are administratively or institutionally weak. The transfer of technology and knowledge, combined with skillfully managed political and diplomatic incentives has and could continue to have a positive effect in Libya and Tunisia.

There is an understandable tendency to focus on programs that could have an immediate, pragmatic effect. European focus on border security in Tunisia (and previously Libya) is one such example. The UK’s focus on tourism security in Tunisia is another. These efforts are potentially valuable, although they must be realistically resourced.

Programs designed to counter violent extremism (CVE) may also offer benefits, although our knowledge about what does and does not work in this field is still very limited. More research is needed to establish credible theories of intervention. Moreover, the benefits of CVE programs when they do work are primarily preventative—aimed at controlling the growth of the problem—instead of reducing it.

Military and security measures can be controversial, but they are sometimes necessary to lay the foundation of security for effective state-building programs. The post-revolutionary experience of Libya underscores this point. Libya after Qaddafi faced comparatively rosy prospects for stabilisation, but lack of security made progress on all other state-building fronts nearly impossible. If Libya is to get off of its current path, it will likely require at least some form of outside security assistance at some point. Tunisia may not need foreign boots on the ground, but it needs the continued support of foreign security services in the form of train and equip programs to strengthen its ability for direct action against extremist groups there, for effective responses to terrorist attacks, and to ensure that its internal security practices do not exacerbate its domestic radicalisation problem, which is severe. Reforming Tunisia’s interior ministry is a major challenge.

To complicate matters in Libya, several foreign actors are now engaged on the ground. In 2015, Italy developed a plan for intervention in favour of the Government of National Accord that would have involved the deployment of a brigade-sized force to Tripoli to help ensure the security of that government. When the government itself under-performed due to the reticence of eastern commander General Khalifa Hiftar, the Italians backed down. In the meantime, operations of French, UK, and US special forces units were widely reported on the ground—on both sides of Libya’s conflict, east and west. The presence of these forces is clearly aimed at counter-terrorism operations and might be beneficial in brokering ceasefire agreements between the sides in the civil war. However, it also complicates the picture because it risks the appearance of favouritism, undermining Western authority with the UN brokered government. Meanwhile, Egypt, with the tacit backing of Gulf states, continues to support General Hiftar, complicating efforts to force him to recognise and accept the UN-backed government. Without an agreed strategy and end-state for Libya from outside powers, it will be even more difficult to resolve the conflict.

Finally, in dealing with groups like Ansar al-Sharia, Daesh, and AQIM, direct military action will continue to have a role to play. The French experience in Mali demonstrates that military forces, including foreign military forces, can, under certain conditions, be a powerful counterforce to the path dependency of violent extremism. The judicious use of airstrikes against such groups also clearly can help, as demonstrated by the dramatic advances of Misratan militias against Daesh in Sirte over the course of the summer of 2016. However, those same airstrikes were controversial within the Libyan political system, demonstrating that the benefits of such operations must always be weighed against their political costs—although these can be difficult to judge in advance.

Ultimately, Western powers will need to determine whether a strategy of containment of the problems emanating from Libya is sufficient to protect their interests. The costs of such a strategy can be underestimated, but the resources for more aggressive strategies are in high demand thanks to crises elsewhere in the world, most notably in the Levant. If a containment strategy is the most desirable, it will be crucial to define the goals of that strategy and understand its resource requirements.