The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Director’s Annual Speech

Introduction

Distinguished guests, members of the press, and fellow Canadians. Thank you for joining me today and allowing me to provide you with an update on the security challenges facing Canada.

This is my first time addressing Canadians as the Director of CSIS.  I do so at a time when Canada’s national security environment is more complex and dynamic than at any point in recent memory. Polarization and radicalisation are on the rise, and social cohesion is eroding. Global events are unpredictable and competition between states is intensifying. Our global environment emboldens competitors’ attempts to interfere and spy, and advancements in technology enable our adversaries while challenging us to adapt. All aspects of national security have risen in urgency and priority, the demands on our service are unrelenting, and there is no clear path to a simpler future.

But, while challenged, CSIS has remained strong and able. We have trusted partners in Canada and abroad and, together with them, we’ve acted decisively to keep Canadians safe. Our intelligence professionals devote themselves to protecting the rights, freedoms, and safety of all in Canada. Even when they aren’t aware of it, Canadians benefit greatly from their work. 

By sharing details today about what we see and what we’ve done, I hope to arm Canadians with a better understanding of the national security context to help them be more resilient against threats, make more informed decisions, and know how they can work together with us in keeping our country safe, secure, and prosperous.

I’ll begin with the threat of violent extremism.

Violent extremism

This year marks 40 years since the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history—the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This tragic event killed all 329 people on board, most of them Canadians. It was truly a terrible moment in Canadian history and serves as an important reminder of the consequences of violent extremism. 

The threat of violence motivated by extreme religious, ideological or political views has changed significantly over the last 40 years, but it persists as one of Canada’s most significant national security concerns.

Today’s violent extremists are motivated by an increasingly diverse, often personalized, set of extreme beliefs including xenophobia, accelerationism, nihilism, anti-Semitism, misogyny, extreme interpretations of religion, and more. Increasingly, violent extremists with these different ideologies find common causes through their shared targets. They find inspiration and motivation in the events and trends that polarize society or cause them to lose hope for the future. And, they easily access and amplify content online that radicalizes them and reinforces their view that violence is justified to achieve their extremist goals.

Worryingly, nearly one in ten terrorism investigations at CSIS now includes at least one subject of investigation under the age of 18.

In August 2025, a minor was arrested in Montreal for allegedly planning an attack on behalf of Daesh. 

In May 2025, a 15-year-old Edmonton area minor was arrested for a terrorism-related offence, as RCMP investigators feared they would commit serious violence related to COM/764, a transnational violent online network that manipulates children and youth across widely accessible online platforms.

And, only a few kilometers from this room, in late 2023 and early 2024 two 15-year-olds were arrested in Ottawa for allegedly conspiring to conduct a mass casualty attack targeting the Jewish community in Canada’s capital.

Clearly, radicalized youth can cause the same harms as radicalized adults, but the societal supports for youth may help us catch radicalization early and prevent it. This is why CSIS joined the RCMP and our intelligence partners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in releasing a joint public report, in December 2024, highlighting the evolving issue of young people and violent extremism. It provides advice to parents, guardians, and others with information to help them identify early concerns and address youth radicalization before it’s too late. 

Fortunately, only small number of youth or adults with extreme views resort to violence. But when they do the consequences are devastating. Since 2014, there have been 20 violent extremist attacks in Canada resulting in 29 deaths, and at least 60 victims injured.

But these tragic numbers would have been higher if not for disruptive actions taken by CSIS and our law enforcement partners. 

Since 2022, CSIS has been involved in the disruption of no fewer than 24 violent extremist actions, each resulting in arrests or terrorism peace bond charges.

For example, in 2024, CSIS played an integral role in the disruption of two Daesh inspired plots. In one case, a father and son were allegedly in the advanced stages of planning an attack in the Toronto area. In another, an individual was arrested before allegedly attempting to illegally enter the United States to attack members of the Jewish community in New York.

In these examples, and in many others, I can’t discuss publicly, our counter-terrorism teams have partnered with law enforcement and saved lives. They work hard, day and night and I’m deeply proud of their dedication. I hope that Canadians feel safer because of their ongoing efforts and their regular success.

That said, eroding social cohesion, increasing polarization, and significant global events provide fertile ground for radicalization and many who turn to violence radicalize exclusively online—often without direction from others. They use technology to do so secretly and anonymously, seriously challenging the ability of our investigators to keep pace and to identify and prevent acts of violence. 

For this reason and others, countering violent extremism will remain a significant portion of our work, though it now accounts for less than half of it.

Foreign Interference

Last year, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference and the work of Justice Hogue helped Canadians better understand the actions of foreign states that have tried to secretly interfere in our democratic processes and institutions. 

This past spring, Canada held its forty-fifth general election, during which CSIS focused our efforts to identify foreign interference and take action to counter it. As the Chair of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, CSIS coordinated our country’s security and intelligence response and supported an independent panel of senior public servants in monitoring threats to the election. We applied the lessons we learned from past experience, Justice Hogue’s report, review bodies, and others to do this work better—and more transparently—than ever. 

We shared the results of our efforts through weekly briefings to media by senior officials during the election period and in October. Canadians can now read the details in our after-action reports online. In essence, while we did see some foreign interference activity of concern, Canadians can be assured that we saw nothing that had an impact on our ability to have a free and fair election. 

CSIS will stay vigilant in our work to identify attempts of foreign interference in our democratic processes and institutions. We’ll take action when necessary and continue to provide information to Canadians to keep them resilient and informed.

But, of course, foreign interference affects more than just our democratic processes and institutions.

Canada is a country that thrives in its diversity and guarantees the individual rights and freedoms of all within its borders. When foreign states don’t share our respect for these rights and feel threatened or embarrassed by the lawful activity of individuals in Canada, they sometimes resort to direct intimidation, influence, or reprisal. We refer to this as transnational repression.

Transnational repression disproportionately targets human rights and political activists, journalists, and others in cultural, ethnic, and religious groups. We’ve observed this in Canada in the form of surveillance; in the spreading of false and discrediting information; extortion; the threatening of loved ones abroad; and, at its most extreme, threats to safety and life. 

These actions have deeply harmful consequences for those targeted. They also intimidate others, deterring them from exercising their right to free speech and lawful advocacy, or from fully participating in their community or democracy.

As a Canadian institution that proudly defends the rights of all in Canada, CSIS collects intelligence and acts to defend against transnational repression. In the past, we’ve publicly discussed transnational repression by the People’s Republic of China, India, and others. In particularly alarming cases over the last year, we’ve had to reprioritize our operations to counter the actions of Iranian intelligence services and their proxies who have targeted individuals they perceive as threats to their regime. In more than one case, this involved detecting, investigating, and disrupting potentially lethal threats against individuals in Canada. 

While CSIS can take action to counter transnational repression, we don’t often do it alone. Our work with law enforcement often serves as our best defence. Also, alongside Public Safety Canada’s Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator, we partner with ethnic, religious and cultural communities. Dialogue with them serves equally to share our information about transnational repression and to help us better understand their experiences. 

Unfortunately, transnational repression and other forms of foreign interference are not the only threat posed by other states.

Espionage

Today’s geopolitical environment is more dynamic and unpredictable than at any other time in recent memory. International relationships are shifting, and states are competing more intensely for economic opportunity and global influence. Our adversaries monitor and seek to exploit any weakness or division that may arise. It’s an environment where the value of intelligence is at its highest, and our adversaries will be more assertive than ever in trying to obtain it.

Intelligence services have long focused their espionage efforts on those with access to sensitive or classified information. Government and military secrets, including insights into technology and economic strategies, have been the primary goals. Today, while the goals are similar, the targets are more varied—some of the world’s most advanced and emergent technology is now held by private sector and academic institutions. National governments are still targeted for sensitive intelligence, military, and economic secrets but so too are corporations and other levels of government whose data, technological innovations, influence and access to resources can shift the balance of advantage.

Canada is an advanced economy. We have an abundance of natural resources. We hold privileged and influential positions in multilateral fora like NATO, the G7, and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Our success makes us prosperous. It also makes us a target and CSIS regularly identifies efforts by foreign intelligence services to collect intelligence across all sectors of our society. 

Classified and sensitive Canadian government information continues to be the target of foreign intelligence services, including the PRC’s civilian and military intelligence services. Chinese spies have tried to recruit Canadians with access to government plans, intentions, information, and military expertise, through social media and online job platforms. We, along with our partners, have found ways to identify and counter these efforts over the last year.

We also routinely work with Global Affairs Canada, the Communications Security Establishment, and other partners to counter espionage threats from Russia. This includes, for example, identifying Russian intelligence officers through intelligence and denying their travel to Canada. It also includes working with allied and domestic partners to degrade the strength of Russian Intelligence Services globally, for example by countering their efforts of sabotage through commercial courier companies and the transportation industry.  

And our counter-intelligence efforts benefit more than just the security of Canada.

As was recently highlighted in the media, illicit Russian procurement networks seek to illegally acquire Canadian goods and technologies, which they move to Russia through a complex series of front companies based around the world. Once in Russia, these Canadian products are then used to support Russian military efforts in Ukraine and elsewhere. 

This year, CSIS took action to prevent this by informing several Canadian companies that Europe-based front companies seeking to acquire their goods were in fact connected to Russian agents. These companies not only took immediate measures to deny the Russians their success but also expressed gratitude and interest in working together to counter any future Russian activity.

Canada is a proud Arctic nation, and the global Arctic has become a theatre of increased interest due to its economic and strategic potential. Non-Arctic states, including the People’s Republic of China, seek to gain a strategic and economic foothold in the region. Russia, an Arctic state with a significant military presence in the region, remains unpredictable and aggressive. Both of those countries, and others, have a significant intelligence interest in our Arctic and those who influence or develop its economic or strategic potential. It's no surprise then that CSIS has observed both cyber and non-cyber intelligence collection efforts targeting both governments and the private sector in the region. 

So, what are we doing? We collect intelligence to identify any state activity counter to Canada’s national interest in the region. We engage significantly with Indigenous, Arctic and Northern partners across Canada to develop awareness of what we’ve observed and to learn from their insights. In essence, we’re positioning ourselves to partner and defend Canada’s interests whenever it becomes necessary. For example, we’ve provided Inuit and territorial governments with information that empowers them to take into account national security interests as they make decisions about economic and research opportunities with foreign companies and investors. 

Amendments to the CSIS Act last year facilitated these engagements and we expect to build on them in the coming years. Beyond the North, we’ve also developed stronger relationships with the private sector, academia, and other governments across Canada to raise awareness and help protect them against espionage. For instance, we’ve worked with the Business Council of Canada, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, and others and intend to build on these partnerships to help ensure Canada’s economic security.

Conclusion

While I’ve outlined today threats of violent extremism, foreign interference, and espionage, I could say much more. 

Foreign governments will continue to manipulate and propagate information in their interests. The threat of hostile hybrid and cyber operations against us continues to rise, and the nexus between criminal groups and state actors challenges traditional definitions and complicates our efforts to respond. It will be important for CSIS and its national security partners to work closely together to understand the intentions and activity of foreign states when they act against our interest, and to ensure our response uses the full range of government options.

Advances in technology, including artificial intelligence, have increased the sophistication of foreign states and other actors.

At the same time, Canadian’s data increasingly resides the hands of foreign governments and the corporations in their jurisdictions. This arms states who may choose to act against Canada’s interests with new ways to weaponize data and information. In response, CSIS will be challenged to adopt technology and use data in new and more significant ways to keep Canadians safe and to secure an advantage for Canada.

I understand that what I’ve covered today is concerning, but my intent is not to alarm. I want to reassure Canadians that CSIS, and the rest of Canada’s security and intelligence community, is here and working tirelessly in their best interests. As the threats shift and evolve, CSIS will continue to prioritize deliberately and ruthlessly, and become comfortable with an extraordinary pace of change.

As the Government seeks to navigate challenges and gain advantages inherent to more complex international relationships, CSIS will also play a significant and essential supporting role. Our intelligence will help serve Canada’s national interests and ensure its sovereignty.

Our many, trusted intelligence relationships with partner services across the globe will allow us to cooperate to defend our shared interests. Our ability to act against and to engage with competitors and adversaries will give the Government options to address security challenges when necessary. 

As you’ve heard today, our environment provides real and significant challenges for CSIS. But, in my first year as Director, I have been continually reminded of one of our greatest advantages: the people of CSIS are passionate and capable. They are deeply proud to serve Canada and have dedicated themselves to defending the rights, freedoms, and way of life that define what it is to be Canadian. 

As their Director, I’m proud of their tireless devotion in service of all Canadians, even when their most significant work is often not known or recognized outside our walls.

I hope that Canadians will join me in taking pride in their work and take comfort in CSIS’ able and steadfast efforts to keep them safe and prosperous.

Thank you.

Dan Rogers