Standing Committee on Public Accounts: Auditor General Report on the Cyber Security of Government Networks and Systems

Opening statement

Scott Jones
President
Shared Services Canada

Ottawa, Ontario
January 26, 2026


Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to discuss the Auditor General’s Report on the Cyber Security of Government Networks and Systems.

Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge that we are on the traditional, unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabe People.

I’m here today with Patrice Nadeau, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister for SSC’s Connectivity and Security Services Branch.

Introduction

Shared Services Canada (SSC) welcomes the Auditor General’s findings and is working to address the issues raised.

It’s important to underline that the Auditor General found that government had tools in place to protect and defend its networks and that the government’s cyber security plan was sound and comprehensive.

As the provider of IT services to departments and agencies, SSC plays a pivotal role in this work.

Indeed, SSC blocks about 6.5 trillion cyber threats annually, which is an average of 18 billion per day. This ensures the uninterrupted operation of government services.

We do that through a state-of-the-art enterprise infrastructure and modern commercial cyber security solutions that defend government systems against a wide range of cyber threats.

SSC uses multiple layers of defence, including firewalls, network defences, anti-denial of service measures, anti-virus and anti-malware tools, encryption, virtual private networking (VPN) and robust identification and authentication services.

We have an excellent partnership with the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE).

This collaboration is absolutely vital, as the Auditor General underscored, and we continue to improve it. We regularly conduct postmortems on cyber events to identify ways we can do better.

Together, SSC and CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security provide sophisticated cyber defenses that go beyond commercial capabilities. Our work offers one of the most sophisticated cyber defenses in the world.

Cyber security is a space that is evolving fast, and we work continuously to keep on top of it.

That said, there is more to do, as the Auditor General rightly underscored.

We share the Auditor General’s concerns about organizations that are outside SSC’s enterprise Internet service. As the threat environment changes rapidly, that is a model that clearly needs to evolve.

This is why SSC is now working to provide connectivity and security services to 43 small departments and agencies, and is on track to complete this work by the end of March 2027.

The Auditor General also highlighted a project called Endpoint Visibility, Awareness and Security, or EVAS for short. This is one of the tools SSC is adding to its cyber security environment.

EVAS will automatically identify network-connected endpoints—such as desktops and servers—and verify they meet security requirements. Unlike our semi-manual system, EVAS is automated and enables real-time vulnerability and impact assessments.

EVAS will also provide automated response to cyber events.

While there were delays to this project, our organization has learned a number of lessons. The project has turned the corner, and since implementation began in July 2025, over 36,000 deployments have been completed.

The Auditor General also highlighted our project to develop a Security Information and Event Management system, or SIEM for short. I want to assure you that we are on track to award a competitive contract for this project in early 2026.

Further, SSC is currently operating an interim SIEM capability, which allows SSC to manage priority needs and supports an effective response to cyber threats.

Conclusion

Mr. Chair, since SSC’s creation, we have shifted the government’s business model from one that is siloed and decentralized, to a government-wide, enterprise approach.

This not only reduces costs, but strengthens overall security GC-wide. It’s easier to monitor, patch and fix one system than 45 separate ones.

We’re not done. SSC is streamlining the management of devices and software by centralizing procurement and operations. This achieves considerable efficiencies and reduces the potential for inconsistencies in security policies.

We’re also continuing to reduce duplication by replacing additional siloed back-office tools with standard, government-wide tools.

Legacy systems are also more vulnerable to cyber threats. Moving off legacy systems improves our security posture.

In short, everything we do to consolidate and modernize IT systems is essential to improving cyber security.

Mr. Chair, reports from the Auditor General are also an important tool to hold us accountable and allow us to improve our operations.

Cyber security is an evolving field with actors that don’t follow our rules. Continuous improvements are key to protecting the GC’s IT systems.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak on this important file, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada’s (OAG) Cyber security of government networks and systems report

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on the Global Affairs Canada (GAC) cyber attack “7-day” delay

If pressed on cyber attack on GAC

If pressed on security information and event management (SIEM)

If pressed on the endpoint visibility, awareness and security (EVAS) project

If pressed on vulnerability and patch management

If pressed on small departments and agencies (SDA)

Background

Cyber security

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on supply chain integrity

If pressed on quantum computing

If pressed on small departments and agencies

If pressed on provincial and territorial cooperation

Background

Security information and event management (SIEM)

Issue

Key messages

If pressed on timing

If pressed on lessons learned

Endpoint Visibility, Awareness and Security (EVAS) project

Issue

The Auditor General’s report on Cyber Security of Government Networks and Systems found shortcomings in how inventories of federal IT assets, such as servers, laptops and printers, were assessed. The report states that Shared Services Canada (SSC) should enhance its understanding of the networks and systems it manages, including supporting software, to better identify which assets require patches, updates or maintenance, and which are no longer supported by a vendor. This improvement is essential to effectively manage cyber risks and address vulnerabilities.

Key messages

EVAS is an additional tool at SSC’s disposal to ensure cyber security, and it

If pressed on incomplete inventory of servers and laptops

If pressed on complicating factors

If pressed on unauthorized device access

If pressed on vulnerability and patch management

If pressed on delays

If pressed on lessons learned

Small departments and agencies

Issue

On October 21, 2025, the Auditor General’s report on Cyber Security of Government Networks and Systems highlighted that certain federal organizations were not using Shared Services Canada’s (SSC) cyber security services.

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on who SSC must and may serve

If pressed on partners with isolated email systems

If pressed on timeline

If pressed on National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)

Global Affairs Canada cyber attack “7 day” delay

Issue

The Auditor General’s report on network cyber security criticized Shared Services Canada’s (SSC) management of a January 2024 cyber attack on Global Affairs Canada (GAC), writing that it took “7 days” to provide information, delaying the response.

Key messages

On January 10, 2024, SSC was made aware of suspicious traffic on Global Affairs Canada’s VPN service. SSC immediately engaged with GAC and the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) to determine the appropriate security mitigation measures.

On January 19, 2024, CCCS officially requested specific VPN-related security information from SSC. The request was approved within an hour, and SSC, GAC and CCCS agreed to make the transfer on January 22, 2024.

While this kind of transfer had not been required over the 13 years since SSC was founded, the department has now incorporated the production of security information as part of its standard operating procedures to ensure similar requests will move faster.

After being made aware of the suspicious traffic on the GAC VPN service, SSC was fully engaged in managing the incident and operating under established security controls considered best practices in the IT industry.

For security reasons, SSC does not publicly disclose details about specific measures, equipment or software.

Mobile Threat Defense

Issue

Shared Services Canada (SSC) is advancing an enterprise service for Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) systems for over 219,000 smartphones across the Government of Canada (GC).

Key messages

SSC is working to bolster the security and functionality of the government’s mobile devices through the Mobile Theat Defense project.

Mobile devices have become a prime target for malicious cyber threats, such as malware, spyware and phishing—putting sensitive information at risk.

The enterprise MTD service will strengthen mobile device security through notification of potential vulnerabilities and exposures to threats. It will take automated and immediate actions, such as blocking unverified Wi-Fi, remotely locking or wiping devices, and implementing patch management. This will all be integrated into the existing management tool for GC mobile devices.

MTD will improve productivity. Instead of using travel devices with limited functionality, MTD will allow employees to travel to more destinations using their usual device with access to corporate email, contacts, resources and collaboration applications.

The MTD service will be deployed to 31,000 Department of National Defence devices by March 2027. Deployment to all other departments will follow at a later date.

If pressed on procurement

Following a request for proposal last fall, SSC will award a competitive contract this winter for an MTD solution.

The costs of the project are being determined.

If pressed on existing use

Currently, Global Affairs Canada uses its own MTD solution for 10,000 domestic and international smartphones due to the risks faced by its employees.

A few departments, including Employment and Social Development Canada, Finance Canada, Justice Canada, the Privy Council Office and Transport Canada, have MTD solutions deployed to a limited number of smartphones.

Background

Today, SSC offers an International Travel Service (ITS) to employees travelling to high-risk locations aboard. A separate device is provisioned for this purpose, with a separate blank email account, no contacts and no access to collaboration applications. The decision on whether a domestic device can be used abroad is made by each department’s security officer. Even with MTD, some high-risk destinations will still require travel devices.

Through Mobile Services, SSC manages over 219,000 smartphones across more than 50 organizations, ensuring secure, always-available access to communication and collaboration tools. This centrally managed service provides cost efficiency, increased security through common controls, and a seamless and standardized experience for employees.

OAG Audit of Cyber Security of Government Networks and Systems – SSC Management Action Plan

Recommendation Management Action Plan Position Responsible Completion Date
Shared Services in collaboration with Communications Security Establishment Canada should develop a clear action plan with defined criteria and timelines to develop a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) application that addresses the existing gaps in cyber security monitoring.
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Assistant Deputy Minister, Project Management and Delivery Branch (PMDB) █████████████████
  1. ███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████
Assistant Deputy Minister, PMDB ██████████████
  1. MVP design – Start of the engineering process to design the solution.
Assistant Deputy Minister, PMDB December 31, 2026
  1. MVP build – Solution getting built according to the design and controls.
Assistant Deputy Minister, PMDB December 31, 2026
  1. MVP ATO – Solution to get the Authority to Operate following the acceptance of risk from the established controls in the build
Assistant Deputy Minister, PMDB March 31, 2027
Shared Services Canada should:
  • Ensure the department has an up-to-date central inventory of its IT assets and a process to manage devices that need to be patched, updated, maintained, or replaced. The department should install the needed patches, perform the needed updates, and maintain and replace IT assets accordingly
  • Determine a solution to resolve the procurement challenges facing the Endpoint Visibility, Awareness and Security Project
  1. Shared Services Canada (SSC) will leverage its Materiel Management Transformation Initiative and the Materiel Management 3-Year Strategic Plan (2025–2028) to strengthen IT asset lifecycle controls and resolve asset management life cycle challenges. This initiative is governed through CFOPB oversight and aligns with SSC’s enterprise asset management objectives. The initiative will deliver the following outcomes:
    • Operationalizing the quarterly In-Stock Asset Reporting aligned with the Financial Situation Report (FSR) process.
    • Visibility of Assets in stock to all service lines as part of the planning process, prior to procurement activities.
    • Integration of Materiel Management into Procurement-to-Pay (P2P) ensuring asset shipping/storage locations controls.
    • Introduce asset compliance checks ensuring governance and accountability to monitor progress and performance through Reporting and Performance Monitoring.
    • Simplify the asset divestment process through automation and improved data integration.
    • Departmental realignment of MM functions to support the Enterprise Asset Management model as a centralized service provider.
Assistant Deputy Minster, Chief Financial Officer and Procurement Branch (CFOPB) March 31, 2028
  1. Define Configuration Management Database (CMDB) Roles and Responsibilities
    • Identifies all Data Providers contributing to the CMDB, including IT Operations and Security
    • Deliverable: CMDB Roles and Responsibilities RACI matrix
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations and Client Services Branch (OCSB) March 31, 2026
  1. Validate ODS Data Against SIGMA Asset Repository OCSB will establish a process to:
    • Compare operational data in the ODS with asset records in SIGMA
    • Identify discrepancies and report them to the appropriate Data Source Owners.
    • Deliverable: Documented discrepancy reporting template
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, OCSB March 31, 2026
  1. The Endpoint Visibility, Awareness and Security (EVAS) Project has 2 streams to be contracted.
    • Stream 1 EVA: A contract was awarded with CCI for a product named Tanium that constitute the EVA services.
    • Stream 2 SEI: The EVAS project established a supply arrangement for the Secure Endpoint Initiative stream, screening by technical requirements.  An RFP amongst qualified bidders is expected to result in a contract before end of FY 25/26.
      1. ███████████████████████████████████
      2. ██████████████
Assistant Deputy Minister, PMDB March 31, 2026
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Communications Security Establishment Canada and Shared Services Canada should re-evaluate its cyber security incident management practices and protocols to enable better coordination and timely access to required critical information when responding to cyber security incidents affecting federal organizations.
  1. Cyber incident management practices and protocols are being reviewed on a continuous basis, especially following events. SSC will review and update its Cyber Security Event Management Processes.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Connectivity and Security Services Branch (CSSB) April 30, 2025
(Complete)
  1. SSC will collaborate with TBS and CCCS in the execution of a cyber event simulation exercise with a view to test the current GC-CSEMP processes, as well as new processes
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, CSSB May 31, 2025
(Complete)
  1. SSC will support CCCS lead role in the establishment of the GC-wide cyber security event collaboration platform. CCCS has indicated that they agree with the recommendation █████████████████████
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, CSSB CCCS lead – dates to be determined

Government transformation

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on cost savings

Background

Artificial intelligence

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on SSC’s AI initiatives

If pressed on jobs

If pressed on memoranda of understanding for AI

Background

Digital sovereignty

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on protections

If pressed on how SSC strengthens digital sovereignty

Background

Shared Services Canada procurement

Issue

This note explains Shared Services Canada’s (SSC) general procurement practices and achievements.

Key messages

If pressed on the interim Policy on Reciprocal Procurement

If pressed on sole-sourcing

If pressed on no substitution

If pressed on outsourcing

If pressed on the Procurement Ombud’s “Bait and Switch” report

If pressed on supply arrangements

Background

Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG)’s Contact centres report

Issue

Key facts

Key messages

If pressed on new contract

If pressed on value

If pressed on cost conflation

Background

Page details

2026-05-11